Writ Petition No. 385 of 1989

1st October, 1996

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. GIRISH S. GODBOLE
Respondent Counsel: Mr. VINIT NAIK, Mr. A.M.BAGLA

Cases Cited:
AIR 1994 SC 853 [Para 10]
(1995) 1 SCC 421 [Para 10]
1996(7) SC 135 [Para 10]
1994(5) SLR 73 [Para 10]
AIR 1951 All. 746 (FB) [Para 10]
AIR 1960 J & K 19 [Para 10]
(JT 1996 (7) S.C. 113 [Para 11]

JUDGMENT

S.S. NIJJAR, J.- In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forthwith hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the land admeasuring 19626.12 sq. mts. out of F.P. No.18 in T.P.Scheme No.3, S.No.217 C.T.S.No.7711-I of Solapur. In the alternative he has made a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to immediately proceed to take the proceedings for acquisition of the aforesaid property under Section 78 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 and to determine the compensation as on the date of notification for acquisition that may be issued by respondents. He has also made a prayer for temporary injunction restraining the respondents from raising any construction or buildings in the said property.

2. The said writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 2nd February, 1989 where a Division Bench of this Court was pleased to issue Notice before admission returnable within two weeks. Interim relief was granted to the petitioner in terms of prayer clause (d) which in effect meant that respondents were restrained from raising any construction. Thereafter the case was adjourned to 16th March, 1989 when an affidavit in reply by one of the respondents was filed. The affidavit in reply of respondent No.2 was filed on 24th April, 1989.

3. When the matter came up for hearing on 27th April, 1989 upon reading the affidavits filed before the Division Bench, the interim order earlier granted was vacated. However, Rule was issued in the writ petition and the hearing was ordered to be expedited.

4. The facts as narrated in the petition which led to the filing of the writ petition may be noticed in extenso.

5. The petitioner claims that he is the owner of the land bearing Survey No.217, City Survey No.7741-I and bearing final plot No.18 in the Town Planning Scheme No.3 of the Solapur Municipal Corporation, Solapur. The petitioner states that under the said scheme, under Reservation No.198, an area of 19626.12 sq. mts. out of the petitioner's land was reserved for a slaughter house. The Chief Officer of the Municipal Council of Solapur by his letter dated 21st February, 1961 informed the petitioner that the Corporation has to construct a slaughter house in the land mentioned in the scheme. Therefore, petitioner was requested to intimate whether he is ready to sell the same and if so what price would be agreeable to him ? Petitioner claimed that he informed the Chief Officer that he was agreeable to sell the property at the rate of Rs.2/- per sq.mt. However, thereafter the Municipal Corporation did not take any action. Again in the year 1982 the Municipal Corporation contracted the petitioner reiterating the earlier request and asking when can he deliver advance possession of the said property so that the construction of the slaughter house could proceed immediately. The petitioner requested that he should be paid compensation as per the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act. The Corporation agreed to give compensation to the petitioner under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner was prepared to give possession of the suit property provided he was paid interest on the amount of compensation at the rate of 4 per cent per year. The Standing Committee of the Corporation is said to have passed a Resolution No.77 on 18th May, 1982 agreeing to pay interest to the petitioner. The Petitioner delivered the possession of the said land on 22nd Sept. 1983. The petitioner states that thereafter the Respondents took no action and they did not proceed to determine the amount of compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner only agreed to give advance possession of the said property on the assurance that he will be given interest at the rate of 4 per cent till the date of the payment of the said compensation. After 22nd September, 1983 nothing is said to have been done by the Corporation. The petitioner, therefore, issued a notice through his Advocate on 16th October, 1987 setting out his various claims. The Corporation ignored the notice of the advocate also. Thus the petitioner states that he has been constrained to file the present petition.

