Letters Patent Appeal No. 1 of 2010,Letters Patent Appeal No. 2 of 2010,Letters Patent Appeal No.18 of 2009,Letters Patent Appeal No.19 of 2009

21st July, 2011

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. Sudheer Voditel , Mr. I. Agha

Cases Cited:
Sanjay Z. Rane and others Vs. Smt. Saibai S. Dubaxi (since deceased) through her legal representatives and another, 2010(1) ALL MR 855=LPA No.15 of 2000 Dt.22/06/2009 [Para 1,3,34,41,58]
P.V. Hemalatha Vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 548 [Para 3,15,18,41,45]
Dadh Nathu Rajah (dead) by Laywers Vs. Angha Nathu Jamal, (1969) 3 SCC 813 : AIR 1971 SC 300 [Para 3,18,35,38]
National Sewing Thread Co.Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Bros.Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357 [Para 23,56]
M/s. Cadar Constructions Vs. M/s. Tara Tiles, AIR 1984 Bombay, 258 [Para 29,30]
Nitin Industrial Associates Vs. State of Mahrashtra & Ors., AIR 1986 Bombay 298 [Para 32]
Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors. Vs. Radhikabai, widow of Anandrao Banapurkar & Anr., 1986 (supp.) SCC 401 [Para 32]
Re : Sridhar Rao and Anr., AIR 1958 AP 60 [Para 47]
Shakuntala and ors. Vs. M.B. Jaisoorya and ors., AIR 1961 AP 390 [Para 47]
Jamshed N. Guzdar, 2005 (2) SCC 591 [Para 49,51]

JUDGMENT

MOHIT S. SHAH, C.J. :- By an order dated 30 September 2010, a Division Bench of this Court, has referred the following questions for determination by a Larger Bench :

"(a) Whether the effect of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the High Court at Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 is that from 30 October 1982, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay including the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent was extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu ?

(b) Whether Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act of 1981 can be interpreted to mean that only a limited jurisdiction vesting in the existing Court of Judicial Commissioner was exercisable by the permanent bench of this Court established under Section 9 of the said Act of 1981 ?"

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we have also framed the following questions:-

(c) Whether Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court is maintainable against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay sitting at Panaji (Goa) in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution?

(d) Whether the decision dated 20 June 2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Sanjay Z. Rane and others vs. Smt. Saibai S. Dubaxi (since deceased) through her legal representatives and another, (Letters Patent Appeal No.15/2000) : [2010(1) ALL MR 855] lays down the correct law?

2. Since, this Larger Bench has been constituted only for determining the aforesaid questions of law in the context of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals against judgments of Single Judge of this Court sitting at Panaji-Goa, it is not necessary to set out the facts of any of these appeals, except to state that Letters Patent Appeal Nos.1 and 2 of 2010 are directed against the separate Judgments passed by a learned Single Judge of this High Court at Goa, dismissing two separate writ petitions filed in 2010 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Similarly, Letters Patent Appeal Nos.18 and 19 of 2009 are directed against separate judgments rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court at Goa, dismissing writ petitions filed in the year 2008.

3. In Sanjay Z. Rane and others vs. Smt. Saibai S. Dubaxi (since deceased) through her legal representatives and another Letters Patent Appeal No.15/2000 decided on 22 June 2009 : [2010(1) ALL MR 855], a Division Bench of this Court, took the view that the jurisdiction to entertain intra-Court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1865 has not been conferred on the High Court of Bombay at Goa. For the purposes of arriving at this conclusion, the Division Bench, besides placing particular interpretation on the relevant statutory provisions, also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in P.V. Hemalatha vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and anr. (2002) 5 SCC 548.

In the order of reference, it is indicated, while prima facie disagreeing with the interpretation placed in the Judgment dated 22 June 2009, that the attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to an important decision of the Apex Court in Dadh Nathu Rajah (dead) by Laywers vs. Angha Nathu Jamal (1969)3 SCC 813 = AIR 1971 SC 300.

4. Before enumerating the rival submissions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant historical facts and statutory provisions in the context of which we are called upon to determine the above questions.

5. For more than 400 years, Goa was under the Portuguese Rule. As far back as in 1544, "Tribunal de Relacao" (Highest Court of Appeal) was established in Goa. It was the highest judicial organ in Goa, for hearing appeals against orders of subordinate Courts in Goa. Appeals against the decisions of Tribunal de Relacao lay before the Court in Lisbon, in Portugal.

On 20 December 1961, the Portuguese Rule in Goa came to an end. By the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962, a new Union Territory comprising Goa, Daman and Diu came into existence with effect from 20 December 1961. The Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 was enacted by Parliament, which came into force on 5 March 1962, providing that in the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, all laws in force immediately before 20 December 1961 shall continue to be in force, until amended or repealed by competent legislation or other competent authority. Section 7 of the said Act of 1962 read as under :

"7. Extension of the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court to Goa, Daman and Diu.

From such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay shall extend to Goa, Daman and Diu."

There is no dispute about the fact that no such notification was issued and the power under Section 7 was never exercised.

