2010(6) ALL MR 65
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(AURANGABAD BENCH)

B.R. GAVAI AND S.V. GANGAPURWALA, JJ.

Satish S/O. Soma Bhole Vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Writ Petition No.1808 of 2002,Writ Petition Nos.7198 of 2005,Writ Petition Nos. 7226 of 2005,Writ Petition Nos. 7227 of 2005

13th August, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. A. S. BAJAJ
Respondent Counsel: Mr. K. B. CHOUDHARI,Mr. P. R. PATIL

(A) Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act (1966), Ss.88, 89, 90 - Summary eviction - Power of Municipal Corporation - Municipal Corporation has power to summarily evict the encroachers, trespassers, etc. - Ss.88, 89, 90 of the Act lay down a mandate on the Corporation to remove all encroachments. AIR 1972 SC 793 - Rel. on. (Para 8)

(B) Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act (1966), S.127 - Release of property reservation - Notice issued under S.127 of the Act after lapse of 10 years - No steps taken by Corporation for acquisition of property within the period of six months - In view of the same, held, by operation of S.127 of M.R.T.P. Act, the property gets released from reservation. 2009(2) ALL MR 347, 2008(2) ALL MR 266 and 2005(3) ALL MR 197 - Ref. to. (Para 10)

Cases Cited:
State of Gujaarat Vs. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634 [Para 5]
Mani D. Seervai Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2001(2) ALL MR 444=2002(5) MLJ 1 [Para 5]
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Advance Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 793 [Para 5,8]
Savatram Dairy Products Ltd. Vs. Akola Municipal Corporation, 2008(2) ALL MR 266 [Para 5,9]
Shankarlal Khimji Patel Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 2001(4) MLJ 21 [Para 5,11]
M/s. C. V. Shah & A.V. Bhat Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2005(3) ALL MR 197 [Para 5]
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association, AIR 1988 SC 233 [Para 5,9]
Suraj Bhan Vs. Financial Commissioner, 2007 ALL SCR 1754=(2007)6 SCC 186 [Para 6]
Rita Premchand Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002(1) ALL MR 461=2001(4) Mh.L.J. 671 [Para 6]
Shivram Kondaji Sathe Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009(2) ALL MR 347 [Para 12]


JUDGMENT

S. V. GANGAPURWALA, J.:- All these petitions involve common question of law and fact, as such are decided by this common Judgment.

2. The respondent - Municipal Corporation, Jalgaon (Erst while Municipal Council) on or about 17/7/1964 had published a declaration of intention to prepare Town Planning Scheme - II. On 17/2/1967, the draft scheme was sanctioned. The Arbitrator was appointed to implement the scheme and on 14/6/1979, the Town Planning Scheme - II was sanctioned by the Government. Earlier, prior to the sanction of the Development Plan, original plot No.526 in Survey No.170 was reserved for garden. After the Development Plan was sanctioned, owners of land Survey No.170 (18 persons), which was bearing original plot No.526 were allotted final plot No. 524. Subsequently, these persons, who were allotted final plot No.524, sold their respective shares. The present petitioners are the purchasers of the undivided share of the original allot tees of plot no.524.

3. The revised Development Plan was sanctioned on 6/1/1993 and final plot No.524 was reserved for play ground and primary school site Nos.126 and 127, the said revised Development Plan came into force on 15/2/1993. After completion of the period of 10 years, a right is created upon the occupier or the person having an interest in the property to issue a purchase notice. The petitioners/their predecessors issued purchase notice to the Jalgaon Municipal Corporation. The same was received by Jalgaon Municipal Corporation. The Jalgaon Municipal Corporation failed to acquire the land within the said period of six months as stipulated in Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act (For short, 'M.R.T.P. Act'). As such, the petitioners have moved this Court seeking directions against the respondents to de-reserve the plot.

4. The respondent - Municipal Corporation, Jalgaon has filed affidavit-in-reply contending that the petitioners have not produced any document to substantiate their title. The Arbitrator had given to the alleged vendor of the petitioners and other 17 persons final plot No.524 and it was agreed that the original owners of original plot No.526 (final plot No.599) will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the said plot to the then Municipal Council in lieu of final plot No.524. As the original owners had not handed over the possession of original plot No.526 (final plot No.599) to the then Municipal Council, the Municipal Council did not hand over final plot No.524 to the owners of the original plot No.526 (final plot No.599). The basis of exchange of land has become illegal due to acts indulged into by the petitioners and others. According to it, the petitioners are not interested persons.

