Civil Revision Application No.155 of 2003

6th June, 2005

Petitioner Counsel: Shri. A. P. MOHARIL
Respondent Counsel: Shri. A. K. CHOUBE

Cases Cited:
Lilabai Waghela Vs. Keshaorao Tidke, 1986 Mh.L.J. 207 [Para 4]
Kutubunnisa Begum Vs. Bilquees Jahan Begum, 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 184 [Para 5]
Salimkhan Vs. Mohammed Ibrahimkhan, 1987 Mh.L.J. 283 [Para 6]
Ashok Vs. Pannalal, 1996(4) ALL MR 643=1996(2) Mh.L.J. 719 [Para 7]
Habib Dar Vs. Mst. Zoona Bibi, AIR 1965 J&K 48 [Para 7]
Bimla Rani Kohli Vs. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Private Limited, AIR 1972 Allahabad 242 [Para 8]
Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 [Para 9]
Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai, (1987)1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203 [Para 10,11,12]
Shyamaraju Hegde Vs. Venkatesh Bhat, (1987)4 JT 663 : AIR 1987 SC 2323 [Para 11]
Jetha Bai and Sons, M/s. Jew Town Vs. M/s. Sunderdas Rathenai, AIR 1988 SC 812 [Para 11]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- In this Civil Revision Application under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, challenge is to the judgment dated 20-3-2003 delivered by Second Additional District Judge, Nagpur in R.C.A.574/2001 in an appeal under section 26-A of Provincial Small Causes Court Act (referred to as Provincial Act hereafter) whereby said court has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 30-10-2001 delivered by Additional Judge, Small Causes Court Nagpur in Civil Suit no.1435/1986. The revision applicant is the original tenant and defendant in Civil Suit and appellant in appeal. The present respondent obtained permission from Rent Controller under provisions of C.P. and Berar House Rent Control Order 1949 and also from competent authority under the provisions of Slum Act and, then terminated tenancy of present revision applicant by issuing notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. When the revision applicant failed to comply with that notice, he filed above referred Civil Suit for his ejectment, for recovery of arrears of rent, notice charges, inquiry into future mesne profits etc. The Small Causes Court granted decree of eviction in his favour and the revision applicant/tenant filed above-mentioned appeal which also came to be dismissed. Thereafter he has filed present civil revision. The revision has been admitted for early final hearing and possession of revision applicant has been protected. The respondent landlord then filed Civil Application 8505 of 2004 for early hearing and the application was rejected on 11-2-2005 as this court did not find any instance of severe hardship. However at that time respondent/landlord made grievance that revision itself was not maintainable. Both the counsels agreed to argue the matter on maintainability and accordingly matter was listed from time to time before this Court. After hearing parties on the point of maintainability, Revision was closed for orders on that point.

2. Advocate Choube for respondent landlord has invited attention of this Court to section 7 of C.P.C. to point out that section 115 thereof is expressly excluded insofar as Small Causes Court is concerned. He contends that a remedy of appeal under Section 26-A of Provincial Act is provided against the judgment of Small Causes Court and the said appellate judgment is final in view of section 27 thereof. Advocate for Revision applicant Shri. Moharil argued that section 27 has no application because it does not refer to the appellate order at all and the appeal court namely the District Court is a Court subordinate to High Court and as such remedy of Revision under section 115 C.P.C. is correctly availed of. In the alternative and by way of abundant prosecution he also stated that if this court ultimately finds that revision under section 115 C.P.C. is not tenable, revision applicant should be permitted to file appropriate writ petition in High Court and till then interim orders operating in revision protecting his possession should be continued.

3. The provisions of Provincial Act therefore need to be considered . It is important to note that said provisions are amended by Maharashtra Amendment at No.24 of 1984 with effect from 1-1-1985. Considering the nature of present controversy, it would be appropriate to first look into the relevant unamended provisions prevalent before said date. Section 24 to section 27 are the relevant sections in this respect. Said sections read as under :-

24. Appeal from certain orders of Courts of small causes - Where an order specified in clause (ff) of clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 104 of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is made by a Court of Small Causes, an appeal therefrom shall lie to the District Court on the ground on which an appeal from such order would lie under that section.

25. Revision of decrees and orders of Court of Small Causes - The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.

26. Amendment of Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure - repealed in 1888.

27. Finality of decrees and orders - Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by court of small causes shall be final.

