Second Appeal No.256 of 1997

28th April, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Shri. S. R. DESHPANDE
Respondent Counsel: Shri. A. H. JAMAL

Cases Cited:
Bhagwant P. Sulakhe Vs. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe, AIR 1986 SC 79 [Para 12]
Mangal Singh Vs. Harkesh, AIR 1958 Allahabad 42 [Para 12]
Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai Vs. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa, AIR 1961 SC 1268 [Para 12]
Sher Mohamad Khan Vs. Ramratan Ganeshram Teli, AIR 1938 Nagpur 87 [Para 13]
Surendra Kumar Vs. Phoolchand (Dead) through L.Rs., (1996)2 SCC 491 [Para 13]
Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade Vs. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade, (2007)1 SCC 521 [Para 13]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This Second Appeal is filed by the original defendants no.2 and 3. Parties shall hereinafter be referred to as plaintiffs and defendants.

2. Facts giving rise to the appeal are as under :

Respondents 1 and 2 the original plaintiffs instituted a suit for partition and separate possession. Plaintiffs contended that the property as described in Schedules A, B and C was ancestral joint family property and the plaintiffs had 1/5th share in the same property. It is their contention that the suit property is in possession of the defendants 2 and 3. Until their mother was alive she was looking after the suit property which is an agricultural land and a house. Plaintiffs contend that defendant no.1 is claiming exclusive title over the field survey no.252/1 on account of a Will said to have been executed in favour of defendant no.1. The plaintiffs claim partition and separate possession of the suit property.

3. Defendants 1 and 4 filed their separate Written Statement and admitted that the suit property in Schedules A to C was the ancestral joint family property except field Sur. No.252/1. According to defendants this property was the separate property of the mother of the plaintiffs and defendants, and she had bequeathed that property in favour of defendant no.4. They therefore contend that plaintiffs or other defendants do not have share in field Sur. No.252/1.

4. Defendants No.2 and 3 filed their Written Statement. They admitted that the suit property mentioned in Schedules A to C was the joint family property, however the defendants 2 and 3 contended that the plaintiffs had excluded the property at Nagpur and Pune and the other property mentioned in Schedule D attached with their Written Statement. They contended that this property which is described in Schedule D is also a joint family property and that should also be partitioned. That property includes a plot at Nagpur, a house at Nagpur, house at Pune and other moveable property and further one open plot which is in dispute with a third party at Wardha. Defendants 2 and 3 submit that the property mentioned in Schedule D that is the plot at Nagpur, house at Nagpur and Pune were purchased by the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 after the sale of agricultural land located at Baggi and Danapur. It is also contended by them that their mother had paid sum of Rs.6,000/- to the plaintiffs for purchasing the flat at Pune. They submit therefore that this property having been purchased from out of income of the joint family should be treated as a joint family property and file a counter claim.

5. Learned Judge of the trial Court after recording the evidence found that the property as mentioned in Schedules A to C was a joint family property and same was liable to be partitioned and plaintiffs had 1/5th share in the same. He found that the Will said to be executed in favour of defendant no.4 was void. He further found that property as mentioned in Schedule D of the Written Statement of defendants 2 and 3 is not a joint family property.

6. An appeal was preferred by the defendants 2 and 3 before the District Judge. Additional District Judge who heard the appeal confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.

7. Appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law :

[i] Whether the suit was maintainable in the absence of taking the entire property in the hotch-potch ?

[ii] Whether the property standing in the name of different members of the family or co-parceners could be said to be their separate or self acquired property in view of the existence of nucleus and whether this aspect of the matter has been considered in its proper perspective by the Courts below ?

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and Shri. Jamal learned counsel for respondent no.2.

9. First question of law relates to failure of the plaintiffs to bring all joint family property in the common hotch-potch. In fact to my mind this question of law did not and could not arise at all. Reason is defendant no.2 and 3 have laid a counter claim and paid a court fee and have included the property in Schedule D attached to their Written Statement and counter claim. They have contended that this property in Schedule D was also therefore liable to be partitioned. With this counter claim it is obvious that all property is now brought into common hotch-potch or is the subject matter of the suit now. Thus it cannot now be said that some property which was a joint family property is left out. The question of law is answered accordingly.

10. This takes me to the next question of law. If the pleadings of defendants 2 and 3 i.e. the present appellants are seen, it would be clear that the properties in Schedule D were purchased after sell of the house, agricultural land and from income of the land. Thus in short the defendants contend that the property in Schedule D is acquired from the sale proceeds of joint family property and from the income of the joint family property. Plaintiffs and defendant no.1 however contend that they were in service i.e. the employment and they had purchased their respective houses from their own income.

