Criminal Appeal No.189 of 1996

5th February, 2009

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. J. C. SATPUTE,Mr. H. V. MEHTA
Respondent Counsel: Mr. J. P. YAGNIK

Cases Cited:
K. I. Pavunny Vs. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin, (1997)3 SCC 721 [Para 10,13]
Surjeet Singh Chhabra Vs. Union of India, (1997)1 SCC 508 [Para 10,17]
Naresh J. Sukhawani Vs. Union of India, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 663 [Para 10,17]
Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 [Para 17,20]
Bhana Khalpa Bhai Patil Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bulsar, Gujarat, (1998)1 SCC 222 [Para 19]
Ram Prakash Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 1 [Para 20]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal against acquittal directed against the order dated 29th March 1995 by which the 1st respondent (accused no.3) has been acquitted of the offences punishable under sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962. The 1st respondent was also acquitted of the offence punishable under section 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947. He has been also acquitted of the offence punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Originally the complaint was filed by the applicant against three accused. After the 1st and 2nd accused absconded, their case was separated and was kept on dormant file and the learned trial Judge proceeded against the 1st respondent.

3. The case against the 1st respondent is based on a statement of the said respondent recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1962) which was retracted later on. The question is whether a conviction can be based only on a retracted statement of the 1st respondent under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. The other question is if the requirement of law is that the 1st respondent cannot be convicted only on the basis of a retracted statement under section 108, whether there is any evidence to corroborate and draw assurance to the contents of the statement. The last question involved is whether retracted statements under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 of the co-accused (accused nos.1 and 2) can be used as corroboration against the 1st respondent.

4. The complaint was filed by the applicant against the 1st respondent and two others (accused nos.1 and 2). The process was issued on 05th February, 1987. Bail was granted to the 1st and 2nd accused on the very day. They were released on bail. Thereafter they jumped the bail and never appeared before the trial Court. With a view to appreciate the submissions, it will be necessary to refer to the material averments in the complaint. Paragraph nos.3 to 5 of the complaint read thus:

"3. Acting on a specific information that a passenger by name Abdul Rehman Mayet (accused no.1), holder of a British passport No.735653-F was to arrive from London by Quantas Airways flight No.QF-010 which was scheduled to arrive at 0045 hrs. on 08.01.87 at the New International Passenger Terminal (NTPT), Sahar, Bombay, carrying 17 kgs. of foreign marked gold to be smuggled into India, the Officers of the Bombay Zonal Unit of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) maintained, in the presence of two panch witnesses, survillance for him, identified him on his arrival by the said flight and followed him into the international arrival hall of the said Bombay airport. The said accused no.1 was, at that time, carrying a black coloured suitcase, a plastic shopping bag and a pouch. After the accused No.1 had cleared himself through the Green baggage and his person were searched and he was also interrogated. The examination of his boarding card revealed that he was allotted seat No.15 J in the said aircraft. Meanwhile, a team of the DRI officers who were rummaging the said Quantas aircraft recovered a cream coloured jacket from the left hand side rack near seat no.14 A on the upper deck of the said aircraft. This cloth jacket was found to be very heavy. Thereafter the accused no.1 was taken, in the presence of two panchas, from the customs arrival hall of Module II of the NIPT, Bombay, to the said aircraft. On being questioned by the D.R.I. officers regarding the said cloth jacket, the accused no.1 admitted that he had brought the said jacket containing foreign marked gold biscuits from Zurich to London by the Swiss Air flight No.SR-800 on 7.1.1987 and that after disembarking at London, he had boarded the Quantas flight No.QF-010 for Bombay with the said jacket containing foreign marked gold. He had further admitted that although he was allotted seat No.15 J in the said aircraft, he was in fact occupying seat No.14 A. He also admitted before the panch witnesses that he was to deliver in the said aircraft itself the said jacket containing the gold biscuits to a crew member Mr. Michael Kypriadis, the Quantas Flight Service Director (accused no.2) who was on board of the said Quantas flight. Accused no.1 also stated to the DRI officers in the presence of panch witnesses, that since the accused no.2 did not turn up, he left the said jacket containing gold biscuits in the rack on the left hand side of the aircraft near seat no.14 A on the upper deck of the said aircraft and walked away.