6. The petitioner has further stated that under Sub-section (3) of Section 78 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act it was incumbent on the Corporation to immediately pay the compensation to the petitioner. He further states that as per the provisions of the law the property acquired by the Corporation can only vest in the Corporation only after payment of the compensation to the owner thereof. He states that so far the amount of compensation for the said property have not been paid by the Corporation. Thus he states that the said property has not vested in the Corporation even till the filing of the petition. In the alternative he states that under Section 78 of the Act, the Corporation is duty bound to make an application to the State Government requesting it to take proceedings for acquiring the said property under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. He states that by not preferring an application under Section 78 of the Act, the Corporation has committed a breach of promise made to the petitioner as well as violating the provisions of the said Act. The Petitioner states that the aforesaid acts of the Corporation are arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious and hence a writ of mandamus deserves to be issued, ordering and directing the respondents to initiate the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the said property forthwith and to pay compensation for the said property to the petitioner. The petitioner reiterates that in the circumstances narrated above it is manifest that the petitioner till today is the owner of the said property and the same has not vested in the Corporation. The petitioner further states that although he is the owner of the said property and the Corporation had sought the possession ostensibly for the purpose of construction of a slaughter house, the Corporation is going on with construction of residential houses for its Class IV employees. He states that if the houses are constructed the petitioner will suffer heavy losses and irreparable injury. Thus the petitioner is entitled to an injunction restraining the Corporation from raising any construction in the said property during the pendency of the petition.

7. Taking these averments to be correct, the Division Bench was pleased to grant interim relief to the petitioner on the very first date of hearing. However, subsequently affidavits in reply had been filed by one Sudhir Mahadeo Kumthekar, Deputy Engineer of the Corporation and Jadhavrao Nanasaheb Babasaheb, Deputy Collector and Competent Authority, Solapur Urban Agglomeration, Solapur on behalf of Respondent No.2. In both these affidavits a preliminary objection is taken. It is stated that the petitioner has suppressed material facts from this Court and the same are fatal to the case of the petitioner. Respondent No.2 says that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed several material facts and important developments in the matter relating to this petition. It is then narrated that with regard to the same land the petitioner had filed a return under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 on 14th August, 1976. This return was filed with regard to the land which is the subject matter of the writ petition. Necessary proceedings under the Act were taken and after an enquiry the competent authority passed an order on 17th Jan. 1981 under Section 8(4) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and declared the land admeasuring 82,115.10 sq.mts. in Final Plot No.18 mentioned hereinabove as excess. Thereafter final statement was served upon the petitioner and a declaration under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was published and/or notified in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 2nd April, 1981. It is, therefore, stated that after the said declaration the land in fact vested in the State of Maharashtra as per the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Thus it becomes apparent that after 2-4-1981 the petitioner was no longer the owner of the said land, The Petitioner filed an appeal bearing Appeal No.3 of 1981 to the Appellate Authority against the said order of the Competent Authority. The appeal was decided on 26th July, 1982 which came to be dismissed. It is, therefore, stated that on 26th July, 1982 the matter about the vesting of the land stood concluded and the petitioner was no longer the owner of the said plot. However, to bring all the facts on record it has been further stated that one Shri N.N.Bhalekar who was in possession of the part of the said land in plot No.18 also filed an appeal bearing Urban Land Ceiling Appeal No.18 of 1984. After the petitioner had handed over the possession on 22nd September, 1983 the aforesaid appeal was allowed by the Appellate Authority on 11th September, 1987. The matter was remanded back for re-determination to the competent authority. However, after re-determination the competent authority again rejected the case of the said Shri Bhalekar for excluding the area of 298.70 sq. mts. from final Plot No.18. Thus the land vested in the State of Maharashtra from 2nd April, 1981 when the necessary declaration under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was published. It is further stated that the Corporation took possession of land on 22nd September, 1983. The said plot was initially reserved for slaughter house in the Development Plan of Solapur but later on due to the representation of the residents of the surrounding area the said reservation was modified and converted to the reservation for building houses for class IV Municipal employees. Thus, it is stated that on the date when the said possession was taken (22nd Sept. 1983) the land was already declared as surplus by the Respondent No.2 (2nd April, 1981). Thus, it is stated that the land declared surplus had vested in the State Government on 2-4-1981. It was, therefore, Respondent No.2 who was competent to give the possession to Solapur Municipal Corporation, Respondent No.1. The Petitioner by this time was a stranger to the land. It is further stated that Solapur Municipal Corporation had also paid an amount of Rs. 20,908.80 ps. to the petitioner which was part of the compensation. The compensation had to be decided under Section 11 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is, therefore, stated that the compensation which was payable to the petitioner for the land admeasuring about 24290 sq. mt. was Rs.48,579.92 at the rate of Rs.2/- per sq. mtr. The amount of Rs.20,908.80 ps. has already been paid by Respondent No.1 to the Petitioner. This he has received under protest on 20-12-84. It is stated that the petitioner has suppressed these facts from the Court. He has not at all disclosed that he has received part of the compensation from Respondent No.1 on 20-12-1984. it is further the case of the respondent No.1 that at the time when the possession of the land was taken by Respondent No.1 they were not made aware about the order passed by the Respondent No.2 under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act declaring the said land as surplus. The Respondent No.1's case is that the petitioner at the time suppressed the material fact from Respondent No.1 to the effect that the land had already been declared surplus by Respondent No.2. It is, therefore submitted that the claim put forward in the petition is totally false and baseless. The petition deserves to be dismissed as the Petitioner has not come to Court with clean hands, rather he is guilty of deliberate suppression of material facts. The affidavit filed by Respondent No.1 virtually reiterates what has been stated by Respondent No.2. except the details about payment made to the petitioner. In short the Petitioner in a deliberate fraudulent manner attempted to sell land belonging to the Government.

