Writ Petition No.1101 of 2009

31st August, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. MATHEWS NEDUMPARA , Smt. JAYMALA J. OSTWAL
Respondent Counsel: Mr. RAFEEQ PEERMOHIDDIN , Mr. S. S. GHOSH , Mr. P. N. KAMAT,M/s. Paras Kuhad & Associates,Mr. M. I. SETHNA,Mr. A. M. SETHNA , Mr. L. S. SHETTY,M/s. Shetty, Sethna and Associates,Mr. D. J. KHAMBATTA,Mr. L. S. SHETTY , Mr. A. M. SETHNA

Cases Cited:
Mahesh Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India, (2009)8 SCC 273 [Para 17]
Sushma Suri Vs. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (1999)1 SCC 330 [Para 19]
Union of India Vs. Kali Dass Batish, 2006(3) ALL MR 250 (S.C.)=AIR 2006 SC 789 [Para 22]

JUDGMENT

P. B. MAJMUDAR, J. :- Leave to delete respondent no.3-Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal from the array of parties is granted. The name of respondent no.3 stands deleted accordingly.

2. Rule.

3. The learned counsel respondent nos.1, 2 and 4 appear and waive service of rule on behalf of their respective clients.

4. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for hearing today itself.

5. The petitioner, against whom an interim order was passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short, "DRT") by which the DRT has not accepted the request of the petitioner to dismiss the application being OA No.27/2008 filed by respondent no.1 and even though the Appeal against the said interim order of the DRT is pending before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short, "DRAT") is, by way of this petition, now challenging the appointment of the Presiding Officer of the DRT/respondent no.2-Shri. Vijay Kumar, on the ground that the initial appointment of the said Officer is not in accordance with the qualification prescribed under The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, "the Act"). The petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the order passed by the DRT at Exhibit "F" dated 16.06.2009 by which, according to the petitioner, his request to keep the matter on board for urgent reliefs, has not been granted.

6. The respondent no.1-Bank has filed OA No.27/2008 before the DRT No.I, Mumbai. During the pendency of the said OA, the petitioner herein, who is defendant, submitted an application for dismissal of the OA on the ground that the same is filed in violation of the mandatory legal provisions of Section 19(3), 19(25) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 read with Rule 18 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993. The learned Presiding Officer came to the conclusion that there is no substance in the preliminary objection taken by giving detailed reasons. The DRT, thereafter, accordingly disposed of the said application at Exh. "13" directing the present petitioner to file written statement. The said order is challenged by the petitioner by way of an Appeal before the DRAT. Since the Appeal is pending before the DRAT, we are not required to examine the merits of the order passed by the DRT, below Exh."13" in OA No.27/2008. Before the DRAT, a praecipe was submitted by the petitioner for early hearing of the Appeal. The petitioner was communicated the order, wherein there is a noting, "No urgency shown. Hence, rejected by the Hon'ble Chairperson. (D.P.Joshi, Steno. 16.6.09)". The petitioner has challenged the said order by way of this writ petition. The petitioner has also prayed to issue an appropriate writ, direction and/or order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the nature of certiorari/quo warranto by setting aside the appointment of respondent no.2, who is the Presiding Officer, DRT No.I, Mumbai, on the ground that the said respondent no.2 was not possessing necessary qualifications as prescribed by the said Act for such appointment.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act, "A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal unless he is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge". The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as respondent no.2 had not put in 7 years practice at the time when he was appointed as a Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, his appointment is contrary to the said statutory provision and, therefore, the same is required to be set aside. Though, in the petition, this point is not specifically dealt with about the ground that respondent no.2 had not practiced for more than 7 years, he was not qualified to be appointed as a District Judge, in the rejoinder to the petition, that point has been taken and during the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has attacked the appointment only on the ground that respondent no. 2 was not qualified to be appointed as a District Judge as, at the relevant time, he had not put in 7 years practice as an Advocate.

8. This petition is resisted on behalf of the respondents.

9. The learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) for respondent no.4 has relied upon the affidavit in reply on behalf of respondent no.4. It is submitted by the learned ASG that respondent no.2 was qualified to be appointed as a District Judge and, therefore, was qualified to be appointed as a Presiding Officer of the Tribunal as per Section 5 of the said Act. In order to substantiate his say, the learned ASG has relied upon the averments made in para 8 onwards in the affidavit in reply. The affidavit has been filed by A. Thomas, Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services. In the said affidavit, various points have been taken as to when respondent no.2 has been enrolled as an Advocate. The learned ASG also submits that the petitioner having failed to get a favourable order in connection with his application at Exhibit "13", that ultimately he tried to now challenge the appointment of respondent no.2-the Presiding Officer. It is submitted that even before the DRAT, no such grievance was raised by the petitioner. It is submitted that this petition is accordingly filed only to delay the proceedings and with ulterior motive for the purpose of delaying the recovery proceedings as huge debts running into Rs.5 crores is payable by the petitioner to respondent no.1-Bank. It is submitted that the writ in the nature of quo-warranto which is prayed by the petitioner is nothing but a ploy on the part of the petitioner filed with sinister design.

