Writ Petition No. 363 of 1984

20th January, 2000

Petitioner Counsel: Shri A. M. KANADE
Respondent Counsel: Shri R. M. BORDE,Shri M. S. INDANI

Cases Cited:
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others etc., AIR 1969 SC 1335 [Para 16]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- The Petitioner had purchased land, Survey No. 494, of village Limba Ganesh, Taluka and district Beed, in an auction held for recovery of dues of the Municipal council, Beed, payable by Respondent No.1 - Devidas. The auction was held in the year 1964. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed an application for setting aside the auction. However, the Collector, Beed, as well as the Revenue Commissioner and the State Government rejected the applications and the sale was confirmed. However, Respondent No.1 then filed Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968 in this Court. The said writ petition was decided on 28-10-1972. The sale was set aside and Respondent No.1 was directed to pay interest at the rate of 12 percent on Rs.4,200/-, being the price paid by the petitioner for the land, Survey No. 494, in the auction, for the period from the date of auction till the date the petitioner obtained possession of the land. Respondent No.1 did not pay the amount as directed by the Court till 4-11-1980. On that day, he deposited the amount before the Tahsildar, Beed, and prayed for restoration of the possession of the land, as per the directions issued by the High Court. The Tahsildar then issued notice to the petitioner, directing him to hand over possession of the land.

2. Being aggrieved by this notice, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Beed, the same was rejected. Then, he filed second appeal to the Collector, Beed, the same was also rejected. The Divisional commissioner, Aurangabad, also rejected the revision petition filed by the Petitioner, by his order dated 28-2-1984. The Petitioner then moved the State Government. However, there also, he failed. Hence, the present writ petition.

3. The petitioner has contended that the order directing Respondent No.1 to make the deposit of the amount of compensation, calculated on the basis of interest at the rate of 12 per cent of the price, ought to have been complied with by Respondent No.1 within the period of three years from the date of the order. This point was raised by the Petitioner before all the revenue authorities in his applications and appeals. However, it was not properly considered by the said authorities. The petitioner has contended that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to the present matter. The order passed by the High Court ought to have been complied with within the period of three years; and as it was not complied with, the execution of the order has become barred by limitation. The copy of the order of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968 is filed on record by the Petitioner along with other documents.

4. The Respondents, though have filed appearance, have not filed any return.

5. In fact, only a short question arises in this matter : As to whether the order passed by the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968 ought to have been complied with within the period of three years from the date of the order; and as Respondent No.1 has failed to comply with the condition laid down in the order, he is no more entitled to get back possession of the land.

6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has strongly relied upon the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

7. At the outset, it must be stated that the proceedings for attachment of the land of Respondent No.1 and for recovery of dues of Municipal Council, Beed, were taken as per the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli. The authorities under the Act, after attaching the land for recovery of the amount, held the auction and the present Petitioner purchased the land in the auction. One another land was also put to auction, but that is not the subject-matter of the present proceedings. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed application to set aside the sale, purported to be an application under section 138 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. His plea was rejected by the revenue authorities, but in the writ petition, he became successful.

8. The most relevant portion of the judgment of this Court in the writ petition is as follows :

" . . . We are, however, convinced that the petitioner (Respondent No.1 herein) suffered pecuniary injuries in this case by reason of the above irregularity and, therefore, is entitled to succeed in this petition. It is, however, clear that the third and fourth Respondents, who were purchasers in respect of the lands S. Nos. 494 and 497 invested by way of purchase price respective sums of Rs. 4200/- and Rs.700/-. These two purchasers took possession of the lands in September, 1967, after the stay was removed by the Government. These purchasers were entitled to fruits of their purchase during the period in which they were not in possession. The Petitioner cannot be entitled to possession of the lands until and after he carries out the promise that he has made by filing the affidavit dated 14th February 1972. Upon the petitioner depositing the amount equal to interest at 12% on Rs.4200/- for three years and on Rs.700/- for three years respectively for payments to Respondents Numbers 3 and 4, the sale of the above lands will be set aside. Respondents Numbers 3 and 4 will be entitled to payment of interest deposited. The result of the setting aside of the sale will be that the Government and/or the Municipality at Beed, whoever is now holding the prices paid by Respondents numbers 3 and 4, must repay the same to each of them. The possession will have to be restored to the petitioner. The petitioner will pay costs."

9. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that, as the petitioner could not get possession of the land till September 1967, the High Court then directed the present Respondent No. 1 to pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent on the purchase price, by way of compensation. So, it was necessary for Respondent No.1 to pay the amount within reasonable time after the order passed by the High Court. As Respondent No.1 has failed to pay that amount for more than 8 years, now, he cannot claim possession of the land.

10. On going through the entire judgment in Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968, I find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the amount of compensation payable to the Petitioner by Respondent No.1 was calculated in terms of interest on the price money, because the Petitioner could not get possession of the land till September 1967, i.e., till the State Government vacated the stay. The stay was in operation because of the proceedings started by Respondent No.1 for setting aside the sale. However, while passing the order in the writ petition, the High Court had not put any time limit for depositing the amount so payable by present Respondent No.1. In such circumstances can it be said that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act can be made applicable ?

