2001(3) ALL MR 566
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(NAGPUR BENCH)
D.D. SINHA, J.
Executive Engineer, Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Industrial Court & Anr.
Writ Petition No.3281 of 2000
21st November, 2000
Petitioner Counsel: Shri. R.K.DESHPANDE
Respondent Counsel: Shri. T.R.KANKALE,Shri. A.M.GHARE
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (1971), S.30(2) - Application before Labour Court for grant of interim relief - Labour Court directing reinstatement of complainant during pendency of complaint - Order cannot be sustained.
It is no doubt true that power is vested in the Labour Court under Section 30(2) of the Act to grant interim relief. However, care needs to be taken by the Court that interim relief should not be such, which would amount to grant of final relief at the interlocutory stage without proper adjudication of matter on merits unless there are exceptional circumstances, which render the order impugned before such court prima facie unsustainable in view of inherent legal infirmities. [Para 4]
In the instant case there was no such exceptional circumstances for the Labour Court to direct reinstatement, which undoubtedly is the final relief, which the employee may or may not get after due adjudication on merits. It is true that the employee is out of employment for number of years and, therefore, his complaint needs to be disposed of on merits finally by the Labour Court within a stipulated period. [Para 5]
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT :- Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of Shri. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri. Kankale, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent no.1, and Shri. Ghare, learned Counsel for the Respondent no.2.
2. The petition is directed against the order dated 24.1.2000 passed by the Industrial Court and order dated 12.6.1998 passed by the Labour Court. Shri. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that respondent no.1 filed Complaint (ULP) No. 139/1997 before the Labour Court challenging termination of the service and moved an application under Section 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act for grant of interim relief. The learned counsel contended that the Labour Court at the interlocutory stage without adjudicating the matter on merits, recorded a final finding that respondent no.2/ complainant had worked for more than 240 days in a year before termination of his service and petitioners without following the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act terminated service of the complainant. It is contended that by virtue of the interim order, Labour Court has declared final result of the complaint, which is not permissible at this stage. The learned Counsel further contended that the petitioners have specifically denied by filing written statement that the respondent no.2/complainant worked for 240 days continuously in the preceding twelve months. It is further submitted that respondent no.2 was appointed on daily wages and as a stop-gap arrangement since regular employee, i.e. Watchman was on leave. It is contended that without giving opportunity to adduce evidence, the Labour Court passed the order of reinstatement and therefore, same is not proper. It is further contended that order of revisional Court is also bad in law for the same reason.
3. Shri. Ghare, learned Counsel for the respondent no.2/complainant, contending that Labour Court was justified in directing reinstatement of complainant during pendency of the complaint under Section 30(2) of the Act. It is submitted that documents produced by the respondent no.2/complainant along with complaint clearly demonstrate that he worked for more than 240 days in one year and, therefore, petitioners were required to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Violation thereof necessarily renders termination of service of respondent no.2/complainant prima facie bad in law and hence, Labour Court as well as revisional Court were justified in passing the impugned orders.
4. I have considered the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. It is no doubt true that power is vested in the Labour Court under Section 30(2) of the Act to grant interim relief. However, care needs to be taken by the Court that interim relief should not be such, which would amount to grant of final relief at the interlocutory stage without proper adjudication of matter on merits unless there are exceptional circumstances, which render the order impugned before such court prima facie unsustainable in view of inherent legal infirmities.
5. However, in the instant case, I see no such exceptional circumstances for the Labour Court to direct reinstatement, which undoubtedly is the final relief, which respondent no.2 employee may or may not get after due adjudication on merits. Similarly, Industrial Court also has not given anxious thought to the issue in question in the manner in which it needs to be given and confirmed the interim order passed by the Labour Court. Hence, for the similar reason, the order passed by the Industrial Court also cannot be sustained. It is true that the respondent No.2 employee is out of employment for number of years and, therefore, complaint of the respondent no.2 needs to be disposed of on merits finally by the Labour Court within a stipulated period.
6. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 12.6.1998 passed by the Labour Court and impugned order dated 24.1.2000 passed by the Industrial Court are hereby quashed and set aside. The Labour Court is directed to dispose of Complainant (ULP) No. 139/1997 of the respondent no.2/ complainant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this judgment after giving appropriate opportunity to the parties to the complaint.
7. The rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.