Contempt Appeal No.1 of 2009,Contempt Petition No.3 of 2008,Writ Petition Nos.518 of 2007,Writ Petition No.1449 of 2007

22nd July, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Shri. A. M. GORDEY
Respondent Counsel: Shri. ANOOP PARIHAR,Shri. R. S. PARSODKAR

Cases Cited:
Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1976 PC 253 [Para 6.1]
Kanwar Paul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007)5 SCC 85 [Para 6.1,10.3]
Anil Ratan Sarkar Vs. Hirak Ghosh, 2002(4) SCC 21 [Para 6.3,8.2]
Jhareshwar Prasad Paul Vs. Taraknath Ganguly, 2002(5) SCC 352 [Para 6.3,8.1]
Ashok Paper Kamgar Union Vs. Dharam Godha, (2003)11 SCC 1 [Para 6.3,8]
Indian Airport Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chaterjee, (1999)2 SCC 537 [Para 6.3]
Kapildev Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, 1999(7) SCC 537 [Para 6.4]
Director of Education Uttaranchal Vs. Ved Prakash Joshi, 2005(5) ALL MR 856 (S.C.)=AIR 2005 SC 3200 [Para 7.3,8.5]
Union of India Vs. Subedar Devassy PV, 2006(4) ALL MR 24=(2006)1 SCC 613 [Para 7.3]
Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand, 2004(5) ALL MR 1129 (S.C.)=AIR 2004 SC 4277 [Para 7.3]
State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Singh, 2004(5) ALL MR 1093 (S.C.)=AIR 2004 SC 4419 [Para 7.3]
Karewwa Vs. Hussensab Hansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 [Para 7.3]
Md. Kasem Ali Mondal Vs. Ajoy Rande, 2000 Cr.L.J. 358 [Para 7.4]
Mohammad Idris Vs. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji, AIR 1984 SC 1826 [Para 7.4]
Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. Sh. K.M.M. Shetty, AIR 1990 SC 464 [Para 7.4]
Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira Singh, 1978 Cr.L.J. 560 [Para 7.4]
All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghavendra Singh, AIR 2007 SC 1386 [Para 7.4]
Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque Vs. S. A. Azmi, 2000(3) ALL MR 762=2001(1) Mh.L.J. 249 [Para 8.3]
Kapildeo Prasad Sah Vs. State of Bihar, (1999)7 SCC 569 [Para 8.4]
Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Maharashtra Publishers Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 296 [Para 8.7]
M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 127 [Para 8.8]
Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati, 2001(4) ALL MR 250 (S.C.)=2001 SCC (L & S) 1196 [Para 20]

JUDGMENT

D. B. BHOSALE, J.:- This contempt appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short "the Act") is directed against the judgment and order dated 18/12/2008, rendered by a learned Single Judge, in Contempt Petition No.3 of 2008, holding the appellants guilty of committing deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of this Court dated 04/04/2007 and awarding simple imprisonment for one month each and pay fine of Rs.500/- (Rs.Five Hundred) each to be paid within a period of two months from the date of the judgment, failing which to undergo simple imprisonment of one week. Further the learned Judge directed to put respondent No.2 in possession of the land in dispute by removing the appellants from the possession thereof within a period of two months from the date of the judgment.

2. This Court while admitting the appeal vide order dated 18-02-2009, granted stay of the impugned order to the extent-it directed the Police Station Officer of the Police Station, Kamptee to hand over possession of the suit land to respondent No.2. It further appears that since the appellants came to be arrested pursuant to the impugned judgment, this Court vide order dated 06-03-2009 ordered to release them on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond in the sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rs.Five Thousand) each with one solvent surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and with their assistance gone through the entire material placed before the Court. Before making reference to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, we deem it appropriate to mention in detail the sequence of dates and events, which, in our opinion, would be relevant and necessary to consider the contentions urged and the questions involved in the appeal.

4. The facts and circumstances leading to this appeal are set out in the following three parts :

PART - I.

(i) The land involved in this proceeding is Survey No.2 (New Survey No.25), admeasuring 5.23 Hectors (13.16 acres) situate at Mouza-Powari, Taluka-Kamptee, District-Nagpur (for short "the suit land").

(ii) The father of the appellants-Gulab Hazare (for short "Gulab") was a tenant of the suit land and one Gajanan Sakharam Teli was its owner. Gajanan Teli sold the suit land to Sitaram Zolba Paunikar on 28-05-1956. Sitaram Paunikar died on 05-06-1969 and thereafter his sons Ramkrushna, Mukund, Madhukar, Shankar and Laxman (for short "Paunikars") became the owners of the suit land. Paunikars sold the suit land to respondent No.2 on 04-05-2002.

(iii) The appellants' father-Gulab had filed an application for fixation of "fair rent" under Sections 12 and 15 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short "Tenancy Act"). The Tahsildar vide order dated 26-12-1963 held that the suit land was given on lease to Gulab for Rs.600/- per year from 1958-1959 and fixed the rent of Rs.144/- per year.

(iv) Paunikars filed an application being Tenancy Case No.1/59/14/98-99 before the Tahsildar, Kamptee under Section 21 of the Tenancy Act for restoration and recovery of possession of the suit land from Gulab on the ground that he failed to make statutory purchase of the suit land and hence, there was a deemed surrender. The Tahsildar by the order dated 20-11-2000 allowed the application filed by Paunikars. That order was carried by Gulab before Sub-Divisional Officer (for short "SDO") in Revenue Appeal No.32/MRC-81/2000-2001. The appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 24-10-2001. That order was further challenged by Gulab before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur (for short "MRT") in Revision Application No.TEN/B/109/2001.

