Criminal Writ Petition No.1216 of 2008

15th October, 2009

Petitioner Counsel: Ms. ANAMIKA MALHOTRA
Respondent Counsel: Mr. NITIN PRADHAN,Mr. SAYAJI NANGRE, Mr. RANJEET M. PAWAR, Mr. SAMEER NANGRE , Mr. SURAJ NANGRE,Mrs. R. V. NEWTON

Cases Cited:
Sadruddin Javeri Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1994(104) Taxman 335 (AP) [Para 10]
Babu Rao Vs. Inspector of Police, 190 ITR 616 [Para 11]
Union of India Vs. Judicial Magistrate (Eastern Railway), Mughalsarai, 140 ITR 553 [Para 12]
K. Choyi Vs. Syed Abdulla Bafakky Thangal, AIR 1980 SC 99 [Para 13]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- The petitioner has challenged the Order dated 19th November, 2004 of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, confirmed in Revision by the Sessions Court Greater Mumbai by an Order dated 5th April, 2008 rejecting the prayer of the Deputy Director of Income Tax - the petitioner herein, for return of an amount seized from the custody of the respondent No.1 Nagorao Malku Ghadge under Section 124 of The Bombay Police Act, 1951.

2. The relevant facts of the matter begin with the seizure of an amount of Rs.80,57,680/- and jewellery worth Rs.2,18,920/- from the possession of the respondent No.1 Nagorao on 21st May, 2001 in the course of a search of his house by the DCB CID i.e. State Police. Nagorao was prosecuted under Section 124 of The Bombay Police Act and called upon to account for possession of the cash and the jewellery. He gave a satisfactory explanation to the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of law. Accordingly he was acquitted on 7th May, 2004 under that Act. Since Section 124 entails punishment only if such a person fails to account for such possession. Section 124 of The Bombay Police Act reads as follows :

"124. Possession of property of which no satisfactory account can be given.- Whoever has in his possession or conveys in any manner, or offers for sale or pawn, anything which there is reason to believe is stolen property or property fraudulently obtained, shall, if he failed to account for such possession or to act to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term [which May, extend to one year but shall not, except for reasons to be recorded in writing, be less than one month and shall also be liable to fine which May, extend to [five thousand rupees]."

3. During the pendency of the trial, the Income Tax Department which had received information from the Police issued Warrant of Authorisation on 22nd May, 2001 under Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act authorising four of its officers to require the Senior Police Inspector Unit - 5 Crime Branch, CID to deliver the aforesaid assets, books of accounts, etc. to such authorised officers. Apparently, the authorisation could not be given effect to against the Sr. Police Inspector, Unit - 5, Crime Branch, CID, who was required to deliver the said assets to the authorised officer since the assets had passed into the custody of the court and the court had deposited the jewellery and the amount in Fixed Deposit in State Bank of India, where they are lying even at this moment.

4. During the trial one of the authorised officer Deputy Director of Income Tax moved an application for return of the seized cash and jewellery along with relevant records of the case for the purposes of assessment under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That application was rejected by the Court for want of details and because the Department had not come to the conclusion that the property is unaccounted or undisclosed. The application was thus dismissed as a premature application. The Sessions Court confirmed that order and granted liberty to the authorised officer to make a fresh application along with other relevant record.

5. Accordingly, another application was made on 1st August, 2002 for the purpose along with a fresh authorisation again requiring the Senior Police Inspector, Unit - 5 Crime Branch, CID, to deliver the assets, books of account etc. to the authorised officer by the Income Tax Department. However, the trial came to an end and the respondent No.1 Nagorao was acquitted on 7th May, 2004.

6. The application under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. was pressed on behalf of the petitioner as an application under Section 452 of the Criminal Procedure Code which the trial court rejected. The rejection has been confirmed by the Sessions Court in Appeal. Those orders are challenged in this writ petition.

7. Ms. Malhotra, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Sessions Court committed a serious error of law in rejecting the application merely on the ground that the authorisation under Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act can only require an officer and authority who has taken the assets or books of accounts or other documents into custody to return the same and since a court cannot be treated as such an officer or authority, the petitioner's application was thus liable to be rejected.

