Letters Patent Appeal No.73 of 2006,Letters Patent Appeal No.89 of 2006,Letters Patent Appeal No.90 of 2006,Letters Patent Appeal No.108 of 2006

10th August, 2008

Petitioner Counsel: Shri. ALOK DAGA

Cases Cited:
Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786 [Para 4,11,15,18,21,23,26]
T. V. Tuljaram Row Vs. M.K.R.V. Alagappa Chettiar, (1912) ILR 35 (Mad) [Para 11]
The Justice of the Peace for Calcutta Vs. The Oriental Gas Co., 1872-8 Beng LR 433 [Para 13]
Employer in Relation to Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 883 [Para 17,21,23,25]
Chandra Kanta Sinha Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2001)6 SCC 158 [Para 19]
Liverpool & London S.P. & I. Association Ltd. Vs. M. V. Sea Success I, (2004)9 SCC 512 [Para 20]
Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. Chunilal Nanda, 2006 AIR SCW 2766 [Para 21,23,24]
Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vs. Annabai Devram Kini, 2003(10) SCC 691 [Para 21]
Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul, 2003(10) SCC 361 [Para 21]

JUDGMENT

R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR, J.:- What is the meaning of the term "judgment" in clause 15, as also nature of the orders which could be said to amount to a "judgment" within the meaning of the said expression in clause 15 of the Letters Patent is the common question which arises for determination in all these Letters Patent Appeals.

2. A final decision arrived at by a judicial authority on adjudication of a dispute is commonly known as a judgment. The dictionary defines the said word as the act or faculty of affirming or denying a conclusion whether as based upon a direct comparison of objects or ideas, or derived of by a process of reasoning; a final determination or adjudication of the rights of the parties to an action. The term obviously implies the final decision on dispute between the parties. The Code of Civil Procedure defines it as the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. The word "decree" means a formal expression of an adjudication by a Court conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy in a case. The term "order" has been defined as a formal expression of any decision of a court which is not a decision. The said meaning of the term "judgment" is of no help to understand the scope and the connotation of the said term as used in the Letters Patent.

3. We have heard at length the advocates appearing for the parties. Various judgments of different division benches of the High Court are sought to be relied upon in support of divergent contentions canvassed in the matter. However, instead of grappling through diverse discourse in those various judgments, it would be advisable to grasp the precise and graphic answer by scanning through the relevant judicial pronouncements in that regard by the Apex Court.

4. In Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1786, while ascertaining the test to determine the import of the word judgment under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Apex Court observed that the said clause makes no attempt to define the word "judgment" and as the Letters Patent is a special law which carves its own sphere, it would not be possible to project the definition of the word judgment appearing in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, into the Letters Patent. It was further held that the term 'judgment' under the Code of Civil Procedure requires as a matter of course that a judgment must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy, and being so, the said term 'judgment' under the Code of Civil Procedure is rather narrow, and therefore, the limitations engrafted by the sub-section (9) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term 'order' or 'decree' any where. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word 'judgment' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. However, at the same time, it was warned that "it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word judgment has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense." The Apex Court thereafter proceeded to classify the judgment into three categories viz. (i) a final judgment, (ii) a preliminary judgment, and (iii) intermediary or interlocutory judgment.

5. A final judgment was described as a judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided which would mean that by virtue of such a judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is either dismissed or decreed in part or in full and such orders passed by the trial Judge undisputedly and unquestionably be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.

6. The second category of the judgment classified as preliminary judgment was explained to have two forms; one of them being where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit and only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable in which case the suit is finally decided one way or the other, and therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is concerned, and therefore, appealable to the larger Bench. Another form of 'preliminary judgment' relates to an order passed by the trial Judge after hearing the preliminary objection raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g. bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant and the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds and that therefore the order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and therefore, be construed to be a judgment for the purpose of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

7. The third category of the judgment is an intermediary or interlocutory judgment. While describing this category, the Apex Court held that most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held to be judgments within the meaning of the said expression under Letters Patent and, therefore, are appealable. There may also be an interlocutory order which is not covered by order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in the sense that, the order may also adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment, the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial Judge in a suit under Order 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiff's case on his own evidence without being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such, when an order virtually affects a valuable right of the defendant, it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. On the other hand, in a suit where the Trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the suit, although the plaintiff is adversely affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial Judge would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order.