10. Mr. Sethna, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no.2Presiding Officer, submits that without any basis and foundation, the appointment of respondent no.2 is challenged in this petition. It is submitted by him that the petitioner is interested only in delaying the proceedings and with that sole object the present petition has been filed. He submits that he is adopting the argument of the learned ASG in so far as it relates to the eligibility of respondent no.2 to be appointed to the post of Presiding Officer, DRT.

11. Mr. Rafeeq Peermohiddin, the learned counsel for respondent no.1, in his turn, submits that since the DRAT was of the opinion that there was no urgency in the matter that on a praecipe, the stenographer made a noting, informing the petitioner that as per the say of the Hon'ble Chairperson, there is no urgency in the matter. The learned counsel submits that it is not correct to say that the order is passed by the stenographer and not by the Chairperson of the Tribunal.

12. We have heard the learned counsel at length. So far as the challenge to the order of the DRAT is concerned, it is required to be noted that the prayer of the petitioner for early hearing is not accepted by the DRAT, though, during the course of hearing, Mr.Sethna, the learned senior counsel, submitted that the petitioner, even though now the matter is already on board before the DRAT, is taking dates and with a view to delay the proceeding before the DRAT, the present petition has been filed.

13. By the impugned order at Exhibit "F", the prayer of the petitioner for early hearing has not been accepted by the Tribunal. As such, there is no specific order which is pointed out to us except there is some noting of stenographer on an application or on praecipe submitted by the petitioner. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner denies the allegations levelled by Mr. Sethna that petitioner's Advocate is taking dates from the Tribunal, it is not necessary for us to examine these aspects in detail as it is pointed out to us that the matter is already placed on the hearing board before the DRAT. The DRAT may accordingly proceed with the Appeal of the petitioner in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if the Appeal is taken up for hearing before DRAT, he will not seek any adjournment and will cooperate with the early hearing of the Appeal. The DRAT may consider this aspect of hearing the Appeal appropriately and as deem fit. At this stage, the grievance of the petitioner that the order has been passed by the stenographer and not by the Judge is concerned, since it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the Bank that only a noting has been made on the praecipe submitted by the petitioner and as such, the Chairperson has not passed any judicial order, one way or the other. At this stage, however, we would like to put a word of caution, in the sense that whatever may be the application submitted by a litigant, the same is required to be decided by passing a judicial order so that such type of grievance may not be raised by a litigant in any manner. Whatever may be the application submitted, the same should be disposed of by passing a judicial order one way or the other. It cannot be said that on the application of the petitioner for early hearing, the same has been decided by the steno and even as per the noting, the stenographer has merely put an endorsement as per the say of the Chairperson that there is no urgency. So far as the challenge to the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, by which the petitioner was informed that there is no urgency in the matter, the order is not required to be interfered in this petition in our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In any case, since the Appeal of the petitioner is already on board, it is for the Tribunal to consider as to when such Appeal is to be decided, but needless to say that the Tribunal may try to dispose of the said Appeal expeditiously provided there is cooperation on the part of the Advocate for the petitioner in the matter of expeditious hearing of the Appeal.

14. So far as prayer made by the petitioner in the petition regarding quashing the appointment order of respondent no.2 is concerned, Section 5 of the said Act, prescribe the qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. It reads thus:

"5 Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.-

A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal unless he is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge."

15. Chapter VI of the Constitution of India deals with the Subordinate Courts. Article 233 of the Constitution deals with the appointment of District Judges. Article 233(2) of the Constitution read as under:

"233. Appointment of district judges. - (1) .....

(2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment."

As per the aforesaid Article, a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.