(v) It appears that Gulab also had filed an application for declaration as owner of the suit land being Revenue Case No.2/59-14/96-97 under Section 41 of the Tenancy Act for fixation of "purchase price" before the Tahsildar, Kamptee. The Tahsildar dismissed the said application vide order dated 20-11-2000. The order of the Tahsildar was carried by Gulab in appeal before the SDO being Revenue Appeal No.33/MRC-81/2000-2001. The appeal was also dismissed by the SDO vide order dated 24-10-2001. It appears that against this order, Gulab filed a revision before the MRT, Nagpur being Revision No.TEN/B/108/2001. The MRT granted order of status quo in the revision on 26-11-2001. During pendency of both the revisions filed by Gulab, he died and the appellants were brought on record as his heirs and legal representatives. The Commissioner, Nagpur, exercising the powers of the MRT, dismissed both the revisions vide common order dated 29-11-2006.

(vi) The order passed by the MRT in disposing of both the revision applications (No.TEN/B/108/2001 and TEN/B/109/2001) are under challenge in two writ petitions before this Court being Writ Petition No.518/2007 and Writ Petition No.1449/2007. In the contempt petition the appellants are alleged to have committed deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of status quo passed by the learned Single Judge while admitting the writ petitions on 4-4-2007.

PART II.

(i) The appellants in the appeals before the SDO, arising from the orders passed by the Tahsildar on the applications under Sections 21 and 41 of the Tenancy Act, had applied for stay of the orders passed by the Tahsildar on 20-11-2000, and the prayer for stay was rejected. In view thereof, Paunikars took possession of the suit land, which forced the appellants to approach this Court in a writ petition being Writ Petition No.457/2001 and this Court vide order dated 01-03-2001 restored the possession of the appellants. Accordingly, possession of the suit land was actually restored to the appellants on 03-03-2001.

(ii) The appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed by the SDO vide order dated 24-10-2001. After dismissal of the appeals and before the order of status quo was passed by the MRT on 26-11-2001, Paunikars approached the Tahsildar for seeking possession of the suit lands under Section 106 of the Tenancy Act. According to respondent No.2, the Tahsildar on 19-11-2001 handed over possession to Paunikars by executing a possession receipt on 19-11-2001 duly signed by him and the witnesses. A notice for handing over possession, as per the orders passed by the Tahsildar, was issued to Gulab, however, the same was admittedly not served on him and it was returned with the remark "not staying in the village".

(iii) The official translation of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 reads thus :-

Camp - Powari	Date : 19-11-2001
Possession Receipt
As per the order dated 24/10/2001 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Umrer in Tenancy Appeal No.33 M.R.C.-81/2000-2001, Shri. Madhukar Sitaramji Paunikar has been called this day 19-11-2001 at Mouza-Powari by issuing him notice in order to take possession of 5.33 H.R. of agriculture land bearing Survey No.25 situated at Mouza-Powari. Similarly, Shri. Gulab Tilbaji Hazare from whom the possession is to be taken has also been called by sending him notice. However, the said notice is received back with the written remark that “he does not reside in the village”. Hence, Shri. Madhukar Sitaram Paunikar has been handed over the actual possession of 5.33 H.R. of agricultural land bearing Survey No.25 situated at Mouza-Powari in presence of the below mentioned Panchas, this day 19/11/2001 and he has been explained about the possession on the spot.
Witnesses :	Sd/- Signature of the person
1) Executing Possession Receipt 2) 3)
	T.C. Sd/- x illegible x” (emphasis supplied)

(iv) It is on the basis of this possession receipt, respondent No.2 claims that Paunikars were put in possession of the suit land on 19-11-2001 and since then they were in continuous possession of the suit land till they sold it to him on 04-05-2002.

(v) Respondent No.2 filed a civil suit being Regular Civil Suit No.841/2006 sometime in July, 2006 in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Nagpur for declaration that he is owner of the suit land and for permanent injunction, so also for setting aside the order dated 14-11-2003 passed by the police authorities on an application filed by the appellants. In this suit, respondent No.2 filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of temporary injunction. That application was vehemently opposed by the appellants. The Civil Court vide order dated 01-12-2006 disposed of the said application directing the parties to maintain status quo. Respondent No.2 thereafter filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure on 14.12.2007 seeking action against the appellants for not complying with the order of status quo dated 01-12-2006. The said application is still pending for hearing.

PART III.

(i) Gulab had filed Contempt Petition No.105/2002 in this Court seeking action against Paunikars for committing contempt of subordinate Court namely; MRT, Nagpur under Section 10 of the Act. Gulab in the said petition contended that after the order of status quo was passed by the MRT on 26-11-2001, Paunikars disturbed their possession and thereby committed willful disobedience of the MRT's order. In that petition, the learned Judge observed that the possession of the suit land was handed over to Gulab after following the "due procedure" on 19-11-2001 and relying upon the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, dismissed the contempt petition vide judgment and order dated 01-04-2004. While disposing of the said contempt petition, the learned Judge in paragraphs 18 and 19 observed thus :-

"18. I am unable to appreciate this submission because the specific defence of respondents 1 to 4 before this Court is that they were placed in possession of the suit land on 19/11/2001 and 26/11/2001 when the direction to maintain status-quo was given, the respondents were in possession of the suit land. Thus the reply filed by the respondents before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal does not falsify their defence made before this Court.

19. It is thus obvious that on the date on which the parties were directed to maintain status quo by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, respondents 1 to 4 were already in possession of the land. As such there is no question of violating the order of status-quo by the respondents." (emphasis supplied)

5. In the backdrop of the facts mentioned above, the contempt petition filed against the appellants by respondent No.2 was allowed by the impugned judgment, holding the appellants guilty. In the contempt petition the following charge was framed against the appellants and one Girish Harishchandra Chute:-

"That you respondent Nos.2 to 5 despite delivery of possession through authority to the petitioner on 19-11-2005 and status quo order dated 4-4-2007, acting in breach thereof, have been deliberately and willfully disturbing the possession of the petitioner. You are also threatening and assaulting the petitioner and thereby not allowing him to cultivate the suit land. You are, therefore, asked to show cause as to why you respondent Nos.2 to 5 should not be punished for contempt of this Court and awarded punishment ?"