5. Mr. A. S. Bajaj and Mr. A. B. Kale, the learned counsels for the petitioners canvassed before us following submissions -

(i) M.R.T.P. Act is a complete Code in itself laying down rights and obligation of the respective parties.

(ii) After preparation of the draft scheme, the State Government has sanctioned the said scheme U/s.68 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Thereafter U/s.72, the State Government appointed an Arbitrator for the purpose of the Planning Scheme. The Arbitrator has drawn the final scheme and as per the same, petitioners predecessor were allotted final plot No.524 in lieu of original plot no.526. The State Govt. has sanctioned the final scheme. Thereafter, all the rights in the original plots, which have been reconstituted shall determine and the reconstituted plots shall become subject to the rights settled by the Arbitrator and the Planning Authority shall hand over possession of the final plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in the final scheme.

(iii) The documents on record show that the possession was handed over to the original owners of final plot no.524 and as such had vested in them. The original owners sold the plots and the subsequent purchasers became the owners and possessors of the same. Their names are also recorded in the record of rights to substantiate the contention that final plot no.524 vested in petitioners. They relied on -

(1) AIR 1969 SC 634 - State of Gujaarat Vs. Shantilal Mangaldas and others.

(2) 2002(5) MLJ 1 : [2001(2) ALL MR 444] - Mani D. Seervai and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others.

(3) AIR 1972 SC 793 - The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and another Vs. The Advance Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others.

(iv) Enquiry into title is not contemplated. The names of the petitioners are validly recorded in P.R. Card. The same is a valid notice of title.

For said purpose they relied on -

(1) 2008(2) ALL MR 266 - Savatram Dairy Products Ltd. Vs. Akola Municipal Corporation & Ors..

(2) 2001(4) MLJ 21 - Shankarlal Khimji Patel and another Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others.

(3) 2005(3) ALL MR 197 - M/s. C. V. Shah & A.V. Bhat Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

(4) AIR 1988 SC 233 - Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association and others.

(v) Notice U/s.127 has been issued and served upon the Municipal Corporation by the petitioners and/or their predecessors. Still the respondents have not acquired the land. No steps have been taken for acquisition of the land. As such, on the lapse of six months, said lands stand de-reserved by operation of Statute and they would be free to use said land.

(vi) The possession panchanamas show that possession of final plot no.524 was delivered to original owners and the contention of respondent - Municipal Corporation that possession of final Plot No.524 was not given is incorrect.

6. Per contra, Mr. P. R. Patil, the learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation vehemently contended that -

(i) The petitioners have till date not produced the document of title so as to substantiate their ownership. They are not the alleged original allottees and unless they can substantiate their ownership by any document of title, they cannot be termed as persons having interest in the property. The property register card is not a document of title and it is meant only for fiscal purpose. For that purpose, relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Suraj Bhan and others Vs. Financial Commissioner and others reported in (2007)6 Supreme Court Cases 186 : [2007 ALL SCR 1754] and Rita Premchand and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 671 : [2002(1) ALL MR 461].

(ii) The original owners who claim to have been allotted final plot no.524 were in fact never put in possession of final plot No.524 for the reason that plot no. 524 was allotted to them in lieu of original plot no.526 (final plot No.599) but the original owners had illegally sold the said original plot no.526 and as such did not get any right in final plot no.524.

7. Before adverting to the respective submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, it would be worthwhile to reproduce some of the relevant provisions of the M.R.T.P. Act.

"Sec.72. Arbitrator : his powers and duties-

(1) Within one month from the date on which the sanction of the State Government to the draft scheme is published in the Official Gazette, the State Government shall for purposes of one or more planning schemes received by it for sanction appoint any person possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed to be an Arbitrator with sufficient establishment and his duties shall be as hereinafter provided.

