Writ Petition No. 1970 of 1989

22nd February, 2002

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. A. Y. SAKHARE, Mr. P. A. SAVANT, M/s. VYAS & BHALWAL
Respondent Counsel: Mr. E. P. BHARUCHA, Ms. ARUNA SAVLA, Mr. S. K. NAIR

Cases Cited:
Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Alexander Farquharson, 1912 A.C. & Privy Council, 864 [Para 15]
Borys Vs. Canadian Pacific Railway Co., 1953(1) All.E.R. 451 [Para 16]
M/s. Indo International Industries Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1079 [Para 17]
Chiranjit Lal Anand Vs. State of Assam, AIR 1985 SC 1387 [Para 18]
Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 1987, 64 S.T.C. 180 (S.C.) [Para 19]
Alladi Venkateswarlu Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1978, 41 S.T.C. 394 [Para 20]
Pharm Aromatic Chemicals Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Balsam Tolu B.P., 1997(95) E.L.T. 203 (Bom.) [Para 21]
State Bank of India Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, First Appeal No.702 of 1996 dtd. 31st January 1997 [Para 22]
Municipal Corporation for the City of Thane Vs. Asmaco Plastic Industries, (1999)1 SCC 372 [Para 24]
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 1992(3) Bom.C.R. 176 (S.C.) [Para 25]
S. P. Jain Vs. Krishna Mohan Gupta, (1987)1 SCC 191 [Para 26]

JUDGMENT

P. S. PATANKAR, J. :- By this Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner is praying to restrain the respondents from levying octroi duty on 'Natural Gas' under Entry 22(a) of Schedule "H" of Octroi Rules 1965 and, further directing the respondents to withdraw the Demand Notice dated 13-5-1989 of Rs.15,85,01,902.27 for the period from 1978-79 to 31-12-1987 and further direction not to recover octroi duty on 'Natural Gas' from December 1978.

2. The petitioner is carrying on the activities of exploration and exploitation of oil resources from Bombay High. It includes natural gas. Respondent No.1 is the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (now Mumbai) (for short, B.M.C.). Respondent No.1 by a letter dated 27th March 1985 brought to the notice of the petitioner that "natural gas" is similar to L.P.G. and is capable of being used as fuel and is actually used as a fuel and, therefore, chargeable for octroi duty under Entry 22(a) of Schedule "H". The respondents put up a demand for payment of octroi duty applying the conversion of pubic feet. The demand was for Rs.6.40 crores and odd amount upto 31st March, 1983 and thereafter at 1 per cent ad-valorem. A reply was sent by the petitioner on 7-5-1985 pointing out that natural gas cannot be taxed. The correspondence went on between the parties. We need not refer to it. The respondents made a demand of octroi contending that 'natural gas' falls under Entry No.22(a) of the Schedule "H" and the petitioner contending that it does not fall within the said Entry. Finally, the letter dated 13-5-1989 came to be issued by the B.M.C. making a demand of Rs.15,85,01,902.27 for the period of 1978-79 to 31-12-1987. This Petition came to be filed on 10th July 1989. In view of the amendment to the said Entry 22(a) by Ordinance No.2 of 1993 (Maharashtra Act No.XII of 1993), the petition came to be amended challenging it. There is no dispute as to facts.

3. Section 192(1) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 empowers the Municipal Corporation to levy octroi tax on articles mentioned in Schedule 'H' on entry of the same in Brihanmumbai for consumption, use or sale therein.

4. There is no dispute that till 1978 'natural gas' was only burnt by the petitioner at the Bombay High. But the petitioner put up pipeline from Bombay High and started importing within the Corporation limit natural gas from 1978 and supplying it to four consumers - (i) Tata Electric Company, Trombay, (ii) Rashtriya Chemical Fertilisers Corporation Limited, Chembur, (iii) Bharat Petroleum Company Limited, Mahul, and (iv) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, Bombay. It was used by them as industrial fuel. Presently, it is also imported for the purpose of domestic use and used as domestic fuel.

