Writ Petition No.1434 of 1997

4th May, 2009

Petitioner Counsel: Shri. M. V. MOHOKAR
Respondent Counsel: Shri. A. R. ATRE

Cases Cited:
Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust Vs. Swami Prakasananda, (1997)6 SCC 78 [Para 9]
Sarva Shramik Sangh Vs. V.V.F. Limited, 2002(I) CLR 797 [Para 10]
P. K. Ramchandra Iyer Vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 541 [Para 13]
Steel Authority of India Vs. National Union, 2001(III) CLR 349 [Para 14,24,25]
Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, 2002 SCC (L&S) 633 [Para 14,A]
(1975)1 SCC 485 [Para 14,A]
F.C.I. Workers' Union Vs. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1985 SC 488 [Para 15]
Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 82 [Para 15,24,25]
F.C.I. Vs. Labour Court, 1992 Lab.I.C. 647 [Para 15]
I.I.T. Vs. State of West Bengal, 2001-I-LLJ 868 [Para 16]
Tata Memorial Centre Vs. Sanjay Sharma (Dr.), 1996(II) CLR 964 [Para 17]
Yovan Vs. Management of Indian Cements Ltd., 1994(1) CLR 33 [Para 18]
Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., Employees' Union, 2008(III) CLR 802 [Para 19]
International Airports Authority of India, Bombay Vs. P. K. Srivastava, 1985 L.L.N. 312 [Para 20]
Administrative Officer, Central Electro Chemical Research Institute, Karaikudi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 Lab.I.C. 1815 [Para 21]
Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 82 [Para 22]
Management, M.D.E. Project Vs. State of Bihar, 1981 Lab.I.C. 1370 [Para 23]
National Textile Corporation Vs. Sudhir, 1991 Mh.L.J. 786 [Para 23]
Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, C.W.P. No.1392/1984, Dt.:-06-01-1993 [Para 23]
N. K. Jain Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi, 1995(II) CLR 758 [Para 23]
M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, AIR 1975 SC 1737 [Para 23]
Abdul Rehaman Vs. Mrs. E. Paul, 1963 Mh.L.J. 261 [Para 23]
Physical Research Laboratory Vs. K. G. Sharma, (1997)4 SCC 257 [Para 31]
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, (1978)2 SCC 213 [Para 31,32]
The Workmen of Indian Standards Institution Vs. The Management of Indian Standards Institution, (1975)2 SCC 847 [Para 32]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- By this petition, six workmen of respondent Nos.1 and 2 seek quashing and setting aside of the order passed on 8-8-1996 by the learned Judge, Labour Court, Nagpur, and maintained upon revision by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur on 21-3-1997.

2. Facts, which led the petitioners to file the present proceedings, are disturbing. The petitioners were appointed in the year 1988-89 by respondent No.2 as agricultural labourers at Nagpur. On 1-11-1990, there services were terminated orally. On 24-4-1991, they filed complaints under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Unfair Labour Practices Act (for short, "MRTU & PULP Act") complaining of unfair labour practice before the learned Judge, 2nd Labour Court, Nagpur. On 7-9-1994, temporary reinstatement was granted to the petitioners. On 12-9-1995, revision filed by the employer against the order of reinstatement was dismissed. On 17-1-1996, Writ Petition No.3133 of 1995 was disposed of by this Court directing the respondents to take the petitioners in employment and also directing the Labour Court to decide the complaints within six months. Accordingly, on 25-1-1996, the petitioners were reinstated in service. On 8-8-1996, the Labour Court dismissed the complaints. However, it stayed the order till 31-8-1996. The petitioners approached the Industrial Court, which, however, refused interim relief. On 31-3-1997, the Industrial Court upheld the order of the Labour Court. Hence, on 21-5-1997, the petitioners approached this Court.