8. Mr. Pradhan the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that indeed the court is not an officer or authority contemplated by section 132-A of the Income Tax Act which can be required to return the seized assets, in this case the cash and jewellery to the Income Tax Department. It was further submitted by Mr. Pradhan that there was no power in a Criminal Court by virtue of Section 452 of the Cr.P.C. to direct return of a property which was seized in respect of offence under Section 124 of The Bombay Police Act. Since in the present case the respondent No.1 gave a satisfactory explanation as a result of which he was acquitted. Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act reads as follows :-

"132-A. (1) Where the [Director General or Director] or the [Chief Commissioner or Commissioner]' in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe that-

(a) any person to whom a summons under sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under sub-section (1) of section 131 of this Act, or a notice under sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or under sub-section (1) of section 142 of this Act was issued to produce, or cause to be produced, any books of account or other documents has omitted or failed to produce, or cause to be produced, such books of account or other documents, as required by such summons or notice and the said books of account or other documents have been taken into custody by any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force, or

(b) any books of account or other documents will be useful for or relevant to, any proceeding under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under this Act and any person to whom a summons or notice as aforesaid has been or might be issued will not, or would not, produce or cause to be produced, such books of account or other documents on the return of such books of account or other documents by any officer or authority by whom or which such books of account or other documents have been taken into custody under any other law for the time being in force, or

(c) any assets represent either wholly or partly income or property which has not been, or would not have been, disclosed for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act by any person from whose possession or control such assets have been taken into custody by any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force,

then, the Director General or Director or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner May, authorise any Additional Director, Additional Commissioner, Joint Director, Joint Commissioner, Assistant Director or Deputy Director, Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Income-tax Officer (hereafter in this section and in sub-section (2) of section 278-D referred to as the requisitioning officer) to require the officer or authority referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause(c), as the case May, be, to deliver such books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer.

(2) On a requisition being made under sub-section (1), the officer or authority referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c), as the case May, be, of that sub-section shall deliver the books of account, other documents or assets to the requisitioning officer either forthwith or when such officer or authority is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to retain the same in his or its custody.

(3) Where any books of account, other documents or assets have been delivered to the requisitioning officer, the provisions of sub-sections (4-A) to (14) (both inclusive) of section 132 and section 132-B shall, so far as may be, apply as if such books of account, other documents or assets had been seized under sub-section (1) of section 132 by the requisitioning officer from the custody of the person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c), as the case may be, of sub-section (1) of this section and as if for the words "the authorised officer" occurring in any of the aforesaid sub-sections (4-A) to (14), the words "the requisitioning officer" were substituted]."

9. This provision empowers the Director General or Director or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or Commissioner of Income Tax to authorise any of the officers specified in said Section such as Joint Director, Joint Commissioner etc. known as requisitioning officers to require an officer or an authority referred to in clauses (a) (b) or (c) in possession of such assets, books of accounts or documents to deliver such books of accounts, documents or assets to the requisitioning officer. There is no doubt that the term 'officer' or 'authority' in possession of such seized assets, books of accounts or documents will not include a court. The term requisition means an 'authoritative formal demand' vide Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edn. and its use shows an intention to conclude a case of law. Surely it is not the intention of the Income Tax Act under Section 132-A to authorise its officers to require a court to deliver the property which is custodia legis to its officers. This position is also settled by a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

10. In Sadruddin Javeri Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [1994(104) Taxman 335 (AP)], a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed as follows :

"Held.

The police officer who seized the property, has a duty to transport the same to the Court or to give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond and undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same. There can be no transfer or appropriation of any property seized by the police except under the order of the Court. The counsel for the ITOs has conceded that S.132-A does not authorise any notice to the Court as by no stretch of imagination the Court can be identified as any officer or authority under any other law for the time being in force as contemplated under cl.(c) of S.132-A(1), r/w. cl.(a) thereof. There has been gross violation of law by the entry of the ITOs. to take delivery of the properties from the police before the seizure is reported to the Court and the Court passed any order as to its custody. Property seized from the house of the petitioner ordered to be released immediately."