5.1. The basic difference between the contempt petition filed by Gulab (Contempt Petition No.105/2002) and Contempt Petition No.3/2008 filed by respondent No.2 against the appellants is that in the contempt petition filed by Gulab, the contempt alleged was of the order of MRT dated 26-11-2001, whereas in the contempt petition filed by respondent No.2 against the appellants, willful disobedience of the order dated 04-04-2007 of status quo in Writ Petition No.518/2007 and Writ Petition No.1449/2007 was alleged.

5.2. The learned Single Judge while dealing with the contempt petition in the present appeal in paragraph 10 has observed that Paunikars were handed over possession of the suit land by the Tahsildar under possession receipt dated 19-11-2001. In the impugned judgment, after the paragraphs 18 and 19 in the judgment dated 1-4-2004 in Contempt Petition No.105/2002 were reproduced, the following observations made :-

"Perusal of the above observations clearly show that this Court confirmed that possession was handed over to the legal heirs of Sitaram Paunikar under the said possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 and, in turn, they handed over the possession to petitioner Jagdish on 4-5-2002. This was despite serious dispute raised by respondents 2 to 4 about the genuineness of that possession receipt dated 19-11-2001. At the end of para 16, this Court observed thus :

"I find no substance in this submission because the possession receipt bears the date 19-11-2001 at least at five places."

Thereafter, another Civil Appln. No.8467/04 was filed in the said decided Contempt Petition No.105/02. I reproduce prayer clause from the said application -

"It is therefore most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to delete the facts of possession noted in judgment of Contempt Petition No.105 of 2002 in the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice."

On this application, after hearing the parties, this Court made the following order on 21-2-2005.

"Heard the learned counsel for the parties. No clarification including deletion of the facts of possession is necessary in the judgment dated 1-4-2004. The same is, therefore, rejected."

This order was not put to challenge any where. The aforesaid order made by this Court upholding possession on the basis of receipt dated 19-11-2001 cannot be ignored by any of the parties or by this Court even for the purpose of deciding the present contempt petition. After this order was passed on 4-4-2007, this Court made an order directing status quo as on 4-4-2007 which means the aspect of possession as held by this Court in Contempt Petition No.105/02. To interpret the order dated 4-4-2007 means that it is of no consequence in the above factual back ground, would mean the impact of such order meaningless which this Court will never permit. Every order made by this Court is meaningful. I, therefore, record a finding that possession of the petitioner has well been established as against respondents 2 to 4 and respondents 2 to 4 cannot contend that they are in possession."

5.3. The criminal complaints lodged by respondent No.2 and revenue entries effected in pursuance of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 were also taken into consideration and the appellants are held guilty of contempt in respect of the orders passed in the writ petitions dated 04-04-2007, deliberately and willfully.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and with their assistance gone through the entire record placed before the Court. Shri. Gordey, learned senior counsel for the appellants, took us through the entire record. The thrust of his argument was that the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 is without legal consequence and does not have the effect of delivery of possession to Paunikars from Gulab and is nullity in law. He submitted that the possession receipt, which was executed without issuing notice to Gulab, cannot be treated as handing over of possession in law and it cannot be stated that the appellants were actually and physically dispossessed. He submitted that since the possession receipt was executed without the appellants' knowledge they continued to remain in possession even after 19-11-2001. In view thereof, Mr. Gordey submitted, the learned Single Judge ought to have independently examined whether the appellants were actually dispossessed on 19-11-2001 and/or whether they continued to be in possession even after execution of the possession receipt. He submitted that none of the Courts, whether it was MRT or Civil Judge Senior Division or this Court, ever granted injunction restraining the appellants from entering into the suit land. All the three courts passed order of status quo despite the fact that specific order of injunction and/or protection of possession was sought.

6.1. Shri. Gordey also invited our attention to the relevant provisions of The Mamlatdar's Court Act, 1906, Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short "the Act") and Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (for short "the M.P.L.R. Code") and submitted that the procedure laid down for handing over possession to respondent No.2 in execution of the orders passed by the Tenancy Courts was not followed/complied with and, therefore, respondent No.2 cannot claim, in law, that the possession was actually delivered on 19-11-2001. Shri. Gordey also submitted that the possession receipt is illegal since it was executed before expiry of the period of limitation as provided for in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 106 of the Tenancy Act. The limitation under Section 114 of the Act for filing appeal or application for revision against the order of S.D.O. is 60 days and therefore, the Tahsildar ought to have waited till the expiry of 60 days period from the date of the order of S.D.O.. He submitted that where the power is given to do certain things in certain way, it must be done in that way. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the following judgments :-

(I) Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1976 Privy Council 253; (II) Kanwar Paul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007)5 SCC 85;

6.2. Shri. Gordey then submitted that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Petition No.105/2002 filed by Gulab does not have the effect of deciding finally the question of possession so as to bind the parties on the principle of resjudicata inasmuch as the Court exercising the contempt jurisdiction does not decide the civil rights of the parties since it is a summary enquiry and the contempt jurisdiction does not give the Court jurisdiction to decide the civil rights of the parties finally and conclusively.

6.3. He then submitted that in any case, since the learned Single Judge in the present case while holding the appellants guilty of contempt, has mainly relied upon the findings recorded by the another learned Single Judge in the earlier contempt petition (Contempt Petition No.105/2002), it is open to this Court to independently consider the issue of possession to find out whether reliance placed on those findings by the learned Single Judge was correct. He further submitted that the sequence of events clearly show that the appellants bona fidely believed to be in possession of the suit land and remained in factual possession and, therefore, even it is assumed that they continued in possession despite the order of status quo in the light of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, it cannot be held to be willful disobedience so as to make the appellants liable for contempt. Shri. Gordey in support of his contentions also relied upon the following Judgments :-

(I) Anil Ratan Sarkar Vs. Hirak Ghosh, 2002(4) SCC 21; (II) Jhareshwar Prasad Paul Vs. Taraknath Ganguly, 2002(5) SCC 352; (III) Ashok Paper Kamgar Union Vs. Dharam Godha, (2003)11 SCC 1; (IV) Indian Airport Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chaterjee, (1999)2 SCC 537.