6. Instead of extending the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, as provided under Section 7 of the 1962 Act, the President of India promulgated the Goa, Daman and Diu (Judicial Commissioner's Court) Regulation, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation of 1963") on 11 December 1963, setting up the Court of Judicial Commissioner, replacing the former "Tribunal de Relacao", with effect from 16 December 1963. Regulation 3 thereof, read as under :

"3. Establishment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. - On and from the commencement of this Regulation, there shall be established for Goa, Daman and Diu, a Court to be known as the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Goa, Daman and Diu which shall consist of the Judicial Commissioner and such number of Additional Judicial Commissioners, if any, as may be determined by the Central Government from time to time."

Clause 7 provided for exercise of jurisdiction by a Bench of Judicial Commissioner and Additional Judicial Commissioners, by opinion of the majority of the Bench.

Regulation 8. Civil and criminal jurisdiction of the court of the Judicial Commissioner.- (1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner shall be the highest civil and criminal court of appeal and revision in Goa, Daman and Diu and shall have all such jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the commencement of this Regulation was exercisable in respect of that territory by the Tribunal de Relacao. ..."

Clause 15 provided that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner shall be a Court of record and shall sit at Panjim or such other place or places, if any, as the Judicial Commissioner may appoint with approval of the Administrator. Clause 22 abolished the Tribunal de Relacao functioning in Goa, Daman and Diu and appointed the Chief Justice and Judges thereof as Judicial Commissioners and Additional Judicial Commissioners.

7. Articles 225, 230, 231, and 241 of the Constitution read thus:

"225. Jurisdiction of existing High Courts.- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.

.........

"230. Extension of jurisdiction of High Courts to Union territories.-(1) Parliament may by law extend the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any Union territory.

(2) Where the High Court of a State exercises jurisdiction in relation to a Union territory,-

(a) nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as empowering the Legislature of the State to increase, restrict or abolish that jurisdiction; and

(b) ..............

231. Establishment of a common High Court for two or more States.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Chapter, Parliament may by law establish a common High Court for two or more States or for two or more states and a Union territory.

(2) In relation to any such High Court.........

241. High Courts for Union territories.-(1) Parliament may by law constitute a High Court for a Union territory or declare any court in any such territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of this Constitution.

(2) The provisions of Chapter V of Part VI shall apply in relation to every High Court referred to in clause (1) as they apply in relation to a High Court referred to in Article 214 subject to such modifications or exceptions as Parliament may by law provide.

(3) .......

(4) Nothing in this article derogates from the power of Parliament to extend or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court for a State to, or from, any Union territory or part thereof."

8. Article 241(1) of the Constitution of India provides that Parliament may, by law, declare any Court in union territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution. Parliament accordingly enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu Judicial Commissioner's Court (Declaration as High Court) Act, 1964 with effect from 16 December 1963 (date of commencement of the aforesaid Regulation of 1963). Section 3 of the said Act of 1964 declared the Court of Judicial Commissioner of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu (the "Judicial Commissioner's Court") as a High Court for the purposes of Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution of India. Section 4 thereof provided that an appeal shall lie to Supreme Court under the provisions of Article 133 from any judgment, decree or final order of the Judicial Commissioner's Court notwithstanding that such judgment, decree or final order is that of a Single Judge.

9. Thereafter, the High Court at Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 was enacted by Parliament with effect from 9 September 1981 with the following Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons :

Preamble:

"An Act to provide for the extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, for the establishment of a permanent bench of that High Court at Panaji and for matters connected therewith

Statement of Objects and Reasons.- There has been a persistent demand for the extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court to the territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and for the establishment of a permanent bench of that High Court there in lieu of the existing Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Although the Judicial Commissioner's Court functioning at present in that Union territory has been given certain powers of a High Court under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Judicial Commissioner's Court) Regulation, 1963, it is not a full-fledged High Court. The Judicial Commissioner also does not enjoy those constitutional safeguards which protect the independence of a High Court Judge. It is felt that the extension of the jurisdiction of a High Court to the Union territory will improve the tone of judicial administration in that Union territory and inspire greater public confidence. It is, therefore, proposed to extend the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and abolish the Court of the Judicial Commissioner there. It is also proposed to establish a permanent bench of that High Court at Panaji." (emphasis supplied)

10. Sections 3, 4, 7 and 9 of the Act of 1981 are very important and relevant for the purposes of the controversy which is subject-matter of this reference and are, therefore, set out verbatim.

"3. Extension of jurisdiction of Bombay High Court to Goa, Daman and Diu -

(1) On and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay shall extend to the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.

(2) On and from the appointed day, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner shall cease to function and is hereby abolished :

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall prejudice or affect the continued operations of any notice served, injunction issued, direction given or proceedings taken before the appointed day by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, abolished by this sub-section, under the powers then conferred upon that Court.

4. Jurisdiction of Bombay High Court - On and from the appointed day, the High Court at Bombay shall have, in respect of the territories included in the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of the said territories by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner.

.....................

7. Transfer of Pending proceedings from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to the Bombay High Court - (1) All proceedings pending in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner immediately before the appointed day shall stand transferred to the High Court at Bombay.

(2) Every proceeding transferred under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the High Court at Bombay as if such proceeding were entertained by that High Court.

(3) Any order made before the appointed day by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner shall, for all purposes, have effect not only as an order of that Court but also as an order of the High Court at Bombay.