(2) xxxxxx

(3) xxxxxx

(i) to (xii) xxxxxxxx

(xiii) provide for the total or partial transfer of any right in an original plot to a final plot or provide for the extinction of any right in an original plot in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 101;

(4) The Arbitrator shall decide all matters referred to in sub-section (3) within a period of twelve months from the date of his appointment, and in the case of an Arbitrator appointed under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915 (Bom.I of 1915) or a Town Planning Officer appointed under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 (Bom. XXVI of 1955) (whose appointment is continued under Section 165) within a period of twelve months from the date of the commencement of this Act :

Provided that, the State Government may, if it thinks fit, whether the said period has expired or not, and whether all the matters referred to in sub-section (3) have been decided or not, extend from time to time by a notification in the Official Gazette the period for deciding all the matters referred to in that sub-section (3) or any extended period thereof.

Sec.86. : Sanction by State Government to final scheme.

(1) The State Government may, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the final scheme under Section 82 from the Arbitrator or within such further period as the State Government may extend, by notification in the Official Gazette, sanction the scheme or refuse to give such sanction provided that in sanctioning the scheme the State Government may make such modifications as may in its opinion be necessary, for the purposes of correcting an error, irregularity or informality.

Sec.88. Effect of final scheme.

On and after the day on which a final scheme comes into force -

(a) all lands required by the Planning Authority shall, unless it is otherwise determined in such scheme, vest absolutely in the Planning Authority free from all encumbrances;

(b) all rights in the original plots which have been reconstituted shall determine, and the reconstituted plots shall become subject to the rights settled by Arbitrator;

(c) the Planning Authority shall hand over possession of the final plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in the final scheme.

Sec.89. Power of Planning Authority to evict summarily.

(1) On and after the day on which a final scheme comes into force, any person continuing to occupy any land which he is not entitled to occupy under the final scheme may, in accordance with the prescribed procedure be summarily evicted by the Planning Authority or any of its officers authorized in that behalf by that Authority.

Sec.90. Power to enforce scheme.

(1) On and after the day on which a final scheme comes into force, the Planning Authority may, after giving the prescribed notice and in accordance with the provisions of the scheme,-

(a) remove, pull down or alter any building or other work in the area included in the scheme which is such as to contravene the scheme or in the erection of which or carrying out of which, any provision of the scheme has not been complied with;

(b) execute any work which it is the duty of any person to execute under the scheme, in any case where it appears to the Planning Authority that delay in the execution of the work would prejudice the efficient operation of the scheme."

8. From the perusal of the provision of M.R.T.P. Act, it is evident that the respondent Corporation is exclusively entrusted with the duty of the implementation of the planning scheme and the responsibility of removing the huts, sheds or other structures, which contravene the scheme, is that of the Corporation and not of the owners of the plot. The scheme of the M.R.T.P. Act is such that it casts duty on the Planning authority to implement the scheme. Sections 88, 89 and 90 of the M.R.T.P. Act lay down a mandate on the Corporation to remove all encroachments and for said purpose it has power to summarily evict the encroachers, trespassers, etc.. The Apex Court in case of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and another Vs. The Advance Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others reported in AIR 1972 SC 793 has observed that -

"10. The Scheme and the regulations made thereunder must be read as supplemental to the Act and, when that is down, there is no room for any doubt whatsoever that the local authority is entirely responsible for removing the huts, sheds, stables and other temporary structures which contravene the Town Planning Scheme. The Scheme gives a statement of works to be constructed under the Scheme which comprises a number of roads and the drainage system. The Scheme then specifies which final plots under the Scheme are reserved for public or municipal purposes. In the section dealing with the regulations controlling the development of the area under the Scheme, the various final plots are mentioned and directions have been given as to how they are to be utilized. Regulation 6 is as follows :

"No hut or shed whether for residential user or otherwise, or temporary moveable shops on wheels or such other temporary structures shall be allowed within the area of the Scheme."