The relevant amended provisions as introduced by Maharashtra Act No.24 of 1984 with effect from 1-1-1985 read as under :-

26. The Suit or proceedings between licensors and licensees or landlords and tenants for recovery of possession of immovable property and license fee or rent, except those to which other Acts apply to lie in Court of Small Causes - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, but subject to provisions of sub-section (2), the Court of small causes shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in the area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court of small causes or relating to recovery of license fee or charges or rent therefor, irrespective of the value of the subject matter of such Suit or proceedings.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to suits or proceedings for recovery of possession of any immovable property or of license fee or charges or rent thereof, to which the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 or the Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Act, 1976, or any other law for the time being in force, apply.

26-A : Appeal : (1) An appeal shall lie, from a decree or order made by the court of small cause exercising jurisdiction under section 26 of the District Court.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be made within 30 days from the date of decree or order, as the case may be :

Provided that, in computing the period of limitation prescribed by this sub-section, the provisions contained in sections 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act 1963 shall and, so far as maybe, apply.

(3) No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1).

(4) The District Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by the court of small causes was according to law, call for the case in which decree on order was made and pass such order with respect there to as it thinks fit.

26-B- XXXXX XXXXXX

26-C : Notwithstanding anything contained in section 16, all suits and the proceedings cognizable by Court of small causes under this Chapter and pending in District Court or the Court of any Civil Judge on the date of coming into force of the Provincial Small Causes Courts and Presidency Small Causes Courts (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be continued and disposed of by the District Court or the court of Civil Judge, as the case maybe, as if this Chapter had not been enacted.

In this background, it is also necessary to look into section 7 C.P.C. it reads :-

7. Provincial Small Causes Courts - The following provisions shall not extend to Courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, or under the Berar Small Causes Courts Law 1906, or the Courts exercising the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes under the said Act or law to the Courts in any part of India to which the said Act does not extend exercising a corresponding jurisdiction that is to say -

(a) so much of the body of the code as relates to -

(i) suit excepted from cognizance of a Court of Small Causes;

(ii) the execution of decree against immovable property; and

(b) the following sections, that is to say -

section 9, sections 91 and 92, sections 94 and 95 so far as they authorise or relate to -

(i) order for attachment of immovable property;

(ii) injunctions;

(iii) the appointment of a receiver of immovable property; or

(iv) the interlocutory orders referred to in clause (e) of section 94, and sections 96 to 112 and 115.

4. In Lilabai Waghela Vs. Keshaorao Tidke reported at 1986 Mh.L.J. 207, the learned Single Judge of this Court has considered the position in the light of 1984 amendment of Provincial Act and has found that provisions of Section 26 cannot be regarded as continuation of the jurisdiction, however limited, which the court of small causes had under items 4 and 8 of the Second Schedule, but the object was to create a larger jurisdiction for entertaining the suits and proceedings which till the amendment could not be entertained by Court of Small Causes and to make the orders and decrees of the Court of Small Causes subject to an appeal to the District Court. Ultimately it was held that the said right of filing appeal to District Court was available only in suits filed on or after 1st January, 1985 and pending suits had to be decided as if the amendment had not come into force i.e. by filing revision in High Court under section 25. Perusal of amendment also reveals that powers of revision available to High Court under Section 25 of Provincial Act are also conferred upon District Court vide section 26-A(4). Question raised is whether in this background, after the District Court decides appeal under section 26-A, can High Court in exercise of powers under section 115 of C.P.C., revise such appellate order. It is to be noted that Section 25 is retained as it is in Provincial Act and section 27 has been renumbered as 25-A.

5. In Kutubunnisa Begum Vs. Bilquees Jahan Begum reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 184 these amended provisions have been considered and it has been held that an appeal lies under section 26-A(1) from final as also interim order made by Small Causes Court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 26 of Provincial Act.

6. In Salimkhan Vs. Mohammed Ibrahimkhan reported at 1987 Mh.L.J. 283 question arose whether ceiling of Rs.3,000/- prescribed for filing of appeal under section 96 C.P.C. would apply to appeal filed under section 26-A(1) of Provincial Act & it has been held that said ceiling limit is not applicable to such appeals. It has been held that section 96(4) prescribing such limit would be applicable to other suits contemplated by section 15 & 16 of Provincial Act & not to suits under section 26 thereof.