11. The order passed by the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968 cannot be treated as a decree. It is an order under Article 227 of the Constitution. So, from this point of view, the provisions of the Limitation Act, which are applicable for execution of a decree passed by a Civil Court, cannot be made applicable to the order passed by the High Court in a writ petition under Article 227 of the constitution, especially when the matter has come up before the High Court not from any order passed by the Civil Court, but from the authorities, who have passed the orders under the Land Revenue Code or the Land Revenue Act.

12. It is true that as per Rule 27, Chapter XVII, of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 a provision is made as follows :

"An order made by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution shall be executable in the same manner in which the order made by the Court or Tribunal, against which the application under Article 227 has been made could have been executed under the law."

So, this provision only prescribes the procedure to be followed for getting executed the order passed by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. This provision is not making any reference to the period of limitation, within which the order of the High Court is to be executed. Merely because such provision is there, it cannot be said that the order passed by the High Court will be covered under Article 137 of the Limitation Act for getting execution of the order.

13. To attract the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, there must be the basic requirement of presenting an application for the execution of the order passed by the High Court. So far as the present matter is concerned, the speaking order passed by High Court in Special Civil Application No.1675 of 1968 clearly directs that the petitioner in the said writ petition to deposit certain amount and thereafter the land be put in his possession. So, to comply with this order, the revenue authorities have to see only whether the amount is deposited as per the directions of the High Court. No further application from Respondent No. 1 was expected to comply with the orders passed by the High Court. It was the duty of the authorities to comply with the further directions of the High Court. So, when no such application is necessary for asking the execution of the order passed by the High Court, it cannot be said the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act will come into pay. The objection raised by the petitioner, therefore, is without any basis. No application is necessary and, therefore, no period of limitation can be imposed.

14. If any period of limitation had been imposed by the High Court itself, while passing the order in the writ petition, then that would have been the ground for the present Petitioner. When the High Court itself has not imposed any period of limitation for complying with the order regarding deposit of money, the Petitioner cannot say that the order ought to have been complied within a particular time or within a reasonable time.

15. This objection with respect to Article 137 of the Limitation Act can be viewed from another angle also. It is well-settled interpretation of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, now that the Third Division of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963, is basically applicable only to applications, which are required to be made under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present matter, if at all any application was to be made by Respondent No.1 for getting possession of the land, it was to be made to the revenue authorities just for the compliance of the order of the High Court. It would not be an application under any statutory provision, either of Code of Civil Procedure; or the Land Revenue Act; or, the Land Revenue Code. The direction issued by the High Court is to be complied with by all concerned.

16. While interpreting the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, with reference to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Apex Court in the matter of Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and others etc. reported in AIR 1969 SC 1335, has observed as follows :

". . . . We think that, on the same principle, it must be held that even the further alteration made in the articles contained in the third division of the schedule to the new Limitation Act containing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary Article 137 which deals with other applications. It is not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it all applications, irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the Code of Civil Procedure."

17. The learned Counsel for Respondent No.1 has rightly relied upon this ruling to argue that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable for any application, which is not under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

18. So, from this point of view also, the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act are applicable and the application for possession of the land ought to have been filed within three years from the date of the order of the High Court cannot be accepted.

19. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the amount payable to the petitioner was by way of compensation Respondent No.1 did not pay the amount for 8 long years. He utilised that amount for his own purposes. No doubt, the Petitioner had received possession of the land in the year 1967 and he is continuing in possession of the land till this date. However, the amount of compensation was awarded for the period of 1964 to 1967 and in such circumstances, the Court should take into consideration the pecuniary loss suffered by the petitioner for not receiving the said amount.

20. In ordinary course, this aspect would have weighed much in favour of the petitioner, because the amount of compensation was not paid for 8 long years. However, in this case, it must be noted that from 1967 till this date, the Petitioner is in possession of the land. He is taking income of the land. If Respondent No.1 had been diligent, he would have received the possession of the land and he would have received the income of the land. He has lost the income from the land by not complying with the order of High court immediately. It may be that there is delay in payment of amount of compensation, but the petitioner is well compensated by getting income of the land, which otherwise would have lost, if Respondent No.1 had deposited the amount immediately. So, I do not think that Respondent No.1 be directed to pay any further compensation to the Petitioner for the time he has taken for depositing the amount.

21. Considering all these circumstances, as the High Court, while passing the order in Special Civil Application No. 1675 of 1968, had not prescribed any period for depositing the amount of compensation, calculated on the basis of interest at 12 per cent on Rs. 4200/- the Petitioner cannot take the stand that , as the amount was paid 8 years after the passing of the order of the High Court, Respondent No. 1's right of getting possession of the land is barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

22. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.