11. When once a party comes out with a case of property having been purchased after sale of the joint family property it would be necessary for that party to show as to how much consideration was received after sale and proximity of time between the sale and purchase. It has come in cross-examination of P.W.1 that the property i.e. house at Hinganghat and fields at Baggi and Danapur were sold in 1937 to 1940. It is not shown by defendants that this property in Schedule D was acquired between 1937 to 1940 or even in 1941. Since its proximity or sale the consideration both are not shown, as defendants did not examine themselves, it is difficult to accept the theory of defendants that this property was purchased out of the sale proceeds of the joint family property. It is merely suggested to P.W.1 that Rs.6,000/- were paid by his mother to him for purchase of the house. The said suggestion has been denied. Defendants do not enter the witness box at all in support of their plea and an inference therefore has to be drawn that had any one of them entered into witness box he would not have been able to support their case. Defendants themselves are not sure as to from what source the money was allegedly provided to the plaintiff and the defendant no.1, i.e. from income from the joint family fields or from the sale proceeds of the joint family property. Further it may be observed that defendants raised an inconsistent plea inasmuch as at one stage they say that suit property was purchased from the sale proceeds and at the other stage they say that it was purchased from the income of the joint family. This inconsistency in pleading itself is sufficient to negative the theory of defendants that it was a property purchased by the plaintiff from income from the joint family property.

12. Shri. Deshpande learned counsel for the appellants-defendants contends that the family continues to be joint and there is evidence available to hold that there was nucleus available to purchase the property in Schedule D. He contends that there is therefore a presumption that the property in Schedule D is joint family property. The contention of Shri. Deshpande has no substance. Both plaintiffs and defendant no.1 have been living separately since 1943 as is stated by P.W.1 totally at different places and not at a place where joint family property and the house is located. Plaintiffs and defendant no.1 have been earning through their employment. Since they are living separately since 1943 there was no joint family as such. The brothers were certainly separate in mess although they were holding a joint family property. Supreme Court in Bhagwant P. Sulakhe Vs. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe and Others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 79 holds severance of status of joint family has no effect on the joint family property. The property continues to be joint until partitioned. This decision as cited by Shri. Deshpande at the most would show that where the family members are separate they can still hold the property jointly. We have seen that defendants 2 and 3 have not entered the witness box to show, what was the income from the joint family property and whether it was sufficient to spare money for the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 to purchase the properties. What is necessary to be shown is that the income must be sufficient to spare money to purchase the suit property i.e. the houses. Since such evidence is not available it could not be said that property in Schedule D was purchased from the joint family income. The presumption would arise only when it is shown that nucleus was substantial. In the absence of the evidence about the substantial nucleus the property could not be said to be joint. In a decision reported in Mangal Singh Vs. Harkesh and Another, AIR 1958 Allahabad 42, High Court holds that the presumption arises only if nucleus is substantial and is such that its yield could provide in whole or at any rate in considerable part the money necessary for acquiring the property in question. In this case one thing that needs to be taken into consideration is that properties are purchased at places where the plaintiff and defendant no.1 were in service for a long. All brothers were living separately at different places and at far away places. At the cost of repetition I may further observe that in fact there was no joint family and therefore there could be no presumption. Shri. Deshpande learned counsel cited before me the decision reported in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai and Another Vs. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa and Another, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1268 to contend that the burden of proof would lie upon the Manager to prove that the suit property was purchased from separate funds. This decision cannot have bearing as plaintiffs and defendant no.1 who were eldest members were living separately at different places and none of them could be said to be Manager of the joint family as there was no joint family in existence. On the other hand, all the joint family property was and is in possession of defendants 2 and 3 alone and plaintiffs had their own source of income from service. Therefore, the burden would be upon the defendants 2 and 3 to show that out of income of joint family money was provided to the plaintiffs and defendant no.1.

13. Similar decision in Sher Mohamad Khan Vs. Ramratan Ganeshram Teli and Another, AIR 1938 Nagpur 87 too has no bearing in the instant case. The parties having been living separately and at different places for long time and earning separately from service there was complete severance of the joint family though property continues to be joint. In the instant case there is no joint family and the plaintiffs and defendants had independent and exclusive source of income. In the circumstances, the said decision has no bearing. Similarly I do not find that the decision in Surendra Kumar Vs. Phoolchand (Dead) through L.Rs. And Another, (1996)2 Supreme Court Cases 491 has any bearing on the case at hand. On facts I find that decision in Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade Vs. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade And Others, (2007)1 Supreme Court Cases 521 also has no bearing on the case at hand. In the circumstances it cannot be concluded that the property in Schedule D except the plot at Wardha was a joint family property. However, as far as plot at Wardha is concerned parties do not dispute that it was a joint family property, the same was therefore liable to be partitioned. It seems that the said property is not at present available for partition. Said plot would be liable for partition as and when the possession of the said plot is obtained. It cannot therefore be disputed that plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 have 1/5th share in the said plot also. In the circumstances the appeal is allowed partly. It is held and declared that the plot as described in Schedule D situated at Wardha is a joint family property and each of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 have 1/5th share in the same as and when such plot is available for partition, the partition thereof may be effected by appointing the Commissioner and each party may be put in separate 1/5th share. In the circumstances of the case parties are left to bear their own costs.

Appeal partly allowed.