7. In 1996(2) Mh.L.J. 719 Ashok Vs. Pannalal it is held that appeal under section 26-A is available even to challenge the orders passed in distress warrant proceedings under chapter IV-A of Provincial Act. It has been held that jurisdiction under section 26(1) is not continuation or enlargement of earlier jurisdiction under section 15 of Provincial Act but is an entirely new & exclusive jurisdiction. When scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of Provincial Act and section 115 of C.P.C. is considered, it is settled that scope of revision under Section 25 is wider. In A.I.R. 1965 J&K 48 between Habib Dar Vs. Mst. Zoona Bibi in paragraph 2 the learned single judge has observed -

"The learned counsel for the respondent has stated that scope of latter section is narrower than that of section 115 of CPC. But I'm afraid his statement of this proposition of law in not correct. There is continuous series of authorities on the point that scope of section 24 of Small Causes Courts Act (Section 25 of the Indian Act) is wider than of section 115 CPC. These authorities begin from Sher Vs. Mohan Singh, 66 Pun Re 1895 up to date."

8. In Uttar Pradesh the powers of revision under Section 25 of Provincial Act were exercised by District Judge. Question arose whether revision under Section 115 of CPC was tenable against revisional order of District Judge. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in ruling between Bimla Rent Kohli Vs. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Private Limited reported at AIR 1972 Allahabad 242 considered this issue. The ruling is over-ruled but is mentioned only to show the line of reasoning adopted by the said Division Bench. After referring to section 7 CPC and section 27 of Provincial Act, the Division Bench found that section 27 does not give finality to orders passed by Courts other than Courts of small causes. It was found that there was, thus no apparent bar to a case decided by District Judge being revised by High Court under section 115 CPC. The Division Bench therefore held that revision under section 115 of CPC was maintainable.

9. This issue is considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 1980 SC 892 "Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad" and the Hon'ble Apex Court held that such revision is not maintainable. The above referred Division Bench ruling of Allahabad High Court has been overruled. Relevant discussion in this respect is contained in paragraphs 13, 16, 17 and 22 which is as under :-

"13. The controversy whether it is open to the High Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under Section 115 the District Court presents little difficulty. The basis for determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction. And legislative history comes to our aid. The consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide the work load of revision petitioners between the High Court and the District Court and decentralise that jurisdiction. That purpose was sought to be achieved by classifying all cases into two mutually exclusive categories depending on the valuation of the suit out of which they arose. In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction - to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court - would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose is meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs.20,000/-, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs.20,000/-. That was never intended at all.

16. We shall now advert to the second question, whether a revisional order of the District Court under Section 25, Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 originally provided :

"25. The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit."

Section 25 was amended in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh from time to time. The first amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court, so that the District Judge became the repository of revisional power instead of the High Court. A further amendment, made in 1972 added a proviso, which declared that in relation to any cases decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes, the power of revision under Section 25 would vest in High Court.

17. The question before us arises in those cases only where the district Judge has exercised revisional power under Section 25. Is an order so made open to revision by the High Court under S.115 Code of Civil Procedure? An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders made by a Court of Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under Section 24 and Section 25 respectively. Cases in which the District Judge and the High Court respectively exercise revisional power, are specifically mentioned. A complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in the Act. Moreover, Section 27 of the Act provides :

"27. Finality of decrees and orders. - Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be final."

The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. It is a point for consideration that had Section 25, in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, continued in its original form the High Court would have exercised the revisional power under Section 25, and no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. All the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of abundant caution, Sec.7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of Sections 96 to 102 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues of take effect. No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under Sec.25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge. It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. We are of firm opinion that the Central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in Section 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act represented a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute.

22. It has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad (Civil Appeal No.2844 of 1979) that in case this Court is of the opinion that a revision petition under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, is not maintainable the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under Sec.115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under Sec.115 is a separate and district proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of Constitution, and cannot be identified with the other." (Emphasis added.)

The underlined portion emphasised above clearly shows that same rationale is also applicable in State of Maharashtra after 1984 amendment. Instead of providing a revision to District Court, the Legislature in Maharashtra has provided appeal to District Court. And the same time by Sec.26-A(4), District Court has also been enabled to exercise revisional powers. There can not be any dispute that when a competent authority makes any new law which is totally inconsistent with earlier law and the two can not stand together, it has to be taken as repeal of such earlier law. It is thus clear that High Court cannot examine appellate order under section 26-A(1) of Provincial Act in revision under Section 25 of Provincial Act and, even otherwise in view of section 7 of CPC, Section 115 has no application.