4. Thereafter, the accused no.1 alongwith the said cloth jacket was brought to a customs room in the arrival hall of Module II of the said airport. The officers, thereafter, examined the said jacket in the presence of panchas and in the presence of accused no.1 which revealed that it contained 15 rows of pouches, each pouch containing a packet wrapped with adhesive paper. Thus, in all 15 packets wrapped in adhesive paper were so found in the said packet. All the 15 packets were opened by the DRI officers and each such packet was found to contain 10 gold biscuits of 10 tolas each with foreign markings. In all 150 (one hundred and fifty) gold biscuits with foreign markings were recovered from the said clot jacket. All these gold biscuits were found to have on the obverse side the marking from the top to bottom thereof as "CREDIT-999.10-SUISSE-10 TOLAS-ESSAYEUR-FONDEUR". The accused no.1 had no permission to import the gold. The DRI officers therefore seized the said 150 gold biscuits with foreign markings totally weighing 1500 tolas/17490 gms and valued at Rs.41,97,600/- (Rupees Forty One Lakhs Ninety Seven Thousand and Six Hundred only) at prevailing local market rate under a panchanama in the reasonable belief that same were smuggled into India and hence were liable to confiscation under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. The adhesive paper in which the said 150 gold biscuits were packed and the said cloth jacket were also seized by the DRI officers as exhibits in the reasonable belief that the same are relevant to the proceedings of this case under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. The search of the black suitcase, the shopping bag and the pouch of accused no.1 and his personal search by the DRI officers in the presence of panch witnesses, resulted in the recovery of certain documents which were also seized by the DRI officers under the panchanama, in the reasonable belief that they are relevant to the case proceedings under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.

5. Thereafter on enquiry, the DRI officers found out that the accused no.2, whom accused no.1 had admitted as being the person to whom the said gold was to be delivered, had checked into room no.2627 in Hotel Oberoi Towers, Bombay. The said room was thereafter searched by the DRI officers in the presence of two panch witnesses, the accused no.2 who was present in the room and accused no.1 who was brought along by the DRI officers to the said room for the identification of accused no.2. During the course of the search, some documents were seized as being relevant to the case proceedings under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. Accused nos.1 and 2 identified each other. On being questioned by the DRI officers, the accused no.2 who was thereafter brought to the DRI office at Hotel Waldorf, Colaba, Bombay, for interrogation, disclosed that he was to deliver the said gold biscuits to Ahmed Abdul Karim of Bombay V.T. In the light of this, searches of the residential and business premises of Ahmed Abdul Karim (Accused no.3) as identified by accused no.2 were carried out in the presence of accused no.3 and in the presence of panchas and some documents were seized under a panchanama as being relevant to the case proceedings under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962."

5. The confessional statement of the 1st accused under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 was recorded on 08th January, 1987. In the said confessional statement the 1st accused admitted that he was working for the 1st respondent-accused no.3 for monetary consideration of 10 pounds per gold biscuit. He stated that he had brought the said 150 gold biscuits on 07th January, 1987 from the Swiss bank at Zurich. He boarded the Swiss air flight and alighted at London and declared the said gold to British Customs Authority. Thereafter, he boarded a flight on 07th January, 1987 at London of Quantas airways to Bombay. According to the 1st accused he was to give the said gold in a rexine bag as per the previous arrangement to the 2nd accused who was on the board of the same flight. He stated that the modus operandi adopted for smuggling activities was that the 1st respondent was financing the entire operation by sending money from London to Zurich where the 1st respondent was having a bank account. The 3rd respondent had given standing instructions to the bank to deliver a pre-arranged quantity of gold to accused no.1 on presentation of his passport. The 1st accused used to fly to Zurich from London on ticket supplied by the 1st respondent. The 1st accused used to pick up the gold from Swiss bank at Zurich and used to fly down to London by Swiss air flight. From London he used to board Quantas airways flight to Bombay. He used to receive instructions from the 1st respondent on telephone about the member of the Quantas air flight crew on London-Bombay flight to whom he used to deliver gold on the board of the flight. The crew members used to be given telephonic instructions by the 1st respondent. The accused no.1 used to meet the concerned crew members at London itself and used to decide at what point of time in the flight the gold was to be handed over to the employee. The 1st accused thereafter deposed to the manner in which the gold subject-matter of the offence was brought.

