2007(3) ALL MR 688
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(NAGPUR BENCH)
A.H. JOSHI, J.
Narendra S/O. Mahadeorao Niley Vs. Government Of Maharashtra & Ors.
Civil Revision Application No.125 of 2005
6th November, 2006
Petitioner Counsel: Mr. N. S. BADHE
Respondent Counsel: Mr. J. B. JAISWAL
Limitation Act (1963), S.5 - Delay - Condonation of - Challenged on ground that delay has not been explained day to day by Respondent Govt. Dept. - Fact that parties left it to Court to decide matter by oral submissions - Court was not assisted by proof of facts which would have resulted in attributing particular date of knowledge in contract with date of knowledge pleaded by respondent (applicant) - Order condoning delay - No interference. (Paras 9, 10, 11, 12)
Cases Cited:
Laxman N. Divekar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1998(1) ALL MR 688=1998(1) Mh.L.J. 545 [Para 8]
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT :- Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith, and heard by consent.
2. Application for condonation of delay was granted by order passed by learned First Ad Hoc Additional District Judge, Chandrapur, in Misc. Application No.13 of 1999.
3. Main ground of challenge to the said order of condonation of delay is that :
(a) the Education Officer, respondent no.4 herein, was personally present when the order was passed and, therefore, in fact, the applicants knew that the order was passed and the date of knowledge assigned in Para 2 of the application to be 2nd December, 1998 is false;
(b) the delay has to be explained not from the date of knowledge, but from the date of judgment;
(c) by various applications, the petitioner had brought on record in the office of defendants that the decree, in question, was passed, and had persistently demanded for compliance.
4. This Court finds that the objection that the delay has not been explained day-today is based on the factual ground as to the knowledge which the present petitioner as respondent in Mis. Civil Application before District Court has relied upon.
5. Proof of the facts used as grounds of objection depended on the evidence that could have been brought by the present petitioner before the District Court, which has not been done by him.
6. Present petitioner [original plaintiff] left it to the choice of the Court by permitting the matter to be heard barely on oral arguments. No efforts are made to prove the facts for which knowledge has been attributed to the present respondents who were the applicants before the District Court.
7. Learned District Judge found favour with the proposition of grant of condonation of delay in view of what he has observed in paragraph 11 of the order, which is quoted below for ready reference :-
"11. In bureaucratic methodology, it is highly impossible to explain day today delay. Therefore, in the cited case of Collector Vs. Smt. Katiji the Hon'ble Apex court held that "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that the pedantic approach should be made but the doctrine must be applied in rational common sense pragmatic manner."
8. Learned Advocate Mr. Badhe placed reliance on reported Judgment of this Court in the case of Laxman N. Divekar Vs. State of Maharashtra (1998(1) Mh.L.J. 545 : 1998(1) ALL MR 688), where the delay of 750 days, which was condoned without proper explanation, was set aside by this Court, since the case was based on the date of knowledge, the delay caused thereafter was required to explain.
9. The delay will have to be explained on day-today basis certainly has its inherent limitations. When certain official correspondence is relied upon which cannot be equal to personal knowledge to the individual who is the decision-making authority to prefer an appeal. Lack of involvement and absence of devotion of bureaucrats is not a matter which can be easily neglected. Moreover, in moffusil drafting, particularly by lawyers of organizations like defendants, the limitations and deficiencies in the quality of legal assistance are also well known, which too need due attention and call for latitude.
10. Present petitioner has raised a controversy about truth and correctness of the said date of knowledge, however, no assistance was rendered to the District Court to prove the plea about the date of knowledge.
11. In the circumstances, on the facts of the case, this Court finds that when parties left it to the Court to decide the matter by oral submissions, in fact, the Court was not assisted by proof of facts which would have resulted in attributing a particular date of knowledge in contrast with the date of knowledge pleaded by the respondents who were applicants before the District Court.
12. In the circumstances, this Court finds that it is not necessary to interfere in the Revision and the same is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. Parties shall bear respective costs.