10. Similar view is again reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment reported at AIR 1987 SC 203 "Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai". The Hon'ble Apex Court here has considered provisions of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act 1965 to resolve the question whether the revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court from a revisional order passed under Section 20 of the said Act? The following discussion made in paragraphs 15, 18, 20, 22, 23 and 24 is important.

"15. Under the scheme of the Act is appears that a landlord who wants eviction of his tenant has to move for eviction and the case has to be disposed of by the Rent Control Court. That is provided by sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act. From the Rent Control Court, an appeal lies to the Appellate Authority under the conditions laid down under sub-section (1)(b) of S.18 of the Act. From the Appellate Authority a revision in certain circumstances lies in case where the appellate authority is a Subordinate Judge to the District Court and in other cases to the High Court. In this case as mentioned hereinbefore the appeal lay from Rent Control Court to the appellate authority who was the Subordinate Judge and therefore the revision lay to the District Judge. Indeed it is indisputed that the respondent has in his case taken resort to all these provisions. After the dismissal of the revision by the District Judge form the appellate decision of the Subordinate Judge who confirmed the order of the Rent Controller, the respondent-landlord chose again to go before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question, is, can he have a second revision to the High Court? Shri. Poti submitted that he cannot. We are of the opinion that he is right. This position is clear if sub-section (5) of S.18 of the Act is read in conjunction with S.20 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18, as we have noted hereinbefore, clearly stipulates that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Controller 'shall be final' and 'shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law', except as provided in Section 20. By Section 20, a revision is provided where the appellate authority is Subordinate Judge to the District Judge and in other cases, that is to say, where the appellate authority is District Judge, to the High Court. The ambits of revisional powers are well-settled and need not be re-stated. It is inconceivable to have two revisions. The scheme of the Act does not warrant such a conclusion. In our opinion, the expression 'shall be final' in the Act means what it says.

18. This Court observed at page 766 (of SCR) (at P.1447 of AIR) that a combined reading of the said two sections made it clear that subject to the right of appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law, the order passed by the Controller or an order passed on appeal was final and could not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. The use of the expression 'shall be final' will have to be understood in the proper context and keeping in view the purpose of the different sections.

19. On behalf of the respondent, Shri. Iyer relied on a decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on which the High Court had rested its decision on Ouseph Vareed Vs. Mary, 1968 Ker LT 583 : (AIR 1969 Ker 103) in repelling the submission by the appellant on this aspect. There the High Court was concerned with the identical Act. Balakrishna Eradi, J. speaking for the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on this contention after referring to several decisions observed at pages 588-589 (of Ker LT) : (at P.107 of AIR) of the report as follows :

"The contention of the respondent that the decision of the District Court rendered under S.20(1) is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code is based mainly on the provision for finality contained in S.18(5) of the Act. That Section is in the following terms :-

"The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in S.20."

What is to be noted here is that there is nothing in the Section which says that the decision of the revisional authority under S.20 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any higher Court.'

20. The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Maung Ba Thaw Vs. Ma Pin, AIR 1934 PC 81. The learned Judge also referred to a decision of this Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. S. B. Sarup Singh, (AIR 1965 SC 1442) (supra). The learned Judge concluded that so long as there was no specific provision in the statute making the determination by the District Court final and excluding the supervisory power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it had to be held that the decision rendered by the District Court under Section 20(1)of the Act being a decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court was liable to be revised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that view of the matter, the Full Bench rejected the view of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kurien Vs. Chacko, 1960 Ker LT 1248. With respect, we are unable to sustain the view of the Full Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter. In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20. It cannot be said that the High Court which is a Court of law and which is a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The Courts must so construe.