8. Not feeling satisfied, the petitioner filed an affidavit in rejoinder wherein he denied the contents and allegations made in the affidavit in reply. He further states that the contents of the affidavit in reply are mischievous and they manifestly show a high-handed and unreasonable attitude towards the petitioner's just and legal claims in the writ petition. He denies that he ever agreed to sell the disputed plot to the Corporation at the rate of 10 paise per sq. ft. He reiterates the averments made in the writ petition but he says that he handed over possession on 22nd September, 1983 only on the representation and the promise by the Corporation to pay the market price for the disputed plot. He reiterates that the Corporation has acted in breach of its promise. He further states that fixing the price of the land at 10 paise per sq. ft. in a city like Solapur is shockingly low. He compounds the lies by saying that he had already filed a return under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act before the Competent Authority. He further states that the return is still pending consideration. He, therefore, requests the Court for an order directing the Corporation to remove forthwith the structure in the disputed plot and hand over the vacant possession of the disputed plot to him and, thereafter necessary orders may be passed by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. He accuses the Corporation of cheating in view of their readiness to pay the valuation fixed by the Appropriate Authority. He further states that he has received the compensation of Rs.20,908.80 ps. under protest.

9. We have heard Counsel for the parties and we are inclined to agree with the Counsel for the Respondents that this petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground that the petitioner has been guilty of suppressing material facts from this Court. Not only he has suppressed the material facts from this Court but he has deliberately tried to mislead this Court into believing that a situation exists, which factually does not exist. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that he is the owner of the disputed land. That on 22nd Sept. 1983 he had the legal title to deliver the possession to Respondent No.1. He has stated time and again that he had agreed to sell the land at a price of Rs.2/- per sq. ft. He has again stated that he never accepted the price of 10 ps. per sq. ft. In the petition there is no mention whatsoever about the proceedings which were pending under the Land Ceiling Act. Although these proceedings would be only in his knowledge, he did not care to mention, that he has filed a return under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. He did not mention that an order has been passed on 17-1-1981 under Section 8(4) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. He did not mention that a declaration has been issued under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. He did not mention that he had filed an appeal against the order of the Competent Authority. He did not mention that the said appeal was dismissed on 26th July, 1982. He did not further mention that even the appeal filed by a third person on the basis of the sale of land by his son also came to be finally decided on 11-9-1987. The writ is filed on 20-12-1988. So all these events are prior to the filing of the writ petition. In the affidavit in reply the respondents have clearly stated that at the time when the possession was ostensibly delivered by the petitioner to the respondents i.e 22nd September, 1983 he was in no way connected with the land. Whilst he was negotiating the deal with respondent No.1 he did not bring any of the proceedings pending under the Urban Land Ceiling Act to the notice of Respondent No.l. The modus operandi was clear that he was trying to sell the land of which he was no longer the owner. All the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act had been concluded so far as the petitioner was concerned as long before 26th July, 1982 when his appeal came to be dismissed but he deliberately went on trying to alienate the land which did not belong to him. He was not happy with the amount of compensation which he had received from respondent No.1. If that was not enough he did not even spare this Court when he filed the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to obtain interim relief he made emphatic and deliberately false statements. He stated that the Corporation had taken advance possession of the land which belonged to him ostensibly for the purpose of constructing a slaughter house. However, they have now abandoned the construction of the slaughter house and are building houses for Class-IV employees. Therefore, irreparable injury is going to be caused. An impression was given to the Court that an innocent party is being deprived of his property. In actual fact if one sees the document by which he has given the possession it clearly says that he has given the possession for the construction of the slaughter house or for any other purpose which the Municipal Corporation may deem proper for its use. Having done so, it could hardly be stated by the petitioner that the user of the land could not be converted. Not only this the petitioner was