3. The fact that the petitioners were employed at the respondents' fields as labourers and that they have put in 240 days of continuous service within a period of 12 months preceding the date of termination has not been disputed. However, according to the respondents, the petitioners were not employed by them, but had been made available to them by M/s. Vidarbha Security and Consultancy Service, Nagpur, which paid the wages to the petitioners. It was contended by the respondents that they were a research organization run by or under the authority of the Central Government and, therefore, the appropriate Government for the industrial dispute was the Central Government. It was contended that the provisions of MRTU & PULP Act would, therefore, not be applicable and the learned Judge, Labour Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaints.

4. The learned Judge, Labour Court held that the respondents had proved that the appropriate Government in respect of the establishment of the respondents was the Central Government and the not State Government, and, therefore, held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaints. He, however, proceeded to hold that the services of the petitioners were illegally terminated on 1-10-1990, that they were not employed as contract labourers through M/s. Vidarbha Security and Consultancy Service, and that the complaints were within limitation.

5. The finding of the learned Judge, Labour Court, that the appropriate Government in respect of the respondent is the Central Government, led to dismissal of the complaints and was affirmed on revision by the learned Member, Industrial Court.

6. I have heard Shri. M. V. Mohokar, learned counsel for the petitioner-workmen and Shri. A. R. Atre, learned counsel for the respondent-employer.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent-employer submitted that having held that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the learned Judge, Labour Court should not have proceeded to decide the other issues. It may, however, be seen that the jurisdictional issue raised in this case was purely one of law and it would have been improper to toss the parties back to the stage of proving facts, should the jurisdictional issue be eventually decided in favour of the petitioners.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that respondent No.1 ICAR carries on several activities including respondent No.2 Research Centre. He submitted that in Nagpur itself, there are two other Institutions run by respondent No.1 ICAR. They are : Central Institute of Cotton Research and National Bureau of Soil Survey and Land-used Planning. One Prakash Mishra, an employee of Central Institute of Cotton Research was removed from service and he challenged the said order before the Labour Court by filing complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act. By order dated 30-7-1986, the learned Judge, Labour Court, set aside the termination and granted reinstatement with 50% back wages. In revision bearing No.92 of 1986, the employer had challenged the order, contending that the appropriate Government was the Central Government. This revision was dismissed by order dated 8-6-1995. This order was challenged by the employer directly before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition No.20726 of 1995. After hearing both the parties, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on 19-2-1996.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the question as to whether the appropriate Government in respect of workmen of respondent No.1 ICAR employed at Nagpur is the State Government or not is no longer res integra. The decision of the Industrial Court confirmed by the Supreme Court is binding on the respondents and the respondents cannot now contend that the appropriate Government is not the State Government. The learned counsel submitted that in Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust Vs. Swami Prakasananda and others, reported at (1997)6 SCC 78, the Supreme Court held that even the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the SLP in limine would operate as final order between the parties and, therefore, the order would operate as res judicata.

10. He also relied on judgment in Sarva Shramik Sangh Vs. V.V.F. Limited and another, reported at 2002(I) CLR 797, where this Court was considering the effect of a settlement on a group of employees, who were not parties to a settlement. The Court held that such a settlement would bind even those workmen who are not signatories to it in order to obviate the possibility of anomalous position of different service conditions being applied to two set of workers employed by the same company.

11. The learned counsel for the respondents rightly submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Narayan Dharmasanghan Trust cannot be an authority for the proposition that the issue is concluded on SLP of employers in another unit being dismissed in limine, since the judgment clarifies that such order would operate as final between the parties. Neither petitioners herein nor their employer - the NRCC were parties to the decision. Hence, the judgment does not conclude the issue between the parties to this petition. However, the decision would be persuasive. Judgment in Sarva Shramik Sangh would also be unhelpful, as it relates to groups of workmen under the same employer. Here the Cotton Research Centre and NRCC are independent units. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine the questions raised in this petition afresh.

12. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the respondent Indian Council Agriculture Research, New Delhi (for short, "ICAR") started as a Department of the Government of India and later it was registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act. It is wholly financed by the Government of India and its budget is voted by the Parliament. Thus for all purposes, it is an organization under the control of the Central Government. Since this is a matter of record, the petitioners cannot take exception. The question is whether this fact would make it an industry carried on by or under the authority of Central Government as provided in the definition of "appropriate Government" under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It may be useful to reproduce this definition for ready reference as under :

"Section 2(a) : "Appropriate Government" means -

(i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948, (9 of 1948) or ..., or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food Corporation Act, 1964, (37 of 1964)... and

(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government;"

13. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a judgment in P. K. Ramchandra Iyer Vs. Union of India, reported at AIR 1984 SC 541, where the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether respondent No.1 ICAR is State or such other authority as would come under the expression "other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court recounted the history of ICAR in para 9 of its judgment, and then concluded in para 10 as under :

"10. Apart from the criteria devised by the judicial dicta the very birth and its continued existence over half a century and its present position would leave no one in doubt that ICAR is almost an inseparable adjunct of the Government of India having an outward form of being a Society, it could be styled as a Society set up by the State and, therefore, would be an instrumentality of the State."

These conclusions were fortified in the discussion that followed in the remaining part of the judgment. The Apex Court, therefore, upheld the claims of the petitioners. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, in view of this judgment, ICAR has to be held to be an institution carried on by the Central Government, and so the appropriate Government would be the Central Government.

14. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, and rightly in my view, that the judgment was rendered in the particular context of Article 12 of the Constitution and merely because ICAR is held to be State under Article 12, it does not follow that for the purpose of definition of "appropriate Government" in clause (a) of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the appropriate Government in respect of establishment of ICAR at Nagpur would be the Central Government. As the discussion to follow would show this is made clear by the Apex Court in its judgment in Steel Authority of India Vs. National Union, reported at 2001(III) CLR 349.

14-A. It would not be necessary to discuss at length the judgment of a majority of five-Judges in a seven Judge bench deciding Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, reported at 2002 SCC (L&S) 633, considering the status of the employees of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was a Society established by the Central Government. The Court, by majority, held that the State as defined under Article 12 is comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. It overruled Sabhajit Tewary Vs. Union of India, reported at (1975)1 SCC 485, which held that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was not an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

15. In F.C.I. Workers' Union Vs. Food Corporation of India, reported at AIR 1985 SC 488, on which the learned counsel for the petitioners relied, the Supreme Court was considering the definition of the "appropriate Government" under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and the Industrial Disputes Act in relation to employees of Food Corporation of India working in their godowns in different States. The definition of "appropriate Government" under Section 2(1)(a) of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act has been reproduced in 11 of the said judgment. The Court was considering whether as far as Food Corporation of India is concerned, it was an establishment pertaining to any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or pertaining to any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. The Union of India had taken the stand that the appropriate Government for the purpose of zonal establishments of Food Corporation of India would be the State Government and not the Central Government. The Governments of Punjab and Madhya Pradesh had also stated that the appropriate Government for the purpose of regional offices and warehouses in their States would be the State Government and not the Central Government. The Court referred to the definition under Section 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, (reproduced earlier), which specifically refers to the Food Corporation of India. The Court then went on to examine the width and content of the expression "any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government". The Court held that approach similar to that in the judgment in Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, reported at AIR 1970 SC 82, would be warranted. The Court held that the establishments of the Food Corporation of India did not pertain to any controlled industry. The Court, therefore held that the appropriate Government for the regional offices and warehouses was to be the State Government. In view of this, it is not necessary to refer to judgment of a learned Single of Allahabad High Court in F.C.I. Vs. Labour Court, reported at 1992 Lab.I.C. 647.

16. In I.I.T. Vs. State of West Bengal, reported at 2001-I-LLJ 868, a learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court was considering similar question relating to IIT Kharagpur, which had been established under the Act of 1956 and governed by the Act of 1961. The Court held that the appropriate Government would be the State Government.

