Criminal Revision Application No.69 of 2007

24th January, 2008

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. S. D. LOTLIKAR,Mr. RYAN MENEZES
Respondent Counsel: Ms. W. COUTINHO

Cases Cited:
A. Deivendram Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1998 SC 2821 [Para 8]
State of Maharashtra Vs. Santosh Kumar Satish Bhushan Bariyar, Confirmation Case No.2/2004 Dt.12-08-2005 [Para 9]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. W. Coutinho, Public Prosecutor for the respondents.

2. Mr. Lotlikar seeks leave to delete respondent Nos.2 to 5. Leave as sought is granted. Amendment to be carried out forthwith.

3. Rule. By consent, rule is heard forthwith.

4. This revision application is directed against the judgment and order dated 5.10.2007 rendered by the President, Children's Court for the State of Goa, Panaji in Special Case No.28/2006 by which the application filed by the petitioner, who is accused No.5 in the case, seeking pardon U/s.307 r/w. Section 306, Cr.P.C. has been rejected.

5. It appears that two such applications, one filed by the applicant and the other filed by accused No.3 Shankar Tiwari, were considered and rejected by the common judgment, impugned in this Revision. The only question raised by the petitioner in the instant revision is whether or not the learned Judge while dealing with the application filed by the petitioner, has followed the due procedure contemplated by Sections 306 and 307, Cr.P.C. and has overlooked the judgments of the Supreme Court as also of this Court, interpreting these provisions and laying down the procedure, parameters and the limits ingrained for considering such application and whether the impugned judgment is sustainable in law. The accused No.3 had independently challenged the impugned judgment in this Court, however, in view of the objection raised by the prosecution for tendering pardon to accused No.3 and/or the fact that they did not joint in the request made by accused No.3, his revision came to be dismissed.

6. My attention was drawn to the certain observations made in the impugned judgment to contend that the learned Judge has unnecessarily entered into the factual matrix and has taken on himself to consider the role played by the petitioner to hold that the record is not convincing enough to grant a tender of pardon to the accused and that the prosecution would not require crutches either of the petitioner or accused No.3, Tiwari to establish its case against the other accused. There is absolutely no discussion in the judgment as to whether or not the petitioner would make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. At one stage, the learned Judge records that a statement recorded U/s.164 of the petitioner shows that he exculpate himself with titbits of information of his involvement and shifting major focus on the involvement of the other four accused persons, and then later it is observed that the statement of the petitioner U/s.164 would not warrant the grant of tender of pardon to him looking to the role allegedly played by him with the other accused as a part of conspiracy, hatched to kidnap the victim Mandar for ransom and thereafter caused his death coupled with the destruction of the evidence.

7. The learned Judge in paragraph 30 of the impugned judgment has recorded that "a cursory perusal of the statement of the petitioner U/s.164, Cr.P.C., to which the learned Public Prosecutor and each of the defence Advocates have referred to, goes prima facie to pinpoint that accused No.5 - Beig (the petitioner) is seeking to keep himself aloof from the purported acts of hatching a conspiracy and the related acts of making a demand for ransom, and finally snuffing out the life of the victim, Mandar." The expression "cursory perusal" itself indicates that the learned Judge did not look into the confessional statement of the petitioner recorded U/s.164, Cr.P.C. carefully and from the angle so as to find out whether he would make a full and true disclosure as contemplated in sub-section (1) of Section 306, Cr.P.C. Similarly, from the contents of the judgment it appears to me that the learned Judge has taken on herself the task of determining propriety of tendering pardon. She has completely overlooked the basic principles of law that while exercising the power to tender pardon, such power is not to be exercised on her own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and, therefore, the Court is only expected to see in such case where the accused makes an application seeking tender of pardon, whether the prosecution has joined in the request and further whether such accused would make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. It is true that merely stating "no objection" for tendering pardon, as it happened in the instant case, would not be sufficient. The prosecution should join in the request made by the accused for the reasons stating as to why tender of pardon is necessary and that the conviction of the other accused is not easy without approver's testimony. This is all lacking in the instant case. The application filed by the petitioner seeking tender of pardon has not been appreciated in proper perspective and in keeping with the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in a catena of judgments. The learned Judge has also given unnecessary weightage to the reports that the then Chief Minister had met the petitioner in the custody which, according to learned Judge, show that the prosecution was out to favour him by joining in the request made by him for tendering of pardon.

