Suit (Lod.) No.1355 of 2004

19th July, 2004

Petitioner Counsel: Ms. FERESHTE SETHNA,Ms. DIPTI DAS,DUNMORR SETT
Respondent Counsel: Mr. GAUTAM PATEL,Maneksha & Sethna,Mr. S. V. MEHTA,Malvi Ranchoddas & Co.,Mr. C. D. MEHTA,Dhru Liladhar & Co.

Cases Cited:
1999(2) Mh.L.J. 643 [Para 4]
Jyoti Doshi Vs. Hindustan Hosiery Mill, 2000(4) ALL MR 389=2000(4) Mh.L.J. 228 [Para 4,16]
2002(2) Mh.L.J. 951 [Para 4]
Shri. Bipin Dalpatbhai Shah Vs. Vasantben Rasilal Zaveri, 2001(4) ALL MR 1 [Para 4,10]
Writ Petition No.1896 of 2000, dt.4-4-2001 [Para 4]
Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 782 [Para 18]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This matter is placed before me as Registry has raised objection on 5th May, 2004 of court fees. Office note is that Court Fee is required to be paid in view of para 9 of the plaint. However, office has also noted the fact that plaintiff is seeking exemption from payment of court fees under the policy of Government of Maharashtra and has undertaken to pay the maximum court fees on the date of filing of the suit. In substance, plaintiff seeks exemption in terms of notification of Government of Maharashtra dated 1st October, 1994 whereunder women litigants are exempted from paying court fees in certain disputes.

2. Being aggrieved by the office objection, plaintiff seeks directions from the Court.

3. Ms. Sethna appearing for plaintiff invites my attention to paras 1, 48, 61 and 69 of the plaint as also prayer clause (u) at page 76 and contends that suit seeks partition of the properties. The suit is filed by plaintiff in her personal capacity. In her individual capacity, she seeks relief of partition after declaring/determining her share in the properties which are more particularly mentioned in prayer (a) of the plaint. She submits that 1994 notification issued by the State of Maharashtra should be construed liberally as it is issued for benefit of women litigants. She submits that policy of the State of Maharashtra as framed in 1994 being clear, benefits thereof should not be denied by a technical view of the matter. She submits that plaintiff is on par with any widow who is seeking a share in the deceased husband's HUF property. She submits that object of the notification should not suffer. She submits that considering the fact that even a prayer for maintenance is made, it is clear that due to financial constraints, plaintiff is unable to pay the normal court fee. She submits that plaintiff's case is on par with the cases in which exemption has been granted. She submits that for all these reasons, office objection be dispensed with and the plaint should be numbered and registered in accordance with rules, after extending benefit of the notification under section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959.

4. In support of her contention Ms. Sethna places strong reliance upon decisions of this Court reported in (i) 1999(2) Mh.L.J. 643; (ii) 2000(4) Mh.L.J. 228 : 2000(4) ALL MR 389; (iii) 2002(2) Mh.L.J. 951 and a judgment of another Single Judge of this Court reported in 2001(4) ALL MR 1. In the submission of Ms. Sethna, the explanation added to the notification dated 1st October, 1994 would not alter the position, insofar as, plaintiff is concerned. She submits that an unreported decision of this Court in Writ Petition No.1896 of 2000 dated 4th April, 2001 would not in any manner affect the law laid down in the earlier decisions referred to above.

5. On the other hand, Mr. Patel appearing for some of the defendants, invites my attention to the explanation below the notification dated 1st October, 1994, introduced with effect from 23rd March, 2000 and contends that the word used therein is "means" and not "includes". He submits that whenever such word is used, the intention is to exhaust all categories and not give any extended or wider meaning to the provisions. In any event, he submits that this is not a suit for maintenance. He submits that the expression "property disputes" has been defined in the explanation to mean property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. This being the position, it is clear that efforts are being made to avoid payment of court fees. He submits that the substance of the matter will have to be considered. So considered, the claim is not an individual claim. It is made on behalf of plaintiff and defendant Nos.5 to 7. In this view of matter, concession should not be granted. He further submits that considering the nature of reliefs claimed, observations of division bench apply with full force. He submits that no exemption can be granted in a partition suit. Mr. Patel contends that although the expression "property disputes" used in the notification and defined in the explanation could be construed with reference to provisions of section 7 of Family Courts Act, yet a partition suit will not fall within the said expression and, therefore, this is a fit case where the office objection should be upheld.