8. In a case where the trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Order 43, Rule 1, though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed ex parte falls within the Order 43, Rule 1, clause (d) and is appealable, the question arises as to whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The question has been answered by the Apex Court in the said decision holding that the order setting aside an ex parte decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, the order passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is, therefore, appealable to a larger Bench. At the same time, the Apex Court has also observed that in the course of a trial, the trial Judge may pass number of orders relating to the various steps to be taken by the parties in prosecution of the suit and such orders may be of a routine nature while other orders may cause some inconvenience to one party or the other, e.g. an order refusing an adjournment, an order refusing to summon an additional witness or documents, an order refusing to condone delay in filing documents after the first date of hearing, an order of costs to one of the parties for its default or an order exercising discretion in respect of a procedural matter against one party or the other. Such orders are purely interlocutory and cannot constitute judgments because it will always be open to the aggrieved party to make a grievance of such order passed against the party concerned in the appeal against the final judgment passed by the trial Judge. Having so observed, the Apex Court then ruled that :-

"every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment."

9. The Apex Court has also given yet another example of interlocutory order which amounts to an exercise of discretion and yet it may amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. In a case where the trial Judge allows the plaintiff to amend his plaint or include a cause of action or a relief as a result of which a vested right of limitation accrued to the defendant is taken away and rendered nugatory, in such a case, it was held that :-

"........ although the order passed by the trial Judge is purely discretionary and interlocutory, it causes gross injustice to the defendant who is deprived of a valuable right of defence to the suit. Such an order, therefore, though interlocutory in nature contains the attributes and characteristics of finality and must be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent."

10. At the same time, it was also clarified by the Apex Court that an order may be appealable under Letters Patent at the instance of one or more parties to the proceedings and yet it may not be so appealable at the instance of other parties to the same proceedings. Elaborating the said proposition of law, it was held that :-

"It may be noted that whereas an order deciding the nature of the court-fees to be paid by the plaintiff would be a judgment but this order affects only the plaintiff or the Government and not the defendant. Thus, only the plaintiff or the Government as the case may be will have the right to file an appeal in the Division Bench and not the defendant because the question of payment of court-fees is a matter between the Government and the plaintiff and the defendant has no locus in this regard."

11. The Apex Court has also approved the tests laid down in this regard by Sir White, C.J. in T. V. Tuljaram Row Vs. M.K.R.V. Alagappa Chettiar, (1912) ILR 35 (Madras), minus the broader and wider attributes adumbrated therein, further specifying that the following considerations must prevail with the Court :

"(i) The trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as judgment otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice;

(ii) the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings."

It was also observed by the Apex Court that the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J. as also by Sir Couch, C.J. as modified by later decisions of the Calcutta High Court itself and which have been dealt with in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra) should be borne in mind.

12. As regards the tests laid down by Sir Arnold White, C.J. in Tuljaram Row's case, the Apex Court has summarised the same as under :-

"(i) It is not the form of adjudication which is to be seen but its actual effect on the suit or proceedings;

(ii) If, irrespective of the form of the suit or proceeding, the order impugned puts an end to the suit or proceeding it doubtless amounts to a judgment;

(iii) Similarly, the effect of the order, if not complied with, is to terminate the proceedings, the said order would amount to a judgment;

(iv) Any order in an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not being a step towards judgment) but is designed to render the judgment effective can also be termed as judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. So far as this test is concerned, the learned Chief Justice had in mind orders passed by the Trial Judge granting or refusing ad interim injunction or appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver;

(v) An order may be judgment even if it does not affect the merits of the suit or proceedings or does not determine any rights in question raised in the suit or proceedings; and

(vi) An adjudication based on a refusal to exercise discretion the effect of which is to dispose of the suit, so far as that particular adjudication is concerned, would certainly amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent."

13. As regards the tests laid down by Sir Richard Couch, Couch, C.J. in The Justice of the Peace for Calcutta Vs. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872-8 Beng LR 433), the same were summarised by the Apex Court as under:-

"(i) A decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties;

(ii) by determining some right or liability ;

(iii) the order determining the right or liability may be final, preliminary or interlocutory, but the determination must be final or one which decides even a part of the controversy finally leaving other matters to be decided later."

