Civil Revision Application No.12 of 2004,Civil Revision Application No.17 of 2004

20th October, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. R. B. DESHMUKH
Respondent Counsel: Mr. C. R. DESHPANDE

Cases Cited:
Damodaran Pillai Vs. South Indian Bank Limited, 2005(5) ALL MR 961 (S.C.)=2005 AIR SCW 4603 [Para 9,10]
Dattatraya Raghunath Jog Vs. Radhabai Laxmanrao Ghate, 2007(3) ALL MR 618=2007(6) LJSOFT 149 [Para 9,10]
Mhatarba Laxman Dongare (Dead through L.Rs.) Vs. Central Bank of India, 2005(2) ALL MR 742=2005(7) LJSOFT 124 [Para 9,10,12]
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers, AIR 2004 SC 2093 [Para 9]
Keshardeo Chamria Vs. Radha Kissen Chamria, AIR 1953 SC 23 [Para 10,12]
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336 [Para 10,12]
M/s. Devi Dayal Textile Company Vs. Nand Lal, AIR 1977 Delhi 7 [Para 10,12]
K. Balasubramania Chetty Vs. N. M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty, AIR 1975 SC 818 [Para 10,12]
Surajdeo Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad, AIR 1982 Allahabad 23 [Para 10,12]
Dambarudhar Mohanta Vs. Mangulu Charan Naik, AIR 2004 Orissa 126 [Para 10,11]
Khoobchand Jain Vs. Kashi Prasad, AIR 1986 M.P. 66 [Para 10,11]
Gour Nag Bhusan Vs. Ananta Sendh, AIR 1958 Ori. 200 [Para 10,11]
Nemi Chand Vs. Umed Mal, AIR 1962 Raj. 107 [Para 10,11]
Devineni Durgamba Vs. Raj Kumar Financiers, 1997(1) A.L.T. 448 [Para 10]
Smt. Padmavati Devi Vs. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, 1997(3) C.C.C. 367 (Raj.) [Para 10,11]
Mst. Ram Dulari Vs. B. Udai Bhan Pratap Singh, AIR 1954 ALL 98 (G) [Para 11]
Radha Kissan Vs. Keshardeo, AIR 1946 Cal 488 (H) [Para 11]
Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 [Para 12]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Both these Civil Revision Applications are filed challenging the order passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Latur in Misc. Civil Application Nos.171 and 172 of 1995 on 21.8.2003 thereby allowing the said applications and restoring the execution proceeding Nos.79 of 1983 and 80 of 1983 respectively.

2. The petitioners herein are the original judgment debtors III and III/2 in said Misc. Civil Applications, filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein for restoration for execution proceeding Nos.79 of 1983 and 80 of 1983, as the said proceedings were dismissed in default for non prosecution by the learned C.J.S.D. Latur on 21.8.1991.

3. In the said Misc. Applications, it was stated by the respondents herein that they have filed Special Civil Suit No.58 of 1966 for specific performance of agreement of sale against the deceased Sangramappa and the said suit was decreed. They have filed execution proceedings to obtain the sale-deed to be executed by the defendants at their costs on payment of balance consideration of Rs.14,850/- as per the decree. The amount is duly deposited in the Court. On death of Sangramappa, his heirs and L.Rs. Shankarappa Sidramappa, widow of deceased and son Prabhu appeared in execution proceedings. While the execution proceeding were pending, Shankarappa died and his L.Rs. were brought on record. The decree holders i.e. petitioners had filed the duly stamped sale-deed in Court to be executed by heirs of judgment debtors. From the record of Darkhast proceeding it is apparent that judgment debtors Sidaramappa and heirs of Prabhu and Suglabai have also withdrawn their share out of consideration amount deposited in Court and in token of their acceptance of sale-deed they have put their signatures, thumb marks on the sale-deed. The sale-deed was to be duly registered at the costs of defendants. Judgments debtors after all have executed the sale-deed as per law and decree.