6. In rejoinder Ms. Sethna admits that financial stringency is not pleaded in the plaint. However, plaint should be read as a whole. She invites my attention to para 45 of the plaint. She contends that the case of plaintiff is that she has been kept in dark about certain documents. She submits that status of plaintiff is that of a wife/widow who claims a right in HUF property of her deceased husband. This coupled with the prayer for maintenance brings the present case within the expression "property dispute" and, therefore, exemption should be granted.

7. For properly appreciating rival contentions it is necessary to refer to section 46 of Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. The said Section confers a power on the State Government to reduce or remit fees. It is a discretionary power conferred on the State Government, which has to be exercised in accordance with section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. The Government of Maharashtra in exercise of this power exempted women litigants from 1st October, 1994 from payment of court fees on any plaint, application, petitions, memorandum of appeal or any other documents specified in the first and second Schedule of the Act to be filed in any civil, family or criminal courts in cases relating to maintenance, property dispute, violence and divorce. This notification with the explanation is reproduced hereinbelow :

"Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 580 No.STP 1094/CR-859/M-1 :- Whereas, the Government of Maharashtra has recently announced a policy with a view to promote the welfare of the women. And whereas, the said welfare policy for women inter alia, provides for exemption of court fees for women litigants in cases relating to maintenance, property right, violence and divorce. And whereas, section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom.XXXVI of 1959) empowers the State Government by notification in the official gazette to reduce or to remit any of the fees mentioned in the First and Second Schedules to that Act. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom.XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra hereby remits the fees payable by women litigants on any of the plaints, applications, petitions, Memorandum of appeals or any other documents specified in the First and Second Schedules to the said Act to be filed in any Civil, family or Criminal Courts in respect of the cases relating to (a) maintenance (b) property disputes (c) violence and (d) divorce."

"Explanation :- The expression "Property Disputes" shall mean property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters."

8. It is not disputed before me that explanation has been added on 23rd March, 2000.

9. A bare perusal of the notification makes it abundantly clear that the Government of Maharashtra remits fees payable by women litigants in proceedings to be filed in any civil, family or criminal courts relating to maintenance, property disputes, violence and divorce. It is also not in dispute that the controversy before me pertains to property disputes. The contention is that this expression has been given restricted meaning inasmuch as the Government does not intend to widen its ambit and scope. It intends to exhaust the disputes pertaining to property and, therefore, in the explanation, it is stated that the same must arise out of and concerning matrimonial matters.

10. In the case of Shri. Bipin Dalpatbhai Shah Vs. Vasantben Rasilal Zaveri reported in 2001(4) ALL MR 1 decided on 6th August, 2001, a learned Single Judge (J. A. Patil, J.) of this Court held that in testamentary petition filed by a widow for succession certificate to claim certain amounts payable to legal heirs of deceased husband, filed after 23rd March, 2000, petitioner widow can claim exemption from payment of court fees for herself, her minor daughter in proportion of their share payable on death of the deceased. But insofar as two sons are concerned, they will have to pay court fees in their shares. After referring to some of the decisions in the field, the learned Single Judge in paras 8 and 13 observed as under :-

"8. My attention is also drawn to a division bench decision in Writ Petition No.1896 of 2000 which was decided on 4th April, 2001 by B. P. Singh, C.J. and Smt. Ranjana Desai. In that writ petition, the notification dated 1st October, 2000 was challenged. The Division Bench, however, repelled the challenge, observing that it is a matter of policy and it is for the Government to formulate the policy as it considers necessary and proper. The following observations made by the Division Bench are, however relevant :-

"... We find no justification to quash the impugned clarification, because the Government has clarified what, perhaps, was implicit and the intendment of Exhibit "A". Property disputes mentioned therein were intended to deal with property disputes arising out of, and concerning, matrimonial matters. Counsel for the petitioner candidly stated that since that concession was misused, and summary suits were being filed in respect of properties not in any manner concerned with matrimonial disputes, the Government may have come out with the clarification. He however, submitted that apart from property disputes arising out of, and concerning, matrimonial matters, the policy also aims at granting some concession in property disputes relating to paternal property. In view of the Clarification (Exh.B), a woman litigant will not be entitled to the remission in the matter of payment of court fees in regard to property disputes of this nature."

