Writ Petition No.2324 of 1990,Civil Application No.16647 of 2010

22nd December, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. M. M. PATIL BEEDKAR
Respondent Counsel: Mr. M. V. GHATGE,Mr. V. B. GHATGE,Mrs. V. A. SHINDE

Cases Cited:
Radhu Gokul Gawali Vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali, 2007(4) ALL MR 339=2007(6) Mh.L.J. 117 [Para 13]
Shyam Gopal Bindal Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, 2010(2) ALL MR 465 (S.C.)=2010(4) Mh.L.J. 187 [Para 13,26]
Yeshwant Sakhalkar Vs. Hirabat Kamat, (2004)6 SCC 71 [Para 22]
Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal, AIR 2002 SC 33 [Para 22]
Nagendra Vs. Commissioner, AIR 1958 SC 398 [Para 22]
Babulal Vs. Dropadabai, 2010(5) Mh.L.J. 845 [Para 22]
Ramji Dhondji Dhumal Vs. Mahadu Jalbaji Dhumal, 2009(4) ALL MR 6=2009(4) Bom.C.R. 678 [Para 22]
Vitthal s/o. Baba (since deceased through L.Rs.) Shevantabai w/o. Vithal Andhare Vs. Ahmed Khan s/o. Nanhe Khan, 2004(1) ALL MR 903=2004(1) Mh.L.J. 81 [Para 22]
Eknath Raghoba Vs. Somla Lalu Lamani through L.Rs., 1992 Mh.L.J. 541 [Para 22]
Sham Rajendra Agrawal Vs. Ghanshyam Hajarilal Sharma, 2007(3) ALL MR 545=2007(4) Bom.C.R. 330 [Para 22]
Bondar Singh Vs. Nihal Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1905 [Para 22]
Bhaurao s/o. Vithal Vs. Godawaribai w/o. Madhukarrao Giri, 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 103 [Para 22]
Rangnath Vs. Daulat Rao, 1975 BCT (0) 43 [Para 22]
Datta Manika Dhobi since deceased through his L.rs. Namdeo s/o. Datta Vs. Dattatraya @ Dattopant s/o. Ganpatrao Kulkarni, 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 393 [Para 22]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

2. This writ petition is filed challenging the judgment and order passed by the Deputy Collector, L.Rs. Parbhani dated 24.11.1987 in Case No.87/TNC/A/98-C/49 and the judgment and order dated 6.4.1990 passed by learned Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Aurangabad in Case No.89/B/89-P.

3. The brief facts, as disclosed in the writ petition, are as under :-

The respondent herein who claims to be the tenant of the suit land, filed an application before the Additional Tahsildar, Parbhani on 16.7.1985 stating therein that the petitioner No.1 is land owner, who gave land in dispute to the respondent Sakharam and his elder brother Tukaram for cultivation on Munafa basis, in the year 1954. It is further stated that Tukaram being elder brother and Karta of the family, his name is entered into cultivation column. It was further claimed that there was joint family and they were cultivating the suit land at the time of enforcement of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the "said Act") and therefore, they have acquired the status of tenants. It is further case of the respondent that the petitioner No.1 land lady executed a sale dated 30.1.1965 with him and in her affidavit she admitted his tenancy. The proceedings were filed under Section 38-A of the said Act. It is further case of the respondent that the partition between him and his brother took place in the year 1965 and the suit land was allotted to his share. In the year 1971, he was implicated in a murder case and convicted for life imprisonment. During which, his son was cultivating the suit land. However, he was dispossessed in July, 1982 by the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 who are purchasers of the suit land. The fact of execution of sale deed and dispossession was known to him when he was released from jail in the year 1985. Therefore, he prayed that the sale deed dated 26.2.1975 and 29.8.1979 be declared as null and void under Section 98-C of the said Act.