8. "Section 306, Cr.P.C. confers power upon the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the Magistrate of the First Class, at any stage of the investigation or the trial, to tender a pardon to any person, with a view to obtaining the evidence of such person supposed to have directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, on a condition of his making a full and true disclosure of whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. Section 307 also confers similar powers upon the Court to which commitment of a case is made "on the same condition." The expression "on the same condition" clearly refers to the conditions of tendering a pardon engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 306. The law in this regard is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in A. Deivendram Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1998 SC 2821 had an occasion to deal with the provisions contained in sections 306 and 307, Cr.P.C. In paragraph 11 thereof, Their Lordships observed that under section 307 when pardon is tendered after commitment of the proceedings by the Court to which the commitment has been made, the legislature mandate is that the pardon would be tendered on the same condition. The expression "on the same condition" obviously refers to the condition of tendering a pardon engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 306, the said being the person concerned on making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence." Mere perusal of this provision show that the paramount consideration for tendering pardon to an accomplice is the satisfaction of a Court that he will make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence so also the satisfaction of the prosecution that the conviction of the other accused is not easy without the approver's testimony.

9. The Division Bench (R. P. Desai and D. B. Bhosale, JJ.) of this Court in a Confirmation Case No.2/2004 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Santosh Kumar Satish Bhushan Bariyar and others) decided on 12th August, 2005 had an occasion to deal with the provisions of Sections 306, 307 and 164, Cr.P.C. After having considered the relevant provisions and the judgments of the Supreme Court, in paragraph No.323 of the judgment held thus :

"323) Moreover, the law is well settled that it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several, may be rendered pardon. If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of a successful prosecution of the other accused whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony, it is open for the prosecution to agree to the tendering of pardon to a particular accused. The power to tender pardon which the learned Judge exercises, is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. The learned Judge or the Magistrate must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon in the circumstances of the case. This has been settled by Supreme Court in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes Vs. State of Maharashtra - AIR 1968 Supreme Court 594, while dealing with a situation wherein the accused had directly applied to the Special Judge who had suo moto tendered pardon without referring it to the prosecution. In yet another Judgment In Jasbir Singh Vs. Vipin Kumar Jaggi and others, 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1525, the Apex Court in paragraph 18 thereof reiterated the principle of law emerged in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes case and further observed that "although the power to actually grant the pardon is vested in the court, obviously the Court can have no interest whosoever in the outcome nor can it decide for the prosecution whether particular evidence is required or not to ensure the conviction of the accused. That is the prosecution's job." It is thus clear that the selection of an accomplice to be tendered a pardon is a choice of the prosecution though it is open for the Court to reject such application on being satisfied that the accomplice shall not make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence. An extent of a role cannot be a consideration while exercising the powers under section 306 and/or 307 Cr.P.C.." (emphasis supplied)

10. Thus, it is clear that it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several may be tendered pardon, if the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of a successful prosecution of the other accused whose conviction is not easy without approver's testimony. It is open for the prosecution to agree for tendering of pardon to a particular accused if the application is filed by such accused. The learned Judge must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon in the circumstances of the case. Although the power to actually grant pardon is vested in the Court, it is a prosecution's job to see whether particular evidence is required or not to ensure the conviction of accused. The extent of role of the accused seeking pardon cannot be a consideration while exercising the powers U/s.307 r/w. 306, Cr.P.C. The learned Judge in the present case while dealing with the application of the petitioner has overlooked the parameters and limits ingrained over the years in a catena of the judgments of the Supreme Court and has not made any efforts to see whether the petitioner would disclose all true and correct facts within his knowledge relating to the offence before the Court. The learned Judge ought to have focused on the confessional statement recorded U/s.164, Cr.P.C. to arrive at the conclusion, whether or not the petitioner would disclose all true and correct facts within his knowledge. Similarly, the learned Judge ought to have ascertained from the approver whether he would make a full and true disclosure as contemplated by sub-section (1) of Section 306, Cr.P.C.

11. The Division Bench in Santosh Kumar Bariyar's case in paragraph Nos.121, 122 & 123 after considering the judgments of the Supreme Court has observed thus :

121. "We are unable to agree with Mr. Gupte. The role played by the accused can never be the consideration for grant or refusal of pardon. All that the learned judge has to consider is whether the person to whom pardon is to be granted wants to make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. It is only on that condition pardon can be granted. Once that condition is satisfied, order granting pardon will have to follow because it is sought by the prosecuting agency with a view to obtaining evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence. The learned Judge cannot go into the aspect of the nature of his involvement or possible weight of his evidence."

122. "In Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1968 SC 594, the Special Judge had suo motu without being invited by the prosecution to consider the tender of pardon to one of the accused before him, tendered conditional pardon to one of the accused. It was argued that the Special Judge could not have done so. While dealing with this question, the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several, may be tendered pardon. But even where the accused directly applies to the Special Judge he must first refer the request to the prosecuting agency. It is not for the Special Judge to enter the ring as a veritable director of prosecution. The power which the Special Judge exercises is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. The Supreme Court further observed that the State may not desire that any accused be tendered pardon because it does not need approves' testimony. It may also not like the tender of pardon to the particular accused because he may be the brain behind the crime or the worst offender. The proper course for the Special Judge is to ask for a statement from the prosecution on the request of the prisoner. If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of a successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony, it will indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon. The Special Judge or the Magistrate must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon. In the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court found fault with the learned Special Judge as he did not bear these considerations in mind and took on himself something from which he should have kept aloof. The Supreme Court observed that all that he should have done was to have asked for the opinion of the public prosecutor on the proposal."