4. One of the L.Rs. Shankarapa and his heirs did not co-operate in the matter and they delayed the matter on one pretext or the other. The court below had also passed order for execution of the sale-deed by Superintendent of the court. Indeed, there was no liability caste upon decree holders except depositing the balance consideration within specified date, which the decree holders/plaintiff has duly fulfilled. The decree holder insisted for balance consideration and for after execution of sale-deed by judgment debtors. The sale-deed duly stamped was on record. It seems that no further action was taken by Superintendent to complete the formalities for registration of sale-deed. The judgment debtors were to pay the costs of registration stamp etc. as per decree and it seems that execution proceeding was disposed of for non prosecution on 21.8.1991 by the lower court without the knowledge of the decree holder. The disposal of the execution proceeding came to the knowledge of the decree holder on 15.11.1995 when they wanted to obtain copy of sale-deed.

5. It was the case of the respondents herein who are original decree holders that all necessary steps have been taken by them to complete the sale-deed but due to death of judgment debtors, one after another, during pendency of the case, execution proceeding were prolonged. The decree holders were ready to deposit the charges of registration. But no notice or estimated costs was issued or served on decree holder. Majority of the judgment debtors have taken their share out of consideration deposited in the court without completing the execution and registration of the sale-deed. Disposal of the case is unjust and not warranted by law and facts of the case. No final order on merits is passed in the case. Disposal of case in default needs to be set aside under section 151 of C.P.C., in the interest of justice.

6. The Misc. Applications filed by the respondents herein came to be allowed on 21.8.2003. The Joint C.J.S.D. Latur allowed the applications and Special Darkhast Nos.79 of 1983 and 80 of 1983, dismissed on 21.8.1991 came to be restored in their original file. Aggrieved by the said orders, these Civil Revision Applications are filed by the petitioners herein.

7. It is stated in the Revision Applications that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 were expected to take necessary steps for appearance of the judgment debtors, as ordered by the court on 7.1.1984. The learned C.J.S.D. Latur passed an order on 2.4.1988 directing the Superintendent to execute the sale-deed after verifying whether the decree holder has deposited required amount of registration of sale deed on or before 30.4.1988 as per the convenience of the parties. It is further case of the petitioners that inspite of this order, the original decree holders did not deposit the amount required for registration of sale-deed and therefore, the learned C.J.S.D. Latur on 21.8.1991 was pleased to dismiss the execution proceeding for want of prosecution. It is further case of the petitioners that even after dismissal of the execution petition respondent Nos.1 to 4 did not take any steps for filing fresh execution proceeding within prescribed period of limitation, which they were entitled for.