The petitioner Nos.2 to 4 filed their written statement contending therein that the petitioner No.1 never leased out the suit land to the respondent or his elder brother Tukaram in 1954. Their family was not joint family in the year 1954. They denied the tenancy of respondent and his brother. It is further stated that the respondent No.1 had concealed the real fact regarding the pendency of civil litigation. The petitioner No.1 Jijabai filed civil suit for declaration of ownership and injunction. The suit bearing R.C.S. No.87 of 1974 which was decreed by learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Parbhani on 26.9.1975. After execution of sale deed in favour of the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 by petitioner No.1, the respondent Sakharam filed R.C.S. No.170 of 1979 (Sakharam Vs. Jijabai and others) for specific performance of contract and perpetual injunction in respect of suit land. The learned C.J.J.D. granted injunction against the petitioners but the same subsequently came to be vacated by the learned District Judge, Parbhani on 9.3.1982 in an appeal filed by the petitioners. It is further stated that the claims of respondents have been negatived by the Civil Court. It was further stated that the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu after holding enquiry by decision dated 16.4.1987 rejected the application of respondent No.1 holding that the respondent No.1 is not tenant of suit land nor he has any locus standi to file the application.

The Additional Tahsildar, Sailu had rejected the application of the respondents and ordered that the applicant is not tenant of the suit land and therefore, the respondent No.1 has no locus to file such application and accordingly the Additional Tahsildar directed to close the file.

4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the respondent No.1 herein filed case No.87/TNC/A/98-C/49 before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Parbhani and the said authority by his judgment and order dated 24.11.1987 held that the sale transaction between the petitioner No.1 with the petitioner Nos.2 to 4 herein as null and void and also their possession on the suit land is declared as unauthorized one. The appellants can file separate suit under Section 98 of Tenancy Act for possession of the suit land since the respondent Nos.2 to 4 are not entitled to remain in possession of the suit land. Accordingly the appeal filed by respondent No.1 came to be allowed.

5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Parbhani dated 24.11.1987, in appeal No.87/TNC/A/98-C/49, the petitioners herein filed case No.89/B/89-P before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad. the Tribunal confirmed the judgment and order passed by the Deputy Collector, Parbhani and thereby dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioners herein. Hence, this writ petition.

6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that unless the tenancy of Sakharam and his brother Tukaram is established under the said Act, the application u/s.98(C) cannot be decided. However, while reversing the judgment of Tahsildar, both the Courts below i.e. Dy. Collector & M.R.T. wrongly proceeded assuming that Sakharam was the tenant. Therefore the decisions of those courts below suffer from incorrect and perverse findings which can be corrected in this writ petition. It is further submitted that in absence of any agreement of tenancy on record or any declaration or certificate of tenancy on record under the said Act, and also in absence of necessary details regarding nature of tenancy, term of tenancy, agreement if any, etc. given by Sakharam in his application, the applicant Sakharam or his brother Tukaram cannot be accepted as tenant.

7. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners had specifically denied and disputed the claim of the applicant Sakharam as a tenant of disputed land, then enquiry under Section 8 of the said Act ought to have been conducted before deciding any application under Section 98(C) of the said Act. It is further submitted that the Courts below failed to appreciate that according to Sakharam when Babu Dhondiba (i.e. maternal cousin of applicants Sakharam) had given up his share by accepting the amount and Sakharam became only tenant, then how it can be said that the land in dispute is the joint family tenancy of Tukaram and Sakharam, because the maternal cousin Babu Dhondiba cannot be the family member of Sakharam and Tukaram. Thus, unless the question of tenancy as to who were the tenants and the nature of tenancy, the finding of the Court below cannot be held to be legal and proper.

8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in absence of ownership certificate u/s.38(6)(a) of the said Act, which is the conclusive evidence of sale as against the land holder and all persons interested therein, Sakharam or Tukaram cannot be held to be tenant purchasers of the land in dispute. Even according to applicant out of Rs.2,500/- an amount of Rs.2,000/- was paid, thus the sale was not completed. Hence, there was no question of any declaration of sale deed executed by land lady in favour of present petitioners No.2 to 4 to be invalid u/s.50(B) of the said Act.