6. The accused no.2 was working for Quantas airways. His statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 was recorded on 21st January, 1987. He also deposed as to how the gold subject-matter of the offence was brought. He also disclosed the modus operandi adopted in such transactions. He stated that on 07th January, 1987 he met the accused no.1 on London-Bombay flight. He received a black pouch containing 120 biscuits of 10 tolas each which were packed in adhesive paper in bundles of 10 biscuits each. After receiving the pouch containing gold, he went to the toilet of the aircraft, took out the bundles of gold biscuits from the pouch and he had transferred the same into an empty cloth jacket which was still with him. He returned the empty pouch. He deposed that when the flight landed at Bombay airport, he noticed that customs staff was checking the passports of the passengers. He stated that this alerted him and he went to the front side toilet of the plane and took out the jacket and put it in his hand and placed his uniform jacket over his hand to hide the jacket containing gold. Thereafter, he put the said jacket containing gold in the locker near seat nos.14/15A.

7. On the same day statement of the 1st respondent was recorded under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. In the said statement he gave all particulars such as his date of birth, place of birth, particulars of his family and the manner in which he went to London and started business. He also disclosed as to how he came in contact with crew members of the airlines including the accused no.2. He also disclosed as to how he used to visit gold shop of Heerji Lakha situated at Wembley, London to buy gold coins and ornaments. The material portion of his statement reads thus :

"As regards the arrangements for the acquisition of the gold which was ultimately smuggled into India, I have to state that in order avoid the payment of VAT in England on the gold Shah and I decided that I should open a bank account in my name in Switzerland which would be used for the procurement of the gold. Accordingly, I opened a bank account in the Zurich airport branch of the CREDIT SUISSE BANK towards the end of 1983 or early 1984 as far as I recall. However, as during the period between late 1983 to early 1986 we did only two or three jobs, we have no occasion to utilise this account for this purpose. ......

Around early 1986 in view of the increased profit margins in gold smuggling Shah and I decided that we should re-activate our business. The modus operandi agreed upon between us was that Shah would have sums of money deposited in my account in Zurich and that these sums would be utilised for the acquisition of gold from the bank in Zurich by my nominee who would then bring the gold to London airport and board a connecting Qantas flight from London to Bombay and hand over the gold to one of the flight crew on board. As I mentioned earlier, Abdul Rehman Mayet had already agreed with me that he would be willing to take delivery of the gold and carry it on our behalf. Accordingly sometime in late 1985 I had introduced him to my bank in Zurich and also given him authority to operate in the bank on my behalf. In early 1986 when Shah and I decided to commence the smuggling of gold from London to Bombay I contacted Mayet on his London telephone No.5390951 and informed him to be prepared in the light of our discussions earlier. I also got in touch with my old acquaintances in Quantas while they were transiting through Bombay and secured their ..... of the crew whom I know as Ken was in Bombay at the relevant time and he agreed to do the job. He also gave me the details of his return flights from London to Bombay and the particulars of the hotel where he would be staying in London. I then telephoned Shah and told him that I had organised the job and that he should deposit an adequate amount of money in my account in Zurich in order to finance the purchase of the gold. Shah's telephone number in London is 450 8728. I also telephoned Mayet and told him that he would have to go to Zurich draw the gold from my account come back to London board the agreed upon Quantas flight from London to Bombay and hand over the gold to the concerned Quantas crew on board the flight. I also communicated to Mayet the name of the crew and the particulars of the hotel where he would be staying and told him to meet the crew concerned in London before proceeding to Zurich so that he could identify the crew concerned easily, on the flight, from London to Bombay. In this manner Mayet procured 100 biscuits of gold from Zurich and handed them over to the crew member named Ken on the flight from London to Bombay. Ken in turn cleared the biscuits through Bombay Customs and thereafter handed them over to me near Excelsior Cinema in Bombay as pre-arranged between us in terms of the arrangements made earlier between Shah and me I handed over the gold to Shah's representative. I do not know the identity of this man as this was never conveyed to me. Shah had only told me that whenever a consignment of gold was received by me in this manner his man would contact me on the telephone in Bombay and that I should hand over the gold to him. I am unable to give the details of Shah's representative in Bombay. After this about 5 to 6 similar jobs were done by us using different Quantas crew. ....