It is possible to construe this regulation as prospective in operation, because Regulation 9 provides that any person contravening any of the aforesaid regulations or any of the provisions of the Scheme is liable to be prosecuted and fined. As a part of the Scheme, there is a Redistribution and Valuation Statement which shows which are the original plots, who were the owners thereof, whether those plots were encumbered or leased out, who the mortgagees and lessees were, what is the number of the reconstituted or the final plot allotted to such owners, what contributions have to be made by the owners and what additions or deductions are to be taken into account while deciding the contributions. In the case of some of the final plots, certain rights are given and liabilities imposed and, in suitable cases, compensation also is directed to be paid. And, then, to this Redistribution and Valuation Statement eleven Notes are appended which are important. Note I says that all rights of mortgagors or mortgagees, if any, existing in the original plots are transferred to their corresponding final plots. Note 2 deals with the rights of lessors and lessees in the original plots. By Note 3, all rights of passage hitherto existing are extinguished. By Note 4, agreements in respect of original plots are transferred to the final plots. By Note 5, the tenures of all original plots are transferred to the corresponding final plots. Note 6 permits the original plot owners to remove their detachable material on the plot if they are deprived of the same. They are required to remove their wire fencing, compound wall, sheds, huts or other structures. They can do so within three months from the date on which the final Scheme comes into force, the idea being that the final plots must be clean plots for being allotted to another under the Scheme. This permission under Note 6 has given not because the local authority has no power to remove wire fencing, huts, sheds, etc. that power is there as already shown under Section 55. But this is a concession made in favour of the owner. Since the owner is required to remove himself from this plot, he is permitted to take away whatever material he could easily remove. And, then Note 11, to which reference has already been made, provides that all huts, sheds, stables and such other temporary structures including those which do not conform to the regulations of the Scheme, are required to be removed within one year from the date the final Scheme comes into force. The Note refers not merely to huts, sheds, stables which do not conform to the regulations of the Scheme, but also to all huts, sheds and stables and such other temporary structures. Whosoever the owner or the occupant of the same might be, he is required to remove the same within one year from the date the Final Scheme comes into force. This is an important regulatory provision which has the effect as if enacted in the Act. If the owner or the occupant of these huts, sheds and stables does not remove the same within one year from the date the final Scheme comes into force, he would be contravening the provisions of the Scheme and, thereupon, the local authority will have the power under S.55(1)(a) to remove or pull down these huts, sheds, stables, etc. Note 11 has taken due note of the fact that, if the huts, sheds, stables, etc. are demolished, the owners or occupants thereof will become dishoused. Hence, further provision is made that persons thus dishoused will be given preference in the allotment of land or accommodation in Final Plot No.16 allotted to the Corporation. In other words, it is implicit in this Note that the Corporation may not hesitate to pull down or remove these huts and sheds, etc. because provision is already made for allotment of land in the Corporation's Plot. The Note, therefore, indirectly establishes that it is the primary duty of the Corporation as the local authority to remove all offending huts, sheds, stables and temporary structures in the whole area under the Scheme and not merely from those areas which are allotted to the Corporation under the Scheme.

11. Our attention was invited by the learned Attorney - General to the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 which came into force on 11th January, 1967. The Act came into force when the present litigation was pending in the High Court but it does not appear that any reference was made to the provisions of that Act. It is a more comprehensive legislation with regard to development and planning than the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 to the provisions of which we have already made a reference. By Section 165(1) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 is repealed; but, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 165, all Schemes finalized under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 are deemed to have been framed under the corresponding provisions of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall have effect in relation thereto. The more important provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 to which a reference has been made by us above were Ss.53, 54 and 55. The corresponding provisions in the new Act are Sections 88, 89 and 90. Section 53 consisted of two Clauses (a) and (b). They are the same as the first two Clauses (a), (b) of the corresponding S.88. One more Cl.(c) is added which provides that the planning Authority shall hand over possession of the final plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in the final Scheme. The Planning Authority is the same as the Local Authority under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 - in the present case, the Bombay Municipal Corporation. There was no specific provision in Section 53 directing the local authority to hand over possession of the final plots; but, in our opinion, that was implicit in the Scheme when the original plots were reconstituted and the reconstituted plots were allotted to the owners of the original plots. Clause (c) of Section 88, therefore, merely clarifies what was implicit in Section 53 of the old Act. Section 54 of the old Act corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 89 of the new Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 89 is a new provision which makes it obligatory upon the Commissioner of Police and the District Magistrate to assist the Planning Authority in evicting persons from the final plots whom there is unlawful opposition to the same. Section 55 of the old Act corresponds to Section 90 of the new Act and is practically the same in content. In our opinion, therefore, there is nothing in the new Act which requires us to reconsider the above finding."