9. The Counsel for the petitioner would submit that in absence of any conclusive proof on record regarding tenancy, such as certificate of protected tenant or declaration regarding status as protected or ordinary tenant by Tahsildar u/s.8 of the said Act, the plea of tenancy of Sakharam cannot be accepted merely on the basis of revenue entries in the cultivation column. Therefore, the courts below committed an error of law by deciding the proceedings under assumption that Sakharam was the tenant of the land in dispute which is absolutely in correct.

10. It is further submitted that Tukaram was interested person being elder brother of Sakharam as well as the affidavit of land lady cannot be said to be a public document as observed by courts below and as such relying on those affidavits in the earlier proceedings u/s.38(A), the courts below have rendered the perverse findings in absence of concrete document of tenancy of Sakharam on record. The proceedings u/s.38(A) of the said Act were not completed nor certificate of ownership was issued to Sakharam or Tukaram as per section 38(6)(a) of the said Act, hence, application u/s.98(C) was not tenable.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that merely on the basis of entries in cultivation column of revenue record for some period in the name of Tukaram, Babu Dhondiba or in the name of Sakharam coupled with their affidavit of interested persons such as Tukaram in the proceedings u/s.38(A) cannot establish that Sakharam was tenant of land in dispute. He would submit that in absence of any declaration under the said Act by the competent authority, no inference can be drawn that Tukaram was cultivating the land being a Karta of the joint family of Sakharam. The presumption of joint family is not available under the tenancy Act unless it is proved. There is no finding regarding the status of Babu Dhondiba and his nature of cultivation. Therefore, no inference can be drawn that Sakharam is a tenant.

12. It is submitted that in this writ petition, the petitioners have filed separate application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for production of documents such as certified copy of plaint in RCS No.170/1979, the certified copy of issues in said suit, certified copy of letter dated 14.12.2000 from Tahsildar, Parbhani to learned C.J.S.D., Parbhani and certified copy of order dated 2.7.2001.

It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that said RCS No.170/1979 was filed by Sakharam against the present petitioners for specific performance of contract and for cancellation of sale deed in respect of present land in dispute. In the said suit the learned C.J.J.D., Parbhani had referred the issue of tenancy of Sakharam, Tukaram to the tenancy court u/s.99(A) of the said Act. Accordingly, the Additional Tahsildar, Parbhani by his letter dated 14.12.2000 (Exh.78 in the said suit) has given his findings on issue No.1 that Tukaram was not in possession of land in Survey No.29 area 10 Acres, 2 Gunthas in the year, 1954 being Munafedar. Similarly, on issue No.2, the finding given is that Tukaram or his brother are not declared tenants. It is also mentioned therein that, the entries in 7/12 extract cannot establish tenancy. Though, the said suit was abated, but the findings of Tahsildar on issue Nos.1 and 2 as supra operates as res judicata unless those are set aside by competent authority. He would submit that in the interest of justice, it is necessary to allow the production of said documents and consider them while deciding this petition. It is submitted that the petitioners were not having knowledge and could notice from the bundle of papers from house of deceased Trimbak Kute which they handed over to their advocate at the time of final hearing, and therefore, the said application needs to be considered sympathetically in the interest of justice.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention submitted that in absence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondent No.1, the status of the respondent as tenant under the provisions of said Act was not established. He further submitted that unless the said relationship is established the provisions laid down under Section 98 of the Act cannot be resorted to by respondent No.1. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Radhu Gokul Gawali and others Vs. Mohan Kishan Gawali and others, reported in 2007(6) Mh.L.J. 117 : [2007(4) ALL MR 339] and submitted that both the Deputy Collector as well as the M.R.T. have not considered the points of limitation for filing application under Section 98-A of the said Act. He further submitted that as per the said judgment, reasonable time for filing the said application can be for three years from the date of cause of action arose for filing the said application.

The petitioners in support of the said application under Order 41, Rule 27 of C.P.C. are relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case Shyam Gopal Bindal and others Vs. Land Acquisition Officer and another, reported in 2010(4) Mh.L.J. 187 : [2010(2) ALL MR 465 (S.C.)] and would submit that the writ petition be allowed.

14. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the tenancy is assumed by the Courts below as the Courts have relied upon the revenue entries and agreement submitted to Tahsildar/Tribunal in which the land-lady has accepted tenancy and agreed to sale the land. The same is not challenged by the land-lady and neither she has stepped in the witness box to deny the same. The tenancy is well established and hence accepted by the Courts below.

15. The Counsel for respondents would further submit that the law does not require any agreement in a written form. The point of agreement or declaration or certificate of tenancy was not pleaded by the petitioners and hence, the same cannot be agitated now. At the same time, the rights of the tenant are not extinguished unless tenancy is terminated as per law. Non issuance of declaration or certificate does not forfeit right to purchase under proviso to Section 38(6)(d) of the said Act. There is sufficient evidence on record to accept tenancy.

16. He further submitted that the argument of enquiry under Section 8 of the said Act is not pleaded and the same is also misconceived. The Tahsildar himself is an authority under Section 8 as well as Section 98 and hence, it cannot be said that a separate enquiry u/s.8 is required as the authority is one and the same and exercises concurrent jurisdiction. It is submitted that the argument regarding Babu Dhondiba's share was not pleaded and hence there was no opportunity to the respondents to answer and meet the same. At the same time, the adjustment is inter-se between the tenant and land-lady who has not raised any grievance till this date.

17. The Counsel for the respondents submitted that the ownership certificate's point was never pleaded and hence cannot be raised now. Anyhow, the right to purchase as well as the tenants' right otherwise available under law are intact unless tenancy is terminated as per procedure of law. Section 50(B) of the said Act is wrongly read and hence it is a misconceived argument. The proviso u/s.38(6)(d) protects right to purchase of respondents. He submitted that it is wrong to say that only revenue entries were considered for adjudicating tenancy as the courts had relied upon the agreement between tenants and land-lady and further took notice of the fact that land-lady has not challenged the same which is sufficient to substantiate the claim of respondents. The Counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence cannot be re-appreciated in writ proceedings when possible view is taken.

18. The Counsel for respondents submitted that it is incorrect to say that Tukaram is interested person and document was not a public document. This cannot be a ground to discard his evidence which is not shaken otherwise, particularly when the land-lady has not supported the defence and no re-appreciation is permissible now. Notarized document submitted to Tahsildar/Tribunal becomes a public document, being public record of private document as per Section 74(2) of Indian Evidence Act. It is further submitted that the argument regarding completion of Section 38(A) proceedings and grant of ownership certificate was not particularly pleaded. However, the same were not completed as criminal prosecution was lodged against Sakharam and his son and they were in jail. However, the same does not forfeit their right to purchase neither their right as tenants.

19. It is further argued that the entries taken in the cultivation column are not the only material in favour of the respondents. There is agreement, affidavit and coupled with the fact that they were not challenged by land-lady, they are sufficient to prove the tenancy. The status of Tukaram as Karta of joint family is very well recognized by entries in revenue record. The Counsel for respondents submitted that the other arguments of the petitioners were not pleaded. The act of the land-lady and tenants stands on higher pedestal and cannot be ignored. The declaration could not be sought due to criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Babu's status has not been challenged by specific pleadings and hence there was no occasion to answer the same. That was mutual adjustment and can be challenged by land-lady only, who has not challenged it.

20. The Counsel for respondents submitted that the amendment and production of additional documents sought is belated and mala-fide. The same was moved when the matter was partly heard and the parties were aware of the same which can be seen from the orders below where Tahsildar has recorded that petitioners were present. The amendments are sought to fill in the lacunae which were brought to the notice of the Court during the argument before earlier court.