14. Having summarised the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J. and Sir Couch, C.J., the Apex Court clearly held that :

"So far as the tests laid down by White, C.J., and as analysed by us, are concerned we are inclined to agree generally with these tests though we feel that some of the tests laid down are far too wide and may not be quite correct. While the view taken by Sir Richard Couch, C.J. in Justice of the Peace for Calcutta ((1872)-8 Beng LR 433) (supra) is much too strict, the one taken by Sir White, C.J. is much too wide. The correct test seems to lie somewhere in between the tests laid down by the aforesaid jurists."

15. The Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra) has further by way of illustrations enumerated the list of interlocutory orders which "may" be treated as judgments and they are :-

"(1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant.

(2) An order rejecting the plaint.

(3) An order refusing leave to defend the suit in an action under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure.

(4) An order rescinding leave of the trial Judge granted by him under Cl.12 of the Letters Patent.

(5) An order deciding a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of limitation, absence of notice under Section 80, bar against competency of the suit against the defendant even though the suit is kept alive.

(6) An order rejecting an application for a judgment on admission under O.12, Rule 6.

(7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(8) An order varying or amending a decree.

(9) An order refusing leave to sue in forma pauperis.

(10) An order granting review.

(11) An order allowing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh one.

(12) An order holding that the defendants are not agriculturists within the meaning of the special law.

(13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(14) An order granting or refusing to stay execution of the decree.

(15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff."

16. The Apex Court while clarifying that the above illustrations are by way of guidance for deciding as to whether an order passed by the trial Judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent, we have been also reminded that "Law with its dynamism, pragmatism and vastness is such a large ocean that it is well-nigh impossible for us to envisage or provide for very possible contingency or situation so as to evolve a device or frame an exhaustive formula or strategy to confine and incarcerate the same in a strait-jacket."

17. The Apex Court in Employer in Relation to Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in AIR 2001 SC 883, while dealing with the same subject, held that the following categories of judgments are to be excluded from the appealable judgments under the said clause of Letters Patent that :

"(i) a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to superintendence of the said High Court in other words no letters patent appeal lies to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court passed in second appeal;

(ii) an order made by one judge of the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction; and

(iii) a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of power under the provisions of Section 107 of Government of India Act, 1935 (now Article 227 of the Constitution of India) or in exercise of criminal jurisdiction.

After enumerating the above types of judgments to be excluded from being subjected to the appeal under the clause 15 of the Letters Patent, it was clearly ruled by the Apex Court that "from all judgments except those falling under the excluded categories, an appeal lies to the same High Court."

18. While dealing with the question as to what does the expression 'judgment' mean in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, after referring to its earlier decision in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), it was held

"It follows that to determine the question whether an interlocutory order passed by one judge of a High Court falls within the meaning of 'judgment' for purposes of Letters Patent the test is : whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned. This has to be ascertained on the facts of each case."

Applying the said test to the facts of the case before the Apex Court, it was held that :-

"Section 17-B of the I.D. Act confers valuable rights on the workmen and correspondingly imposes an onerous obligation on the employer. The order in question passed by the learned Single Judge determines the entitlement of the workmen to receive benefits and imposes an obligation on the appellant to pay such benefits provided in the said section. That order cannot but be 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of Letters Patent, Patna. The High Court is obviously in error in holding that the said order is not judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna."

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna is in pari materia with the Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay.

19. In Chandra Kanta Sinha Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2001)6 SCC 158, it was held by the Apex Court that :-

"From a judgment passed by one Judge in second appeal, under Section 100, CPC or any other provision of a special Act, no letters patent appeal will lie to the High Court provided the second appeal was against a decree or order of a District Judge or a Subordinate Judge or any other Judge subject to the Superintendence of the High Court passed in a first appeal under Section 96, CPC or any other provision of a special Act."

20. In Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. Vs. M. V. Sea Success I and Anr., reported in (2004)9 SCC 512, the Apex Court, while considering the question as to whether refusing the application to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure upon holding that the plaint discloses a cause of action is a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and was thus appealable, observed that :-

"The idea underlying Order 7, Rule 11(a) is that when no cause of action is disclosed, the courts will not unnecessarily protract the hearing of a suit. Having regard to the changes in the legislative policy as adumbrated by the amendments carried out in the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts would interpret the provisions in such a manner so as to save expenses, achieve expedition and avoid the court's resources being used up on cases which will serve no useful purpose. A litigation which in the opinion of the court is doomed to fail would not further be allowed to be used as a device to harass a litigant."