9. Establishment of a permanent bench of Bombay High Court at Panaji. On and from the appointed day, there shall be established a permanent bench of the High Court at Bombay at Panaji and such Judges of the High Court at Bombay, being not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Panaji in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu :

Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in such territory shall be heard at Bombay. (emphasis supplied)

11. Section 13 of the Act of 1981 conferred power on the Central Government to remove the difficulties, which may arise in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, within two years from the date of coming into force of the Act. The Government of India, accordingly, issued Notification dated 30 October 1982, containing the High Court at Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982 in the following terms:

"2. Adaptation of rules and forms - (1) All the rules relating to procedure and conduct of cases before the Court of Judicial Commissioner (including rules for charging of fees for certified copies and for Court processes) which were in force immediately before the appointed day (hereinafter referred to as the said rules) shall continue in force and shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the bench of the High Court at Bombay established under Section 9 of the said Act (hereinafter referred to as the said bench) subject to the power of the said High Court to repeal or alter them.

...............

(2) In the absence of any provision in the said rules on any particular matter, the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 shall apply to proceedings before the said bench."

12. We may also set out Clause 15 of Letters Patent of 1865, which reads thus:

15. Appeal to the High Court from Judgments of the Court. - And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction........ revisional jurisdiction ....................and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, -pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, ....... but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." (emphasis supplied)

13. Thereafter, Goa became a State on 30th May, 1987 on coming into force of the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987. While Goa became an independent State, a new Union Territory known as "Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu" was formed. Part IV of this Reorganisation Act, 1987 provides for the High Court, commencing with Section 20 which reads as under:

" 20. Common High Court for Maharashtra, Goa, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu.- (1) On and from the appointed day,-

(a) there shall be a common High Court for the State of Maharashtra and Goa, and for the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Daman and Diu, to be called the High Court of Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the common High Court);

(b) the Judges of the High Court at Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the existing High Court), holding office immediately before that day shall, unless they have elected otherwise, become, on that day, the Judges of the common High Court.

(2) The expenditure ...................

(3) On and from the appointed day, the common High Court shall have, in respect of the territories comprised in the States of Maharashtra and Goa and the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of those territories by the High Court of Bombay." (emphasis supplied)

14. Sections 25 to 30 provide as under :

"25. Powers of Judges. - The law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and division Courts of the existing High Court and with respect to all matters, ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the common High Court.

Section 26 provides for Principal Seat and other places of sitting of the common High Court.

27. Procedure as to appeals to Supreme Court. - The law in force immediately before the appointed day relating to appeals to the Supreme Court from the existing High Court and the Judges and division Courts thereof shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the common High Court.

28. Transfer of proceedings to the common High Court. - (1) All proceedings pending in the existing High Court immediately before the appointed day shall, from such day, stand transferred to the common High Court.

(2) Every proceeding transferred under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the common High Court as if such proceeding was entertained by that High Court.

30. Saving - Nothing in this Part shall affect the application to the common High Court of any provision of the Constitution and this Part shall have effect subject to any provision that may be made on or after the appointed day with respect to that High Court by any Legislature or other authority having power to make such provision."

15. When Letters Patent Appeal of Sanjay Rane was argued before a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : B.P. Dharmadhikar & U.D. Salvi, JJ.), a preliminary objection was raised about maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that such an intra-court appeal was not maintainable in the Court of Judicial Commissioner for Goa, Daman and Diu and that, therefore, the High Court of Bombay at Panaji also did not have any such jurisdiction to entertain an intra-court appeal. The Division Bench heard the appeal both on the preliminary objection as well as on merits of the challenge to the Judgment of the learned Single Judge. By Judgment dated 22 June 2009, the Division Bench held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and that since the appeal was heard on merits also, the Division Bench recorded that it did not find any substance in the appeal on merits also. Accordingly, the Letters Patent appeal was dismissed on both the counts. The question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal was considered by the Division Bench in paragraphs 39 to 46 of the Judgment and the following reasons commended to the Division Bench for taking the view that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable :

(i) There was no remedy of intra-court appeal in the Court of Judicial Commissioner for Goa, Daman and Diu;

(ii) Section 3 of the High Court of Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 had the effect of extending only the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and Section 4 conferred upon it the actual powers.

(iii) The High Court was supposed to exercise the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner, because Section 4 uses the expression "all such jurisdiction, powers and authority" as contrasted with the word "jurisdiction" used in Section 3 of 1981 Act. Section 9 of the 1981 Act also contemplated qualified jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court of Bombay at Panaji. It was only Section 4 of 1981 Act which conferred power and authority upon the High Court at Bombay to exercise in relation to the matters arising in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. The word "jurisdiction" when juxtaposed with the words "powers and authority" in Section 4 signifies different types of jurisdiction like appellate, original, etc., and when it appears in Section 3, it only means power to take cognizance. Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982 also did not confer upon the High Court of Bombay at Goa any additional jurisdiction or power to entertain intra-court appeal.

(iv) Section 20(3) of 1987 Act also uses the words "jurisdiction powers and authority" referable to Section 4 of 1981 Act. Hence, the word "Jurisdiction" in Section 3 of 1981 Act only extends the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. The Act of 1987 did not confer any additional power or jurisdiction on the Bombay High Court at Goa or even the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982.

(v) In P.V. Hemalatha vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and anr., the Supreme Court considered the controversy about availability of appeal under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court to the territories of the erstwhile Malabar State which was earlier under Madras High Court and which later on became part of the new State of Kerala.