It is submitted that the order of the Tahsildar cannot be applied as res judicata because the proceedings were not finally adjudicated and no rights were finally determined as the proceedings abated. The pleadings of 1979 suit were not taken which were very well available and within the knowledge of the petitioners. The findings of Tahsildar are in nature of interim findings and same are given in concurrent jurisdiction and consistent with the findings under 98(c) proceedings. Hence, they do not conclude anything as the same are set aside by the appellate authority under law i.e. Deputy Collector and confirmed by M.R.T. in Revision. In view of this, the findings subsequently given by Tahsildar are beyond the jurisdiction and illegal. No separate challenge is required to the said findings as the proceedings are abated and the substantial challenge to the said findings were made before appellate authority under 98(c) proceedings. He submitted that therefore, the said findings cannot operate as res judicata.

21. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the petitioners have not demonstrated any perversity and illegality in the impugned judgments and hence, interference under writ jurisdiction is not permissible. The tenant has lodged proceedings immediately after he was released from Jail and the earlier proceedings have not been adjudicated finally, hence, the same does not create any hurdle in the present proceedings. He submitted that the tenant has brought on record the revenue entries, agreement, affidavit of land-lady which is not challenged and hence, the courts below have taken a possible view after appreciating the evidence and it is not desirable to interfere in the same even if other view is possible.

22. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the Deputy Collector and the M.R.T. has recorded concurrent findings that the respondent No.1 is tenant. The said finding is on the basis of evidence brought on record. There is concurrent findings recorded by both the forums, therefore, this court may not interfere with it in the writ jurisdiction. The counsel submitted that there is limited scope while entertaining writ jurisdiction. In support of his contention, counsel placed reliance on the following judgments.

i) Yeshwant Sakhalkar Vs. Hirabat Kamat, reported in (2004)6 SCC 71,

ii) Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal, reported in AIR 2002 SC 33,

iii) Nagendra Vs. Commissioner, reported in AIR 1958 SC 398,

iv) Babulal Vs. Dropadabai, reported in 2010(5) Mh.L.J. 845.

The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that to establish the relationship as tenant and landlord, it is not necessary to have registered document or lease deed, even oral agreement is sufficient, if it is convincingly proved. He relied upon the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Ramji Dhondji Dhumal and Ors. Vs. Mahadu Jalbaji Dhumal and Ors., reported in 2009(4) Bom.C.R. 678 : [2009(4) ALL MR 6]. Learned counsel further submitted that if two remedies are availed and one abandoned, even then application under Section 98 of the said Act can be entertained. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the reported judgment of this court in the case of Vitthal s/o. Baba (since deceased through L.Rs.) Shevantabai w/o. Vithal Andhare and others Vs. Ahmed Khan s/o. Nanhe Khan and others, reported in 2004(1) Mh.L.J. 81 : [2004(1) ALL MR 903]. Learned counsel further submitted that for filing application under Section 98 of the said Act, limitation is not applicable. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the reported judgment in the case of Eknath Raghoba and Ors. Vs. Somla Lalu Lamani through L.Rs. and others, reported in 1992 Mh.L.J. 541. Learned counsel further submitted that even if it is assumed that the law of limitation is applicable for filing application under Section 98 of the said Act reasonable explanation is offered by respondent No.1 since he was undergoing sentence in jail. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Vitthal s/o. Baba (supra). Learned counsel further placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Sham Rajendra Agrawal Vs. Ghanshyam Hajarilal Sharma and Anr. reported in 2007(4) Bom.C.R. 330 : [2007(3) ALL MR 545] and contended that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable unless the matter is heard and finally decided. The counsel further placed reliance in the case of Bondar Singh and others Vs. Nihal Singh and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 1905 and submitted that if there are no pleadings, no evidence can be considered in that regard. Counsel further placed reliance in case of Bhaurao s/o. Vithal and other Vs. Godawaribai w/o. Madhukarrao Giri and another, reported in 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 103 and submitted that even if the consideration is not paid, the tenancy rights remain intact. It is further submitted that tenancy cannot be terminated unless by procedure laid down in law, is followed. For this he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Rangnath Vs. Daulat Rao and Ors. Reported in 1975 BCT (0) 43. It is further submitted that Tenancy cannot be surrendered without following due procedure of law. In support of his contention, counsel placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Datta Manika Dhobi since deceased through his L.rs. Namdeo s/o. Datta and others Vs. Dattatraya @ Dattopant s/o. Ganpatrao Kulkarni and another, reported in 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 393. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents relying on the written arguments, oral submissions, judgment cited submitted that this petition is devoid of any merits and the same be dismissed.