6.4. Lastly, Shri. Gordey invited our attention to the directions issued by the learned Single Judge to deliver possession of the suit land to respondent no.2 through police authorities and submitted that the contempt proceedings are not substituted for execution proceeding. He submitted that such a direction is beyond the scope of exercising the contempt jurisdiction. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapildev Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, 1999(7) SCC 537.

7. Shri. R. S. Parsodkar, learned counsel for respondent No.2, on the other hand, submitted that possession of the suit land was handed over to Paunikars by the Tahsildar on 19-11-2001 by following the due procedure contemplated by Section 106(2) of the Tenancy Act. He further submitted that if the appellants were aggrieved by the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, it was open to the appellants to challenge the execution/the possession receipt in appeal under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The appellants having failed to challenge the possession receipt in appeal, it is not open now to contend that the possession receipt was illegal and that actual possession was never delivered to Paunikars and/or they were ever dispossessed from the said land. He further submitted that the possession receipt executed by the Tahsildar in the presence of witnesses on 19-11-2001 clearly shows that Paunikars were put in possession of the suit land in view of the orders passed by the tenancy authorities below.

7.1. Shri. Parsodkar further submitted that the Contempt Petition No.105/2002 was dismissed holding that respondent Nos.1 to 5 were already in possession of the suit land by virtue of the possession receipt executed on 19-11-2001. The order of this Court dated 1-4-2004 in the said petition was not challenged in further proceedings, and thus attained finality. Shri. Parsodkar then invited our attention to the order passed on an application being Misc. Application No.8467/2004 in Contempt Petition No.205/2001 and submitted that by this application, the appellants sought deletion of the observation regarding possession from the order dated 1-4-2004 and that prayer was rejected by the learned Single Judge, which further confirms that Paunikars were in possession of the suit land after 19-11-2001.

7.2. Shri. Parsodkar submitted that since the appellants interfered with the possession of respondent No.2, he was forced to lodge F.I.R. against them on 29-07-2004 for the offence punishable under Sections 447, 294 and 506 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In this case the appellants were arrested and released on bail. He further submitted that this conduct of the appellants clearly shows that they were bent upon to commit willful and deliberate disobedience of the orders passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petitions dated 04-04-2007 and has been rightly held guilty by the learned Single Judge.

7.3. Next, Shri. Parsodkar submitted that legality of the possession receipt cannot be agitated in the contempt petition nor is it permissible to examine the contention that the notice was not served on the appellants when the possession was delivered on 19-11-2001 and hence, the possession receipt is illegal. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Director of Education Uttaranchal and others Vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and others, AIR 2005 SC 3200 : [2005(5) ALL MR 856 (S.C.)]. He, then submitted that it would not be permissible for the court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which has not been assailed and to take the view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. In support of this proposition, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006)1 SCC 613 : [2006(4) ALL MR 24 (S.C.)] and in Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand and others, AIR 2004 SC 4277 : [2004(5) ALL MR 1129 (S.C.)]. In view of these judgments, so also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajendra Singh and another, AIR 2004 SC 4419 : [2004(5) ALL MR 1093 (S.C.)], he submitted that the validity of the possession receipt so also the correctness of the order dated 1-4-2004 passed in earlier contempt petition filed by the appellant cannot be raised and considered in this proceeding. He, then submitted that the presumption as to the correctness of the revenue entries has to be rebutted by leading evidence and unless that is done it has to be presumed that the person in whose favour the entries in the revenue record are made, is in possession of the suit land. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment in Karewwa and others Vs. Hussensab Hansaheb Wajantri and others, AIR 2002 SC 504.

7.4. Lastly, Shri. Parsodkar submitted that Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act does not limit the power of punishment of awarding a sentence in prison only. The court can issue appropriate directions or further consequential directions for enforcing the order. In support of this proposition, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Md. Kasem Ali Mondal Vs. Ajoy Rande and others, 2000 Cr.L.J. 358; Mohammad Idris and another Vs. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji and others, AIR 1984 SC 1826; Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. Sh. K.M.M. Shetty and others, AIR 1990 SC 464; Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira Singh, 1978 Cr.L.J. 560 and All Bengal Excise Licensees Association Vs. Raghavendra Singh, AIR 2007 SC 1386. He submitted that in view of the well settled position of law, it cannot be stated that the directions issued by the learned Single Judge to deliver possession of the suit land to respondent No.2 was wrong and illegal.

8. Before we deal with the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, we would like to have a glance at the judgments relied upon by them. Section 2(b) of the Act defines "Civil contempt" and it means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of undertaking given to a court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Paper Kamgar Union Vs. Dharam Godha and others, (2003)11 SCC 1 while dealing with the expression "willful" has observed that "Willful" means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to constitute contempt the order of the court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extraordinary effort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.

8.1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and another Vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and others, (2002)5 SCC 352 has observed thus :

"11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment of order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not to dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts." (emphasis supplied)

8.2. In Anil Ratan Sarkar and others Vs. Hirak Ghosh and others, (2002)4 SCC 21 the Supreme Court has observed thus;

"13. Before proceeding with the matter further, certain basic statutory features ought to be noticed at this juncture. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced in the statute-book for the purpose of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country - undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the law courts but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless thus otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the statute. The observation as above finds support from a decision of this Court in Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati wherein one of us (Banerjee, J.) stated as below : (SCC p.532, para 2)

"2. As regards the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology 'he who asserts must prove' has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the 'standard of proof', be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt."

14. Similar is the situation in Mrityunjoy Das Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and as such we need not dilate thereon further as to the burden and standard of proof vis-a-vis the Contempt of Courts Act - suffice it to record that powers under the Act should be exercised with utmost care and caution and that too rather sparingly and in the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of the justice delivery system in the country, and for proper administration of the justice delivery system in the country. Exercise of power within the meaning of the Act of 1971 shall thus be a rarity and that too in a matter on which there exists no doubt as regards the initiation of the action being bona fide.