Any way it will be clear that the State of Maharashtra did not intend to extend the benefit of giving exemptions from court fee to the women litigant in all the property disputes. Otherwise there was no reason for the Government of Maharashtra to issue second notification dated 23rd March, 2000, though belatedly, to clarify that expression "property dispute", referred to in the first notification shall mean disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. Thus the effect of both the notifications is that a woman litigant is exempted from the payment of court fee in respect of cases relating to divorce, violence, maintenance and property disputes arising out of or concerning matrimonial matters."

"13. Coming to the fourth petition, i.e. Test. Petition No.278/2001, it is filed by the petitioner widow for succession certificate to claim certain amounts payable to the legal heirs of her deceased husband on account of his death. The petition is filed on 11th December, 2000 i.e. after the issuance of clarificatory notification dated 23rd March, 2000. Shri. Saxena, the learned Advocate for the petitioner initially tried to convince me that a claim for succession certificate is covered by "property disputes" within the meaning of both the notifications. However, it is not possible to hold that such a petition raises or concerns a dispute relating to the matrimonial matters. As pointed out by Ms. Kalyanram, the learned AGP it is the claim to the estate of the deceased. Shri. Saxena then submitted that such a petition would fall under the category of cases relating to the maintenance as contemplated by the notification dated 1st October, 1994. He pointed out that the deceased is survived by his widow (petitioner), two sons and a daughter and that the amounts which are payable on account of the death of the deceased are really required for the maintenance of the petitioner as well as three children. I have given an anxious consideration to the submission made by Shri. Saxena and I am of the opinion that the notification dated 1st October, 1994 needs to be interpreted in a liberal manner so as to extend the benefit to the women litigants contemplated under the "policy for women". I have already referred to the decisions of K. G. Shah, J. and Gokhale, J. and Nijjar, J. and I am inclined to follow the view that the women petitioner will not be required to pay the court fee only to the extent they get benefit in the estate. This being the position, the petitioner in the instant case can claim exemption from payment of court fees for herself and her minor daughter Jyoti in so far as their shares in the amount of Rs.3,83,917/- payable on the death of the deceased is concerned. However, so far as her two sons namely Nitin and Nagesh are concerned, the court fee will have to be paid on their shares on the said amount."

11. Mr. Patel, however, inviting my attention to para 8 reproduced above, contends that even the single Judge was of the view that a petition filed claiming succession certificate is not concerning a dispute relating to matrimonial matters. Therefore, he submits that in the instant case, the exemption will not be available to plaintiff for similar reasons.

12. Before going further, in my view, it is necessary to peruse the plaint. In the plaint, plaintiff avers that she has instituted the suit in her capacity as widow of late Shri. Rajnikant Kilachand, member of Rajnikant Kilachand Family Group which is a constituent of the Ambalal Kilachand Family Group and/or as an executrix of the estate of the late Shri. Rajnikant Kilachand. The plaint proceeds to narrate that plaintiff's husband Rajnikant was grand son of one Kilachand Devchand who had five sons through his second wife. The said Kilachand had another son through his first wife. Plaintiff's deceased husband was one of the two sons of late Ambalal Kilachand. It is not in dispute that Ambalal was the son of late Kilachand Devchand. After setting out the family history this is what is stated in para 9 of the plaint :

"9. The plaintiff is seeking partition of immoveable properties described in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked Exhibit-A and the moveables described in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked Exhibit-B, in respect of which the plaintiff is a tenant-in-common/co-owner and a member of the Kilachand Devchand Family along with Defendant Nos.1 to 57 as shown in the lineage table, which is annexed hereto and marked Exh.C. The plaintiff is also seeking partition of business interests in the Kilachand Complex (more particularly described hereunder) in respect of which the plaintiff is a joint owner of shares along with defendant Nos.1 to 12 and 23 to 29 herein, which Corporate Tree is detailed in Exh.D hereto. Furthermore, defendant Nos.69, 75 to 77 being chartered accountants have had close dealings with the companies belonging to the Kilachand Complex and their intricate roles/involvements are apparent from Exh.E hereto. Alternatively, the plaintiff in her capacity as widow and heir of late Rajnikant, who in turn was a joint/co-owner and/or as a member of Ambalal and Rajnikant Group, which are co-owners of the Kilachand Group, is seeking partition of business interests in the Kilachand Complex against defendant Nos.1 to 12 and 23 to 29 herein."