5. Schedule 'H' came to be substituted by Maharashtra Act 32 of 1964. Schedule 'H' as stood in 1978 categorises 'articles' in clauses. Clause (ii) dealt with articles used for fuel, lighting, washing and industrial use. The relevant entry is Entry 22(a). In 1978 it stood as under :-

"22(a) Mineral oils of all sorts, diesel oil, petrol, aviation spirit, all kinds of lubricating oils, white oil, spindle oil, furnace oil, Petroleum products mava oil, sevasol, solvent oil, other fuel oils, oils used as insecticides, natural gasoline, paints, solutions and compositions, Turkey Red Oil and by-products of mineral oils, but nothing hereinbefore contained shall include kerosene and crude oil, ... 2 Paise per litre."

The State Government exercised power under Section 192(5) of the B.M.C. Act and amended the entry by Notification dated 30th March 1983, published on the same date in the Maharashtra Government Gazette. The rate of octroi leviable was changed in the following manner :-

"From 2 paise per litre to 1% per cent ad valorem".

6. The Maharashtra Ordinance No.II of 1993 came to be issued on 4-1-1993. It provides by clause 9(b) that in Entry No.22(a) for the words "petroleum products", the words "petroleum products including natural gas and liquified petroleum gas" shall be and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 1st Day of April 1978. Clause 11 thereof provided that "For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that any octroi levied on natural gas and liquified petroleum gas, being petroleum products, on or after the 1st day of April 1978 shall be deemed to have been levied under entry 22 in Schedule H to the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, as amended by section 9 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993, as if that entry in that form was in force on the day on which the octroi was so levied". The said Ordinance became Maharashtra Act No.XII of 1993 and it came to be published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 15th April 1993 after getting the assent of the Governor. Entry 22(a) after the amendment stands as under :-

"22(a) Mineral oils of all sorts, diesel oil, petrol, aviation spirit, all kinds of lubricating oils, white oil, spindle oil, furnace oil, petroleum products including natural gas and liquified petroleum gas, mava oil, sevasol, solvent oil, other fuel oils, oils used as insecticiders, natural gasoline, paints, solutions and compositions, Turkey Red Oil and by-products of mineral oils, but nothing herein before contained shall include Kerosene and crude oil, ... 2 per cent ad valorem".

This became effective from 1st April, 1978.

7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner first contended that the phrase "petroleum products" cannot and does not include "natural gas" and hence, it was an error on the part of the B.M.C. to demand octroi on natural gas from 1-4-1978. It is submitted that it is an independent product and cannot be called as a petroleum product. It is secondly submitted that there could have been no retrospective effect given by Ordinance No.2 of 1993 making the said Entry No.22(a) effective and enforceable from 1-4-1978.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondents contravenes the submission. It is submitted that "natural gas" is a petroleum product and hence, comes within Entry 22(a). It is further submitted that Ordinance No.2 of 1993 making Entry 22(a) effective from 1-4-1978 is only clarificatory in nature. This is clear from the Statement of Objects of the said Ordinance and it has rightly been made retrospectively effective from 1-4-1978.

9. In view of the submissions made, two questions arise for consideration:-

(1) Whether the phrase "petroleum products" includes "natural gas"?

(2) Whether Ordinance No.2 of 1993 dated 4th January 1993 amending Entry No.22(a) retrospectively with effect from 1-4-1978 has been validly issued or not ?

10. We may state at the outset that if we are against the petitioner on the first point, then it is not necessary to deal with the second one. This was made clear at the time of hearing and hence, we only decide the first point.

11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to extensive technical or scientific literature dealing with petroleum products. He submitted that considering the said literature 'natural gas' is not covered by the phrase "petroleum products". He then submitted that prior to 1978 'natural gas' was of no commercial value. He submitted that when Schedule "H" was substituted by Maharashtra Act No.32 of 1964, at that time it was never contemplated to include natural gas as petroleum product. He submitted that, therefore, by Ordinance No.2 of 1993 dated 4-1-1993 it has been specifically included in Entry 22(a). It cannot be called as mere declaratory. It is included from that date. He submitted that prior to 4-1-1993 only liquids were included in Entry 22(a) and it is clear from the fact that till 1983 computation of octroi was based on litre basis and not on ad-valorem basis. The products which are refined in refinery are only petroleum products. He submitted that even in commercial world or in common parlance petroleum products do not include natural gas. They are treated as two different and independent products. He also submitted that as there is doubt about the Entry, the benefit thereof should be given to the assessee. In support of his submissions, he also relied upon certain judgments.

12. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the very literature produced by the petitioner shows that 'natural gas' is a 'petroleum product'. He further submitted that it is irrelevant that prior to 1978 natural gas was of no commercial value and because of that it cannot be said that inclusion of 'natural gas' was not contemplated by the phrase 'petroleum products'. 'Petroleum product' is the generic or omnibus phrase. It can include all the products developed out of petroleum in course of time and by technical or technological developments. There are many such products developed. He further submitted that natural gas can be measured in litres and it requires only mathematical conversion from volume. Hence, he submitted that it was an error to say that only liquids coming out of refinery are included in that Entry. He submitted that Ordinance No.2 of 1993 is only clarificatory in nature and this is clear from its Objects and it cannot be said that natural gas was for the first time included in that entry. He submitted that 'natural gas' may be a different product, but nonetheless it is a petroleum product. He submitted that even in commercial world and considering its used as fuel, it can be said that it is a petroleum product. He further submitted that the petitioner has not produced any evidence in support of the submission that in common parlance 'natural gas' is not treated as a 'petroleum product'. He denied that there is any doubt about the entry or that the benefit should go to the petitioner. He also relied upon some technical literature and Judgments.

13. Though the learned Counsel from both the sides relied on technical literature to impress us about the strength of their respective cases, we decline to interpret the Entry on that basis. But we may make a short reference to it. There is book 'Principles of Petroleum Reservoir Engineering' by Gian Luigi Chierioi showing that gas and oil layers under earth are different. The same author mentions about the principal components of natural gas, its viscosity. Then, there is 'Gas Production Operations' by H. Dale Beggs. It mentions that "' Natural Gas' is a mixture of hydrocarbon gases with some impurities......". There is a Table 1 - 13 given. It mentions as Constituents of Petroleum - Product of Commerce. One of them is 'natural gas' apart from certain oils and asphalt. The predominant constituent of 'natural gas' is stated as methane. There is a Dictionary for the Petroleum Industry, Second Edition, University of Texas, at Austin. In it, 'petroleum' is defined as "a substance occuring naturally in the earth in solid, liquid or gaseous state ...". Then, there is a book "Gas Handling and Field Procession, by Bill D. Berger and Ken E. Anderson. It mentions that 'natural gas' is a homogenous fluid of low density and low viscosity. It may also be defined as a complex mixture of combustible hydro carbon gases and impurities. 'Gas' is classified as a fluid and fluids include both liquids and gases.

It is stated that Natural Gas is always present with oil from a reservoir. In the book 'Handbook of Oil Industry Terms and Phrases, 'Petroleum' embraces the whole spectrum of hydro-carbons-gaseous, liquid, and solid. In popular sense, petroleum means crude oil. Our attention was invited to the book written by D.S.J. Jones - Elements of Petroleum Processing. 1.3, thereof mentions 'Products from Crude Oil'. It does not include 'gas', but 'gas oils' are included. The products grouped therein are produced from distillation process and treated to meet certain specifications.

Then, reliance is placed on the book by J. P. Wauquier - Crude Oil, Petroleum Products, but one of them mentioned is 'natural gas'. In our opinion, this book and the literature mentioned instead of helping the petitioner helps the respondents.

14. The literature relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents is 'Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology', Third Edition, Volume 17 mentions that 'petroleum' is a naturally occurring complex mixture made predominantly of hydrocarbon and other compounds of carbon-hydrogen. It can occur in solid, liquid and gaseous form and asphalt, crude oil and natural gas respectively. Then, there is a 'Criteria for Quality of Petroleum Product, by J. P. Allinson. Chapter 3 thereof deals with 'Petroleum Gases'. They are 'natural gases'. This literature produced by the learned Counsel for the respondent clearly supports the case that 'natural gas' is one of the petroleum products. The dictionary meaning - Concise Oxford Dictionary of 'Product' is a thing or substance produced by natural process or manufacture'.