15. It may also be noticed at this juncture that mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a "civil contempt" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 - the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible and the action of the alleged contemnor pertains to one such interpretation - the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature. A doubt in the matter as regards the willful nature of the conduct if raised, question of success in a contempt petition would not arise." (emphasis supplied)

8.3. This court in Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque Vs. S. A. Azmi and others, 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 249 : [2000(3) ALL MR 762] has observed that -

"5. It is thus clear that one of the aspects to be looked into by the Court before initiating action under the Contempt of Courts Act is to find out whether the petitioner has any other remedy available for enforcing the order of which he is alleging breach by the respondent. This aspect of the matter, it appears has also been considered by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in its judgment in the case of Rudraiah Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1982 Karnataka 182. In paragraph 5, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court observed thus :

"It is a well settled principle of law that when there is special law and general law, the provisions of the special law prevail over the general law and when special procedure and special provision are contained in the Civil Procedure Code itself under Order 39, Rule 2-A for taking action for the disobedience of an order of injunction, the general law of Contempt of Court cannot be invoked. If such a course encouraged holding that it amounts to contempt of court, when an order of subordinate court is not obeyed, it is sure to throw open a floodgate of litigation under contempt jurisdiction. Every decree-holder can rush to this court stating that the decree passed by a subordinate court is not obeyed. That is not the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act." (emphasis supplied)

8.4. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1999)7 SCC 569 the Supreme Court has observed that:

"Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear violation of the court's order. Since notice of contempt and punishment for contempt is of far-reaching consequence, these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of willful disobedience of the court's order has been made out." (emphasis supplied)

8.5. In Director of Education, Uttaranchal and others Vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and others, AIR 2005 SC 3200 : [2005(5) ALL MR 856 (S.C.)] the Supreme Court held thus :

"7. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take the view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K. G. Derasari and Anr. Vs. Union of India and ors. (2001(10) SCC 496). The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside." (emphasis supplied)

8.6. For the same proposition, reliance was also placed on the judgments in Subedar Devassy PV's case, in Prithawi Nath Ram's case, in Rajendra Singh's. In N. C. Das's case (Supra) while dealing with the powers of the appellate court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court will not interfere unless order is totally perverse.

8.7. In Ravindra Singh's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that 'the court has all powers to pass incidental order in contempt petition to undo the result achieved by particular party in violation of the courts' order or direction'. (also see AIR 2003 SC 296, Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Maharashtra Publishers Pvt. Ltd.). The same proposition is reiterated in several other cases referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.2. Reference to those cases is already made while narrating the arguments advanced on behalf of respondent No.2.

8.8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1988 SC 127 has observed thus :

"The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term 'status quo' implies the existing state of things at any given point of time." (emphasis supplied)

9. We now proceed to deal with the arguments advanced on behalf of both the sides. From perusal of the facts, it is clear that between 24-10-2001 and 26-11-2001 Paunikars approached the Tahsildar seeking execution of the order passed by the S.D.O. dated 24-10-2001 under Section 106 of the Tenancy Act and on 19-11-2001, according to respondent No.2, the Tahsildar handed over possession to Paunikars by executing the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 duly signed by him and the witnesses. We have perused the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 and for the following reasons we are satisfied that the possession receipt was executed without following the due procedure.

9.1. Section 106 of the Tenancy Act provides for execution of order for payment of money or for restoring possession. It would be advantageous to reproduce Section 106 of the Tenancy Act, which reads thus :

"106. Execution of order for payment of money or for restoring possession.

(1) Any sum the payment of which has been directed by an order of the Tahsildar or the Tribunal including an order awarding costs shall be recoverable from the person ordered to pay the same as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) An order of the Tahsildar or the Tribunal awarding possession or restoring the possession or use of any land shall be executed in the manner provided in section 21 of the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906, as if is was the decision of the Tahsildar under the said Act :

Provided that such order shall not be executed till the expiry of the period of appeal as provided in section 114.

(3) Any order or decision of the Tahsildar in execution proceedings conducted under sub-section (2) shall, subject to appeal (if any) to the Collector, be final."

9.2. From perusal of the section it is clear that sub-section (2) provides that an order of the Tahsildar or the Tribunal awarding possession should be executed in the manner provided in Section 21 of the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906 (Bombay II of 1906), as if it was the decision of the Tahsildar under the said Act. However, such order cannot be executed till the expiry of the period of appeal as provided in Section 114. Sub-section (3) of Section 106 provides that any order or decision of the Tahsildar in execution proceedings conducted under sub-section (2), subject to appeal, if any, to the Collector, be final.

9.3. Section 21 of the Mamlatdar's Courts Act provides that where the Mamlatdar's decision is for awarding possession, he is supposed to give effect thereto by issuing such orders to the village officer, or to any subordinate under his control or otherwise as he thinks fit. The other sub-sections of Section 21 are not relevant for our purpose. Section 21 does not provide for the actual procedure that needs to be followed while awarding possession in pursuance of the orders passed under the Tenancy Act.

9.4. Section 54-A of the Tenancy Act provides that in all the matters not provided for in Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906, the Tahsildar or the Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed for Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts under Chapter IV of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954. Section 35 thereof provides that where any person against whom an order to deliver possession of immovable property has been passed under this Code, such order shall be executed in the following manner, namely :

"(a) by serving a notice on the person or persons in possession requiring them within such time as may appear reasonable after receipt of the said notice to vacate the land; and

(b) If such notice is not obeyed, by removing or deputing a subordinate to remove any person who may refuse to vacate the same; and

(c) if the officer removing any such person shall be resisted or obstructed by any person, the Revenue Officer shall hold a summary inquiry into the facts of the case, and if satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was without any just cause, and that such resistance or obstruction still continues, may, without prejudice to any proceedings to which such person may be liable under any law for the time being in force for the punishment of such resistance or obstruction, take, or cause to be taken, such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force as may, in the opinion of such officer, be reasonably necessary for securing compliance with the order."

9.5. There is no dispute that the notice issued by the Tahsildar to the appellants was received back with the remark, "he does not reside in the village". The learned counsel for respondent No.2, submitted that in fact the appellants were residing at the very same address on which notice was issued, however he managed to return the notice with the said remark. In other words it was submitted that in fact Gulab refused to accept the notice and returned the same with the aforementioned remark and hence, it cannot be stated that the due procedure was not followed or the possession was handed over without issuing notice to Gulab.