13. The plaint proceeds to set out Rajnikant's share in the properties. The plaintiff has alleged that on the demise of her husband on 6th August, 1997, she enjoyed her normal/routine benefits and rights of being a member of Kilachand family. However, her son Harsh Kilachand immediately cut off facilities enjoyed by her in her capacity as wife of Rajnikant, who as Chairman of Companies of Rajnikant Group enjoyed several benefits and facilities. She has also contended that although under Rajnikant's will she and defendant No.1 has been appointed as Executrix/Executor, in utter disregard and breach of the terms thereof, defendant No.1 has not parted with any information in relation to the estate of Rajnikant. He has independently instituted proceedings in this Court for grant of probate in respect of the last will and testament dated 27th March, 1997. The defendant Nos.1 and 23 have illegally perpetuated control over family companies to the exclusion of rightful members, such as plaintiff and defendant No.1. The plaintiff has alleged that by her letter dated 12th May, 2003 addressed to defendant Nos.23, 33 and 50, she sought partition of the moveable and immovable properties as well as interalia of the companies/partnerships and trusts. The response to this letter was in the negative and, therefore, she has been forced to file the present suit. She contends that prior to 2003, she approached Senior members of the family to ensure fair and equitable distribution but no solution was found. Therefore, she had to institute the present suit. She contends that defendants are trying to usurp share of plaintiff to her detriment. It is in these circumstances, the suit is instituted with the following prayers:-

"(a) That a preliminary decree of partition be passed declaring/determining the share of the plaintiff as may be determined by this Hon'ble Court in all the properties movable, immovable, assets, effects, cash, businesses, listed and mentioned in Exhs.A, B, D, F and K together with separation of her share therein and possession thereof;

(b) That a final decree of partition of all the properties, movable, immovable, assets, effects, cash businesses, listed and mentioned in Exhibits A, B, D, F and K together with such properties and assets as form Kilachand family property, which is liable to be the subject matter of the sought partition, pursuant to disclosure in this suit as prayed hereinafter, be passed, and the plaintiff's share as determined by this Hon'ble Court be separated, with possession to be declared as her exclusive possession;

(c) That this Hon'ble Court order and declare the plaintiff to be entitled to the free and unhindered use and occupation of all offices or business premises owned and/or controlled, directly and/or indirectly, by defendant Nos.1 to 12 and 23 to 29 as also the business entities under their direct and/or indirect control, viz., the offices or business premises of entities listed in Exh.F hereto, including a definite share of independent user of 6,624 sq. ft. area or joint user of 19,872 sq. ft. in the demised commercial premises situate on the 4th, 5th and 6th floors of the East and West Wing of Oriental House, 7, Jamshedji Tata Road, Churchgate, Mumbai-400 020 and/or such other area therein as may be found by this Hon'ble Court to comprise the legitimate share of the plaintiff, together with full right to use and occupy a defined share in the premises of all Kilachand Group of Companies, and more particularly defendant Nos.78 to 105 (excluding defendant Nos.89 and 90) including their subsidiaries and/or affiliates and/or offshoots as the case may be, situate in Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Calcutta, Chennai, Baroda as listed in Exhibit-F hereto and inclusive of all such locales as are the subject matter of a disclosure in this suit, without any interference from any of the defendants."

14. Vide prayer clause (u), interim maintenance has been claimed. In para 69 of plaint, it is stated that for purpose of court fees and jurisdiction, although exact value of the property sought to be partitioned and/or share of plaintiff therein is currently not easily ascertainable, plaintiff's share in the said properties would be worth several crores. However, being a woman litigant, plaintiff is entitled to seek the benefit of the aforementioned policy and has undertaken that in the event she is held liable to pay court fees, then she will deposit the same as per the orders and directions of this Court.