16. It needs to be noted at the outset that it is common ground between the parties and all the intervenors that an intra-court appeal was not provided either in the Tribunal deRelacao or in the Court of Judicial Commissioner for the Union Territory of Goa, Damn and Diu. The only question which, therefore, arises for our consideration is, whether the High Court at Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "1981 Act" or "Extension Act") and/or the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "1987 Act" or "Reorganisation Act") contain any provision, expressly or impliedly, making available intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent for the Bombay High Court against the judgments rendered by a Single Judge of the same High Court having the sittings at Panaji-Goa.

17. Mr. Sudheen Voditel, learned Counsel for the Appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No.1/2010, Mr. V. Pangam, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No.19/2009, as well as Mr. Mahesh Sonak and other learned Counsel for the Intervenors, who are the appellants in other Letters Patent Appeals, have submitted that the Letters Patent Appeals were always considered as maintainable ever since the establishment of permanent bench of the Bombay High Court at Panaji under the 1981 Act, as well as the Common High Court for the States of Maharashtra and Goa under the Reorganisation Act, 1987 and that there was no reason for the Division Bench in Sanjay Rane's case to hold in the year 2009 that the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable against Judgments of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Panaji.

18. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that:

I. Section 3 of the 1981 Act extended the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu (and abolished the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for the said territories) without any qualification or restriction on the power of the Bombay High Court and that Section 4 of the 1981 Act did not control or restrict the wide sweep and contents of Section 3 of the 1981 Act.

II. Section 7 of 1981 Act also provided that pending proceedings were transferred to Bombay High Court as if they were entertained by Bombay High Court. Hence, the Letters Patent Appeals were maintainable against judgments in petitions transferred to Bombay High Court. Letters Patent Appeal would equally be maintainable against judgments in fresh petitions filed after establishment of permanent Bench of Bombay High Court at Panaji (Goa).

III. Section 9 of 1981 Act provided for establishment of a permanent bench of Bombay High Court at Panaji in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court at Bombay in respect of the cases arising in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Hence, the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay, in its entirety, came to be extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.

IV. Sections 3 and 4 of 1981 Act are required to be read harmoniously as supplementing each other.

V. The decision of the Apex Court in P.V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and another, relied upon by the Division Bench in Sanjay Z. Rane's case supports the appellants' case by providing that for different territories coming under the same High Court, different kinds of procedure would not apply.

VI. The decision of the Apex Court in Dadh Nathu Rajah (dead) by Laywers vs. Angha Nathu Jamal, also supports the appellants' case that when the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay is extended to another territory without any express limitation, the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court over the existing territory will extend to the new territory without any limitation.

19. On the other hand, Mr. Almeida, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents and Mr. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in other appeals who have been permitted to intervene at the hearing, have contended that the Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable against Judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, at Panaji. The following submissions are made in support of the proposition:-

(a) Bombay High Court at Panaji merely exercises the powers which were exercisable by the Court of Judicial Commissioner for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, under the Regulation of 1963 which did not provide for any intra-court appeal.

(b) With effect from 30 December 1963 under the Regulation of 1963 (promulgated under Article 240 of the Constitution), the Court of Judicial Commissioner replaced the Tribunal de Relacao. Section 8 of the Regulation lays down that the Court of Judicial Commissioner shall have all such jurisdiction which was exercisable earlier in respect of that territory by the Tribunal de Relacao.

(c) The jurisdiction of Bombay High Court to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was extended by the 1981 Act, by the Parliament in exercise of its power under Article 241(1) of the Constitution, read with Entry 79 of the Union List, by abolishing the Court of Judicial Commissioner. Section 3 of the 1981 Act replaces the Court of Judicial Commissioner by the Bombay High Court and in that context the expression "jurisdiction" is used in Section 3. However, Section 4 of the 1981 Act confers jurisdiction, powers and authority on Bombay High Court that were exercisable by the Court of Judicial Commissioner. Sections 3 and 4 have to be read harmoniously. Section 3 constitutes Bombay High Court for Goa and Section 4 actually gives jurisdiction, powers and authority to such constituted Bombay High Court. Section 3 will have to be read in terms of Article 241(1), read with Entry 79 of the Union List, to mean constitution of Bombay High Court for Goa, Daman and Diu in place of the Court of Judicial Commissioner.

(d) The Extension Act of 1981 merely replaced the existing "Tribunal de Relacao" by the Bombay High Court and, therefore, the Judges of the Bombay High Court hearing cases arising from the territories within the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu were merely to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercised by the Tribunal de Relacao. It was on 20 December 1963 that Section 18 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 came into force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. The said provision empowered the State Legislative Assembly of the Union Territories to make laws in respect of any matters enumerated in the State or concurrent list.