8. It is further case of the petitioners that after a period of about six years i.e. in the year 1995, the respondent Nos.1 to 4 original decree holders filed Misc. Civil application Nos.171 of 1995 and 172 of 1995 respectively for restoration. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 were negligent even after filing of the said restoration applications, inasmuch as the applications were dismissed against many of the judgment debtors for not taking steps by the respondent Nos.1 to 4.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relying on the grounds taken in the civil revision applications would urge that though the applications were filed after a period of four years, no application for condonation of delay was filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 4. The trial court allowed the application of respondent Nos.1 and 4 and restored the execution proceedings. It is further submitted that there is no explanation in the application or reasons given in the applications that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 were prevented from appearing in the court for taking steps on the date on which the order of dismissal came to be passed. The trial court did not follow the settled law that when the order is passed under Order 9, Rule 5 of C.P.C. dismissing the proceeding for not taking steps, provisions of Order 9, Rule 5 are not attracted and cannot be invoked the only remedy available to the person against whom order is passed to file a fresh proceeding subject to period of limitation, as such restoring the execution petition which is dismissed for default is illegal. It is further submitted that the order impugned is passed under Section 151 of C.P.C. But at the same time the court has failed to appreciate the law conferring the powers under Section 6, execution are not to be invoked in such manner that too when there is a settled procedure laid down by law. According to the counsel for the petitioners, restoration applications came to be dismissed on the date fixed for hearing of the matters. It is further submitted that while allowing the applications filed by the respondents, the learned Judge has not assigned any reasons while reviving the execution proceedings. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the perverse finding is recorded by the court below while allowing the application for restoration of execution proceeding. Learned counsel further invited my attention to Order 21, Rules 105 and 106 of C.P.C. and submitted that the respondents herein ought to have filed applications under Rule 105 of Order 21 and under Rule 106 limitation is provided to file such application. The applications should have been filed within 30 days from the date of dismissal of the execution proceedings. In support of his contention, learned counsel heavily placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Damodaran Pillai and others Vs. South Indian Bank Limited, reported in 2005 AIR SCW 4603 : [2005(5) ALL MR 961 (S.C.)] and submitted that inherent of power of the court cannot be invoked to restore the execution proceeding. Since there is specific provision provided under Order 21, Rules 105 and 106 of C.P.C. The trial court was not justified in passing the order under Section 151 of C.P.C. to restore/revive the execution proceeding. Learned counsel further placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Dattatraya Raghunath Jog Vs. Radhabai Laxmanrao Ghate, reported in 2007(6) LJSOFT 149 : [2007(3) ALL MR 618] and submitted that for restoration of execution proceeding, an application is required to be filed within a period of 30 days. Learned counsel further submitted that in the case of Mhatarba Laxman Dongare (Dead through L.Rs.) Vs. Central Bank of India and others, reported in 2005(7) LJSOFT 124 : [2005(2) ALL MR 742], this Court has held that in absence of any express provision for restoration of an execution petition which is dismissed in default or for non prosecution, it is not possible for the Court to restore the execution petition, which is so dismissed by resorting to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers and others, reported in AIR 2004 SC 2093 and submitted that the Revision against the order of restoration of execution petition under Section 151 of C.P.C. is maintainable. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the grounds taken in the civil Revision Applications and other documents and submitted that these Civil Revision Applications deserve to be allowed.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the orders impugned in these revision applications are passed under Section 151 of C.P.C. and it cannot be said that the Court, who has passed the order, has no jurisdiction to pass such orders. It is further submitted that the concerned court in order to do the justice to the parties in the matter, has passed the order and restored the proceedings and directed to rehear the same and thereby there is no prejudice caused to the petitioners since execution proceedings were dismissed for want of prosecution. Learned counsel submitted that if the execution proceedings are dismissed for want of prosecution, it cannot be said that the said date was fixed for hearing of the matters. According to the counsel the provisions of Order 21, Rules 105 and 106 of C.P.C. will come into picture when the matter is set down for hearing. Learned counsel invited my attention to the provisions of Rules 105 and 106 and has submitted that in the instant case the date which was fixed in the execution proceeding was the date fixed for taking steps and since the steps were remained to be taken, the execution proceedings were dismissed for want of prosecution. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the order of dismissal of execution proceedings was under Section 151 of C.P.C. and the said Court while reviving/restoring the execution proceeding has also resorted to provisions of Section 151 of C.P.C. and therefore, there is no question of any delay in restoring the order because the court was exercising its inherent powers. Learned counsel further invited my attention to the original record and contended that the date on which the matter was shown on the board was for taking some steps and was not fixed for hearing. Learned counsel, in support of his contentions placed reliance on the various judicial pronouncements in the cases of Keshardeo Chamria Vs. Radha Kissen Chamria and others, reported in AIR 1953 SC 23; Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bhutnath Banerjee and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1336; M/s. Devi Dayal Textile Company and Ors. Vs. Nand Lal, reported in AIR 1977 Delhi 7; K. Balasubramania Chetty Vs. N. M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty, reported in AIR 1975 SC 818; Surajdeo Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, reported in AIR 1982 Allahabad 23 and also in the case of Dambarudhar Mohanta Vs. Mangulu Charan Naik and others reported in AIR 2004 Orissa 126; Khoobchand Jain and Anr. Vs. Kashi Prasad and others, reported in AIR 1986 M.P. 66; Gour Nag Bhusan Vs. Ananta Sendh and Ors., reported in AIR 1958 Ori. 200; Nemi Chand and Ors. Vs. Umed Mal, reported in AIR 1962 Raj. 107; Devineni Durgamba Vs. Raj Kumar Financiers, reported in 1997(1) A.L.T. 448 and Smt. Padmavati Devi Vs. Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, reported in 1997(3) C.C.C. 367 (Raj.).