Similarly, the learned Counsel for the respondents also pointed out the meaning given to 'petroleum product' in Oil Industry (Development) Act, 1974. Section 2(i) defines "natural gas" as a gas consisting primarily of hydrocarbons obtained from oil wells or gas wells. Section 2(m) defines "petroleum product" which includes crude oil and natural gas. In view of this, in petroleum industry 'natural gas' is considered as a petroleum product. It is necessary to note that no affidavit is filed by the petitioner to indicate that 'natural gas' is not considered as a petroleum product in common parlance.

15. We shall now consider the Judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the parties. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment of the Privy Council, reported in 1912, A.C. and Privy Council, 864 - Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearns Oil and Gas Company, Limited, and Others V/s. Alexander Farquharson. In the said case, by a Deed, the appellant Canada Company granted to the respondent's predecessor-in-little all their right, title and interest in the land in suit and every part thereof 'excepting and reserving to the said company their successors and assigns all mines and quarries of metals and minerals and all springs of oil in or under the said land whether already discovered or not" with liberty, to the company to search for, work, win, and carry away the same. The question arose whether it exempts or not the grant of 'natural gas'. It was held by Lord Atkinson that 'Gas and the oil are in their chemical composition no doubt both hydro-carbons, but they are distinct and different products. But it was held that it does not fall under the phrase 'metals and mines or all springs of oil'. Therefore, it was held that it does not fall within the exemption clause. It is difficult to see how this can help the petitioner.

16. Then, he relied upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in 1953 (1). All.E.R., 451 - Borys Vs. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. and Another. In the said case, the appellant acquired the property from the respondent No.1 in 1906. In the Conveyance, the respondent No.1 reserved to themselves all coal, petroleum and valuable stones. On the basis of the said reservation, respondent No.1 allowed respondent No.2 to find petroleum. There was,under the appellant's property and the lands adjoining it a large reservoir of petroleum which was found in a bed of porous rock underlying the land. The bed contained at the bottom water, then the petroleum, and on top a layer of gas. When the petroleum was tried to be taken out, the gas would normally become free. The appellant sought a declaration that he was the owner of the 'natural gas' whether it was found in the solution of petroleum or in the free state and prayed for injunction restraining the respondent from using, removing, wasting, interfering with or otherwise disposing in any manner this natural gas. It was held that petroleum and natural gas were two separate substances. The appellant was the owner of the said gas, whether free or in solution, but grant of the substance 'petroleum' included the right to work on it and so long as in the operation modern methods were adopted and reasonably used, the respondent was entitled to work on it even if it caused some interference with the appellant's right. This does not help the petitioner.

17. The Judgments are cited how to interpret an entry in a taxing statute. We may first refer to the case of M/s. Indo Uttar Pradesh - A.I.R. 1981, Supreme Court, 1079. In the said case, it was held that clinical syringes cannot be considered as glassware, though according to the dictionary meaning it may be so. It was observed that -

"It is well settled that in interpreting items in statutes like the Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expression used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined but in the absence of any definition being given in the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted".

18. Then, reliance is placed on Chiranjit Lal Anand V/s. State of Assam and another - A.I.R. 1985, Supreme Court, 1387. In the said case, it was held that 'Meat on hoof' has to be understood in the context of persons who are dealing with it and so understood, it falls within the item 'meat'.

19. Reliance is placed upon Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. V/s. Union of India and others - 1987, 64 S.T.C. 180 (S.C.). In the said case, common parlance rule was applied. It was held that under the Central Excises and Salt Act tariff schedule, 'properzi rods' were nothing but species of wire rods and fall within Tariff Item No.27(a)(ii) and liable to excise duty as such and not under the residuary duty of First Schedule.