aware that the user of the land had been converted. This is patent from reading of the letter dated 20th August, 1987 which was written by the Municipal Commissioner to the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. In this letter it is stated that the said land was reserved for a slaughter house in the sanctioned Development Plan. It further states that the possession of the said land has already been taken on 22nd September, 1983. However, the said land is likely to be declared as vacant land, in view of the Notification under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Hence the compensation for the land has to be paid as per the value decided by the Competent Authority under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. It is further pointed out that the owner of the land is pressing hard for compensation. Hence the Competent Authority was required to communicate the value of the aforesaid land. A copy of this letter was also forwarded to the petitioner in particular. This being the position, the petitioner could hardly make the averments which he has made in the petition. The said averments have been made not only to hoodwink the respondents but also to obtain favourable orders from this Court. The petitioner has clearly played a fraud not only on the respondents but has also tried his utmost to mislead this Court.

10. The law as to what is required of a person approaching the Court under Article 226 is now well settled to be reiterated. However, in this case it would be pertinent to mention just a few of those judgments. In the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (AIR 1994 SC 853) the Supreme Court in the words of Kuldip Singh, J. has observed as under.

"The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

8. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a Clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Exhibit B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Exhibit B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side than he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.

9. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court. The appellants shall be entitled to their costs which we quantify at Rs.11,000-

Appeal allowed.".

Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Shashi v/s. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 S.C.C. 421). In the said judgement it is observed as follows.

"The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned.

2. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice.

3. These prefatory remarks well project the importance of the point under consideration in this suo motu contempt action taken against respondent Anil Kumar for his having filed a fabricated document to oppose the prayer of his wife seeking transfer of matrimonial proceeding from Delhi to Unnao. It shall be first required to be seen whether Anil did file a fabricated document and then we shall address ourselves as to whether filing of a forged document with intention to defraud amounts to contempt of court, as this expression has been defined in Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (the Act.)

5. "The real question is whether filing of the aforesaid forged and fabricated document amounts to contempt. According to Shri Ganguli, appearing for Anil Kumar this does not. Let it be seen whether the contention advanced by Shri Ganguli is tenable."

xxx xxx xxx

8. To enable the courts to ward of unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. People would have faith in Courts when they would find that (In Marathi script) Satyamev Jayte (truth alone triumphs) is an achievable aim there; or (In Marathi script) Yato Dharmastato Jay (it is virtue which ends in victory) is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of courts."

xxx xxx xxx

14. The legal position thus is that if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of justice. It would, in any case tend to interfere with the same. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens rea. In the case at hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court; the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil kumar, is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Keeping in view the above, we awar sentence of two weeks' imprisonment to the contemner. We would have indeed awarded a longer period of incarceration because of the gravity of contumacious act-fabrication of document to defeat just cause of an adversary and thereby seriously affecting the purity of courts' proceeding - but we have refrained from doing so as this is the first occasion in free India when this Court (for that matter may be any court of the country) has felt called upon to send a person like the contemnor behind iron bars in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. We have restricted the period of imprisonment to two weeks in the hope that the incarceration of this contemner will work as eye-opener and no court will henceforth feel constrained and to do so in any other case. We have traversed the untreated path guardedly, because the assumption of contempt jurisdiction by a court requires zealous and careful movement as the affected party faces a summary trial and the prosecutor himself acts as a Judge."