The Apex Court held that the order refusing to reject the plaint falls in the category of preliminary judgment. Before arriving at the said finding, the Apex Court reiterated the following observation from Shah Babulal Khimji's case as under :-

"8 ....... We think that "judgment" in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final, or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined.

81. ........ An analysis of the observations of the Chief Justice would reveal that the following tests were laid down by him in order to decide whether or not an order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment :

(1) a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties;

(2) by determining some right or liability;

(3) the order determining the right or liability may be final, preliminary or interlocutory, but the determination must be final or one which decides even a part of the controversy finally leaving other matter to be decided later."

21. In Midnapore Peoples Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Chunilal Nanda & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2766, the Apex Court while considering as to whether an intra-court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is available against an interlocutory order containing certain directions on merits of the dispute, and after referring to its earlier decisions in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd.'s case (supra), and Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vs. Annabai Devram Kini, reported in 2003(10) SCC 691 as well as Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul, reported in 2003(10) SCC 361, held thus:-

"Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories:-

(i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case.

(ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case.

(iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject matter of the case.

(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.

(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties."

22. After having categorised the interim orders/interlocutory orders in five categories as above, the Apex Court ruled thus:-

"The terms 'judgment' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section 2(9), CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43, Rule 1 of CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, 'judgments' for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not 'judgment' for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent."

Applying the said ruling to the facts of the case which came up before the Apex Court, it was held that the order which was under challenge therein gave several directions to the bank with reference to first respondent though was not a final 'judgment', it was an interlocutory judgment which finally decided several rights and obligations of the employee vis-a-vis the employer, and therefore, it was appealable under the clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

23. It is thus abundantly clear that the entire law on the point of maintainability of the appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent with reference to the meaning of the word judgment' under the said provision had been elaborately discussed in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), and the same has been summarised in two decisions, namely, in Employer in Relation to Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra) and Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd.'s case (supra).

24. The judgment in Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank's case (supra) clearly classifies the interlocutory/interim orders in five categories and specifically ruled that the orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case or which may materially and directly affect the final decision in the main case as well as the order which finally decides a collateral issue or question, which may not be subject matter of the main case, are the judgments for the purpose of appeal under the Letters Patent, whereas, the orders which are passed in routine course to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination into final judgment and even those which may cause some inconvenience to the parties but do not determine rights and obligations of the parties cannot by any stretch of imagination fall within the meaning of the term judgment under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. At the same time, it is also apparent that the orders which are classified as being the judgments and can be subjected to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are those "which finally decide a question or issue". Undoubtedly, the final determination can be in relation to the part of controversy in the main case or which may materially and directly affect the final decision in the case or may be a collateral aspect of the matter or beyond the subject matter of the main case; nevertheless, it has to be "finally decided".

25. In Employer in Relation to Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra), the Apex Court clearly lays down the test for determining the order to be a judgment for the purpose of Letters Patent Appeal and the test is :

"Whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned."

26. It is pertinent to note that both the above decisions were delivered after consideration of its earlier decision in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), wherein the Apex Court had ruled that "an order, therefore, though interlocutory in nature, contains the attributes and characteristics of finality and must be treated as a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent". In short, unless it satisfies the requirements of the characteristics of finality in the determination of vital and valuable rights and obligations affecting the parties, the same cannot partake a colour of judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Letters Patent.

27. Evidently, therefore, even though the order may be of interim or interlocutory nature, if it concludes any dispute or subject or question or issue, either in the controversy in the main case, or even a collateral one, in the sense that it finally determines the said dispute, subject matter, question or issue, during the pendency or disposal of the suit or the case or proceedings, affecting the vital and valuable right and obligation of the parties, it would amount to a judgment within the meaning of the said word in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, in the absence of such final determination merely because such order causes some inconvenience or prejudice to a party and to that extent it may appear to have dealt with the rights and liabilities of the parties, without finally determining any vital and valuable right or obligation, it would not be a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Various other decisions of this Court were sought to be relied upon on either side which, in our opinion, need no reference in view of the law being very clearly laid down by the Apex Court and which is binding on this Court.