22. Indeed this view, in our opinion, is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad, (1980)3 SCR 32 : (AIR 1980 SC 892) where this Court was concerned with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the amendments made therein which superseded the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court. The High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction from an order of District Judge disposing of revision petition. This Court observed that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred on the High Court of a State power to remove any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate Court in cases where the error could not be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction. Thereafter tracing the history of the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act, 1976, this Court observed that the amendment superseded the scheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction with effect from 1st February, 1977. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was amended from time to time in its application to the State of U.P. The two questions that fell for consideration before this Court were (1) whether the High Court possessed the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and (ii) whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of C.P.C. against an order of District Court under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. It was held that the High Court was not vested with that revisional jurisdiction. This Court was of the view that an order under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was not of a Court of District Court and was not amenable to revisional jurisdiction. This Court further observed that an examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act indicated that it was self-sufficient code so far as the enquiry covered by that Act was concerned. All the indications in that Act were to the effect. After analysing the scheme and referring to the decisions of this Court, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded.

23. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 of C.P.C.

24. It was urged that in case we are of the opinion that a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not lie, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accede. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is different from revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two procedures are not interchangeable though there are some common features. It must, however, be emphasized that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act."

11. Again similar view is reiterated Hon'ble Apex Court while holding that there is not conflict in its ruling reported at A.I.R. 1987 SC 203 (supra) and A.I.R. 1987 SC 2323, (Shyamaraju Hegde Vs. Venkatesh). Said ruling reported at AIR 1988 SC 812, Jetha Bai and Sons, M/s. Jew Town Vs. M/s. Sunderdas Rathenai. Question for consideration was common question of law viz. whether against an order of a District Court in revision under S.20, Kerala Building (Lease and Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965 (for short the Kerala Act), a further revision would lie to the High Court under S.115, C.P.C. Though the question was not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai (1987)1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203 (supra), the appeals were listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and a later decision of Apex court in Shyamaraju Hegde Vs. J. Venkatesh Bhat (1987)4 JT 663 : (AIR 1987 SC 2323) and whether the view taken in the earlier case required reconsideration. Aundal Ammal's case arose under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge's case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Following are the important paragraphs of the judgment:-

"15. Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different. However, to clarify matters further we may point out the difference between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity. Under the Kerala Act, against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided by over by a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal under S.18. The Appellate Authority has to be a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Appellate Authority has been conferred powers co-extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having overriding effect. Having these factors in mind, the Legislature had declared that in so far as an order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority; and in so far as an Appellate Authority is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of Law except as provided in S.20. As regards S.20, a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and the District Court. In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under S.18, the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, the High Court has been constituted the Revisional Authority. The revisional powers conferred under S.20, whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by a High Court under S.115, C.P.C. Under S.20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or property of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have been expressly conferred powers of remand under S.20-A of the Act. Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case before the Rent Control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before three Courts viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court, there was no need to make the revisional order of the District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code. It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203) (supra) that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms of S.20 read with S.18(5), in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion. According to the Full Bench, a revisional order of a District Court under S.20 laid itself open for further challenge to the High Court under S.115, C.P.C. because of two factors viz., (1) there was no mention in the Act that the order would be final, and (2) that there was no provisions in the Act for an appeal being filed against a revisional order under S.20. The full Bench failed to notice certain crucial factors. In the first place, S.20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court. Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under S.20 will not have finality because the Section does not specifically say so, then it will follow that a revisional order passed by the High Court under S.20(1) also will not have finality. Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of its powers of revision under S.20(1) can be subjected to further revision because S.20(1) has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that Section. Secondly, the terms of S.20(1) have to be read in conjunction with S.18(5). Section 18(5), as already seen, declares that an order of a Rent Control Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in S.20. When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective stages unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under S.20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality. The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in S.20. These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under S.115, C.P.C. to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court under S.20 of the Act. This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203) (supra). As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar's case (AIR 1980 SC 892) the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court and for determining the legislative intent, the Court must as far as possible construe a statute is such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.

16. At thought may occur to some whether by a rigid construction of S.20(1) read with S.18(5), the High Court's power of superintendence over the District Court, even when it functions as a revisional Court under S.20(1) of the Kerala Act will not stand forfeited. We may only state that legislative history would indicate that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by a High Court under S.115, C.P.C. appear to have been conferred and vested "because the supervisory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition over Subordinate Courts in the mofussil could not be exercised, (and hence) it would be reasonable, to hold that it was intended ........to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue the high prerogative writ and the power of supervision under the Charter Act and its successor provisions in the Constitution Act." Vide para 10, S. S. Khanna Vs. F. J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497.

17. Incidentally, we may also point out that the Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution over all Courts and tribunals which are within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction.