15. The plaint averments are therefore clear. The Government of Maharashtra has framed a policy for upliftment of women in general. It is on the basis that development of women in India is rooted in the constitution. It legitimises positive discrimination in favour of women and children in the State. The goal of Government is to ensure an improvement in the physical, mental, social and emotional quality of life of women of the State. This goal will be attained through ensuring equality for women in every sphere of life, but specially in political, economical, social, emotional and cultural areas. One of the issues on which attention is focussed is ensuring equality both in spirit and letter of the law and improving economic status of women. The policy document has several heads. One of which is women and law. It is in this regard that policy envisages exemption of court fees for women litigants. The intention is that opportunity should be made available to women to redress their grievances and have recourse to law on par with every other citizen. Legal systems and laws have evolved over many years. For most women, however, an opportunity to redress their grievances and recourse to law has remained on paper. As a part of review of all statutes, dealing with womens' access to the property both at the matrimonial and maternal home and ensure equality to the economy and review the working and procedures of family court that exemption in court fees has been provided.

16. In Jyoti Doshi Vs. Hindustan Hosiery Mill reported in 2000(4) Mh.L.J. 228 a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the notification dated 23rd March, 2000 will not restrict and/or govern and/or control exemption granted by the earlier notification dated 1st October, 1994. The said notification provides for exemption of court fees to women litigants provided the suits instituted by them are in their personal capacity. It was held that exemption will clearly be made available to all women litigants who have filed suits in this Court in their personal capacity. The learned Single Judge heard submissions on the scope and applicability of the exemption notification dated 1st October, 1994 and whether notification dated 23rd March, 2000 adding the explanation restricts or controls the earlier notification. Somewhat identical submissions were made before the learned Judge and after referring to the decisions rendered by this Court on the first notification, this is what is observed by the learned Single Judge in paras 10 and 19.

"10. From the above referred different judgments and orders passed by various judges, what emerges is as follows :-

(a) In a suit for specific performance, a learned Judge has taken a view that the court fees would not be payable if the suit is filed by a lady litigant. That judgment has been rendered as back as on 19th September, 1995;

(b) In matters of probate petition and similar proceedings also, the lady litigants have been exempted from the requirement of payment of court fees to the extent they are the beneficiaries in the property which has been the view taken by me on 28th April, 1999 and the same approach has been continued by another Judge (Nijjar, J.);

(c) In matters of mental torture, a counter-claim by a lady litigant has been entertained without payment of court fees by an order passed on 19th March, 1997;

(d) In a matter of motor accident claim, though invoking provisions of Rule 257(3) of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, a learned Judge has taken a view that property will include immovable as well as movable and exempted a lady litigant from payment of court fees by an order passed on 24th October, 1997;

(e) In a summary suit, a learned Judge has taken a view on 18th February, 1998 that court fees would not be payable (though that was also on the footing of the Assistant Government Pleader conceding to that position).

Thus we have judgments covering different facets of property disputes such as suits for specific performance, summary suits, claims to the Motor Accident Tribunal, claims seeking compensation for mental torture and probate petition and application for succession certificate which have all held women litigants to be exempt from court fees. All these judgments and orders have been given during this intervening period and have remained and are being followed in different courts including this court whenever such controversies are coming before the Court. There are two judgments taking a different view. One given by the appeal Court in a bank suit wherein a lady director sought exemption from court fees. In an appeal filed by her, the Division Bench has taken the view that she would not be eligible to claim exemption from payment of court fees. And in a suit claiming compensation another Judge has taken a view that property dispute does not include tortious liability."

"19. I have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the women litigants as well as the counsel for the defendants as also by the Advocate General.

(i) As far as the two issues which have been framed by me are concerned, my answer on Issue No.2 will be that the Notification dated 23rd March, 2000 will not restrict and/or govern and/or control the exemption granted by the earlier Notification of 1st October, 1994 with regard to payment of court fees to women litigants provided those are suits filed by women litigants in their personal capacity. The suits filed by them as directors of companies or as partners of firms will not make them eligible to get the exemption in the pending matters.