9.6. Learned counsel for the appellants though initially submitted that the notice was not required for handing over possession in pursuance of the order passed by the S.D.O., then he fairly submitted that the procedure as contemplated by Section 35 of the M.P.L.R. Code needs to be followed for handing over possession in execution of the order of Tahsildar or Tribunal. In view thereof, we examined the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No.2 that Gulab managed to return the notice with the aforementioned remark. This contention was advanced for the first time in the appeal. The record including the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 does not support the contention of the learned counsel. The possession receipt, on the contrary, clearly reveals that the notice was issued, however, it was received back with the aforementioned remark. We are satisfied that the possession receipt was executed, showing that the possession was handed over to Paunikars on 19-11-2001, without following the due procedure contemplated by Section 35 of the M.P.L.R. Code.

10. We would also like to examine the contention urged by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the appellants having fail to prefer appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Tenancy Act challenging the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 executed by the Tahsildar, now it is not open for them to contend that the possession receipt was illegal and that they were not physically dispossessed from the suit land.

10.1. The expressions "order" and "decision" in sub-section (3) of Section 106, in our opinion, do not refer to possession receipt. The expression "order" is a legal expression and is generally understood as a command or a direction by a court or an authority. In Civil Procedure Code "order" has been defined in Section 2(14) as "order means formed expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree". The expression "order" and "decision" are synonyms. In our opinion, the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 in any case cannot come within the expression "order" or "decision" within the meaning of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 106 of the Tenancy Act. The appeal as provided for in sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Tenancy Act, in our opinion, would not lie against the possession receipt executed in execution proceedings under this section. The contention that since the appeal against the possession receipt as provided under Section 106(3) was not preferred by Gulab, now it is not open to the appellants to claim that Gulab and after his death they continued to be in possession of the suit land also must be rejected.

10.2. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 106 of the Tenancy Act provides that the order of Tahsildar or Tribunal awarding possession cannot be executed until the expiry of the period of appeal as provided in Section 114. The limitation for challenging the order of Tahsildar or Tribunal, under Section 114 of the Tenancy Act for filing appeal or revision is sixty days. In the present case after the order of S.D.O. dated 24-10-2001, the Tahsildar executed the order of awarding possession on 19-11-2001 i.e. before the expiry of 60 days period. The order of the S.D.O. was challenged by Gulab before M.R.T. and the M.R.T. had passed the order of status quo on 26-11-2001 i.e. before the expiry of 60 days from the date of the order of S.D.O. We, therefore, find substance in the submission that the possession receipt was illegal/void and that the Tahsildar ought to have waited for the period of limitation as provided for in Section 114 of the Tenancy Act.

10.3. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides any particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in the Act. (See Kuwar Paul Singh Vs. State of Utter Pradesh, 2007(5) SCC 85). In the present case, we are satisfied that the Tahsildar did not follow the procedure for execution of the order of possession as contemplated by Section 106 of the Tenancy Act read with the aforesaid provisions of the M.P.L.R. Code, and of the Mamlatdar's Court Act.

11. Next, we would like to consider the factual matrix, we are concerned with, to find out whether the appellants have committed disobedience of the order dated 4-4-2007 passed by this Court. Respondent No.2 in the contempt petition after narrating the facts, in paragraph 9 has stated that after the order of the High Court dated 4-4-2007, the appellants tried to interfere with the possession of the suit land and therefore, they were forced to file a private criminal complaint in the court. It is further alleged that the appellants threatened his possession and since police did not take cognizance, he filed criminal complaint before the court, and thereafter civil suit and obtained order of injunction. He has further stated on oath that despite the criminal complaints, the appellants were flouting the orders passed by this Court and the injunction order passed by the civil court. Admittedly, no order of injunction was passed by the civil court. As stated earlier, even the civil court passed order of status quo on the application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. Respondent No.2 in the very same paragraph 9 has further stated that the contempt petition filed by Gulab was dismissed because Paunikars were in possession. A reference to the F.I.R. lodged with the Police Station, Kamptee is also made in the said paragraph, so also to the Criminal Case No.62/2007, which is pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamptee. It is, thus, clear that respondent No.2 has mainly relied upon the complaints lodged by him with the police and the order of the civil court so also the revenue record to contend that on the date of the order dated 4-4-2007 passed by the learned Single Judge, he was in possession of the suit land.

12. From perusal of the order impugned in this appeal, it is clear that while holding the appellants guilty of the contempt of court, a heavy reliance was placed on the findings recorded in Contempt Petition No.105/2002. The reliance was also placed upon the revenue entries effected in pursuance of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, so also on the criminal complaints lodged by respondent No.2 against the appellants and the order passed in the civil suit. In this suit, the appellants filed written statement and asserted that they were in possession of the suit land. They have specifically contended in the written statement that as respondent No.2 tried to disturb their possession, they had to file an application before the police authorities and vide order dated 14-11-2003 a direction was issued to respondent No.2 not to disturb the peace.

12.1. After the order of status quo was passed by the civil court, respondent No.2 filed an application dated 14-12-2007 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2-A of the C.P.C. for taking action against the appellants and for not complying with the injunction order passed by the civil court. The prayer in that application read thus :

"It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to take action against all respondents (i.e. appellants in the present case) for violating the injunction order passed by this Hon'ble Court." (emphasis supplied)

12.2. From bare perusal of this application, it is clear that respondent No.2 since then has been proceeding on the assumption that there was an order of injunction passed against the appellant. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 before this court also vehemently submitted that the order of status quo passed by the civil court dated 1-12-2006 so also the order passed by this Court directing the parties to maintain status quo was in the nature of injunction and thereby the appellants were injected from interfering/disturbing his possession. It would not be possible to endorse this submission. On the contrary, in the facts of the present case, it appears that the civil court found it difficult to grant order of injunction, and hence the order of status-quo was passed.