(e) Section 4 of Act of 1981 clearly provided that the Bombay High Court at Panaji shall have all such jurisdiction, powers and authority which were hitherto exercisable by the Judicial Commissioner's Court in respect of the territories included in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Section 20 of the 1987 Act merely provides for a common High Court for the States of Maharashtra and Goa to be called as "The High Court of Bombay" and the common High Court has all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable by the High Court of Bombay in respect of the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu. In other words, Section 3 of the 1981 Act or the 1987 Act merely extended the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay to the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu and it did not confer any additional jurisdiction, powers or the authority on the Bombay High Court at Panaji to entertain intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

(f) The Letters Patent jurisdiction is not inherent jurisdiction of Bombay High Court, but a conferred jurisdiction, conferred by an appropriate State enactment limited to Province of Bombay only. The Letters Patent 1865 was amended from time to time before India became independent on 15 August 1947, but, thereafter, the Letters Patent has been amended only by an Act of State Legislation. Letters Patent (Amendment) Act, 1948 was enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay, amending Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to exclude Original Jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court and City Civil Courts. Hence, applicability or otherwise of Letters Patent of Bombay High Court to the State of Goa could be determined only by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Goa. Hence, after formation of the State of Goa by Reorganisation Act, the applicability or otherwise of Letters Patent of Bombay High Court to the territories within the State of Goa, could only be determined by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Goa. In the absence of any such Legislation by the Legislative Assembly of Goa, then Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu to which first elections were held on 9 December 1963, after liberation of Goa and thereafter, upon formation of the State of Goa with effect from 30 March 1987, there was no question of applying the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court to the State of Goa. Consequently, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court could never be maintainable against a Judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, sitting at Panaji, Goa.

(g) Sub-Section (3) of Section 20 of the Reorganisation Act reaffirms that the common High Court shall exercise already existing jurisdiction, powers and authority. Therefore, the Letters Patent jurisdiction has not been conferred by the Reorganisation Act. Further, Section 22 of the Reorganisation Act furthermore refers to the practice and procedure already existing. Section 66 specifically provides that provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force applied before the appointed day. Sections 67, 68 and 69 reaffirm that the existing law will continue despite the common High Court.

20. We have carefully considered the rival submissions.

21. The statements of objects and reasons for the Extension Act of 1981 clearly indicate that the Legislature found that the exercise of power by the Judicial Commissioner's Court functioning in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was not found to be adequate and that the Judicial Commissioner's Court did not enjoy constitutional safeguards which protects independence of a High Court Judge. Hence the Legislature was of the view that the extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu will improve the tone of judicial administration and inspire greater public confidence and, therefore, provided for extension of jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu by establishing a permanent bench of the Bombay High Court at Panaji- Goa with all powers of the Bombay High Court and abolished the Court of Judicial Commissioner. The Legislature, thus, never intended to curtail the power and jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to entertain intra Court appeal, while extending its jurisdiction to the union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.

22. On analysis of the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1981, in our view, the Legislative scheme was two-fold. Firstly, section 3 extended jurisdiction of Bombay High Court to Goa, Daman and Diu without any limitation (which would include the jurisdiction under Letters Patent). Secondly, Section 4 confers upon the Bombay High Court further jurisdiction which the Court of Judicial Commissioner exercised in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu but which the Bombay High Court would not otherwise have but for such conferment by section 4. In other words, sections 3 and 4 of Act of 1981 have to be read harmoniously. There is no question of section 4 overriding section 3, because section 4 only confers additional powers on the Bombay High Court which were possessed by the Court of Judicial Commissioner in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and which Bombay High Court would not have possessed otherwise. Of course, such additional powers of the said Court of Judicial Commissioner would be available in respect of the territories included in the then Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and which are now included in the territories of the State of Goa and in the Union Territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu.

23. Before further dealing with the provisions of 1981 Act showing the intrinsic legislative intent supporting the above interpretation, we must first refer to the decision of three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co.Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros.Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 357 In that case, the appellants made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay for registration of their trade mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The respondent gave notice of their opposition to that application. The Registrar of Trade Marks allowed their opposition and rejected the application made by the appellants. The appellants preferred an appeal against the said order of the Registrar before the High Court of Bombay as permitted by the provisions of section 76 of the Trade Marks Act. The Single Judge allowed the appeal and directed the Registrar to register the appellant's trade mark. The respondents filed Letters Patent Appeal before the Bombay High Court which came to be allowed, setting aside judgment of the Single Judge and restoring the order of the Registrar. The appellants first contended before the Supreme Court that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable.

24. The Supreme Court considered,

76(1): "Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act an appeal shall lie, within the period prescribed by the Central Government, from any decision of the Registrar under this Act or the rules made thereunder to the High Court having the jurisdiction."

Section 77 of the Act provided that the High Court may, if it likes, make rules in the matter.

The Supreme Court observed that the Trade Marks Act, 1940 did not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the High Court. In other words, the Trade Marks Act itself did not provide for a further appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge to the Division Bench. Even in the absence of any such specific provision for appeal before the Division Bench, the Supreme Court laid down the law in the following terms:-

"Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane, L.C. in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General, (1913) A.C. 548 in these terms:

When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches."

The same view was expressed by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, AIR 1948 P.C. 12,wherein it was said:

"Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal."

25. In the context of the controversy here, after the writ petition is filed in the Bombay High Court, it has to be decided according to the rules of practice and procedure of the Bombay High Court which is governed by the Letters Patent of 1865. In view of the above emphatic statement of law laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that once section 3 of the 1981 Act extended the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay to Goa, Daman and Diu, all the proceedings of the High Court at Bombay conducting the hearing and deciding cases at Panaji (Goa) would be governed by ordinary rules or procedure applicable to the Bombay High Court and since under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court, an appeal lies before the Division Bench against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, Letters Patent would lie against the judgment of a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court sitting at Panaji (Goa) in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of this High Court.