18. Having said so much it is really not necessary for us to dwell at length about the decision in Shyamaraju's case (AIR 1987 SC 2323) restoring the ratio in Krishnaji's case (ILR(1978) Kant. 1585) (FB) and disapproving the decision in Yaragatti's case (AIR 1987 Kant 186) (1713). Even so we cannot but refer to the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely taken away and entire proceedings are sought to be limited to a two tier system viz., the Rent Control Court and the Revisional Court, whereas under the Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz., the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court. Though S.48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under S.50 in more or less the same terms as in S.18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words "shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question" etc. has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions, present distinctly different perspectives. It is in that situation it was found in Shyamaraju's case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal's case (AIR 1977 SC 1555) and Krishnadas Bhatija's case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar's case (AIR 1980 SC 892) and Aundal Ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203). In fact, it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji's case (ILR(1978) Kant 1585) was a party to the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case and the learned Judge, while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case.

19. There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision rendered in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and Shyamaraju's case (AIR 1987 SC 2323)(supra). As to the question whether a fresh thinking is called for on the scope of S.20 read with S.18(5) of the Kerala Act, we do not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in Aundal Ammal's case and on the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal's case (AIR 1987 SC 203).

23. In accordance with our pronouncement it follows that the order of the High Court under S.115, C.P.C. in each of the appeals concerned, viz., Civil Appeals Nos.626 of 1981, 624 of 1985, 2079 of 1981, 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of 1983 will stand set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case will stand restored and become operative. As the appeals are directed only against the order of the High Court passed in revision the appeals will stand disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines."

12. Thus, from discussion above it is apparent that the Provincial Act is a separate code complete in itself. Scheme in various sections reproduced in the beginning like forums, limitation, finality & other provisions in the Act like section 17, Chapter IV-A introduced in Maharashtra about distress warrants, sections 28, 29, 30, 31 & 32 all support this. The Provincial Act still contains a provision for revision in High Court in other matters, in landlord-tenant or licensor-licensee matters appeal has been provided with revisional powers to the same court. Though in cases considered by Hon'ble Apex Court by amendment powers of revision were conferred upon District Court, the position here in Maharashtra is not much different. By 1984 amendment, the District Court has been given power under section 26-A(4) to do that which High Court have done under Section 25. Language of Section 25 and 26-A(4) is similar. Thus, while providing a remedy of appeal which did not exist until then, the Legislature also conferred revisional powers upon District Court. Forum for filing appeal and for filing revision is same. No limitation has been prescribed in Section 26-A(4) for exercise of that power. Thus the intention of legislature to expedite the final adjudication of disputes between landlord & tenant or licensor & licensee & to limit statutory challenges to it till level of District Court is obvious. Because of S.27 (now S.25-A) decree or order made by Court of Small Causes is final & it can be challenged only in manner provided under the Provincial Act. The Provincial Act contemplates approach in appeal to District Court. It also enables District Court to exercise revisional powers in certain circumstances. Thus, judgment and decree of Small Causes Court is final subject to this appeal or revision. Section 7 of C.P.C. expressly rules out revision under section 115 against orders of Courts constituted under Provincial Act. The court to which appeal is to be filed is provided under Provincial Act. Perusal of Section 33 of Provincial Act shows that if a single Court is invested with the jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes as also ordinary Civil jurisdiction, such Court is deemed to be different Court for the purpose of Provincial Act and Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, the District Court functioning as appellate Court under section 26-A is subject to all restrictions imposed by Provincial Act. It is not functioning as such under Code of Civil Procedure and it cannot be said that its appellate orders are revisable by High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. When in disputes between landlord-tenant or licensor-licensee, revision under section 25 of this court is not available, it can not be introduced by making section 115 C.P.C. applicable to such new & exclusive jurisdiction. Section 27(25-A) of Provincial Act will have to be interpreted on same lines as section 18(5) of Kerala Act by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai (supra).

13. It is thus obvious that the present revision is not maintainable. As is apparent from above judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court conversion of Revision into Writ petition under Art.227 is out of question. The Revision is therefore dismissed accordingly. In view of request made by learned Advocate Moharil for Revision applicant, the interim order operating in favour of revision applicants during pendency of this revision since 27-11-2003 is continued for further period of six weeks to enable revision applicant to file writ petition challenging the impugned appellate order. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

Revision dismissed.