At this stage, Mr. Beedkar, learned counsel for the petitioners, in his alternate submission, prayed for remand of the matter to the concerned authority.

23. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents at great length. This matter was heard for admission on 8.8.1990, when this court issued Rule and granted interim stay in terms of prayer clause "C". It further appears that this matter was taken up for final hearing on 9.9.2008. The matter was adjourned to 22.9.2008, since none was present for the petitioners and interim relief granted in terms of prayer clause "C" was vacated. On the adjourned dated i.e. on 22.9.2008, the petition was dismissed for want of prosecution. On 3.7.2009 this Court restored the petition on an application filed by the petitioner. By order dated 5.8.2009, the legal heirs of deceased respondent No.1 were allowed to be brought on record. On 6.8.2010 the petition was directed to be listed for final hearing on 13.8.2010. Interim relief was continued. Thereafter the matter was listed from time to time and on 30.9.2010 this Court allowed the civil application filed by the petitioner and held that the parties to maintain status quo in relation to possession and proceedings before the learned Collector, Parbhani till the next date. The said interim order was continued from time to time. The matter was again heard on 25.10.2010, when this court passed the following order.

"1) Heard.

2) In RCS No.170 of 1979 (Sakharam Vs. Jijabai), pending before the learned CJJD, at Parbhani, Issue No.1 was formulated and referred for adjudication to the Tenancy authorities, precisely to the learned Tahsildar, Parbhani. The said issue is answered against the plaintiff (Sakharam) in the said case by communication dated 14.12.2000. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner has tendered a Photostat copy of such communication.

3) Before this court there is no document of RCS No.170 of 1979, its outcome or the evidence adduced by both the parties.

4) The learned Counsel for the petitioner desire to tender documents, to follow procedure, serve copy of application to other side by taking out appropriate proceedings. Such exercise to be carried within two weeks.

5) S.O. to 22nd November, 2010.

6) Interim relief of status quo concerning the possession to remain in force till 22nd November, 2010."

Thereafter, the matter was listed from time to time and was heard finally on 7.12.2010 and on 8.12.2010 hearing was completed and the matter was reserved for judgment.

24. Civil Application No.16647 of 2010 is filed by the petitioners herein for amendment in the writ petition to add paras 7-A to 7-G stated in the application so also prayed for exhibiting the documents at Exh.D to Exhibit G. The perusal of annexures to the said application, would show that the deceased respondent Sakharam Punjaji did file suit being R.C.S. No.170 of 1979 for specific performance of contract to the effect that the defendant No.1 should execute the registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of land survey No.29 admeasuring 10 acres, 2 gunthas situated at Village Pimpala, Tq. and district Parbhani. It further appears that in the said suit, following issues were framed :-

1. Does the plaintiff proves that defendant No.1 delivered the suit land in the possession of plaintiff and one Tukaram for the purpose of cultivation in the year 1954 on the basis of the Munafa basis ?

2. Does the plaintiff prove that he and his brother were declared as the tenants of suit land and that right from 1954 to 1979 the suit land was and it is still in his possession and cultivation in the capacity as a tenant ?

While answering issue No.1, The Additional Tahsildar, opined that in Pahani Patrak of 1954-55, and Khasra Patrak on 1955, the name of Tukaram is mentioned. There is no any proof that the land was given to Tukaram in 1954 on Munafa basis. Therefore, Tukaram was not in possession of the suit land as Munafedar. While answering issue No.2, the Tahsildar has opined that there is no entry in Revenue record about the tenancy of the respondents there is no any tenancy certificate in their favour. They have not paid any tenancy price and the applicant Tukaram and his brother are not declared as tenants. On perusal of Khasra Pahni Patrak of 1955, the name of the applicant is not recorded and therefore, the applicant cannot be said as tenants of the suit property. However, in 7 x 12 extract of 1956, there is entry of cultivation, however, in the column of ownership of 7 x 12 there is no name of applicant. The Tahsildar opined that merely on the basis of 7 x 12 extract, the tenancy cannot be proved and therefore, the applicant or his brother are not tenants of the suit property.