26. Section 4 of the Extension Act of 1981 preserved the jurisdiction of the existing forum and conferred it on the successor forum in order to ensure that no area of jurisdiction of the existing forum was left out from the purview of the new forum. A Decree of Divorce under Canon Law was required to be confirmed by the Tribunal deRelacao till 16 December 1963 and thereafter by the Court of Judicial Commissioner. In the absence of Section 4, the permanent Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Goa would not have got the jurisdiction to entertain such a proceeding with effect from 9 September 1981. Section 4 therefore, transferred the jurisdiction of the existing forum of the Court of Judicial Commissioner to the permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court, at Panaji Goa. Section 4 is, therefore, an ex abundanto cautela provision which ensured that such an area of jurisdiction of the Court of Judicial Commissioner was not left out of the purview of the Bombay High Court. Absence of Section 4 would have created a void. Section 4 thus filled the void. Section 4, therefore, supplements Section 3, and does not override it.

27. Clause 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982 set out in para 11 of this Judgment refers to the procedure and conduct of cases for which powers of the Court of Judicial Commissioner were conferred by Section 4 of the 1981 Act on the Bombay High Court at Goa.

28. Section 7 of the 1981 Act provided for automatic transfer of all proceedings pending in the Court of Judicial Commissioner, immediately before the appointed day to the High Court at Bombay and that all proceedings so transferred shall be disposed of by the High Court at Bombay as if such proceedings were entertained by that High Court.

29. Hence, if a writ petition was pending before the Court of Judicial Commissioner before 30 October 1982, that writ petition stood transferred to the High Court at Bombay and was to be disposed of by the High Court at Bombay as if the petition was entertained by the High Court at Bombay. As held in M/s. Cadar Constructions Vs. M/s. Tara Tiles AIR 1984 Bombay 258, Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. If the contention of the respondents were to be accepted, though as per section 7(2) of the 1981 Act, Letters Patent Appeal did lie against such a Judgment rendered before 30 October 1982, the Letters Patent appeal would not lie against a Judgment of the Single Judge sitting at Panaji, Goa rendered after 30 October 1982. The Legislature could never have intended to provide for such incongruity.

30. In M/s. Cadar Constructions Vs. M/s. Tara Tiles (supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Panaji held that in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the 1981 Act, the Judgment of the learned Single Judge sitting at Panaji has to be regarded as a Judgment passed by the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against Judgment of the Single Judge. It was a case where a First Appeal was pending on the date of coming into force of the 1981 Act and by the Judgment dated 23 December 1982, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Panaji (Jahagirdar, J.) dismissed the appeal. Against the said judgment, a letters patent appeal was filed. The respondent/plaintiff took a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal on the ground that when the appeal was filed, it was filed before the Judicial Commissioner's Court and no intra-court appeal was maintainable. The Division Bench hearing the appeal, rejected the preliminary objection on the ground that all proceedings pending in the Court of Judicial Commissioner immediately prior to 30 October 1982 (the appointed day) stood transferred to the High Court at Bombay under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Extension Act, and that under sub-section (2) of thereof, the proceeding transferred under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the High Court at Bombay as if such proceedings were entertained by that High Court. Hence, the Judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay at Panaji has to be regarded as a judgment passed by the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench, therefore, held that the letters patent appeal was maintainable.

31. The proviso to Section 9 empowers the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, in his discretion to order that any case or class of cases arising in Goa shall be heard at Bombay. It would be incongruous to hold that when a case arising in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu (and now in the territory of State of Goa) is heard by a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay at Panaji, a Letters Patent Appeal would not lie, but if such a case is transferred by the Chief Justice of the High Court at Bombay, a Letters Patent appeal would lie against the Judgment that may be rendered by a Single Judge sitting at Bombay in such a case transferred from Panaji to Bombay.

32. In Nitin Industrial Associates vs. State of Mahrashtra and others AIR 1986 Bombay 298, the Nagpur Bench of this Court has held that the Judges of the Bombay High Court have jurisdiction in the entire State of Maharashtra and entire State of Goa, irrespective of the fact whether they are sitting at Bombay, Nagpur, Aurangabad or Goa and that such distribution of business on territorial lines is only for the purposes of administrative convenience.

An anomalous situation would arise if different jurisdictions were created i.e. a Letters Patent appeal would lie against judgments of Single Judges of this Court at the Principal Seat at Bombay and its Benches at Nagpur and Aurangabad, but the Letters Patent appeal would not lie against the judgment of Single Judges of Bombay High Court sitting at Panaji, Goa. Such a view would also run counter to the observation of the Supreme Court in Umaji Keshao Meshram and ors., vs. Radhikabai, widow of Anandrao Banapurkar and anr. 1986 (supp.) SCC 401 Tracing the history of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in paras 33 and 34 of the Judgment:-

"...The Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and the rules made by that High Court thus continued to be in operation by virtue of the Constitution itself. The statutory provisions referred to above show that the Bombay High Court as the High Court for the pre-reorganisation State of Bombay continued as the High Court for the post-reorganisation State of Bombay and thereafter for the State of Maharashtra with the same jurisdiction and powers which it possessed, exercisable either by Judges sitting singly or in Division Courts, whether at its principal seat or at one of its Benches at a place other than its principal seat."