I have to state that on the 2nd January, 1987 Mike telephoned me from Bombay and told me that he would be leaving for London on the 04th and would be back in Bombay on the 08th and asked me whether there was any job for him. I told Mike that he would be required to bring 150 biscuits of gold from London to Bombay on his return journey. I then rang up Mayet and told him to contact Mike at his hotel and confirm with him that he would be on board the flight and would hand over the gold to Mike for clearance through Customs. I also rang up Shah and informed him of the arrangements made and Shah told me that he would arrange for the money to be deposited into my account in Zurich and that Mayet could take the delivery of the gold and that Shah's man would contact me as usual in Bombay and I should hand over the gold to him. After these conversations I had no further discussions with Mayet, Mike or Shah and I was expecting the gold to be delivered to me by Mike sometime this morning. The arrangement was that Mayet would have picked up the gold in Zurich, taken a flight to London and thereafter boarded a Quantas flight from London to Bombay and handed over the gold to Mike on board who would then clear it through Bombay Customs and deliver it to me. This morning my shop and residence was searched by your officers and thereafter I was brought to your office under summons. I confirm that had the 150 gold biscuits of gold seized by your officers been cleared through Customs they would have been handed them over to me by Mike and I would in turn hand them over to Shah's man. ...."

8. It is not in dispute that all the three accused including the 1st respondent retracted their statements by giving writings.

9. The learned Magistrate in the impugned judgment and order observed that only evidence brought on record against the 1st respondent is of his retracted statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. The learned Judge observed that the documents seized from his residential or shop premises are not at all connected with alleged activity of smuggling of gold. The learned Judge held that in absence of corroboration from independent evidence it was unsafe to convict the 1st respondent on the basis of retracted statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. He, therefore, proceeded to acquit the 1st respondent.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant heavily relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. I. Pavunny Vs. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin [(1997)3 Supreme Court Cases 721]. He invited my attention to material part of the decision and submitted that conviction could be based on a retracted statement of an accused under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. He invited my attention to the nature of the statement of the 1st respondent and pointed out that the 1st respondent has disclosed all material particulars right from his date of birth and place of birth. He pointed out that he has given all the particulars of the members of his family and as to what transpired in the family. He has stated the manner in which he reached London in the year 1975 and the manner in which he developed business at London. He submitted that there are certain corrections made in the typewritten statement of the 1st respondent and all corrections have been initiated by the 1st respondent. He submitted that this shows that the confessional statement was voluntary. He submitted that if it was not voluntary, all personal details could not have been incorporated in the statement right from the date of birth and other particulars as pointed out earlier. He submitted that there was no material on record to show that the said statement was obtained by threat, duress or promise. He submitted that there is evidence of the seizure of the gold and evidence of the responsible officers of the Customs Department which shows that the statement is true. He submitted that by stereotype letters all the accused have retracted their statements under section 108 of the said Act and the said letters appears to have been drafted by the same advocate. He submitted that though the 1st respondent may not have played actual part in bringing smuggled gold to India, the 1st and 2nd accused were acting at his instance and therefore the confessional statements of the 1st and 2nd accused are sufficient to corroborate the confessional statement of the 1st respondent. He placed reliance on decision of the Apex Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Chhabra Vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1997)1 Supreme Court Cases 508] as well as another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Naresh, J. Sukhawani Vs. Union of India [1995 Supp. (4) Supreme Court Cases 663] in support of his submissions.

11. I have perused the record. I have perused the impugned judgment and order and notes of evidence. As pointed out earlier, all three accused have purportedly retracted their statements under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. The trial against 1st and 2nd accused was separated. The first witness examined by the appellant is Mr. K. Raghavan, Air Intelligence Officer. He deposed as to how the gold was seized from the jacket on the board of the plane. He also deposed regarding personal search of the accused no.1. P.W. No.2 Suresh Nivatkar is an inspector of Central Excise. He deposed about the search of the premises of the 1st respondent. He stated that the three photographs and one telex message were seized. He proved the seizure panchanama in evidence. In the cross-examination he admitted that they have not ascertained as to whose photographs were found in the premises of the 1st respondent. He admitted that it was not ascertained as to how the telex message was connected to the investigation. P.W. No.3 Mr. H. R. Phalvahan deposed about search of the shop premises/business premises of the 1st respondent. He stated that during the search no incriminating documents could be found in the shop premises of the 1st respondent. P.W. No.4 Mr. Raju Koshi, Intelligence Officer deposed about the search of the room in a hotel occupied by the accused No.2. P.W. No.5 Mr. Deepak Shetty, Assistant Director, DRI was examined as he had recorded the statements of 1st and 2nd accused under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. He admitted that both the 1st and 2nd accused retracted their statements. P.W. No.6 Mr. Ramchandra Bapuji Shinde was examined as he had recorded statement of the 1st respondent under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. He produced retraction letter dated 13th January, 1987 of the 1st respondent. He was cross-examined at length by the advocate for the accused.