25. The respondents herein have filed reply to the Civil Application No.16647 of 2010 and vehemently opposed the prayer made in the said application on the ground that the amendment sought is belated and even then the Tahsildar has passed the order as back as in the year 2000 and there is no explanation as to why the said amendment was not brought on record for such a long period. There are also other grounds taken in the reply to oppose the application. It is also stated that many new facts have been stated in the application and therefore, the respondents have no opportunity to answer those new grounds taken in the application and also documents brought on record.

26. When this petition was heard on 25.10.2010, this court observed in the order that the learned counsel for the petitioners if desires to tender documents, to follow procedure, serve copy of application to other side by taking out appropriate proceedings and such exercise is to be carried out within two weeks. The matter was adjourned to enable the counsel for the petitioners to file application. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Gopal Bindal and others Vs. Land Acquisition Officer and another, reported in 2010(4) Mh.L.J. 187 : [2010(2) ALL MR 465 (S.C.)] and submitted that the production of additional documents on record is required to be allowed since these documents are having crucial and direct bearing on the merits of the claim put by the petitioners. In my opinion, though the application is filed belatedly for production of documents on record, on perusal of farad sheet, it clearly appears that the matter pertains to year 1990-91, is taken up for final hearing for the first time in the year 2008. The reference by the Civil Court about the tenancy issue made to the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu was answered by the Additional Tahsildar in the year 2000 i.e. during the pendency of the writ petition. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the production of said documents on record. It is true that certain contentions raised by the petitioners in the said application for producing the documents on record are taken for the first time and also some of the documents have come into existence after this writ petition is filed. Therefore, respondents had no opportunity to reply the said contention or the documents. On careful perusal of the judgment and order passed by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, it clearly reveals that all these three forums have not taken into consideration three important points. First is of limitation for filing application, which will go to the root of the matter, secondly, both the forums i.e. Deputy Collector and the M.R.T. have not convincingly held that there exists relationship between the petitioner No.1 and the L.Rs. of deceased respondent No.1 as landlord and the tenant, as contemplated under the provision of said Act and thirdly what is the effect of outcome of R.C.S. No.87 of 1974 filed by the petitioner No.1 and R.C.S. No.170 of 1979 filed by the respondent Sakharam, in the Civil Court on pending proceedings.

27. On careful perusal of the judgment and order passed by the Deputy Collector, Parbhani as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad it clearly appears that both the Forums have not considered the submissions of the petitioners about filing of R.C.S. No.170 of 1979 by Sakharam against the present petitioners. When this point was argued by the petitioners before both the forums, it was incumbent on the authorities to adjudicate the said point and express its opinion either way. It further appears that all the three forums have also not considered the impact of another suit filed by the petitioner No.1 before the Civil Court. All the three forums have not analyzed each document separately filed before it and given its clear findings about the relationship between the parties, as landlord and tenant, as contemplated under the said Act.