As such, it is no gain saying on the part of respondent - Corporation that encroachments are made on original plot no.526 (final plot no.599), due to acts of commission on the part of the owners thereof, who were allotted final plot No.524 and as such they would not be entitled to final plot No.524. Such a plea would be against all tenets of law, justice and equity. Once a final plot has been allotted in favour of a person and the possession is also delivered, the said person would be entitled to enjoy the said plot as a full owner thereof. When the scheme comes into force, all rights in the original plots are extinguished and simultaneously thereunder ownership springs in the reconstituted plots. There can not be any restriction or impediment on the right of ownership of that person. If the respondent - Corporation fails to perform its obligations and duties under the Statute, it can not be heard to complain against the allottees of the said final plot no. 524 or those who stepped into the shoes of original owners/allottees. Duty is cast on the Planning Authority to implement the scheme and the same is also the mandate of Sections 88, 89 and 90 of the M.R.T.P. Act.

9. This takes us to the next objection of Mr. Patil, the learned counsel for the respondent - Corporation that the petitioners can not be said to have any interest in the property as they are not original allottees of final plot No.524. They claim to be subsequent purchasers and for which no document of title has been produced. The P.R. Card that is produced cannot be a document of title as the entries therein are meant only for the fiscal purposes as per the Judgment cited supra. There cannot be any debate on the proposition that the property register card is not a document of title, but the long standing entries therein which are entered into after following due procedure of law, would have a presumptive value. Nothing is brought on record to show that while the entries were recorded in the property register card on the basis of the conveyance executed by the erst-while owners, the proper procedure was not followed. Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that the Court may resume that the judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. The preparation of the property register card is an official work of the authorities concerned. As such, when there is a presumption, said presumption is not rebutted by the respondent - Corporation. Perusal of the property register card shows that the names of the petitioners have been incorporated and the details of the title deeds have also been mentioned. Moreover, when a notice U/s.127 was issued to the respondent - Corporation, the Corporation has nowhere disputed the right, title or interest of the petitioners in said plot. Useful reference can be had to the Judgment of this Court in the case of Savatram Dairy Products Ltd., referred supra. In the said case, this Court has observed thus,

"17. Even if we accept that the said undated communication of respondent no.1 allegedly received by the petitioner on 16/1/2004 is true, in that case also, the same does not take the case of respondent nos.1 & 2 any further. The purchase notice dated 26/12/2003 is annexed at page 19. The purchase notice is addressed to respondent nos.1 & 2. The petitioner has attached 4 documents to this purchase notice and one of them is 7/12 extract of the said land. The petitioner in para 4 of the petition has made following pleadings :

"The petitioner further submits that the petitioners served notice dated 26/12/2003 under Section 127 of the MRTP Act on respondent nos.1 & 2 calling upon them to acquire the land in question which was affected by reservation nos.71,73,75. Along with this letter, the petitioner submitted the documents, list whereof was appended below the said letter."

This contention in the petition is not denied by the respondents. The respondent no.2 by filing reply specifically admitted receipt of the purchase notice. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have not denied the specific contention of the petitioner that purchase notice was submitted along with the document, list of which was appended below the said letter and one of the documents was 7/12 extract. Therefore, in view of above, we accept the contention of the petitioner that certified copy of the 7/12 extract was sent along with the purchase notice. 7/12 extract is combination of record of rights and crop statement. Rights of the parties are recorded in 7/12 extract. This record of right is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority under the Land Revenue Code, 1966 and same is the notice to the public at large as to who are the owners of the land in the record of authorities. In view of this, we are of the considered view that there was no propriety on the part of respondent nos.1 to 2 to doubt the title of the petitioner. The purchase notice was accompanied with following documents namely, (1) part plan of D.P., Akola (additional area) attached by reservation site Nos.71, 73 and 75.

(2) part plan of D.P. Akola additional area showing petitioner's land in red outline and reservation site nos.71, 73 and 75.

(3) 7/12 extract.

(4) area statement of reserved site 71, 73, 75 and the roads.