17. Judgment in Tata Memorial Centre Vs. Sanjay Sharma (Dr.) and others, reported at 1996(II) CLR 964, arising out of a complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act, involving the question whether the appropriate Government was the State Government in relation to Tata Memorial Centre, though it was a part of the Central Government's department of Atomic Energy, is of no help, since the Court concluded that since the petition was against prima facie finding at an interim stage which had not been decided as a preliminary issue.

18. In Yovan and another Vs. Management of Indian Cements Ltd. and others, reported at 1994(1) CLR 33, the Supreme Court held that in respect establishment of Indian Cements, both the Central Government and the State Government were the appropriate Governments. This was on facts of that case and, therefore, this judgment is not helpful.

19. In Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., Employees' Union, reported at 2008(III) CLR 802, this Court was considering the question as to whether the State Government or the Central Government is appropriate Government under Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of establishment of Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., which is established by the Central Government. It was held that mere existence of clauses in the memorandum of articles of association of the company indicating that the Company is a Government Company as defined under the Companies Act, would not lead to the inference that the Company is run by or under the authority of the Central Government. It is a commercial enterprise governed by its own constitution. Business and commercial considerations and decisions of such Company are taken by the Board without waiting for sanction or ratification from the Government of India. It was, therefore, held that the Central Government was not the appropriate Government.

20. In International Airports Authority of India, Bombay Vs. P. K. Srivastava and others, reported at 1985 L.L.N. 312, this Court held that the appropriate Government in the case of International Airports Authority of India was the Central Government, obviously on the basis of facts in that case.

21. In Administrative Officer, Central Electro Chemical Research Institute, Karaikudi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, reported at 1990 Lab.I.C. 1815, the High Court of Madras has held that the research institute was one of the national Laboratories established by CSIR and, therefore, it was a concern carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government for the purpose of the industrial dispute and, therefore, the Central Government would the appropriate Government. It may be seen that all these cases have been decided by examine activities of concerned entities.

22. In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar, reported at AIR 1970 SC 82, the Supreme Court held that an industry carried on by a Corporation incorporated under the Companies Act and not directly by the Central Government is not one carried on by the Central Government, though all the shares are owned by the President of India. The Court considered the meaning of the word "authority" and in para 4 observed as under :

"There being nothing in Section 2(a) to the contrary, the word 'authority' must be construed according to its ordinary meaning and therefore must mean a legal power given by one person to another to do an act. A person is said to be authorised or to have an authority when he is in such a position that he can act in a certain manner without incurring liability, to which he would be exposed but for the authority, or, so as to produce the same effect as if the person granting the authority had for himself done the act. For instance, if A authorises B to sell certain goods for and on his behalf and B does so, B incurs no liability for so doing in respect of such goods and confers a good title on the purchaser. There clearly arises in such a case the relationship of a principal and an agent. The words "under the authority of" mean pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master."

It then concluded that an incorporated company, which has a separate existence and having its rights and obligations flowing from memorandum of association, would not be an establishment acting under the authority of the Central Government. The Court observed that the question whether Corporation is an agent of the State would depend on facts of each case on examination of the statute setting up the Corporation.

23. It is not necessary to discuss judgments in Management, M.D.E. Project Vs. State of Bihar, reported at 1981 Lab.I.C. 1370; National Textile Corporation Vs. Sudhir, reported at 1991 Mh.L.J. 786; Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur and another (Civil Writ Petition No.1392 of 1984, decided on 6th January, 1993); N. K. Jain Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi and others, reported at 1995(II) CLR 758; M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and others, reported at AIR 1975 SC 1737 and Abdul Rehaman Vs. Mrs. E. Paul, reported at 1963 Mh.L.J. 261, which deal with the same point.