This view has been followed by our own High Court in Company Petition No.395 of 1994 decided on 3rd April, 1996 by one of us (Vyas, J.). In the aforesaid judgment , noticing the earlier two judgements of the Supreme Court, this Court has observed as follows.

" One who comes to Court must come with clean hands. The position in law is too well settled to require any elucidation. The Apex Court has in S.P.Chengalavarya Naidu v/s. Jagannath and others reported in A.I.R. 1994 S.C. at page 853 inter alia observed that the Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties; that one who comes to Court must come with clean hands and that it can be said without hesitation that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation that a litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all the documents which are relevant to the litigation, and that if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. The Apex Court therein was dealing with a case where it was found that a preliminary decree was obtained by playing fraud on the Court. It, therefore, observed that a fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another and that it is deception in order to gain by another's loss. A cheating intended to get an advantage. Again, the Apex Court in the decision of Chandra Shashi v/s. Anilkumar Verma reported in 1991(1) SCC at page 421 inter alia held that to enable Court to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sence and to the satisfaction of those who ultimately prevail; that any one who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; that if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interfers with administration of justice and that such a conduct is contempt of Court."

The same view has been expressed in JT 1996 (7) S.C.135. Where the Supreme Court has observed as under.

"Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party of the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order."

" In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) AC 736, the House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In another case, Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 QB 702 at 712 Denning LJ said :

"No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Pawan Kumar v/s. State of Haryana and Anr. (1994 (5) SLR page 73) had also an occasion to consider a similar situation. Therein the petitioner had made an attempt to mislead the Court by giving an incorrect picture of the remarks made in his annual confidential reports. The petitioner in that case had deliberately made an attempt to mislead the Court by painting a rosy picture about the entries in his annual confidential report. the High Court in the words of Justice G.S.Singhvi observed as follows :-

"9. There is an additional and a very cogent ground for not giving any relief to the petitioner. We are constrained to observe that the petitioner has made an attempt to mislead the Court by giving an incorrect picture of the remarks made in his annual confidential reports. In para 4 of the writ petition, the petitioner has made a statement regarding the remarks in his annual confidential reports. However, this statement is contrary to the remarks actually made in his Annual Confidential reports for the years 1983-84, 1989-90 and 1990-91. This is evident from the reproduction of remarks as mentioned in para 4 together with the actual entries which are borne out from Annexures P -2 to P-7 which we reproduce below;

Year	Classification	Actual remarks
1982-83	Average.	Average.
1983-84	Average	Below Average.
1984-85	Good	--
1985-86	Below Average	Below Average.
1986-87	Below Average	Below Average.
1987-88	Good	--
1988-89	Good	--
1989-90	Average
(Achievement of target Average. is low)
1990-91	Average (Irresponsible in discharging duty	Average.
1991-92	Good	--
1992-93	Good	--
1993-94	Good	--

The petitioner has not shown as to how he has described entries in his confidential reports and classification thereof as good for the years 1984-85, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94. He has not come out with a case that he presumed entries in his confidential reports for these years to be good because nothing has been communicated to him. It is thus clear that the petitioner has deliberately made an attempt to mislead the Court by painting a rosy picture about the entries in his annual confidential reports. In our opinion, a person who makes an attempt to mislead the Court by misstatement of facts or by deliberate twisting of facts has no right to get any relief from the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Writ jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised only in favour of those who come with clean hands and a person who approaches the Court with tained hand has no right to be heard on the merits of his case.

10. In Rex. v. Kensinghton, 1917(1) K.B.Cozens Hardy M.R.Observed:

"On an ex parte application uberrima fides is required, and unless than can be established if there is any thing like deception practised on the Court, the Court ought to go into the merits of the case, but simply say we will not listen to your application because of what you have done."

Lord Scrutton L.J. Observed :

" It has been for many years the rule of the Court and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when any applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts, facts now law....The applicant must state fully and fairly the facts and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have been fully and fairly stated to it the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement."