In view of these facts, we are of the opinion that even assuming that communication sent by the respondent no.1 which allegedly was received by the petitioner on 16/1/2004 is true, in that case also, in our opinion, the respondent nos.1 & 2 are not justified in doubting petitioner's title to the said land and in any case, the respondent nos.1 & 2 towards acquisition of the said land. In this regard, we find that learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is right in placing reliance upon the observations in para 8 of the Supreme Court decision in the case of W.B. Housing Board (supra), which read as follows :-

"8. The principal question that arises for consideration is if it were the writ petitioners who were entitled to notice under section 3(2) of the Act or that this provision stood complied with by serving notice on the recorded owners of land in the Record of Rights maintained under Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. We are of the view that the provisions of service of notice stood complied when notices were served on the persons recorded as owners in the Record of Rights. Record of Rights is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority under Section 50 of the Act and it is a notice to the public at large as to who are the owners of the land in the records of the authorities. That would be the reason as to why the writ petitioners themselves applied for mutation of the lands in their names in the year 1990 when in fact they had purchased the same in 1988. Under Section 3 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, the Act overrides other laws if there is anything inconsistent with what is stated in that Act. Section 50 of the Act provides for maintenance of the Record of Rights by the prescribed authority by incorporating therein the changes on account of mutation of names as a result of transfer or inheritance or partition, exchange, etc.. Under sub-section (9) of Section 51-A every entry in the Record of Rights shall be presumed to be correct until it is proved that the entry in the Record of Rights is incorrect, proceedings for that, however, will have to be initiated under the Act itself. Otherwise there is every presumption about the correctness of the Record of Rights. As noted above, mutation was effected in September, 1995. The Division Bench has observed that the Collector would have been aware of the pendency of the applications of the writ petitioners for mutation of lands in their names when the same were pending in his office. The Bench in effect observed that it was a case where the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing. This observation sounds good, but knowing the working of the government offices it appears to have no place. Of course, the Collector could have asked for a report from the prescribed authority concerned if any application for mutation of the land was pending with him. But that would be expecting too much from the Collector. It is no part of the duty of the Collector to make a roving inquiry into ownership of the persons. We are of the opinion that the requirements of the law were met when notices were served upon the recorded owners as per the Record of Rights. Again we do not think in a case like the present one, it is for the Collector to make enquiries from the registration office to find out if the land had since been sold by the recorded owners. In Winky Dilawari Vs. Amritsar Improvement Trust this Court observed that the public authorities were not expected to go on making enquiries in the Sub-Registrar's office as to who would be the owner of the property. The Collector in the present case was thus justified in relying on the official record being the Record of Rights as to who were the owners of the land sought to be requisitioned and prudence did not require any further enquiry to be made. We are, therefore, of the view that notices were properly served under Section 3(2) of the Act on the owners of the land."

The plain reading of above observation does support petitioner's contention that 7/12 extract is a statutory document maintained by the prescribed authority and since this document is annexed with the purchase notice, the respondent nos.1 and 2 could not have doubted the petitioner's ownership to the said land and termed purchase notice as insufficient."

As such, the ground raised by the respondents that the petitioners are not the owners nor the persons interested, is not tenable. More over, an enquiry into title is not contemplated as is held by the Apex Court in case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association and others, referred supra. The Apex Court in the said case observed thus,

"7. According to the plain reading of S.127 of the Act, it is manifest that the question whether the reservation has lapsed due to the failure of the Planning Authority to take any steps within a period of six months of the date of service of the notice of purchase as stipulated by S.127, is a mixed question of fact and law. It would, therefore, be difficult, if not will-nigh impossible, to lay down a rule of universal application. It can not be posited that the period of six months would necessarily begin to run from the date of service of a purchase notice under S.127 of the Act. The condition prerequisite for the running of time under S.127 is the service of a valid purchase notice. It is needless to stress that the Corporation must prima facie be satisfied that the notice served was by the owner of the affected land or any person interested in the land. But, at the same time, S.127 of the Act does not contemplate an investigation into title by the officers of the Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the running of time if there is a valid notice. Viewed in that perspective, the High Court rightly held that the Executive Engineer of the Municipal Corporation was not justified in addressing the letter dated July 28, 1977 by which he required respondents 4 - 7, the trustees, to furnish information regarding their title and ownership, and also to furnish particulars of the tenants, the nature and user of the tenements and the total areas occupied by them at present. The Corporation had the requisite information in their records. The High Court was therefore right in reaching the conclusion that it die. In the present case, the Planning Authority was the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. It can not be doubted that the Municipal Corporation has access to all land records including the records pertaining to cadastral survey No.176 of Tardeo. We are inclined to the view that the aforesaid letter dated July 28, 1977 addressed by the Executive Engineer was just an attempt to prevent the running of time and was of little or no consequence. As was rightly pointed out by respondents 4 - 7 in their reply dated August 3, 1977 there was no question of the period of six months being reckoned from the date of the receipt from them of the information requisitioned. The Municipal Corporation had been assessing the trust properties to property tax and issuing periodic bills and receipts therefor and obviously could not question the title or ownership of the trust. We are informed that the building being situate on Falkland Road, the occupants are mostly dancing girls and this is in the knowledge of the Corporation authorities. The rateable value of each tenement would also be known by an inspection of the assessment registers. We must accordingly uphold the finding arrived at by the High Court that the appellant having failed to take any steps, namely, of making an application to the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act within a period of six months from the date of service of the purchase notice, the impugned notification issued by the State Government under S.6 Land Acquisition Act, making the requisite declaration that such land was required for a public purpose i.e. for a recreation ground was invalid, null and void."