24. In Steel Authority of (I) Ltd. and others Vs. National Union Water Front Workers, reported at 2001(III) CLR 349, a five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was considering the question as to which was the appropriate Government under Section 2(1)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act in relation to Steel Authority of India Ltd. This reference was occasioned because two-Judge Bench of the Court had noticed a conflict of opinion between different Benches. In paras 37 and 38, the Court held as under :

"37. We wish to clear the air that the principle, while discharging public functions and duties the Govt. Companies/Corporations/Societies which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government must be subjected to the same limitations in the field of public law - constitutional or administrative law - as the Government itself, does not lead to the inference that they become agents of the Centre/State Government for all purposes so as to bind such Government for all their acts, liabilities and obligations under various Central and/or State Acts or under private law."

"38. From the above discussion, it follows that the fact of being instrumentality of a Central/State Government or being 'State' within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution cannot be determinative of the question as to whether an industry carried on by a Company/Corporation or an instrumentality of the Government is by or under the authority of the Central Government for the purpose of or within the meaning of the definition of 'appropriate Government' in the CLRA Act. Take the case of a State Government corporation/company/undertaking set up and owned by the State Government which is an instrumentality or agency of the State Government and is engaged in carrying on an industry, can it be assumed that the industry is carried on under the authority of the Central Government, and in relation to any industrial dispute concerning the industry can it be said that the appropriate Government is the Central Government? We think the answer must be in the negative. In the above example if, as a fact, any industry, is carried on by the State Government undertaking under the authority of the Central Government, then in relation to any industrial dispute concerning that industry, the appropriate Government will be the Central Government. This is so not because it is agency or instrumentality of the Central Government but because the industry is carried on by the State Government Company/Corporation/Undertaking under the authority of the Central Government. In our view, the same reasoning applies to a Central Government undertaking as well. Further, the definition of 'establishment' in CLRA Act takes in its fold purely private undertakings which cannot be brought within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In such a case how is 'appropriate Government' determined for the purposes of CLRA Act or Industrial Disputes Act ? In our view, the test which is determinative is whether the industry carried on by the establishment in question is under the authority of the Central Government ? Obviously, there cannot be one test for one part of definition of 'establishment' and another test for another part. Thus, it is clear that the criterion is whether an undertaking/instrumentality of Government is carrying on an industry under the authority of the Central Government and not whether the undertaking is instrumentality or agency of the Government for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution, be it of Central Government or State Government."

The Court noted judgments in Heavy Engineering, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Food Corporation of India and held as under in para 46 as under :

"46. We have held above that in the case of a Central Government company/undertaking, an instrumentality of the Government, carrying on an industry, the criteria to determine whether the Central Government is the appropriate Government within the meaning of the CLRA Act, is that the industry must be carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government and not that the company/undertaking is an instrumentality or an agency of the Central Government for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution; such an authority may be conferred either by a statute or by virtue of relationship of principal and agent or delegation of power and this fact has to be ascertained on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. In view of this conclusion, with due respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges on interpretation of the expression "appropriate Government" in Air India's case (supra). Point No.1 is answered accordingly."

The conclusions in sub-para (1) of para 121 would clear all the doubts in this regard, which reads as under :

"121. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus :

(1)(a) Before January 28, 1986, the determination of the question whether Central Government or the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression "appropriate Government" as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry; or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oil filed or the establishment of banking or insurance company ? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise is relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be appropriate Government.

(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, if (i) the concerned Central Government company/undertaking or any undertaking is included therein, eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by railway company; or

(c) by specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be appropriate Government otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government."

(Emphasis supplied).

The question whether an industry is carried on under the authority of the Central Government would have to be resolved with reference to the observations in Heavy Engineering (Supra).

25. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on an unreported judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.6964 of 1981 decided on 13-11-1984 between the ICAR and its employees. It was contended that the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act were not applicable. The Court held that the Labour Court was in error in holding that ICAR was not an instrumentality or the agency of the State and, therefore, held that the dispute between ICAR and its workmen is covered by Clause I of Section 2(1) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, that is, a dispute concerning an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government and, therefore, the State Government was not the appropriate authority. I have carefully considered this judgment. It proceeds on the basis that since ICAR is an instrumentality or an agency of State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Court, it is ipso facto an institution carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. This view cannot now stand in view of what is held by the Supreme Court in paras 38 and 46 of the judgment in Steel Authority [2001(III) CLR 349] and the judgment in Heavy Engineering (AIR 1970 SC 82).

26. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that even the petitioners had stated that the appropriate Government was the Central Government, as may be seen from para D of the complaint before the learned Judge, Labour Court, Nagpur, which reads as under :

"D. The office of the respondent no.2 is the undertaking run by or under the authority of the Central Government, but as its office being located at Nagpur, the appropriate court for an industrial dispute concerning the respondent no.2 would be the State Government and hence this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to decide this case."

It may be seen that it is not that the petitioners had stated that the appropriate Government was the Central Government, though they had also stated that respondent No.2 was an undertaking run by or under the authority of the Central Government. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, as far as statement of fact is concerned, an admission in pleading would bind a party. But an erroneous statement on the basis of incorrect understanding of law would not bind the party. He submitted that the petitioners' not understanding as to what amounts to an institution being run "by or under the authority of", the Central Government cannot result in the conclusion that respondent No.2 is run by or under the authority of the Central Government.

27. The learned counsel for the respondents next submitted that by an amendment to the Administrative Tribunals Act, Clause (rr) has been added in Section 3 defining "a Society" as a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Section 14 relating to the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal was also amended and in clause (b) of sub-section (1) after the words "or of any corporation" the words "or Society" have been inserted. He submitted that the Government of India have accordingly issued a notification dated 20-4-1987 specifying 15-5-1987 to be the date on and from which the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act would apply to Indian Council of Agriculture Research. By the said notification eighth entry in respect of Indian Agriculture Research was added in the schedule to notification dated 2-5-1986. He submitted that this inclusion of respondent No.1 as an entity to which the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act apply would show that it was an entity run by or under the authority of the Central Government.

28. The learned counsel for the petitioners contested this contention submitting that inclusion of respondent No.1 Society in the Institutions to which the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act apply is merely logical extension of the finding of the Apex Court that ICAR is instrumentality of State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, according to him, the personnel working with ICAR would also be entitled to the protection which is available to employees of the State as also the avenues for ventilating the grievances on par with the Central Government employees. This does not and should not lead to an inference that ICAR is an institution run by or under the authority of Government of India unless the respondent so establishes.

29. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the Government of India was funding the entire operations of the ICAR, there would have been no need to create a separate entity for the purpose of research activities, if the Government wanted such research activities to be carried out by itself or under its authority. He rightly submitted that this creation of a separate entity, registered under the Societies Registration Act is indicative of the Governments, desire to distance itself from the research activities of ICAR. The provision for financial support of the Central Government cannot lead to an inference that the Institution is run by or under the authority of the Central Government.

30. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the word "authority" would relate to a principal-agent relationship as held in Heavy Engineering. And, it has to be shown that the Central Government, as the principal, had authorised ICAR, as the agent, to do something which the Central Government was expected to do. No function of the Government of India is shown to have been given to ICAR or to respondent No.2. The Government has merely funded altruistic research activity in order to bring about an improvement in agriculture, which is not necessarily a core governance function.

31. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that respondent Nos.1 and 2 cannot be termed as industries and, therefore, the provisions of industrial law would not at all be attracted. For this purpose, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Physical Research Laboratory Vs. K. G. Sharma, reported in (1997)4 SCC 257. Physical Research Laboratory was a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and was financed by the Department of Space, Government of India. After considering the question as to what is industry as discussed in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, reported at (1978)2 SCC 213, the Court found on facts that the Physical Research Laboratory was engaged in power research in space science. The Labour Court had also found that the work carried on by the Physical Research Laboratory was not connected with production, supply or distribution of material or goods or services. The research is not conducted for the benefit of anyone else and the object of research is to obtain knowledge only for the benefit of Department of Space. In these peculiar facts, the Court held that Physical Research Laboratory was not an industry.