13. Right from inception the case of the appellants is that they were never physically dispossessed, as alleged, and they continued to be in possession all throughout and therefore, they were not allowing respondent No.2 to disturb their possession on the basis of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001. The assertion of the appellants is also reflected in the police complaints lodged by respondent No.2 from time to time. We have perused the F.I.R. dated 29-7-2004 registered at Kamptee Police Station. In this complaint, respondent No.2 has stated that after he purchased the land, when he made an attempt to enter the lands, the appellants restrained him from doing so and threatened him of dire consequences. Then, he proceeds to state that when on 29-7-2004 he went to the suit land, he found that the appellants had cultivated and sown, and when he was looking at the field, the appellants abused, threatened and asked him to leave immediately. This complaint (dated 29/7/2004) was lodged before the order of the civil court dated 1/12/2006 was passed on the application at Exh.5.

13.1. There are two more complaints on record dated 3/2/2007 and 4/4/2007 made by respondent No.2. Both these complaints were lodged just before the order of status quo was passed by this Court on 4/4/2007. In the complaint dated 3/2/2007 respondent No.2 has stated that on 2/2/2007 when he tried to enter the suit land, the appellants abused and restrained him from doing so and therefore, he sought police protection. Similarly, in the complaint dated 4-2-2007 he made reference to all earlier events including the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 and stated that when he attempted to enter the suit land, he was abused and restrained from entering the suit land. From these complaints, it is clear that whenever respondent No.2, even prior to the order of this court dated 4-4-2007, made an attempt to enter the suit land, he was abused and restrained from doing so.

14. In the contempt petition, respondent No.2 sought action against the appellants for committing willful disobedience of the order dated 4/4/2007 passed in Writ Petition No.518/2007 and Writ Petition No.1449/2007. We have already made reference to the complaint dated 29-7-2004, which was lodged after the order of this court dated 4-4-2007. Apart from this complaint, there is one more complaint on record addressed to Kamptee Police Station dated 30-11-2007. In this complaint respondent No.2 alleged that on 30-11-2007 the appellants have encroached by plowing the land. In reply to the contempt petition the appellants have stated that they were never dispossessed and they continued to be in possession of the suit land and whenever there was an attempt to disturb their possession by respondent No.2, they prevented him from entering the suit land. It is only on the basis of the possession receipt and revenue entries effected on the basis thereof, respondent No.2 asserts that he was put in possession by Paunikars and, in fact, was in physical possession thereof. It is true that the revenue entries have presumptive value, but in the facts of this case, and more particularly while dealing with the contempt petition, it would not be possible to hold the appellants guilty of contempt only on the basis of such entries.

15. In this backdrop, even if it is assumed that the learned Single Judge in earlier contempt petition filed by Gulab held that Paunikars were in possession of the suit land by virtue of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, much water has flown thereafter. Thereafter, even civil court refused to grant injunction. This court also, on the prayer made by the appellants seeking protection of their possession in the writ petition, granted order of status quo as on the date of the order. At no point of time either the M.R.T. or the civil Court or this court recorded finding in respect of the possession. The civil Court where the suit and the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of C.P.C. is still pending, is competent enough to record evidence and decide who was in possession on the date of filing of the suit. Similarly this Court while deciding the writ petitions on merits can also issue appropriate directions in respect of the possession of the suit land.

16. Thus, after the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 was executed, we find three orders on record, passed by the M.R.T., the Civil Court and this Court, directing the parties to maintain "status quo". Though the possession receipt was executed and respondent No.2 claims that Paunikars were physically put in possession of the suit land, the M.R.T. directed the parties to maintain status quo. Thereafter in Regular Civil Suit No.841/2006, sometime in July, 2006, the Civil Court also directed the parties to maintain status quo. The application filed under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the C.P.C. alleging breach of the order of status quo passed on the application at Exh.5 is still pending. If the contention of respondent No.2 was correct that Paunikars were put in possession of the suit land on 19-11-2001, then we failed to understand as to why the M.R.T., so also the civil court directed the parties to maintain status quo and/or did not grant the order of injunction as prayed by respondent No.2. Even this Court in two writ petitions on 4-4-2007 not only granted the order of status quo, but it was also made clear that the parties to maintain status quo "as on the date of the order". This order further shows that even at that stage, it was not clear as to who was in possession of the suit land. It was possible for the learned judge, who passed the order dated 4-4-2007 to either reject the prayer made in the writ petition seeking protection of the possession or to allow the same. It is pertinent to note that when the orders of status-quo were passed, they were passed in the face of the judgment and order dated 1-4-2004 passed in the contempt petition that was filed by Gulab.

17. The expression "status quo", as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term 'status quo' implies the existing state of thing at any given point of time. The qualifying words in the order of learned Single Judge dated 4-4-2007 passed while admitting the writ petitions "as on today" clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo order. The learned Single Judge refrained from entering into the question as to who was in actual possession of the suit land, may be because at that stage, it was not possible to examine the disputed questions of fact. On the basis of the possession receipt so also the entries effected in the revenue record and the order dated 1-4-2004 passed in the contempt petition filed by Gulab, it was possible to straight way refuse the interim relief prayed for by the appellants. But the learned Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo as on the date of the order. Viewed from that angle, it is obvious that the status quo as in the High Court cannot mean anything else except the status quo as existing when the order was passed. Strictly speaking, this creates doubt about the case of respondent No.2 on the plain term of 'status quo' order.

17.1. Thus, while dealing with the contempt petition/appeal, it cannot be overlooked, that the procedure contemplated by Section 35 of the M.P.L.R. Code was not followed while executing the possession receipt on which heavy reliance is being placed by respondent No.2 to assert his possession, so also of the fact that possession was handed over by Tahsildar even without awaiting the period of limitation as provided for under Section 114 of the Tenancy Act. In this backdrop, it will have to be examined whether it is possible to hold that respondent No.2 was in possession of the suit land as on 4-4-2007. It is true that the learned Single Judge in the contempt petition filed by Gulab has on the basis of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 held that Paunikars were in possession of the suit land. In our opinion, this finding will not help respondent No.2 to assert his possession as on 4-4-2007, particularly in view of the subsequent developments referred to by us in the foregoing paragraphs. The subsequent events, undoubtedly create ambiguity as to the question of possession.