(ii) As far as the applicability of the Notification of 1st October, 1994 is concerned, which is issue No.1, it will continue to apply to the suits which are already filed and which are pending in this court though subject to the above, namely that those suits which are filed by women directors of companies or women partners of partnership firms will not make them eligible for exemption under the Notification.

(iii) The answers to these two issues will grant exemption normally to all the women litigants who have filed their suits in this court in their personal capacity and which are pending in objection before the Prothonotary and Senior Master, subject to the exceptions stated above.

(iv) In those cases, where however, for reasons to be recorded, the Prothonotary takes the view that the women litigants are required to pay the court fees, that would be subject to a revision as provided under section 5(1) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959.

(v) This will also not prevent the defendants from raising their objections when the suits are lodged and numbered without payment of court fees. They will be entitled to raise their objections before the concerned Judge by filing their written statements as and when the suit is taken up for hearing.

(vi) In matters of probate petition and succession certificate, my brother K. G. Shah, J. in his earlier order has taken the view that the moment a lady litigant files a proceeding, she will not be required to pay the court fees. I have taken a view after referring to the judgment of K. G. Shah, J. that the women beneficiaries will not be required to pay the court fees only to the extent they are getting benefit in the estate. The same view is taken by Nijjar, J. in his order of 10th February, 2000 but he has specifically differed with the view taken by K. G. Shah, J. The office faces the problem and as far as pending matters are concerned, a query was made to Nijjar, J. as to what approach the office should adopt. My brother Nijjar, J. kept the decision in abeyance since the present controversy was pending in this Court. In view of what is stated above, in my view, it would be appropriate that from the date of the order passed by Nijjar, J. i.e. 10th February, 2000 effect be given to the view that I have taken as well as the view taken by Nijjar, J. viz. that only to the extent women are beneficiaries, court fees will not be required.

(vii) Needless to state that the matters filed on and after 23rd March, 2000 will be governed under the Notification of that date."

17. As to whether this view holds the field after the observations of the Division Bench dated 4th April, 2001 needs to be seen now. According to Division Bench, the clarification/explanation is nothing but a clarification of what was implicit in the main part. Property disputes mentioned in the earlier part are property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. The Division Bench noted that suits were filed including summary suit and concession was misused by raising claims in respect of properties not in any manner concerned with matrimonial disputes. Therefore, the clarification came vide the explanation. The Division Bench noted the submission that concession in property disputes will not relate to paternal property and women litigant will not be entitled to remission in respect of payment of court fees in regard to property disputes of this nature. The challenge to the explanation was, therefore, rejected.

18. In my view, decisions of single Judges to which a reference has been made hereinabove, continue to hold the field. The observations of the Division Bench while dealing with the challenge to the explanation, does not alter the legal position. The expression property dispute is explained to mean disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. It is pertinent to note that expression matrimonial matters has not been defined. While, the main part of notification refers to case relating to maintenance, violence and divorce, the explanation only defines expression "property disputes". Even while defining or explaining them the intent is not to restrict the disputes but clarify the concept. Said concept is clarified. The expression has been defined keeping in mind a relationship. Disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters have to be given the meaning which the legislature/Government intended to give. In other words, whenever, terms such as "arising out of", "concerning" are used, the idea is not to restrict the expression but to give a wider meaning to the same. The expression property disputes is defined to mean property disputes arising (out) of and concerning matrimonial matters. The terms "arising out of" and "concerning" are wide enough but they have to be considered in the context of matrimonial matters. Although it is not necessary to go in details but whenever such expressions are used, then how the same have to be construed has been subject matter of decision in number of judgments rendered by the Supreme Court. In the case of Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 782, the Supreme Court in paras 48 and 49 has held thus :-

"48. The words "arising out of" have been used in the sense that it comprises purchase of shares and lands from income arising out of the Kanpur undertaking. We are of the opinion that the words "pertaining to" and "in relation to" have the same wide meaning and have been used interchangeably for among other reasons, which may include avoidance of repetition of the same phrase in the same clause or sentence, a method followed in good drafting. The word "pertain" is synonymous with the word "relate", see Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 17, page 693."