123. "We may also refer to yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in Jasbir Singh V. Vipin Kumar Jaggi & Ors., 2001 SCC (Cri.) 1525. In that case the Supreme Court was dealing with the question of granting pardon to a witness who was a convicted offender. The Supreme Court reiterated the same principle and held that it is for the prosecution to decide the necessity of granting pardon to an accused and if it so decides, the court has to agree to tendering of pardon. In that case, the Supreme Court referred to its judgment in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes's case (supra) and observed that although the power to actually grant the pardon is vested in the court, obviously the court can have no interest whatsoever in the outcome nor can it decide for the prosecution whether a particular evidence is required or not to ensure the conviction of the accused. That is the prosecution's job. In view of this, the Supreme Court found that the order of the Sessions Judge refusing pardon to respondent 1 therein, even though it was actively canvassed for by the public prosecutor, was wrong. It was not for the Sessions Judge to have considered the possible weight of the approver's evidence, even before it was given. In view of these judgments, it cannot be urged that in the application for pardon made before the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution had made a wrong averment that PW-1 had played a lesser role and, therefore, the discretion exercised by the learned Sessions Judge is vitiated. Whether the approver had played a lessor or greater role is immaterial. It is for the prosecution to examine this aspect from the point of view of the interest of the case. It is the prerogative of the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge could not have gone into that aspect prior to granting of pardon. All that he had to consider was whether PW-1 was desirous of making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned. Once the Sessions Judge was satisfied about this, then without going into the nature of the role played by PW-1, he had to grant him pardon. After pardon is granted and he is examined as a witness, his evidence will have to be examined keeping in view the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. If it is totally exculpatory, the court may reject it. But prior to that, his alleged role must not weigh with the judge. The averment in the application made before the Sessions Judge under Section 307 of the Code about the role played by PW-1 would therefore not affect the prosecution case adversely. This submission of Mr. Gupte must fail." (emphasis supplied)

12. Thus, the role played by the accused can never be the consideration for a grant or refusal of pardon. All that the learned Judge has to consider is whether the person to whom the pardon is to be granted wants to make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence. The learned Judge cannot go into the aspect of the nature to his involvement or possible weight of his evidence. Ordinarily it is the prosecution to ask that a particular accused, out of several, may be tendered pardon. But even where the accused directly applies to the Court, the learned Judge must first refer the request to the prosecuting agency. It is not for the Special Judge to enter the ring as a veritable director of the prosecution. The power which the Court exercise is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. The proper course for the learned Judge is to ask for a statement from the prosecution on the request of the prisoner. The learned Judge must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety of tendering pardon. The learned Judge is not expected to consider possible weight of the approver's evidence, even before it was given. Whether the approver had played a lesser or greater role is immaterial. It is for the prosecution to examine this aspect from the point of view of the interest of the case. It is the prerogative of the prosecution.

13. In the present case, the learned Session Judge could not have gone into the aspect as to whether or not the petitioner, seeking tender of pardon, had played lessor or greater role. All that he had to consider was whether the petitioner was desirous of making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned. It is apparent from the impugned judgment that the learned Judge did not bear these considerations in mind and took on herself something from which she should have kept aloof. After the pardon is granted and the petitioner is examined as a witness, his evidence will have to be examined keeping in view the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. If it is totally exculpatory, the Court may reject it. But prior to that, his alleged role must not weigh with the judge.

14. From perusal of the impugned judgment, it is seen that the learned Judge did not refer the request of the petitioner to the prosecuting agency, as to why the prosecution also feel it necessary to tender pardon to him. The prosecution has indubitably failed in its duty to place on record the reasons for supporting the application filed by the petitioner. The prosecution has simply given its no objection without applying its mind to the request and recording their own reasons in the form of reply. The prosecution ought to have joined in the request with the objectivity. The prosecution did offer to file detail affidavit in this Court justifying their no objection given in the trial Court for tendering pardon to the petitioner, however, that need not be allowed and examined in the instant revision. It is against this backdrop, I am satisfied that the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. Hence, the following order.

ORDER

1. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside.

2. Matter is remanded to the trial Court for considering the application filed by the petitioner afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 4 weeks from the date of receipt of this order.

3. The learned Judge shall proceed with the trial only after he decides the application afresh as aforestated.

4. It is open for the prosecution to file their reply to the application filed by the petitioner within one week from the date of the receipt of this order.

5. While passing this judgment, I shall not be understood to have expressed any opinion on merits of the application of the petitioner under section 307 r/w. section 306, Cr.P.C.

6. Rule is, accordingly, made absolute in terms of this judgment.

Application allowed.