2002(4) ALL MR 295
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.
Shri. Chandrakant Anandrao Gurav Vs. Sou. Manisha Chandrakant Gurav
Civil Revision Application No.1386 of 2001
23rd April, 2002
Petitioner Counsel: Shri. DILIP BODAKE
Respondent Counsel: Shri. S. G. DESHMUKH
Hindu Marriage Act (1955), S.19(1) - Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (1956), S.18 - Suit for maintenance - Presentation of petition - Scope of S.19(1) of Hindu Marriage Act - Provisions of S.19(1), applicable only to that Act and cannot be extrapolated to Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act - S.19(1) is, however, relevant for limited purpose of demonstrating that it embodies legislative recognition of fact that place where marriage was solemnized, does constitute a part of cause of action, in certain cases.
Civil P.C. (1908), S.20. AIR 1983 SC 235 - Referred to. (Para 5)
Cases Cited:
Neeta Deelipkumar Suchak Vs. Deelipkumar Mohanlal Suchak, AIR 1983 Bom. 235 [Para 6]
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT :- Rule, returnable forthwith. Respondent waives service. By consent taken up for final hearing.
2. By the impugned order dated 22nd November, 2000, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara has rejected the objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and has held that the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Special Civil Suit No.123 of 1999 has been instituted by the Respondent in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara in which she has prayed for maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Civil Suit which is now pending on the file of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara was initially instituted in the form of a petition for maintenance before the Family Court at Pune. A preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Pune came to be framed and by an order dated 18th January, 1999, the learned Judge of the Family Court concluded that, that Court would have no jurisdiction. The Family Court held that the parties were married at Satara, and the Petitioner herein is a permanent resident of the District of Satara though he was then residing at Vashi where he was employed. Moreover, the parties had last resided together at the place of employment of the husband viz. at Vashi, New Bombay. In the circumstances, the Family Court was of the view that the Petition would lie either before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Satara or at Vashi, New Bombay. After the Petition was thus returned for presentation before the proper Court, the Respondent filed it before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Satara where again an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court was taken. By the impugned order dated 22nd November, 2000, the learned Trial Judge has answered the issue of jurisdiction by holding that the Court did have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.
3. It is common ground that the parties were married on 12th July, 1994 at Satara within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. The Petitioner husband had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara by filing a petition for divorce under Section 13 B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 bearing H.M.P. No.85 of 1996. In his deposition which was recorded in the aforesaid petition, the Petitioner had stated that he was a resident of village Masurne, Taluka Khatav, District Satara. The Petition came to be dismissed on the ground that the Respondent herein had withdrawn her consent. What is material, however, is that the Petitioner had furnished his address as that at Satara both in the Petition as well as in his deposition which was recorded in the year 1996. Again, it is common ground that the Petitioner has landed property at Satara, where his family, consisting of his parents, also resides.
4. In the present case, the suit for maintenance has been filed under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Unlike the provisions of Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, no specific provision in regard to the court to which a petition shall be presented is made in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Court must of necessity fall back upon the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the present case, it is common ground that (i) the parties were married at Satara and (ii) that in the previously instituted suit for divorce, the Petitioner himself furnished his address as that in the District of Satara. This was confirmed by the Petitioner in the course of his deposition. On behalf of the Petitioner, however, it was sought to be urged that in a petition under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the place where the cause of action can be stated to have arisen can only be the place where the husband had either deserted his wife or had treated her with cruelty so as to bring the case within the purview of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18.
5. In order to consider this submission, it would be necessary to note that sub-section (1) of Section 18 provides that subject to the provisions of the Section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. The suit which has been instituted by the Respondent is, therefore, a suit under Section 18 in which the Respondent claims a right to be maintained by the Petitioner, being a lawfully wedded wife of the Petitioner. What sub-section (2) of Section 18 postulates is that a Hindu wife does not forfeit her claim to maintenance and she will be entitled to live separately from her husband if any of the conditions in clauses (a) to (g) are fulfilled. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) deals with a case where a husband is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning the wife without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her. Under clause (b) the eventuality which is provided is that where the husband has treated the wife with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband. The other clauses of sub-section (2) deal with situations such as where the husband is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy, where he has any other wife living, where he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or where he habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere, where he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion or if there is any other cause justifying the wife living separately. The cause of action in a suit by a wife who claims maintenance against her husband in terms of Section 18 is that she is a Hindu wife, and that, as a lawfully wedded wife she is entitled to be but is not being maintained by her husband. The cause of action for claiming maintenance is not confined to the circumstance that the husband is guilty of desertion or that he has treated her with cruelty within the meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18. All that clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) Section 18 do is to relieve the wife of the consequence of forfeiting her claim to maintenance by providing that she will be entitled to live separately from her husband without forsaking her claim to maintenance if any one of the eventualities set out therein is fulfilled. The cause of action consists of a bundle of facts which the Plaintiff must establish in order to establish an entitlement to the grant of relief. In a suit for maintenance, the bundle of facts consists of the circumstance that parties have been lawfully married and that the husband has failed to discharge his obligation to maintain his wife. Therefore, in a suit for maintenance the place where the parties were married is not alien to the accrual of the cause of action. Though under section 19(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a petition under that Act can be presented inter alia to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized, this can be construed to be a legislative recognition of the fact that the place where the marriage was solemnized does constitute a part of the cause of action for the purpose of a matrimonial proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Undoubtedly, the provisions of Section 19 are applicable only to that Act and cannot be extrapolated to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 19(1) is, however, relevant for the limited purpose of demonstrating that it embodies legislative recognition of the fact that the place where the marriage was solemnized does constitute a part of cause of action, in certain cases.
6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner relied upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Neeta Deelipkumar Suchak Vs. Deelipkumar Mohanlal Suchak reported in AIR 1983 Bombay 235. The question which arose before this Court was whether this Court on the original side would have jurisdiction to entertain and try an application for maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. In that case, admittedly the parties were married at Kalyan. The acts of desertion and cruelty had taken place at Calcutta, Delhi and Kalyan. The only circumstance on the basis of which the Court of Bombay was claimed to have jurisdiction was that the Respondent husband had forwarded divorce papers at Bombay; certain income tax assessment papers were sent to the Petitioner wife there; and the Petitioner wife had stayed at Bombay for a short while where she delivered a child. These circumstances, it was held, were not sufficient to hold that this Court had territorial jurisdiction in law. The judgment of the learned Single Judge clearly does not decide the question as to whether the place of marriage was solemnized would furnish a part of the cause of action. Admittedly, in that case, the parties were not married within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court.
7. In the circumstances, having considered the submissions which have been urged on behalf of the Petitioner, I am of the view that the order dated 22nd November, 2001 does not call for interference and that it is correct. The Civil Revision Application is accordingly rejected.
Parties to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar/C.S. of this Court.
Certified copy expedited.