11. In Req. v. Garland (1870) 39 LJ QB 86, it has been held:

"Where a process is ex debito justitiae the Court would refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant where the applications found to be wanting in bona fides."

l2. In Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 All. 746 (FB), a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court stated the principles of law in these words :

"A person obtaining an ex parte order or rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant fact from the court, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Court should insist that persons invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court should not attempt in any manner to misuse a valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts."

In Nand Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1960 J & K 19, it has been held :

"Where the petitioners under Art.226 have not stated the relevant facts correctly and candidly either in their petition or in the affidavit in support of their petition, this is by itself sufficient to entail an outright dismissal of the writ petition without going into its merits. It has further been held in this case that even if the Petitioners have a good case on merits the Court will be entitled to decline to go into the merits and dismiss their petition because the conduct of the petitioners has been such as to mislead the Court."

Similar propositions of law have been laid down in M.Hali Mohammad Ismail Sahib and Co. v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Gudiyathen, AIR 1970 Madras 422 (FB) Abdul Gafoor v. State of M.P., AIR 1968 MP 29, G.Appukkutan Pillai v. Government of India, AIR 1970 Kerala 110 (FB); S.H.Motor Transport Co. v. Moti Lal, AIR 1965 Bombay 24; and Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1977 Rajasthan 52.

l3. The principle which can be deduced from the above referred decisions is that the party who seeks relief from the High Court in exercise of its requitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with all bona fides, must make true, candid and full disclosure of all the relevant facts. Its conduct must be above board. There should be no attempt by a party to mislead the Court. The petitioner is under an obligation to collect all material facts with due care and attention and he will not be heard to say that facts were not within his knowledge although the same could have come to his knowledge had he taken due care and had made efforts to find them out. The High Court will be fully justified in declining exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction in favour of a party who is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi or who makes an attempt to mislead the Court.

14. In this case the petitioner has made a deceitful attempt to mislead the Court and, therefore, we find little justification to give relief to him."

We are in respectful agreement with the observations made in the aforesaid judgement. We are, of Course, bound by the judgements of the Supreme Court given above. Respectfully following the same we are not inclined to give any relief to the petitioner.

11. Judging the behaviour of the petitioner on the basis of the law elucidated by the Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve any sympathy or leniency. At the first instance when nobody was appearing for the respondents, the petitioner managed to obtain an ex parte order on the basis of misrepresentation before the Court. Upon filing of affidavits, the said interim order was vacated. The petitioner, however, was not satisfied, he filed a rejoinder reiterating the false stand taken by him. Not only did he take a false stand on facts but he took a false stand in law also. He persisted with his plea that the land had not vested in the Municipal Corporation. It is a settled proposition of law that once a declaration is issued under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the land is deemed to be vested in the Competent Authority. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Smt. Darothi Clare Parreira and Ors. v/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (JT 1996 (7) S.C. 113) wherein it has been clearly held that on publication of the notification under Section 10 (3) and after putting a date from which the land stands vested in the state and after publication of the notification in the Gazette and on and from the date mentioned therein, the excess vacant land stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In this view of the matter, the petitioner could hardly have taken the stand that he had a legal title to deliver the possession to the Corporation on 22nd Sept. 1983. Having considered the behaviour of the petitioner we were minded to recommend his prosecution for perjury. However, at this stage an affidavit has been filed by the Counsel for the petitioner who is present in Court wherein an unqualified apology has been tendered for the statements that had been made. It is also stated in the affidavit that the petitioner is 72 years of age and, therefore, a lenient view may be taken. Having sympathy for his old age and in view of the fact that no real damage has been done. in the interest of justice we are of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by either ordering the prosecution of the petitioner or for punishing him under the Contempt of Courts Act. However, in order to express our displeasure for the manner in which he has abused the process of the Court, we are constrained to burden him with costs.

12. The petition is hereby dismissed both on account of the fact that it is wholly devoid of any merit in law and on account of the fact that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution because he has not come to the Court with clean hands. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. The Rule is discharged. However, the petitioner shall pay costs in the sum of Rs.5,000/- to each Respondent within a period of six weeks from today.

Petition dismissed.