The question which requires to be considered is as to whether respondent no.2 can be said to be eligible to be appointed as a District Judge and whether it can be said that he had put in seven years practice as an advocate or a pleader which would make him eligible for such appointment. In this behalf, the averments made in the reply filed by A. Thomas, Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance is required to be considered. In para 8 of the reply, it is pointed out that respondent no.2 was belonging to Indian Legal Service and was working as Presiding Officer, DRT, Chennai for a period of 5 years from 18.08.2003. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the averments made in the said reply. In paras 8 to 11, it is averred as under:

"8 I say and submit that Shri. A. Vijay Kumar an Officer belonging to Indian Legal Service was working as Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai for a period of 5 years from 18-08-2003. The vacancies of Presiding Officers, DRT were advertised in the Employment News of 05-11th January, 2008. Shri. Vijay Kumar applied for the post of Presiding Officer and was interviewed by the Selection Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. Justice Arijit Pasayat, Hon'ble Judge of The Supreme Court of India. The Committee selected Shri. Vijay Kumar for the post of Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Mumbai. The Central Government accepted the recommendation of the Committee and Shri. Vijay Kumar was appointed as Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Mumbai for a period of five years from 11th February, 2009.

9 I respectfully submit that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the landmark case of Union of India Vs. Kali Dass Batish & Anr., reported in AIR 2006 SC 789, unequivocally mandated that where a Member (Judicial) of the Central Administrative Tribunal was appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, it is not open for the High Court to sit in judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning legality of such prerogative powers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India or that of the Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court duly nominated by him.

10 This answering Respondent respectfully submits that the Respondent No.2 has been fully qualified to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the DRT. The provisions of Section 5 of the Recovery of debts Due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which lays down the qualifications required for appointment of the Presiding Officer reads as follows:"

"Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.- A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal unless he is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge."

11 I say and submit that the qualifications for appointment of District Judge have been provided in Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. Shri. A. Vijay Kumar was enrolled as an Advocate as far back as 1978 and has practiced as an Advocate upto March, 1981. He was appointed as a Company Prosecutor by the Central Government in March, 1981 and served as such in the Office of the Registrar of Companies, Kerala for the conduct of prosecution cases arising out of the Companies Act in the various courts of Kerala. He has also served as Company Prosecutor/Legal Asstt. In the Official Liquidator's Office, Madras High Court. Thereafter he served as Junior Central Govt. Advocate in the Ministry of Law and Justice, Kolkatta and appeared in the Government cases as well as Appellate Sides of the said High Court. By computing all the period in various capacities, as stated above, Shri. A. Vijay Kumar has had experience of 11 years and 6 months from the date of enrollment as an advocate. Thereafter, he has served as an Asstt. Legislative Counsel, Deputy Legislative Counsel and Additional Legislative Counsel in the Ministry of Law and Justice, all under the Govt. of India. That apart, he had also worked as the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chennai for a full tenure of five years from 18.08.2003. It is, therefore, submitted that he is fully qualified and clearly eligible for being appointed as the Presiding Officer of Debts Recovery Tribunal."

16. Relying upon the affidavit, the learned ASG submits that the respondent no.2 was enrolled an Advocate as far back as 1978 and thereafter in March, 1981 he was appointed as a Company Prosecutor by the Central Government and he served as such in the office of the Registrar of Companies, Kerala for conducting the prosecution cases arising out of Companies Act in various courts of Kerala, and subsequently since he served as a Company Prosecutor/Legal Asstt in the Official Liquidator's Office, Madras High Court. Thereafter he was served as Junior Central Govt. Advocate in the Ministry of Law and Justice, Kolkatta and appeared in the Government cases as well as Appellate Side and if all this period is taken into account, the petitioner had put in about 11 years and 6 months experience by conducting various cases in the court.

17. In order to substantiate his say, the learned ASG has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India & ors., (2009)8 SCC 273. In paragraph 38, the Court has held that "Whether "actual practise" as against "right to practise" is the prerequisite constitutional requirement of the eligibility criteria under Article 217(2)(b) is the question which we are required to answer in this Court". This question is considered by the Supreme Court in para 51 and observed as under:

"51 In Lily Isabel Thomas, Re AIR 1964 SC 855 this Court equated "right to practise" with "entitlement to practise (see para 11). In our view, Article 217(2)(b), therefore, prescribes a qualification for being appointed a Judge of the High Court. The concept of "actual practise" will fall under Article 217(1) whereas the concept of right to practise or entitlement to practise will fall under Article 217(2)(b). The former will come in the category of "suitability", the latter will come in the category of "eligibility". Meaning of the expression "an advocate of a High Court" in Article 217(2)(b)."

18. Relying upon the observations of the said judgment, it is submitted by the learned ASG that it is not necessary that one should have actual practise for all this period. What is required is to be seen is that whether he was eligible to practise or not. It is submitted that it is not that respondent no.2 was not eligible to practise during this period and, therefore, he was qualified to be appointed as per Section 5 of the said Act.