20. Then, reliance is placed upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in Alladi Venkateswarlu and others V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another - 1978, 41 S.T.C., pg.394. In the said case, question arose whether 'parched rice' and 'puffed rice' fell within the definition of 'rice'. It was held that it was necessary to give a broad interpretation to the term 'rice'. This is in view of the common parlance rule of interpretation. It was held that 'rice' is ordinarily understood in the English language as including 'parched and puffed rice'.

21. In 1997(95) E.L.T. 203 (Bom.) - Pharm Aromatic Chemicals V/s. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Balsam Tolu B.P. was brought within the Corporation Limits. It was imported by the dealers as drugs and was used for manufacturing expectorants and cough syrups. The primary and dominant use was as drug. It could also be used as an aromatic of flavouring substance in food or drinks. Earlier, it was taxed as a 'drug', but later on it was sought to be classified as a 'food essence'. This was challenged and the challenge came to be upheld by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge summarised the principles as under -

"14. The principles that emerge from the above interpretation can be summed up thus: Where no definition is provided in the statute for ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry, the same should be construed as understood in common parlance or trade or commercial parlance. Such words must be understood in their popular sense. The strict or technical meaning or the dictionary meaning of the entry is not be resorted to. The nomenclature given by the parties to the word or expression is not determinative or conclusive of the nature of the goods. The same will have to be determined by application of the well-settled rules or principles of interpretation which have been referred to as "common parlance" rule, "trade or commercial parlance" rule, "commonsense rule or interpretation" and "user test". The application of the principles will again depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test or tests can be said to be universal application. Each case will have to be decided by applying one or more rules of interpretation depending upon the facts of that particular case".

22. In First Appeal No.702 of 1996 - State Bank of India V/s. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and another, decided on 31st January 1997, the question arose whether 'software disc' can be said to be an appliance or an apparatus falling under Article 52 of Schedule 'H'. Considering the dictionary meaning of 'appliance' it was held that it falls within the said Entry.

23. Applying the well-settled tests, as mentioned above, in our opinion, 'natural gas' is a petroleum product and so treated in the petroleum industry. The user thereof is for fuel as in case of some other items covered by the said Entry 22(a).

24. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court, reported in (1999) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 372 - Municipal Corporation for the City of Thane and others Vs. Asmaco Plastic Industries and others. In the said case question arose whether PVC resin in powder form is classifiable under the expression "plastic, plastic goods and plastic powder" in Entry 56 or under "chemicals" in Entry 40(b). Considering the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 and considering the legislative intent it was held to be falling under Entry 53(c) dealing with "plastic, plastic good and plastic powder. It was held that it fell under Entry No.32(c) of Schedule 'H' of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (Levy of Octroi) Rules 1965. Similarly, Synthetic hydrocarbon resin had also to fall under the said Entry. Essentially, the question involved was under what Entry the goods fell. This has no application here.

25. The learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1992(3) Bombay Cases Reporter, 176 (S.C.). The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others Vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Section 3(r) and Section 3(s) defining with 'land' and 'building' were for interpretation. In the said case, property tax came to be levied by the Municipal Corporation on the 6 oil tanks constructed by the Indian Oil Corporation. They were meant for storage of petrol and petroleum products. They were of huge size and were put on steel plates and rested freely on the asphalt layer. There were no bolts and nuts for holding them on the foundation. It remained in the position by its own weight. It was held that it is a building and liable for property tax. Contention that when the Act was introduced it was not intended that the said storage tank should be considered as a 'building' or 'structure' came to be negative as under :-

"19. Since the enactment of the Act, enormous research and scientific development has taken place in the construction technology of storage tanks etc. The petroleum products are highly inflammable and highly dangerous liquid which cannot successfully be stored without taking careful precautions with modern technology for its storage. The erection and storage must be according to law or relevant rules. Therefore, the Court would not fold its hands and say that the legislature had not hand in its view the storage tanks at the time of making law as one of the subjects for fixation of ratable value and ask the legislature to make the amendment to the Act. If it could be possible to give an interpretation consistent with the purpose and scheme of the act and the nature of the property sought to be assessed for ratable value, the Court could always endeavour to give that interpretation which would subserve the purpose of the Act. If it, otherwise, becomes not possible, the Court is left with no option but to leave it to the legislature to amend the law:"

This negatives the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that we should peg down the meaning of 'natural gas' to 1965 or 1978 when it was not used as fuel.