33. When the jurisdiction of the existing High Court is extended to a Union Territory under Article 230(1) or a common High Court is established for more than one State under Article 231(1), the Constitution does not provide for any limitation on the exercise of powers of the High Court and the existing High Court continues to exercise all its powers in the Union Territory to which its jurisdiction may be extended under Article 230(1) or in the State to which it is established as a common High Court under Article 231(1). On the other hand, when an existing Court in a Union Territory is declared to be a High Court under Article 241(1), Clause (2) thereof provides for limitations or modifications.

That is why when the Judicial Commissioner's Court functioning in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was declared to be a High Court by the Act of 1964, there were various limitations and modifications made under Article 241(2) of the Constitution. However, when the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay was extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu under the Extension Act of 1981, there were no limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction by the Bombay High Court, through its Bench at Panaji, Goa. Similarly, under the Reorganisation Act of 1987, when the common High Court (High Court of Bombay) has been established for the State of Maharashtra and State of Goa, the existing High Court i.e. High Court at Bombay continues to exercise its jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent, both in the State of Maharashtra and State of Goa.

34. In view of the above analysis of the Legislative Scheme of the 1981 Act read in light of the above constitutional provisions, it is clear that the Division Bench in Sanjay Rane's case [2010(1) ALL MR 855] (supra) was not right in restricting the expression "jurisdiction" in Section 3 of 1981 Act only to territorial jurisdiction, without making an endeavour to read Sections 3 and 4 harmoniously in light of the legislative intent flowing from Sections 3, 4, 7(2) and 9 of the Act of 1981. As is well known the term "jurisdiction" of a Court encompasses all kinds of jurisdiction - territorial, pecuniary, pertaining to the subject matter, so also the power to lay down its procedure and to evolve its practice, subject to any law made by the competent Legislature providing otherwise. The moment the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay was extended to additional territories outside the State of Maharashtra, in those additional territories also, the Bombay High Court would exercise the same all compassing jurisdiction. Section 4 in 1981 Act used the words "jurisdiction, powers and authority" as were hitherto exercisable by the Court of Judicial Commissioner only to emphasize that no power or authority of the Court of Judicial Commissioner in Goa, Daman and Diu was to lapse, merely because the Bombay High Court might not have been hitherto vested with such power or authority, such as the power to confirm a decree of divorce under the canon law.

35. The decision of the Apex Court in Dadh Nathu Rajah vs. Angha Nathu Jamal (1969)3 SCC 813 = AIR 1971 SC 300, rendered by a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through J.C. Shah, J., clearly supports the appellants' case The Supreme Court held that when the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay is extended to another territory (Saurashtra, in that case) without express limitation, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay over the existing territory will extend to the new territory also, without any limitation.

36. It was a case where the appellant before the Supreme Court filed a suit on May 3, 1951 in the Court of Assistant Judge, Morvi, which was in the former Part "B" State of Saurashtra for a decree for Rs.9,000/- and odd amount. The Trial Court decreed the suit on October 17, 1955. An appeal was filed against that decree in the High Court of Saurashtra at Rajkot. Thereafter, on November 1, 1956, the High Court of Saurashtra was abolished and the proceedings pending in that Court stood transferred to the Bombay High Court. On February 21, 1958, Vyas, J., of the Bombay High Court allowed the appeal. Against that Judgment, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay was filed by the Plaintiff, but without an order of Vyas, J., certifying that the case was fit for appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court. On May 1, 1960 under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, the appeal stood transferred to the High Court of Gujarat. However, the Gujarat High Court held that an appeal was incompetent in the absence of an order under Section 22-A of the Saurashtra Ordinance 2 of 1948, certifying that the case was fit for appeal to a Division Bench. The Gujarat High Court did grant a Certificate for filing an appeal before the Supreme Court.

37. In the appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 22-A of the Saurashtra Ordinance 2 of 1948 provided that an appeal against a Judgment of a learned Single Judge, in an appellate jurisdiction, could lie only upon a certificate of the learned Single Judge that the case is fit one for appeal. An appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court could be filed without a certificate of the Judge hearing the appeal. But when Vyas, J., heard the appeal, he functioned as a Judge of the Bombay High Court and appeals against the Judgments of Single Judges in First Appeals against decrees of trial Courts were subject to appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, without a certificate of fitness.

38. Learned Counsel Mr. Dessai submitted that reliance placed by the Appellants on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dadh Nathu Rajah's case (supra) is misconceived. The controversy whether the condition requiring a certificate by the Single Judge that the case is fit one for appeal, did not survive after 1 November 1956, as Ordinance 2 of 1948 under which the Saurashtra High Court was abolished and under which the condition was imposed through Section 22A, was repealed by Saurashtra (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects) order, 1957. Hence, the decision of Vyas, J., after 1 November 1956 was amenable to challenge in Letters Patent Appeal before the Bombay High Court, without any certificate by the learned Single Judge that the case is fit one for appeal.

39. We are unable to agree with Mr. Desai, learned counsel for intervenors supporting the respondents. In the above Judgment, the Supreme Court, in terms, held that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay (State of Bombay then included Saurashtra with effect from 1 November 1956) was to be the same which the High Court of Saurashtra possessed, but the limitation which applied to the High Court of Saurashtra did not apply to the High Court of Bombay. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court superseded restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction of the erstwhile High Court of Saurashtra.