12. Thus, it appears from the evidence that nothing incriminating was found in the custody of the 1st respondent when his house and business premises were searched. None of the witnesses have stated anything which will connect the 1st respondent with the seizure of the gold on the board of the plane. Thus, the only material brought on record by the prosecution against the 1st respondent is his statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 which has been admittedly retracted. The statements of the 1st and 2nd accused under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 have been produced and proved which have been also admittedly retracted.

13. Thus, the first question which arises is whether conviction of the 1st respondent could be based on the retracted statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has taken me through the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. I. Pavunny (supra). The question which arose for consideration of the Apex Court is summarised in the first paragraph of the judgment which reads thus :

"This appeal by special leave has come up before this Bench, pursuant to a reference order dated 09.11.1994 passed by a two-Judge Bench, to consider whether the confessional statement of the appellant made to the Customs Officers under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short "the Act"), though retracted at a later stage, is admissible in evidence and could form the basis for conviction and whether retracted confessional statement requires corroboration on material particulars from independent evidence ?...."

14. After considering the law on the point, the aforesaid question was answered by the Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the said decision which reads thus :

"25. It would thus be seen that there is no prohibition under the Evidence Act to rely upon the retracted confession to prove the prosecution case or to make the same basis for conviction of the accused. Practice and prudence require that the court could examine the evidence adduced by the prosecution to find out whether there are any other facts and circumstances to corroborate the retracted confession. It is not necessary that there should be corroboration from independent evidence adduced by the prosecution to corroborate each detail contained in the confessional statement. The court is required to examine whether the confessional statement is voluntary; in other words, whether it was not obtained by threat, duress or promise. If the court is satisfied from the evidence that it was voluntary, then it is required to examine whether the statement is true. If the court on examination of the evidence finds that the retracted confession is true, that part of the inculpatory portion could be relied upon to base the conviction. However, prudence and practice require that court would seek assurance getting corroboration from other evidence adduced by the prosecution." (Emphasis added)

15. What has been held by the Apex Court can summarised as under :

(i) There is no prohibition under the Evidence Act to rely upon retracted confession to prove the prosecution case;

(ii) Practice and prudence requires that the Court could examine the evidence adduced by the prosecution to find out whether there are any other facts and circumstances to corroborate the retracted confession;

(iii) The Court is required to examine whether the confessional statement is voluntary in the sense whether it was obtained by threat, duress or promise;

(iv) If the Court is satisfied from the evidence that it was voluntary, then it is required to be examined whether the statement is true;

(v) If the Court on examination of the evidence finds that the retracted confession is true, that part of the inculpatory portion could be relied upon to base the conviction;

(vi) However, the practice and prudence requires that the Court should seek assurance getting corroboration from other evidence adduced by the prosecution.

16. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court, even assuming that the confessional statement of the 1st respondent was voluntary and was true, as a rule of prudence, the Court is required to seek assurance getting corroboration from the other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus, the Court is required to find out whether there are other facts and circumstances on the record to corroborate what is stated in the retracted confession. As stated earlier, except for the statements of 1st and 2nd accused under section 108 of the said Act of 1962, there is nothing on record to corroborate what is stated in the confessional statement of the 1st respondent. Thus, if at all any assurance is to be drawn or assurance is to be taken, the same will have to be on the basis of statements of 1st and 2nd accused under section 108 of the said Act which have been retracted. Thus, in short, now the question which remains to be decided is whether retracted confessional statements of the co-accused who are not being tried with the accused can be used as corroborative evidence for drawing assurance to what is stated in the statement of the accused (1st respondent) under section 108 of the said Act of 1962.

17. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has relied upon decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Chhabra (supra) and Naresh Sukhawani (supra). These decisions do not arise out of a prosecution for offence under the said Act of 1962 and these decisions arise out of adjudication proceedings. Therefore, the said decisions are of no help to the appellants. It will be necessary to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Haricharan Kurmi & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1184). It must be borne in mind that the Apex Court was dealing in the said case with the probative value of confession of co-accused against the other accused where there was a joint trial of all the accused. In the present case accused nos.1 and 2 are not being tried with the 1st respondent and their trial has been separated. Therefore, so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, strictly speaking 1st and 2nd accused are not the co-accused as they have not been tried with the 1st respondent. Turning back to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Haricharan (supra), the Apex Court considered section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While dealing with the probative value of the confessional statement of the co-accused the Apex Court proceeded to hold thus:

"..... It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the Court is evidence, circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence......" (Emphasis added)

18. The Apex Court made a distinction between confession of co-accused and evidence of accomplice which is recorded under section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and held that statements contained in confession of co-accused persons stand on a different footing. In paragraph 14 the Apex Court observed thus :

"14. The statements contained in the confessions of the co-accused persons stand on a different footing. In cases where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with the examination of the said statements. The stage to consider the said confessional statements arrives only after the other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory. The difference in the approach which the Court has to adopt in dealing with these two types of evidence is thus clear, well-understood and well-established. .... "

19. Thus, what has been held by the Apex Court is that though a confession of co-accused may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by section 3 of the said Act of 1872. Therefore, while dealing with a case against an accused person, the Court cannot start with the confession of the co-accused person and it must be begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to give assurance to the conclusion of the guilt which judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. It will be also necessary to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhana Khalpa Bhai Patil Vs. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bulsar, Gujarat and Anr. [(1998)1 Supreme Court Cases 222]. This was a case where co-accused were convicted after they pleaded guilty. A co-accused who pleaded guilty was examined as a prosecution witness against the accused. The Apex Court held that the evidence of the co-accused can be held corroborative to the statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. However, this decision will be of no help to the applicant as in this case the co-accused who was already convicted was examined as a witness.

20. It must be noted here that the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Haricharan (supra) was not dealing with retracted confession of co-accused. In the case of Ram Prakash Vs. The State of Punjab (AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1) the Apex Court considered the scope of section 30 while dealing with retracted confession of co-accused. It will be necessary to refer to paragraph 6 of the said decision. Relevant part of paragraph 6 reads thus :

"6. ...... It will be clear from the terms of this section that where more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by any one of them affecting himself and any one of his co-accused can be taken into consideration by the Court not only against the maker of the confession but also against his co-accused. The Evidence Act nowhere provides that if the confession is retracted, it cannot be taken into consideration against the co-accused or the confessing accused. Accordingly, the provisions of the Evidence Act do not prevent the Court from taking into consideration a retracted confession against the confessing accused and his co-accused. Not a single decision of any of the courts in India was placed before us to show that a retracted confession was not admissible in evidence or that it was irrelevant as against a co-accused. An examination of the reported decisions of the various High Courts in India indicates that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view that although it may be taken into consideration against a co-accused by virtue of the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, its value was extremely weak and there could be no conviction without the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars. The corroboration in the full sense implies corroboration not only as to the factum of the crime but also as to the connection of the co-accused with that crime. In our opinion, there appears to be considerable justification for this view. The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession, however, would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Although a retracted confession is admissible against a co-accused by virtue of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, as a matter of prudence and practice a Court would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co-accused without corroboration. ....." (Emphasis added)

21. Again the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the co-accused were being jointly tried with the accused. Thus, what has been held by the Apex Court is that through retracted confession is admissible against the co-accused by virtue of section 30 of the said Act of 1872, as a matter of prudence and practice, Court would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co-accused without corroboration. This decision squarely answers the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. According to the advocate for the appellant retracted statements under section 108 of the said Act of 1962 of accused nos.1 and 2 whose trial has been separated, corroborate the retracted statement of the 1st respondent. The Apex Court has held that retracted confessional statements of the co-accused in the same case cannot be acted upon to convict the accused without corroboration as to the connection of the accused with the crime. Therefore, in the present case, the retracted statements of the co-accused whose trial has been separated cannot be used as a piece of evidence to draw assurance or to corroborate the retracted statement of the 1st respondent.

22. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate held that there is no corroborative evidence on record to lend assurance to what is stated by the 1st respondent in the retracted statement under section 108 of the said Act of 1962. The view taken by the learned Magistrate is certainly a possible view of the matter. Even assuming that another view can be taken on the basis of evidence is no ground to interfere in an appeal against acquittal in as much as the presumption innocence is further strengthened by the acquittal of the accused.

23. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.