17.2. There is no dispute that on the date of the order, impugned in this appeal, respondent No.2 was not in possession of the suit land. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, to our specific query, fairly conceded that as on the date of the impugned order dated 18-12-2008 respondent No.2 was not in possession of the suit land. Perhaps that was the reason, why police were directed to hand over possession to respondent No.2. It is pertinent to note that respondent No.2, has not stated as to when he lost possession. There is nothing on record to show as to when respondent No.2 lost possession of the land and/or was dispossessed. The question, therefore, would also arise whether respondent No.2 was ever put in exclusive possession of the suit land. In the facts of the case and more particularly the events after the order of this Court dated 1-4-2004 in Gulab's contempt petition, it undoubtedly becomes doubtful whether respondents No.2 was in exclusive possession of the suit land. It is against this backdrop and having considered the order passed by the civil court where the application under Order 39, Rule 2-A is still pending, so also the criminal complaints filed before and after the order of status quo passed by the civil court, it gives rise to doubt and difficulty in recording positive finding that on the date of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 4-4-2007 respondent No.2 was in exclusive possession of the suit land. It is difficult, at this stage, to record positive finding on the point of possession while interpreting the order of status quo. The term "status quo" in the order dated 4-4-2007 implies the existing state of things on the date of the order. From the perusal of the contempt petition, we could not find as to when respondent No.2 was dispossessed after the order of status quo. What has been stated in the petition is only the disturbance caused to his possession. Thus, if he was admittedly not in possession as on the date of the impugned order, it would not be possible to hold that he was in possession even on the date of the order dated 4-4-2007.

18. It is against this backdrop, it would be difficult to hold that it was a willful act done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to disregard the order dated 4-4-2007 passed by this Court. In order to constitute contempt the order of the Court, it must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extra ordinary effort nor should it be depending, either whole or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party of its compliance. In the present case, it cannot be stated that the order of status quo passed by this Court on 4-4-2007 is either capable of execution or without extra ordinary efforts compliance of the same was possible. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, even if it is assumed that Gulab and/or the appellants continued to remain in possession after the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001, they cannot be stated to have committed disobedience of the order of status quo or that the disobedience was willful. The appellants throughout asserted that they have been in possession of the suit land right from the year 1958-1959 and were in possession on the dates on which the status quo orders were passed. In our opinion, the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001 is not sufficient to hold that respondent No.2 was in physical possession of the suit land as on the date of the order dated 4-4-2007. We would also like to take note of the fact that the contempt petition filed by Gulab against Paunikars was decided on 1-4-2004 on which date neither Gulab was alive nor Paunikars were owners of the suit land. The suit land was transferred to respondent No.2 on 4-5-2002. The heirs of Gulab i.e. the appellants were not brought on record nor respondent No.2 was added as party when that contempt petition was decided on 1.4.2004. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the alleged breach of the order of status quo passed by this Court cannot be held to be "willful" so as to make the present appellants liable for contempt.

19. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the constitution in the courts of record and also the statute. The power needs to be exercised with care and caution. It cannot be used unless the contemptuous conduct is held to be proved beyond doubt. One has to keep in mind that the court in exercise to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the authorities. In the backdrop of this well settled position of law the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, based on the findings recorded by the another learned Single Judge in the contempt petition filed by Gulab, were, in fact, not called for. What was necessary for this court to consider while dealing with the contempt petition, was only to see what was the status of possession or what was the existing state of things on the date of the order and whether it was possible to hold beyond reasonable doubt that either on the date of the order of status quo or thereafter the established possession of respondent No.2 was disturbed. In fact, it cannot be ignored that the order of status quo was passed by this Court after hearing both the sides and after having considered the submissions in respect of the possession receipt dated 19-11-2001. A bare look at the order passed by this Court, of which the contempt is alleged, does not contain any specific direction. If the order of status quo passed by the learned Single Judge was in the nature of injunction, as tried to be contended across the bar on behalf of respondent No.2, it was open to respondent No.2 to approach the Court, which passed the order, seeking clarification instead of filing contempt petition solely on the basis of the possession receipt.

20. It is now well settled that as regards the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the provisions of the Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt. (See Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati and another, 2001 SCC (L & S) 1196 : [2001(4) ALL MR 250 (S.C.)]).

20.1. Thus, the powers under the Act should be exercised with utmost care and caution and that too in the larger interest. Mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to "civil contempt" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act. The element of willingness, therefore, is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible and the action of alleged contemnors pertains to one such interpretation and the acts or act cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature (See Anil Ratan Sarkar's case). If a doubt in the matter as regards the willful nature of the contempt is raised, question of success in a contempt petition would not arise. In the present case undoubtedly, it creates doubt as regards "willful" disobedience by the appellants. We cannot over look the fact that application filed by respondent No.2 in the civil suit under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the C.P.C. is pending for adjudication. It is not the case of respondent No.2, as stated earlier, that he was dispossessed from the suit land either on the date of the order of status quo dated 4-4-2007 or thereafter, and since he admits that as on today he is not in possession, it is not clear as to when he lost possession and/or whether he was in possession at any point of time. We have not examined the correctness of the order passed by this Court on 4-4-2007 nor have we examined the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the earlier contempt petition filed by Gulab.

21. We have made reference to the factual matrix in detail only with a view to find out whether the appellants are guilty of committing willful and deliberate disobedience of the order passed by this Court on 4-4-2007. We are conscious of the fact that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. We are also conscious of the settled position of law that right or wrong any order of the Court has to be obeyed and flouting of order of the Court render the party liable for contempt. We make it clear that whatever observation we have made in this judgment are made only in order to find out whether the appellants have committed willful disobedience of the order passed by this Court.

22. In view of the view taken by us in this appeal, we are not examining the controversy as to whether the learned Single Judge was right in issuing direction to the police to hand over possession of the suit land to respondent No.2, though we have strong reservation about the submissions advanced by Shri. Gordey, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in that behalf.

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order, impugned in the appeal is set aside. No costs.

Appeal allowed.