26. Reliance is placed on the case of S. P. Jain Vs. Krishna Mohan Gupta - (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 191, in which it was held that the law should take a pragmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also take congnisance of the capability of technology etc. for interpreting the meaning of the Act.

27. Merely because till 1978 'natural gas' had no commercial value it cannot be held that it was not intended to be included in Entry 22(a). That aspect is totally irrelevant. We have to consider further technical developments. There is no dispute that since 1978 it is used as fuel. It is also clear that the amendment brought out by Ordinance No.2 of 1993 was merely declaratory or clarificatory in nature. This is clear from the statement of objects for the amendment. Further, the amended entry also shows this as it reads 'petroleum product including natural gas and liquified petroleum gas (LPG)'. Natural Gas and LPG are not separately put from petroleum products. From the said amendment, it cannot be said that it was for the first time natural gas was included in Entry 22(a). 'Petroleum Product' is a generic or omnibus Entry. If it would have been only petrol or petroleum, then perhaps it was possible to say 'natural gas' is not included. But 'petroleum product' is a broad or comprehensive phrase and would include 'natural gas' in its fold. Any products in future which are naturally found out with petroleum or manufactured out of petroleum can be included in that Entry. It cannot be said that 'natural gas' falls outside the said phrase 'petroleum product'. The amendment of the Entry 22(a) shows the legislative intent. Further, the literature produced itself shows that gas can be measured in litres. It only requires mathematical conversion from 'volume' to 'litre'. We need not go into that mathematical formula. Merely because in 1983 the rate came to be changed from '2 paise per litre to 1% ad valorem' does not indicate that 'natural gas' was not intended to be included. It is not possible to accept that only liquids coming out of the refinery are only to be included in the phrase 'petroleum product'.

28. The scientific literature produced as pointed out above is against the petitioner. The technical literature clearly indicates that liquids, solids and gaseous substances are included in 'petroleum product'. They are all made from hydro-carbons of different complexities. Further, there is no dispute that petroleum and natural gas are two different products, but it cannot be accepted that 'natural gas' cannot be called as 'petroleum product'. Even if it is so understood in the 'petroleum industry' or commercial parlance and hence in the definition of 'petroleum product' contained in the Oil Industry (Development) Act, 1974 natural gas is included. The said Act is for establishment of the Board for the development of oil industry and for levying duty of excise on crude oil, natural gas etc. This is how oil industry understands. Petitioner has not at all shown that in 'common' or 'popular' parlance 'natural gas' is not included in the phrase 'petroleum product'. Contrary user of 'natural gas' as fuel also indicates that it is a 'petroleum product'. Thus, applying the well-settled tests as stated above, we hold that 'natural gas' is included in the phrase 'petroleum product' as mentioned in Entry 22(a).

Considering the above, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Rule discharged.

29. There is no dispute that in view of the interim order passed by this Court on 1st August, 1989, the Petitioner has not paid the octroi from 1st April, 1978 to December 1992. However, it was undertaken by the Petitioner to maintain the accounts in respect of the import of petroleum product within municipal limits and the amount of octroi duty payable. The Petitioner is directed to furnish the said account to the Respondents within one month from today. However, it is made clear that the Petitioner shall go on making payment as per the order dated 2nd February, 1994. Admittedly, the Petitioner has paid accordingly since January, 1993. The payment of octroi for the period from 1-4-1978 to December 1992 is stayed for further period of 3 months from today. The Petitioner to make payment of the octroi amount within one month after the period of three months is over. On failure to make payment within one month, the Petitioner to pay interest at 12% per annum on the said amount from the date of this order till payment thereof and respondents shall be free to realise the same.

Petition dismissed.