Learned counsel submitted that the judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioners in the case of Damodaran Pillai and others [2005(5) ALL MR 961 (S.C.)] (supra) is not applicable in the facts of this case. In the said case, the matter was set down for hearing. In the said case as it appears from the facts of the said case that the execution proceeding had been set down for hearing. Learned counsel invited my attention to para 19 of the said judgment and submitted that when the execution application was dismissed on a day which was not fixed for hearing, the order of dismissal was not under sub-Rule 2 of Rule 105 of Order 21 of C.P.C. and therefore, there was no question of taking recourse of said provisions, while filing application for restoration. Learned Counsel further submitted that the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners in the case of Dattatraya Raghunath Jog [2007(3) ALL MR 618] (supra) has no relevance in the facts of the case since in that case it appears from the facts that the execution proceeding was fixed for hearing and therefore, the court held that the application for restoration of execution proceeding is required to be filed within 30 days. Learned counsel further submitted that in the case of Mhatarba Laxman Dongare (Dead Through L.Rs.) [2005(2) ALL MR 742] (supra), the observations of this court runs contrary to the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, the said judgment cannot be relied upon in the light of various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The sum and substance of the arguments advanced by the counsel for the respondents is that if the court exercises inherent powers vested in it, it cannot be said that there is jurisdictional error or there was no jurisdiction to pass such order. Therefore, he would submit that these Civil Revision Applications deserve to be dismissed.

11. I have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and respondents. I have also perused the original record and also Civil Revision Applications and annexures thereto. I have also gone through the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the parties. At the outset, it is necessary to reproduce the order passed by the executing Court while dismissing the execution proceedings. It appears from the original record that on 21.8.1991 the matter was fixed for compliance/taking some steps, the order reads thus :-

"No steps

Dismissed for want of prosecution. No costs."

Therefore, from perusal of the order it would show that the matter was not fixed for hearing and it was fixed for taking some steps. Since no steps were taken the court dismissed the execution proceedings for want of prosecution. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that the matter was fixed for hearing is required to be rejected. Having said so, there is no question of invoking the provisions of Order 21, Rule 105 and Rule 106 of C.P.C. In the instant case. Rule 105 contemplates the situation when the application is fixed for hearing. Rule 105 and 106 of Order 21 read thus :-

ORDER XXI

EXECUTION OF DECREES AND ORDERS

"Rules 1 to 104 - ---

105. Hearing of application.- (1) The Court, before which an application under any of the foregoing rules of this Order is pending, may fix a day for the hearing of the application.

(2) Where on the day fixed or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the applicant does not appear when the case is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the application be dismissed.

(3) Where the applicant appears and the opposite party to whom the notice has been issued by the court does not appear, the Court may hear the application ex-parte and pass such order as it thinks fit.

106. Setting aside orders passed ex-parte, etc..- (1) The applicant, against whom an order is made under sub-rule (2) of rule 105 or the opposite party against whom an order is passed ex-parte under sub-rule (3) of that rule or under sub-rule (1) of rule 23, may apply to the Court to set aside the order, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non appearance whom the application was called on for hearing, the court shall set aside the order or such terms as to costs, or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for the further hearing of the application.

(2) No order shall be made on an application under sub-rule (1) unless notice of the application has been served on the other party."

On perusal of above Rules, it reveals that Rule 105 contemplates hearing of application. Limitation prescribed under Rule 106 would be relevant if order is made under sub-Rule 2 of Rule 105 of Order 21 of C.P.C.. Therefore, in the facts of this case, there is no question of invoking the power under Order 21, Rules 105 and 106 of C.P.C. This view is fortified by the decision in the case of Dambarudhar Mohanta (supra). In para 6 of the said judgment, the High Court held that if the execution proceedings are dismissed in default, it cannot be restored by filing an application under Order 21, Rule 106 of C.P.C. and provision in Section 151 is the only provision to consider such prayer. Yet in another case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra), the Madhya Pradesh High court held that dismissal of execution application for default of appearance of decree holders cannot be treated under rule 105 of Order 21 of C.P.C. so as to attract Rule 106 but it should be under inherent powers. Application for its restoration also would be by invoking inherent powers of court where no time limit is prescribed. (emphasis supplied).