32. The analogy cannot, however, apply to the case of the present respondents. The question as to what amounts to an industry has been settled for over thirty years now. In The Workmen of Indian Standards Institution Vs. The Management of Indian Standards Institution, reported at (1975)2 SCC 847, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Indian Standards Institution was an industry. The various tests laid down by the majority in that case were later considered and affirmed by a seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, reported in (1978)2 SCC 213. Applying those tests to the activities of the respondents, it cannot be said that the respondents are not industry. The research carried on by the respondents is for the benefit of agriculturists and not for the purpose of only non-material gain of knowledge. In any case, whatever may be the higher objective with which the Institution is established, if the workmen employed have to put up a work, which would be akin to an industry, they would be covered by the industrial law, since they cannot be said to have joined the Institution as missionaries with an altruistic object and furthering knowledge of mankind. For them, it is a means of survival. In view of this, the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents based on the decision in Physical Research Laboratory Vs. K. G. Sharma, have to be rejected.

33. Having held that the respondents are industry and that the appropriate Government in respect of the respondents was the Government of State of Maharashtra, the reference made was competent and, therefore, the learned Judge, Labour Court was obliged to entertain and decide the reference. In this case, the learned Judge, Labour Court had proceeded to decide the factual issues though he held that he lacked jurisdiction. He had held that the complainants had proved that they were engaged as agricultural labourers with effect from respective dates of their appointments and their services were illegally terminated by the respondents on 1-11-1990. He had also held that the respondents failed to prove that the complainants were employed by contractor M/s. Vidarbha Security and Consultancy Service. This contention of the employer (though negatived) would rule out any argument that the petitioners had entered by the back door. The learned Judge held that the complaints were filed within the period of limitation. Once his findings that he could not entertain the complaints as they were beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted by the State, and that the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act were not applicable to the petitioners because the appropriate Government was the Central Government, are set aside, the petitioners would be entitled to reliefs claimed in view of findings on other issues.

34. As already pointed out, this order had been challenged by the petitioner-workmen before the Industrial Court, which had upheld the finding of the Labour Court that the appropriate Government was the Central Government. But the learned Member of the Industrial Court had also upheld the findings of the Judge, Labour Court on other issues, viz. that the petitioners were engaged as agricultural labourers, that their services were illegally terminated, and that they were not employees of the contractor. The learned Member, Industrial Court had also held that since the finding of fact recorded by the learned Judge, Labour Court was not shown to be apparently erroneous or perverse, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the learned Member, Industrial Court could not have upset the findings. Then upon examining the evidence and the findings of the Labour Court, the learned Member, Industrial Court held that there is no illegality or error apparent on the face of the record and the learned Trial Judge had rightly held that the termination of the complainants was illegal. In view of these concurrent findings, it would not be necessary to remit the parties back for a fresh trial of those issues.

35. Once it is held that the termination of the petitioners was illegal, it would follow that they would have to be reinstated in service. It has to be realized that the services of the petitioners were terminated orally on 1-11-1990, i.e. over 18 years ago. It would be improper and cruel to direct the parties to go back to the Trial Court and plead and prove entitlement of the petitioners to back wages for such a long time. Since the petitioners are labourers and had been engaged as such, their survival through these 19 years shows that they must have been making a living likewise by working as labourers. Therefore, rather than granting them back wages, it would be appropriate if each of them is directed to be paid a lump sum of Rs.5,000/- in lieu of back wages.

36. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned orders passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court dated 8-8-1996 and the learned Member, Industrial Court dated 21-3-1997 are set aside. The termination of the services of the petitioner from 1-11-1990 is held as illegal. They are held entitled to reinstatement and continuity in service and in lieu of back wages, a lump sum of Rs.5,000/- each.

37. Rule is made absolute in above terms.

Petition allowed.