19. The learned ASG has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Suri Vs. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi & anr., (1999)1 SCC 330. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon this judgment. In para 8, it is observed, "For the purposes of the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder the law officer (Public Prosecutor or Government Counsel) will continue to be an advocate. The intention of the relevant Rules is that a candidate eligible for appointment to the Higher Judicial Service should be a person who regularly practises before the Court or tribunal appearing for a client. In paragraphs 10 to 12 it has been observed as under:

"10 Under Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, an advocate shall not be a full-time employee of any person, Government, firm, corporation or concern and on taking up such employment, shall intimate such fact to the Bar Council concerned and shall cease to practise as long as he is in such employment. However, an exception is made in such cases of law officers of the Government and corporate bodies despite his being a full-time salaried employee if such law officer is required to act or plead in court on behalf of others. It is only to those who fall into other categories of employment that the bar under Rule 49 would apply. An advocate employed by the Government or a body corporate as its law officer even on terms of payment of salary would not cease to be an advocate in terms of Rule 49 if the condition is that such advocate is required to act or plead in courts on behalf of the employer. The test, therefore, is not whether such person is engaged on terms of salary or by payment of remuneration, but whether he is engaged to act or plead on its behalf in a court of law as an advocate. In that event the terms of engagement will not matter at all. What is of essence is as to what such law officer engaged by the Government does - whether he acts or pleads on behalf of his employer, then he ceases to be an advocate. If the terms of engagement are such that he does not have to act or plead, but does other kinds of work, then he becomes a mere employee of the Government or the body corporate. Therefore, the Bar Council of India has understood the expression "advocate" as one who is actually practising before courts which expression would include even those who are law officers appointed as such by the Government or body corporate.

11. If that be the true position, we fail to understand how the object of recruitment could be defeated if these persons are also allowed to participate in the recruitment process. None of the decisions referred to in Oma Shanker Sharma case has examined the matter in this perspective. Either those decisions were concerned with the distinction between service and judicial service or the meaning of the expression "advocates" in other contexts. We think it is in this manner that the expression used in Article 233(2) of the Constitution has to be understood and the Rules framed by the Delhi Administration in this regard have to be read in the light of the constitutional provisions. The expression used "from the Bar" would only mean from the class or group of advocates practising in courts of law. It does not have any other attribute.

12 On the above analysis made by us, we think that the view taken by the High Court cannot be upheld."

20. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, tried to raise the point that unless a person is actually practised in the court of law subsequent to the period during which he has spent as an officer in the Central or State Government service, such period cannot come to his rescue. He has relied upon the observations made by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of S. Srinivasan Vs. Sudheer with Ms. Sunitha in Civil Writ Petition No.7606/2003 and other connected matters, wherein the Delhi High Court has held that the person so appointed must be a District Judge or somewhat equal to him in ability and experience and he must come from judiciary to which we the judges have the honor to belong. The aforesaid case was in connection with the appointment for Chairperson in the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange (Recruitment, Salary and Allowances and other Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2000.

21. From the material placed before us on record in the form of an affidavit in reply and the averments made therein, we are of the view that before his appointment in the concerned Department of the Government, the petitioner has put in three years practice. Thereafter as per affidavit in reply, respondent no.2, after his appointment as a Company Prosecutor by the Central Government in March, 1981, used to conduct cases on behalf of the prosecution arising out of the Companies Act in various Courts in Kerala. All throughout, during his appointment, he used to conduct cases from time to time on behalf of the concerned Departments. Detailed particulars have been given in para 11 of the affidavit in reply. Considering the said aspects, in our view, respondent no.2 was eligible to be appointed as Presiding Officer in the DRT. In our view, it is not necessary that for all these seven years, he should be actively practising Advocate. It is sufficient, if the person has an experience by arguing cases on behalf of the employer and to represent the case of the Department. It cannot be said that, therefore, such a person cannot be said to be a person having seven years practice as an Advocate. It is not even the case of the petitioner that after enrolling his name in 1978 with Bar Council, his name was ever struck off or removed from the Advocate's roll. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court even after taking employment with the Government Undertaking, if a person continues arguing the cases on behalf of the Department, such tenure can also be considered to find out as to whether that person has completed seven years practice as an Advocate. It is also required to be noted that even after his appointment as Presiding Officer of the DRT-II, Chennai respondent no.2 continued for a full tenure of five years from 18.08.2003. Thereafter, he was appointed to DRT-I, Mumbai wherein he is at present functioning. The fresh appointment of procedure was undertaken as per the Rules and it is pointed that at the relevant time, a Senior Judge of the Supreme Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pasayat, presided over the selection process and selected him. At the time when respondent no.2 was appointed as a Presiding Officer, DRT, Mumbai, he can be said to be an experienced Advocate for about more than 11 years plus 5 years, even as a Presiding Officer, DRT Mumbai and with such experience behind his back that he was selected by the Selection Committee presided over by a Senior Judge of the Supreme Court. In view of the same, it cannot be said that respondent no.2 was not qualified to be appointed as Presiding Officer of the DRT, Mumbai.