10. It is undisputed that the notice U/s.127 was issued by the petitioners after the lapse of 10 years. The receipt of notice by the respondent Corporation is also not disputed. It is also not disputed that no steps have been taken by the respondent Corporation for acquisition of the property within the period of six months nor they have taken any steps till this date. In view of the same, by operation of Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act, the property gets released from reservation.

11. The contention of the respondent - Corporation that in some matters, the petitioners have not issued the notice but it is their predecessor, who had issued notice and as such the petitioners do not get any right, can not stand to any reason. The word 'person interested' in Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act, would mean a person who on the said date had a right to issue the notice. The person stepping into the shoes of the person, who had issued the notice would get a right from the said person who had issued the notice. The requirement is on the date when the notice has been issued, the person issuing notice should have interest in the property. IT is by fiction of law that after the lapse of six months if no steps of acquisition are taken, the land stands de-reserved and the benefit would be accrued to the person in whose favour the said person who had issued the notice, had transferred the land. This Court in case of Shankarlal Khimji Patel and another Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, referred supra has observed as under :

"8. The facts of the instant petition, and of the reported case are somewhat similar. In the case before Supreme Court, the disputed plots , belonging to M. J. Wadia Trust were in possession of the Receiver. In 1962, the receiver transferred total area of 69.625 Sq. Yards comprising 41 final Plots being Nos.106 to 116 and 118 to 147 to respondents 1 to 3 and one Gardi. Gardi sold his plots in due course to respondents 4 and 5, thereby they became owner of 41 final plots. The respondent 1 to 5, the purchasers in the reported case, thereafter filed the Writ Petition seeking direction to the Corporation to remove all the huts, sheds, stables and temporary structures from 41 plots referred to above. Instant Writ Petition, has also been filed by the purchaser of the final plot seeking identical relief. In view of this, we are of the opinion, that the petitioners can take recourse to section 88(c) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and claim benefits which are conferred on the owners of the Final Plot as allotted in the Final Scheme. In other words, we hold that the word "owner" in sub-section (c) of section 88 mean the successor or transferee of the Final Plot, who is also entitled to exercise the right to get possession of the Final Plot from the Planning Authority. Where, the Statute imposes the duty, the performance or non-performance is not the matter of discretion and therefore, the mandamus could be granted ordering that to be done which the Statute requires to be done. In view of this we are inclined to allow the Writ Petition."

12. As such, this submission that the petitioner is not the person who had issued the notice and as such would not be entitled for the said relief, is sans any substance. Once notice has been issued U/s.127, the time would not stop running by sale of the property by the said person. There is no bar for a person to sell his interest in a land which is reserved as is held by this Court in case of Shivram Kondaji Sathe Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2009(2) ALL MR 347. It is also held by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.4702 of 2003 in case of Ashok Kumar and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others that even if a dispute exists, the time to purchase is not extended.

13. In light of the above premise, we allow the Writ Petitions and hold that final Plot No.524 of Jalgaon stands released from reservation to the extent of each petitioners' share. Rule accordingly made absolute. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondent - Municipal Council seeks stay to the operation of the Judgment for the period of six weeks.

Mr. A. B. Kale and Mr. A. S. Bajaj, the learned counsels for the petitioners have vehemently opposed this prayer.

The operation of this Judgment is stayed for the period of four weeks.

Petitions allowed.