28. As far as the decision in P. S. Sathappan's case (supra), it was in relation to the effect of the provisions of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure vis-a-vis clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Madras. It was held therein that the sub-clause (2) of Section 104 of Code of Civil Procedure can only apply to appeals not saved by sub-clause (1) thereof and the finality provided by the sub-clause (2) only attaches to Order passed in Appeal under Section 104 i.e. those orders against which an Appeal under "any other law for the time being in force" is not permitted, and the Section 104(2) would not bar a Letters Patent Appeal.

29. Reverting to the facts of the case in Letters Patent Appeal No.73 of 2006, it pertains to the challenge to the interim order passed in Writ Petition No.852 of 2006. While issuing rule in the said writ petition, the learned Single Judge has granted the relief in terms of prayer clause (b) of the petition. The prayer clause (b) in the petition reads thus:

"(b) During the pendency of the petition, stay the effect and operation of the order dated 27-1-2006 in Appeal No.28 of 2005 passed by the respondent No.3."

The order dated 27th January, 2006 in the said appeal was to the effect of declaring the petitioner in the petition who is the respondent No.1 herein as being disqualified to be the Member of Panchayat Samiti, Nagpur, under Section 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti Act, 1961, hereinafter called as "the Panchayat Samiti Act" and further declaring the post of the respondent No.1 to have fallen vacant.

30. Undoubtedly, the effect of the impugned order is to stay the order of disqualification issued against the respondent No.1. The net result of such order is that the respondent No.1 is continued to be the Member of Panchayat Samiti. However, the impugned order nowhere decides any of the rights of the parties and in particular of the appellant in relation to any issue in the petition. The impugned order neither directly affects the rights or causes prejudice to the appellant. There is no final determination of any right or obligation either of the appellant or of the respondent No.1. The issue in that regard is wide open before the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition No.852 of 2006 and the order is squarely in the nature of routine order which is passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its final culmination in the final judgment. Merely because remotely it may cause some inconvenience or prejudice to the appellant, that will not give the colour of judgment to the impugned order as it does not finally determine the rights or obligations of the parties. Hence, the impugned order in the Letters Patent Appeal No.73 of 2006 cannot be said tobe the 'judgment' within the meaning of the said expression under clause15 of the Letters Patent, and therefore, the appeal is liable to be summarily dismissed.

31. Reverting to the facts of the Letters Patent Appeal No.89 of 2006, the same relate to the impugned order dated 2nd February, 2006 passed in the Civil Application No.5203 of 2005 in the Writ Petition No.601 of 2005. The respondent No.1 herein, who is the petitioner in the said writ petition had filed the said application seeking direction for permanent approval for the appointment issued to her as Head Mistress in the school. Considering the fact that the respondent No.1 was already officiating as Head Mistress and approval was already granted for three months, the learned Single Judge has observed that there was no reason as to why the same approval cannot be continued during the pendency of the petition subject to the result of the petition and such approval has been made without prejudice to the rights of the parties in any manner. Besides, the learned Single Judge has also observed in the impugned order that the appellant herein and the respondent in the petition are at liberty to move for appropriate relief if by such approval or arrangement, any prejudice is caused to her status/position. Obviously, the impugned order does not disclose even determination of any issue or right or obligation, leave aside final determination thereof. It merely passes an order of continuation of status quo during the pendency of the petition without granting any approval of the Court to the present arrangement whereby the respondent No.1 is allowed to continue as Head Mistress under the approval by the Education Officer, and simultaneously permitting the appellant to move for an appropriate relief if the prejudice is caused by such arrangement. All the issues having been kept wide open even for interim determination in the matter and by the impugned order no issue or right of obligation as such having been decided, the question of impugned order being called as the 'judgment' does not arise at all. Hence, the same cannot be subjected to the Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed summarily.