22. At this stage, the learned Additional Solicitor General has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & ors. Vs. Kali Dass Batish & anr., AIR 2006 SC 789 : [2006(3) ALL MR 250 (S.C.)], wherein in paragraphs 14 and 15 it is observed as under:

"14 Unfortunately, the High Court seems to have proceeded on the footing that the appointment was being made on its own by the Central Government and that there was an irregular procedure followed by the Secretary by giving undue importance to the IB report. It was most irregular on the part of the High Court to have sat in appeal over the issues raised in the IB report and attempted to disprove it by taking affidavits and the oral statement of the Advocate General at the Bar. We strongly disapprove of such action on the part of the High Court, particularly when it was pointed out to the High Court Page 0147 that, along with the proposals made by the Government, the Minister of State had specifically directed for submission of the IB report to the Chief Justice of India for seeking his concurrence, and that this was done. We note with regret that the High Court virtually sat in appeal, not only over the decision taken by the Government of India, but also over the decision taken by the Chief Justice of India, which it discarded by a side wind. In our view, the High Court seriously erred in doing so. Even assuming that the Secretary of the concerned department of the Government of India had not apprised himself of all necessary facts, one cannot assume or impute to a high constitutional authority, like the Chief Justice of India, such procedural or substantive error. The argument made at the Bar that the Chief Justice of India might not have been supplied with the necessary inputs has no merit. If Parliament has reposed faith in the Chief Justice of India as the paterfamilias of the judicial hierarchy in this Country, it is not open for anyone to contend that the Chief Justice of India might have given his concurrence without application of mind or without calling for the necessary inputs. The argument, to say the least, deserves summary dismissal.

15. In this matter, the approach adopted by the Jharkhand High Court commends itself to us. The Jharkhand High Court approached the matter on the principle that judicial review is not available in such a matter. The Jharkhand High Court also rightly pointed out that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in the selection list gave him no right, and if there was no right, there could be no occasion to maintain a writ petition for enforcement of a non-existing right."

Relying on this, it is submitted by the learned ASG that when a Senior Judge of the Supreme Court presided over the selection process, such appointment should not be disturbed by the High Court. However, since, even otherwise, we have considered the question as to whether respondent no.2 was eligible at the relevant time to be appointed or not, it is not necessary to say anything further in this behalf. Since we are convinced and satisfied that respondent no.2 was qualified to be appointed as a Presiding Officer of the DRT, Mumbai and as such at the time of his appointment, he had put in 11 years of practice, it can be said that respondent no.2 had an experience of 11 years, initially for three years actual practice and subsequently he was appearing in various Courts and arguing the cases for the Departments and therefore he was qualified to be appointed as per Section 5 of the said Act.

It can always be said that respondent no.2 at the relevant time was eligible to be appointed as a District Judge and on the basis of such criterion, he was selected initially as a Presiding Officer, DRT, Chennai, where he served for five years and subsequently, now he has been selected as a Presiding Officer, DRT, Mumbai. In our view, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that he was not qualified for such appointment. It is not necessary that an Advocate is required to argue the cases regularly before the Court. As pointed out earlier, even there is nothing to show that his name was struck off or removed from the roll of the Advocates maintained by the State Bar Council.

23. We, accordingly, do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent no.2 was not eligible and his selection is contrary to Section 5 of the said Act.

24. In our view, the petitioner having lost before the concerned Member of the DRT, has tried to take out the present proceedings in which we do not find any substance in any manner. Respondent no.2 is also required to engage an Advocate and defend himself and has tried to justify his appointment. In our view, this petition is nothing but a vexatious proceeding, the petitioner is accordingly directed to pay costs of Rs.5,000/- each to the concerned Respondents. Such costs to be paid within a period of two weeks from today.

25. The Petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged, subject to the costs quantified as above.

Petition dismissed.