Writ Petition No.366 of 2011

12th August, 2011

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. S. N. VERNEKAR
Respondent Counsel: Mr. AMEY KAKODKAR

Cases Cited:
Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues & Anr. Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., 1996 (6) S.C.C. 746 [Para 2]
Tota Ram Vs. State of U.P., (1997) 6 SCC 280 [Para 3]

JUDGMENT

F. M. REIS, J. :- Heard Shri S. N. Vernekar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Shri Amey Kakodkar, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the Respondents.

2. The above Petition challenges the Order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Salauli Irrigation Project, Margao, dated 28.01.2011, whereby the application of the Petitioner dated 07.12.2011 for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, came to be rejected as being time barred. The reason for rejecting the said application by the Land Acquisition Officer is that Section 28-A is applicable to only those persons who make first attempt after the passing of the Order by the Court in a reference under Section 18 and not otherwise. The Petitioner in the present case was seeking to file such an application from the date of the passing of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in an Appeal preferred by a claimant. The Apex Court in a Judgment reported in 1996 (6) S.C.C. 746 in the case of Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigues & Anr. V. Land Acquisition Collector & anr., has stated at para 3 thus :

"3. Before examining the decisions of this Court on which the High Court has placed reliance, we deem it appropriate to first examine the plain language of Section 28-A extracted earlier. Section 28-A was inserted as the last section in Part III entitled "Reference to Court and Procedure thereon" by Act 68 of 1984. Part III begins with Section 18 which provides that if an interested person does not accept the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act, he may, by a written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred for determination of the court. Section 2(d) defines the expression 'Court' to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless a Special Judicial Officer has been appointed. Therefore, the court referred to under Section 18 can only mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Section 23 then sets out the matters to be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to be awarded for the acquired land, and Section 24 indicates the matters to be omitted from consideration. Section 26 provides that the award shall be in writing signed by the Judge which shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of clauses (2) and (9) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Section 27 provides for costs to be awarded and Section 28 provides for payment of interest on excess compensation. We then come to Section 28-A. The first part of the section begins with the words "Where in an award under this part, Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11" which clearly indicate that the legislature was talking of an award made under the provisions of Part III, i.e., an award under Section 11 and therefore, in that context, reference to 'Court' can only mean the court to which a reference is made by the Collector under Section 18. This position is further clarified when the section refers to compensation awarded in excess of the amount awarded under Section 11 of the Act. The second part of the section then addresses "the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification ... and who are also aggrieved by the award" and permits them to make a written application to the Collector "within three months from the date of the award of the Court" requiring him to redetermine the amount of compensation on the basis of the amount awarded by the Court, notwithstanding the fact that they had not sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the newly added section seeks to give the same benefit, which a person who had sought a reference and had secured the Court's award for a higher amount of compensation had received, to those who had, on account of ignorance or financial constraints, not sought a reference under Section 18. In the latter part of the section also, reference is to the award under Section 11 and later, to the award of the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the court referred to therein is again the court referred to in Section 2(d) of the Act, i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The plain language of Section 28-A, therefore, prescribes the three months' period of limitation to be reckoned from the date of the award by the Court disposing of the reference under Section 18, and not the appellate court dealing with the appeal against the award of the Reference Court."

3. The Apex Court in a Judgment reported in (1997) 6 S. C. C. 280 in the case of Tota Ram v. State of U.P., has held at para 3 thus :

"A reading thereof clearly indicates that a person whose land is acquired under a common notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act but who failed to avail of the remedy of reference under Section 18, is eligible to make a written application within three months from the date of the award of the Court enhancing the compensation. It has been interpreted by this Court that the "court" means Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction to whom reference under Section 18 would lie. Admittedly, the award of the reference court having been made on 18-5-1990, the limitation began to run from that date. The proviso to Section 28-A gives a right to the persons to obtain the certified copy of the award and decree and the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award and the decree shall be excluded in computing the period of three months. In view of the express language, the question of knowledge does not arise and, therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the limitation of three months begins to start from the date of the knowledge is clearly unsustainable and cannot be accepted. The High Court, therefore, is right in its decision in that behalf."

4. Considering the said Judgments of the Apex Court, we find no reason to interfere in the impugned Order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. There is no dispute that the application filed by the Petitioner is time barred in case time is counted from the date of the Judgment passed by the Reference Court. Hence, no case for interference in the impugned Order is made out. As such, the Petition stands summarily rejected.

Petition rejected.