28. Upon perusal of the judgment and order passed by the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu it appears that the said judgment and order is cryptic and is without analyzing documents. Therefore, on careful perusal of the order passed by the Additional Tahsildar on an application filed by respondent No.1 herein, it clearly appears that the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu has not properly applied his mind while answering all contentions raised by respondent No.1 in his application under Section 98-C of the said Act. The Deputy Collector, who was appellate authority was expected to go into the details of the contentions raised by both the parties including adverting to each document separately and then render the decision, however, said exercise is not done. The petitioners herein did raise the contentions about filing of civil suit by the petitioner No.1 Jijabai and also filing of suit by Sakharam before the competent Civil Court. The appellate authority was duty bound to refer to these points raised by the petitioners herein about the civil proceedings. As held by this court in the case of Sandu alias Jamaluddin Madarbhai and Anr. (supra), it was incumbent on the appellate authority to convincingly record about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent No.1. However, it appears from perusal of the order passed by the Additional Tahsildar and even by the appellate authority, that they have not gone to the root of the matter for analyzing each documents to find out the status of respondent No.1 as tenant under the provisions of the said Act. As per the aforesaid judgment of this court, unless that relationship is established, the provisions laid down under Section 98 of the said Act cannot be resorted to by the tenant. The authorities below have not properly exercised the jurisdiction vested in him and by cryptic order rejected the application of respondent No.1. The appellate authority if wanted to take different view that the Additional Tahsildar should have addressed to the issue of limitation of filing application under Section 98-A of the said Act, to record the clear and categorical findings about relationship between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent No.1 i.e. whether the respondent No.1 is tenant and petitioner No.1 is landlord. Thirdly, the appellate court was bound to say something about the proceedings filed by the parties before the civil court about the same suit property.

29. Therefore, in my opinion, upon careful perusal of the judgment and order passed by the authorities below and also upon perusal of the pleadings in the writ petition, annexures thereto, submission in the civil application for production of documents on record and reply filed by the respondents and the written submissions filed on their behalf as also the reply filed to the civil application for production of certain documents on record, the position emerges that unless all three orders are set aside and the Additional Tahsildar is directed to consider the application of the respondent No.1 herein afresh by giving opportunity to the parties to put forth their case including the contentions raised in the civil application and reply filed thereto, there will be no proper justice to either of the parties. Therefore, matter deserves to be remanded back to the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu.

30. Though the various contentions are raised by the counsel appearing for the respective parties, this Court feels it appropriate not to go into the merits of the matter, since the matter is required to be remanded back to the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu for fresh adjudication and any findings given on merits by this Court would affect the merits of the matter. Therefore, to sum up, the Additional Tahsildar has not properly adjudicated the application filed by the respondent No.1 and appreciated the rival contentions thereof and rather by cryptic order has rejected the application. The appellate authority i.e. Deputy Collector has not gone into the details on the vital contentions raised by the parties about the limitation of filing application under Section 98 of the said Act and has not given clear findings of relationship between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent No.1 as landlord and tenant. Thirdly, without discussing anything about the Civil Suit filed by the respective parties about the same suit property, the revisional authority has mechanically made endorsement on judgment and order passed by the appellate authority, this reaches only to the conclusion that the authorities below have not properly dealt with all aspects of the matter raised by the both the parties. It is also relevant to note that both the parties should get proper opportunity to put forth their case in respect of additional documents.

31. Therefore, in my opinion, the proper course, which would meet the ends of justice is to set aside the judgment and orders passed by all three forums below i.e. Additional Tahsildar, Sailu, Deputy Collector, Parbhani and Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad and remand the matter back to the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu for fresh adjudication. Accordingly the judgment and order passed by the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu, Deputy Collector, Parbhani and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad are quashed and set aside. The application filed by respondent No.1 Sakharam Punjaji Punjari (since deceased) through his L.Rs. i.e. file No.85/TNC/98 KSR/33 is restored to its original position. The Additional Tahsildar, Sailu, to hear the said application by giving full opportunity to the parties and finally dispose of the said application within six months from today. It will be open for the parties to take all available grounds and produce necessary documents on record before the Additional Tahsildar, Sailu. The Additional Tahsildar, Sailu is directed to give full opportunity of hearing to the parties and then decide the application in the light of provision of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and the judgment on the subject cited by the parties before him and give clear cut findings on the issues raised.

32. Till application is decided by the Additional Tahsildar, the interim order passed by this Court that the parties to maintain status quo in relation to possession of the suit property, would remain in operation.

33. The petition is allowed to the above extent and stands disposed of. Rule made absolute to the above extent. Civil application is accordingly disposed of.

Petition allowed.