I am in respectful agreement with the view of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Ms. Malhotra the learned counsel for the petitioner however submitted that though the term 'Officer' or 'Authority' under Section 132-A did not include the court the authorised officers were empowered by virtue of the authorisation under that section to make an application for return of the property under Sections 451 and 452 of the Cr.P.C. as the case may be. It is however not possible to accept this argument since there is nothing in Section 132-A under which an authorised officer may be empowered to recover any property from a court. The purpose of enactment of Section 132-A is clear, namely, to enable the Director General or Director or Chief Commissioner or a Commissioner of the Income Tax Department for requiring any "officer or authority" who has taken any assets, books of accounts etc. into his custody and requiring such officer or authority to deliver such assets, documents or books of account to the requisitioning officer. The purpose of the section is not to authorise any officer to make an application to a court for return of any property. The purpose of the provision cannot be stretched to make an application to the court which is routinely done by the department without resorting to any particular provision of the Income Tax Act.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioner however relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in Babu Rao Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr. [190 ITR 616] where an amount seized was handed over to the court and an Income Tax Department filed an application for return of the property under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C under an authority under Section 132 and 132-A of the Income Tax Act. The learned Single Judge who decided the matter held that it is not necessary to decide whether the word 'authority' used in Section 132-A of the Act includes the court since the order has been passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. read with Sections 132 and 132-A of the Act on a request emerging from the Income Tax Department. The court merely held a criminal court is entitled to pass such an order for return of property under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. where such property seized and produced before it to the person entitled to possession of the property seized. In my view, that decision is not an authority for the proposition that an authorisation under Section 132-A empowers an authorised officer to make an application to a criminal court for return of property which is in custodia legis. Though it seems that in that case the Income Tax Authorities did make an application on the basis of an authorisation under Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Union of India Vs. Judicial Magistrate (Eastern Railway), Mughalsarai & Anr. [140 ITR 553] for the proposition that by virtue of authorisation under Section 132-A authorised officer can recover the property from a court. However, the facts of the case were entirely different and so in the ratio. The assets in that case were seized by the Station House Officer who refused to deliver possession of the assets without an order of the Court. The High Court held that the Magistrate should have directed the Station House Officer to release the assets to the requisitioning officer instead of the party from whom they were seized. That decision also is of no help to the case of the petitioner.

13. Turning to the facts of the present case, it appears that after the property was seized, the petitioner - the Income Tax Department assessed the tax liability of the respondent No.1 in respect of the seized amount. Not only that after such assessment, they have made an application to the court under Section 226(4) of the Income Tax Act which reads as follows :

"226. (4) The [Assessing] Officer [or Tax Recovery Officer] may apply to the court in whose custody there is money belonging to the assessee for payment to him of the entire amount of such money, or, if it is more than the tax due, an amount sufficient to discharge the tax."

The petitioner seems to have already resorted to the correct procedure for recovering the tax amount which is in custodia legis since that provision empowers the department to recover the entire amount if the amount is less than that is seized if such amount is less than the tax liability or such an amount is sufficient to discharge the tax liability. It hardly needs any emphasis that the Income Tax authorities are not entitled to the amount except by way of a tax. This application under Section 226(4) is in accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court in K. Choyi Vs. Syed Abdulla Bafakky Thangal & Ors. [AIR 1980 SC 99], where Their Lordships observed as follows :

"....If an assessment is completed before the seizure is effected and while the assets are still in the custody of the Court, the appropriate remedy for the Revenue is to make an application under Section 226(4) of the Income Tax Act."

The said application is pending before the criminal court. In such circumstances, it would be appropriate in the interest of justice to direct the criminal court to decide an application under Section 226(4) of the Income Tax Act preferred by the Department on 4th June, 2008 as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. Having regard to the fact that the amount is lying in the custody of the court for over a period of 5 years after the respondent No.1 was acquitted, the trial court is directed to decide the said application not later than three months from the date the parties appear before it. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 9th November, 2009. Petition is disposed of accordingly.

Ordered accordingly.