"49. The expression "in relation to" (so also pertaining to) is a very broad expression which presupposes another subject matter. These are words of comprehensiveness which might both have a direct significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the context, see State Wakf Board Vs. Abdul Azeez, AIR 1968 Mad. 79, 81 paragraphs 8 and 10, following and approving Nital Charan Bagchi Vs. Suresh Chandra Paul, (1962)66 Cal. WN 767, Shyam Lal Vs. M. Shayamlal, AIR 1933 All 649 (FB) and 76 Corpus Juris Secundum 621. Assuming that the investments in shares and in lands do not form part of the undertakings but are different subject matters, even then these would be brought within the purview of the vesting by reason of the above expressions. In this connection reference may be made to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that the term "relate" is also defined as meaning to bring into association or connection with. It has been clearly mentioned that "relating to" has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous with as to "concerning with" and "pertaining to". The expression "pertaining to" is an expression of expansion and not of contraction."

It is not necessary for me to decide in this case as to what would be covered by the term "matrimonial matters". Mr. Patel has invited my attention to the provisions of section 7 of Family Courts Act, 1984, the same reads thus:-

"7. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall,

(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation; and

(b) be deemed, for the purpose of exercising such jurisdiction under such law to be a District Court, or as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends;

Explanation :- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely :-

(a) A suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;

(b) A suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;

(c) A suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;

(d) A suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;

(e) A suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;

(f) A suit or proceeding for maintenance;

(g) A suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.

2. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise -

(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter-IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and

(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment."

19. In the context of section 7 of the Family Courts Act, it is possible to hold that the term "matrimonial matters" would include within its import, cases not just of divorce, judicial separation, annulment of marriage, interim maintenance, alimony, custody of children, maintenance envisaged by marriage laws but matters concerning property rights which arise out of matrimonial relationship. The term has to be understood in the context of a relationship after marriage and qua a family. Ultimately, all family matters were intended to be adjudicated by a family court. While interpreting a provision, which is beneficial in nature law is intended to confer a right on a weaker section so as to remove an obstacle and give opportunity to seek redress. If two interpretations are reasonably possible, then one which will be in favour of woman's right to seek remedy will have to be preferred; rather than denying her an opportunity at the threshold. However, the wider question need not be finally decided in this case.

20. Suffice for me to state that in the present case, the status of plaintiff is that of a wife/widow. She is claiming a declaration of her share in the property of her deceased husband on the basis that she has a right therein upon his demise. She has averred that, that right is being denied to her not just by other members of her deceased husband's family but even her own son. She claims her individual right in the properties and prays for ascertainment of the share therein and upon such ascertainment to grant the same and for that purpose, even, partition the assets and properties, by metes and bounds. It is, therefore, a clear case where on account of matrimonial relationship, the plaintiff asserts her right in the properties of her deceased husband which devolves either in terms of intestate succession or by testamentary disposition being executrix and beneficiary of the estate. This is a case of a woman beneficiary coming as a litigant to the court seeking her share in the estate of her deceased husband, denied to her by the members of the husband's family. In my view, such matter is covered by the explanation and could safely be termed as a property dispute arising out of matrimonial relationship. To the extent of the plaintiff's share in the property of her deceased husband she is therefore, entitled to seek exemption from payment of court fees. It is clarified that after adjudication, if ultimately, it is found that the plaintiff is not sole beneficiary but there are others then to the extent of her sons share, plaintiff or the sons will have to pay court fee. Suit for partition is not a suit where parties are strictly adversaries. It is a suit where all parties are plaintiffs and defendants. In such litigation it will not be proper to hold that the woman litigant would be entitled for exemption in payment of court fees, not just qua her share as beneficiary but even that of her sons. As held by this Court (Patil, J.), exemption will be restricted to the plaintiff and her share in the estate of deceased.

21. Consequently, the office is in error in insisting on payment of court fees by the plaintiff women litigant. It is held that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit and exemption under notification dated 1st October, 1994. She is, therefore, exempted from payment of court fees prescribed under Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. Office to proceed. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order.

Order accordingly.