1990 ALLMR ONLINE 1186
Bombay High Court

M. M. QAZI, J.

GOPAL MAHADEORAO ASARKAR vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Cri. Appln. No. 250 of 1988

30th October, 1990.

Petitioner Counsel: V. S. Sirpurkar
Respondent Counsel: A. M. Tayade

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the similar situation in the case reported in AIR 1978 SC 514 Sanjay Gandhi vs Union of India and others.The Supreme Court has observed as under -Application dismissed.

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- It is unfortunate that in the instant case though the incident had taken place on 8-7-1977 and the complaint was also filed immediately thereafter before the trial Court, the matter has not yet been committed to the Court of Session. The present proceeding has arisen out of a private complaint filed by the complainant. The trial Court after recording the statement of the complainant and after examining the witnesses, issued process under sections 395, 506, 454, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code against accused Nos. 1 to 14 and 16. The other accused, viz. accused Nos. 15, 17, 18 and 19 were discharged since the learned Magistrate did not find sufficient grounds to proceed against them. This order was challenged by the accused by way of revision before the Sessions Judge, Akola, in Criminal Revision No. 25 of 1987. The learned Sessions Judge, dismissed the revision and hence the present application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

2. Mr. Sirpurkar attacked the order of the trial Court on the following grounds :

i) That, all the witnesses were not examined by the complainantefore the trial Court and consequently there was a breach of sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ii) That, the trial Court did not give reasons for issuance of process against the accused persons.

In my view, both the challenges are devoid of substance. It appears from the memo of the application that the trial Court examined 9 witnesses including the complainant even though the complainant gave a long list of about 20 witnesses. Mr. Sirpurkar relying on the decision reported in 1980 Cri.L.J. 1388, Shyamkant Wamanrao Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, submitted that it is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to examine all the witnesses under sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has heavily relied on the observations made in para 4 of the above decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which read as under :-

"4. In the aforesaid decision i.e. Laxmanlal vs. Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khamgaon, Satara the Division Bench of this Court has taken a view that the proviso to section 202(2) makes it obligatory on the Magistrate in the case of offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session that he must call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. Section 202(2) proviso is introduced for the first time in the new Code of Criminal Procedure and it applies to a case which is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, and when the prosecution is instituted on the basis of private complaint. In case of private case, obviously there being no earlier investigation by the police, the statement of witnesses under section 161 and/or 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not available. Therefore it appears that in its wisdom Legislature has made this wholesome provision. That said provision is mandatory is further clear from the provision of section 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, having regard to these various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court took the view in Laxmanlal vs. Judicial Magistrate First Class that it was obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath and if this is not done, then obviously the order passed issuing the process is patently in violation of the mandatory requirements of the proviso to section 202(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this view of the matter, we have no other alternative but to quash the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class dated 8th January, 1979, issuing the process itself."

3. In the above decision this Court was dealing with the case where the complainant examined himself and two other witnesses before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate issued process to the accused. Ultimately the case was committed to the Court of Session, and before the Court of Session the complainant wanted to examine witnesses besides those whom he had examined before the trial Court. In that context the accused persons filed an application before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik that the prosecution could not be permitted to examine witnesses who were not examined before the Committal Court. That application was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, and in that context this Court observed that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not right in rejecting the application of the accused persons. This case, in my view, is quite distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, no eventuality has arise showing that the complainant wants to examine witnesses other than those who have been examined before the trial Court. It is possible that the complainant may have examined only 9 witnesses and may have given up the rest, which he was entitled to do. In the present case, fairly large number of witnesses have been examined before the trial Court along with the complainant and thereafter Court felt satisfied and issued process to the accused persons. In view of this, it is not possible to hold that the learned Magistrate has not examined all the witnesses as required by sub-section (2) of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first challenge therefore fails.

4. In regard to the second challenge, it is not necessary for the learned Magistrate to give reasons while issuing the process to the accused persons. In my view, it appears to be his subjective satisfaction to which he arrived at on the basis of the evidence and other material placed before him by the complainant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the similar situation in the case reported in AIR 1978 SC 514, Sanjay Gandhi vs. Union of India and others. The Supreme Court has observed as under :-

"Secondly, it is not open to the committal Court to launch on a process of satisfying itself that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits. The jurisdiction once vested in him under the earlier Code but has been eliminated now under the present Code. Therefore, to hold that he can go into the merits even for a prima facie satisfaction is to frustrate the Parliament's purpose in re-moulding section 207-A (old Code) into the present non-discretionary shape."

Again in AIR 1980 SC 1780, Kewal Krishnan vs. Suraj Bhan and another, the Supreme Court has observed as under -

"At the-stage of sections 203 and 204, Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under sections 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge levelled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is "sufficient ground for processing" against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial Court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges."

In the instant case, it is clear from the order passed by the trial Court that it has fully applied its mind to the facts of the case; it has weighed the evidence and, therefore, rightly issued the process against some and discharged others against whom it did not find evidence as sufficient. These were the only two points urged by Mr. Sirpurkar. Mr. Sirpurkar lastly argued that after the case is committed to the Court of Session, he should be allowed to move the Sessions Judge for trial. It is not necessary for me to give any direction to this effect since he is always entitled to move the Court for such relief as may be legally tenable in law. The application is devoid of substance and hence rejected.

Application dismissed.