The Madhya Pradesh High Court further held that the date on which the execution application was dismissed for default of appearance of the decree holders, was not a date fixed for 'hearing' within the meaning of Rule 105.

Yet in another case, in the case of Gour Nag Bhusan (supra), Orissa High court relying on the view expressed by Allahabad High Court in the case of Mst. Ram Dulari Vs. B. Udai Bhan Pratap Singh, AIR 1954 ALL 98 (G), held that in an appropriate case e.g. where the Court, in ignorance of the fact that notice of the date of hearing was not actually served on the decree holder or his agent, dismissed the execution for default, the High Court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to restore the application even though fresh application is barred. So also the Calcutta High Court in Radha Kissan Vs. Keshardeo, AIR 1946 Cal. 488 (H), expressed the view to the effect that although the provisions of Order 9 do not apply to execution proceedings, yet the Court is not altogether incapable of exercising its inherent power in regard to the restoration of the execution petitions dismissed for default.

Yet in another case in the case of Nemi Chand and Others (supra) the Rajasthan High Court has taken a view that it is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed that the execution court had the jurisdiction to consider the question of restoration and at best it can be said to be a case of an erroneous decision restoring the case. This by itself does not justify an interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage in the facts and file circumstances of this case.

Yet in another case, in the case of Smt. Padmavati Devi (Supra), the Rajasthan High Court held that the date on which executions were dismissed in default could not be said to be a date for hearing within the meaning of Rule 105. Even otherwise execution by one of the joint decree holders were competent, order of dismissal in default of execution since were not covered by Rule 105 of Order 21 of C.P.C. application for setting aside said order could not be filed under Rule 106 of Order 21, application under Section 151 of C.P.C. was competent.

Therefore, taking into consideration the view taken in the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it can be said that there is no substance in the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that the applications ought to have been filed under Rule 105 and within limitation of 30 days, as contemplated under Rule 106 of Order 21 of C.P.C..

12. Another important aspect, which involved in this matter is that whether the court below who has passed the order restoring the execution proceeding has jurisdiction to pass such order or not ?. The Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshardeo Chamria (supra), has considered the case involving the similar facts like the case in hand. In that case, on the adjourned date of hearing of an execution the decree holder therein again applied for time for giving instructions to his pleader for taking necessary steps in execution but the application for time was refused by the Court and the execution case was dismissed on part satisfaction by the very same order without formally calling for the execution case and without intimating the decision of the adjournment application to the decree holder's pleader in order to enable him to take the necessary steps. The decree holder then applied under S.151, C.P.C. for restoration of the case and the Court thereupon restored the execution case under its inherent powers in order to rectify the said mistake, it had committed in dismissing the execution case by the same order without giving opportunity to the decree holder to take the necessary steps. On revision the High Court set aside the order of restoration and remanded the case to the executing Court for reconsideration and disposal in accordance with the observations made in its order.

In the facts of the said case, the Supreme court in paras 13, 14, 15 and 21 held that :-

(i) in the circumstances of the case the order dismissing the execution on part satisfaction was bad and the executing Court was justified in correcting the same under its inherent powers.

(ii) the order of restoration of the execution case passed under S.151 by the executing court did not come within the purview of S.47, C.P.C. and as such was not appealable. The proceedings that commenced with the decree holder's application for restoration of the execution and terminated with the order of revival could in no sense be said to relate to the determination of any question concerning the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Such proceedings were in their nature collateral to the execution and were independent of it.

(iii) An order under S.151 simplicitor is not appealable. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, certain specific orders mentioned in S.104 and O.42, R.1 only are appealable and no appeal lies from any other orders (vide S.105, C.P.C.) An order made under S.151 is not included in the category of appealable orders.