32. Reverting to the facts of the Letters Patent Appeal No.90 of 2006, the same arise from the order dated 3rd March, 2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition No.6601 of 2005 along with the Civil Application No.1199 of 2006 filed in the said petition. In the Writ Petition while issuing rule, the interim relief has been refused and the Civil Application has been dismissed. The appellant herein had prayed for interim relief in the said writ petition by way of stay of the decision dated 22nd September, 20005 passed by the respondent No.1 herein and communicated to the appellant under the letter dated 8th November, 2005. The decision dated 22nd September, 2005 was by the grievance committee on the appeal filed by the respondent No.2 herein. Under the said decision, the said appeal has been allowed and the appellant was directed to allow the respondent No.2 to join the duties immediately and further directed to pay him salary for the entire period of his absence after adjusting the medical leave to his credit. In the writ petition, the said decision was sought to be challenged. Meanwhile, it appears that there was a resignation dated 4th August, 2004 submitted by the respondent No.2 to the appellant. Subsequent to the order in the appeal which was passed on 22nd September, 2005, and on 10th December, 2005, it appears that the school management purportedly passed a resolution accepting the said resignation dated 4th August, 2004. The respondent No.2 while disputing the validity of the said resignation contended that the same was waived and was never accepted, nor acted upon and therefore, after the order was passed in appeal in favour of the respondent No.2, the management could not have sought to accept such resignation. The main question which is involved in the writ petition being the propriety of the appeal proceedings before the grievance committee in view of the fact that on same charges the appellants were proceeding with the departmental inquiry against the respondent No.2 and the effect of resignation letter dated 4th August, 2004. The learned Single Judge issued the rule, however, refused to grant any interim relief. It is against this refusal of this interim relief that the present Letters Patent Appeal is sought to be filed.

33. The said order of the learned Single Judge apparently decides the issue relating to the waiver of the resignation letter while observing that the only issue which is required tobe determined in the writ petition relates to the propriety of the appeal proceedings before the grievance committee in view of the pendency of the departmental inquiry on the same charges before the management. In other words, the issue regarding power of the management to give effect to the resignation letter dated 4th August, 2004 of the respondent No.2 having been left out of the scope of adjudication in the petition, prima facie, it amounts to have been determined the said issue, while limiting the judicial review in the writ petition to the issue of propriety of the appeal proceedings before the grievance committee. In the given set of facts, the impugned order squarely discloses final determination of the said issue in controversy regarding the resignation letter which can materially and directly affect the final decision in the main case and consequently the rights and obligations of the parties to the petition. Being so, the impugned order has to be considered as the 'judgment' within the meaning of the said expression under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and hence, the appeal needs to be admitted.

34. Reverting to the facts of the Letters Patent Appeal No.108 of 2006, the same has been filed against the order dated 30th June, 2005 whereby while issuing the rule in the Writ Petition No.3183 of 2005, the learned Single Judge has granted stay to the clauses (2) and (3) of the order dated 21st June, 2005 passed by the respondent No.2 herein. The clause (2) of the order of the respondent No.2 relates to the setting aside of the order passed by the Divisional Joint Registrar on 13th December, 2004 and the clause (3) refers to the direction that the action to be taken to reinstate the appellant on the post of Director of Parmatma Ek Sevak Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited, Nagpur, as per the order passed by this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal No.104 of 2005 and the Civil Application No.3440 of 2005. By the impugned order while holding that the respondent No.2 has passed the order dated 21st June, 2005 without taking into consideration the utter violation of the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India by the appellant and thereby benefiting the Gas Suvidha Petrochemical Co. of which he is a Chairman-cum-Managing Director and that therefore, the conduct of the appellant does not permit him to continue tobe a Director of the respondent No.4/bank, that the interim relief has been granted in the matter. Plain reading of the impugned order prima facie discloses determination of the issue regarding violation of the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India by the appellant resulting in benefit to Gas Suvidha Petrochemical Co. of which he is Chairman-cum-Managing Director and that therefore, the conduct disentitles him to be the Director of the respondent No.4/Bank. In view of the said determination which prima facie appears tobe final, leaving only the issue regarding requirement of consultation under Section 78 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 for adjudication in the writ petition, prima facie the impugned order partakes the colour of judgment within the meaning of the said expression under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Hence, the Letters Patent Appeal No.108 of 2006 needs tobe admitted.

35. In the result, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal Nos.73 of 2006 and 89 of 2006 are hereby summarily dismissed. The Letters Patent Appeal Nos.90 and 108 of 2006 are hereby admitted for final hearing.

Order accordingly.