(iv) In reversing the order of the executing court reviving the execution, the High court exercised a jurisdiction not conferred on it by S.115, The High Court therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained a revision against the order of the executing Court and set it aside in exercise of that jurisdiction and remanded the case for further inquiry.

This decision of the Supreme Court is rendered by the larger Bench of three Hon'ble Judges in which it is held that the High Court acted in facts of the case and in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained the revision against the order of executing Court and set it aside in exercise of revisional powers of the High Court and remanded the case for further enquiry.

Yet in another case in the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. (Supra) the Court held that it is not open to the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, to question the findings of fact recorded by a subordinate Court. Section 115 applies to cases involving questions of jurisdiction, i.e. questions regarding the irregular exercise or non exercise of jurisdiction or the illegal assumption of jurisdiction by a Court and is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which questions of jurisdiction are not involved.

Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Devi Dayal Textile Company and others (supra) held thus :

"When a suit is dismissed for default due to a mistake of the Court, and the Court, on the same day, on discovering the mistake recalls the order of dismissal, the subsequent order does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction. It is not only, the jurisdiction and power of the Court, but it is certainly its duty to recall its order, if it finds that the same is invalid and had been passed by a mistake of the Court and would cause injustice to the parties not at fault. Correction of the mistake of the court can be done by the court suo motu without any application by the parties concerned, or even if the Court is moved to do so by the parties. But though the Court is justified in setting aside the order of dismissal suo motu it ought to have done so after notice to the opposite side. But the failure to do so will not justify interference by the High court under its discretionary powers under Section 151, when the impugned order has advanced substantial justice." (Emphasis supplied)

Yet in another case of K. Balasubramania Chetty (supra), the Supreme Court held that under section 115 of C.P.C. it is only where there is a jurisdictional error or irregularity or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction that the High Court can interfere.

In the case of Surajdeo Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others (supra), the Allahabad High Court held that, "revisional Court should not exercise its powers to set aside even an illegal and wrong order, if it results in restoring another illegal and wrong order".

Therefore, it follows from the various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Courts, if the proceedings are restored by passing the order U/s.151 of C.P.C., the court had advanced substantial justice. The High Court should not interfere in such orders. Since in the instant case, the impugned order is passed under Section 151 of C.P.C. it cannot be said that said Court has no jurisdiction to pass such order. Though counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged that the judgment of this Court in the case of Mhataraba [2005(2) ALL MR 742] (supra) squarely covered the case in hand. However, in my opinion, the said judgment has not considered the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme court. This court in the case of Mhataraba (supra) held that in absence of any express provisions of restoration of execution proceeding which is dismissed for non-prosecution, it is not possible for the Court to restore the execution proceeding which was dismissed by resorting to Section 151 of C.P.C..

With respect to the judgment of this court in the case of Mhataraba (supra), it has to be held in the facts of this case that said judgment runs contrary to the view taken by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported in AIR 1962 SC 527. In paras 24 and 25 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus :-

"Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the code itself recognized the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code." (Emphasis supplied).

13. Therefore, in my considered opinion, in the facts of this case, the learned Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Latur had jurisdiction to allow the applications for restoration of Special Darkhast Nos.79 of 1983 and 80 of 1983, which were dismissed on 21.8.1991. Thus, the order dated 21.8.2003 passed below Exh.1 in Misc. Application Nos.171 of 1995 and 172 of 1995 is well within jurisdiction of the court since the Joint C.J.S.D. Latur exercised the jurisdiction under Section 151 of C.P.C. Therefore, the orders impugned in these Revision Applications do not call for any interference in the revisional powers under Section 115 of C.P.C. The learned C.J.S.D. Latur had jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders and they do not suffer from any jurisdictional error, illegality or irregularity. Hence, these Civil Revision Applications are devoid of merits and the same stand dismissed. Rule discharged.

14. Record and proceedings received from the lower court be sent back forthwith to the said Court.

Applications dismissed.