40. Before Section 100-A was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by an amendment with effect from 1 July 2002, Appeals from Judgments delivered by learned Single Judges in First Appeals either under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or otherwise, were maintainable in terms of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent before a Division Bench. This position continued even after the Bombay High Court became a common High Court for the States of Maharashtra and Goa. In such circumstances, the argument of Mr. Desai cannot be accepted.

41. We may now deal with the decision of the Supreme Court in P.V. Hemalatha vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and anr (2002)5 SCC 548 which was relied upon by the Division Bench in Sanjay Rane's case [2010(1) ALL MR 855] (supra).

The appellant/plaintiff filed two suits, seeking injunction and two other suits claiming decree of specific performance of the contract for sale of two cinema theaters in Calicut. Calicut was part of erstwhile Malabar District in the State of Madras and now forms part of the new State of Kerala. The Trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance. Appeals under Section 96 of C.P.C. came up before the Division Bench of Kerala High Court and were decided by a common Judgment along with the appeals arising from the injunction matters. Two Judges constituting the Division Bench delivered two separate judgments in which they differed on almost all issues arising in the case. It, therefore, held that the decree of the Court below was liable to be confirmed in terms of Section 98(2) CPC, which provides that in case the Two Judges hearing an appeal disagree, the Judgment of the lower Court stands confirmed.

42. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that in view of Clause 36 of Letters Patent of Madras High Court, the two Judges constituting the Division Bench ought to have referred the matter to the Chief Justice for placing the matter before a Third Judge. It was contended that the Letters Patent of Madras High Court was applicable to cases arising from Calicut District which was a part of the erstwhile Malabar District of the erstwhile State of Madras. Section 52 of the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 saved original, appellate and other jurisdiction of the erstwhile High Court for the territories which now form part of the new State of Kerala and is within territorial jurisdiction of Kerala High Court after Reorganisation of States.

43. The Supreme Court held that the "powers of Chief Justice, Single Judges and Division Benches" applicable to the High Court of "corresponding State" Travancore-Cochin would apply to all the territories of the new State of Kerala in which are included territories of the erstwhile State of Tranvancore-Cochin and Madras. In this manner, Sections 54 and 55 ensure application of one uniform law on "jurisdiction", "procedure" and "powers of Judges" to the new State and its High Court. After examining the scheme contained in all the provisions under Part V of the Reorganization Act, 1956, the Supreme Court rejected the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff that Letters Patent of the Madras High Court was applicable to the cases arising from Calicut as part of the erstwhile Malabar district of the erstwhile State of Madras which now forms part of the territories of the new State of Kerala.

44. In paras 25 and 26 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court held that if the appellant's/plaintiff's contentions were to be accepted, the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court would apply to Malabar District which was part of the erstwhile State of Madras before its merger with the new State of Kerala; whereas the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court would not apply to other parts of the territories included in the new State of Kerala. Thus, for the different territories which have merged into the new State of Kerala, different laws would apply. Such result was avoided by the Legislature. Otherwise, a very incongruous result would ensue which, according to the Supreme Court, could never have been intended by the Legislature which was enacting the transitory provision to lay down uniform procedure for all the integrating territories of the High Court of a new State until suitable legislation on the subject is brought into force.

45. In our view, the Supreme Court decision in P.V. Hemalata's case (supra) supports case of the appellants, rather than the case of the respondents. The Supreme Court has held that in the matter of intra Court appeal different territories coming under one High Court would not be governed by different rules applicable prior to merger.

46. We may now deal with the submission of Mr. Dessai, learned Senior Counsel, that when the Legislative Assembly in the State of Maharashtra passed the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 which received the assent of the President on 28 February 1986, it would be incongruous that there would be no Letters Patent Appeals against Judgments of the Single Judges of the Bombay High Court sitting at Bombay, but the Letters Patent Appeals would lie against the Judgments of the Single Judges of Bombay High Court, sitting at Panaji - Goa.

47. In Re : Sridhar Rao and Anr. AIR 1958 AP 60 and in the case of Shakuntala and ors. vs. M.B. Jaisoorya and ors. AIR 1961 AP 390, same argument was canvassed and in this context, what the Andhra Pradesh High Court held in paras.4,5 and 6 of the judgment in Shakuntala's case is extremely relevant. Therefore, the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court and the Charter under which it is established, is equally applicable when Judges of the Bombay High Court sit at Panaji (Goa) because ultimately, it is the Bombay High Court which is common High Court for both the States. That such a common High Court will have jurisdiction only in Maharashtra and not in the territories and areas for which it is a common High Court, if to be accepted, will produce incongruous and startling results. That woud be complete misreading of the Appellate power and jurisdiction conferred on the Bombay High Court. Once it is conferred on an existing High Court, then, merely because subsequently it exercises jurisdiction, powers and authority over the additional territories does not mean that in these additional territories it will not have the same power with which it was originally vested and possessed. That is how the Andhra Pradesh High Court has interpreted the provisions of the Letters Patent and the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Similar would be the situation as far as Goa is concerned. There is nothing in the Reorganisation Act, 1987 which would indicate that the jurisdiction, powers and authority and the law administered by the Bombay High Court would not be applicable to the State of Goa.

48. Mr. Desai further submitted that considering the fact that the State of Maharashtra had already enacted the above Legislation for abolition of Letters Patent Appeals, and the President granted assent to the same on 28 February 1986, the Parliament in its wisdom, rightly did not extend the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court to the State of Goa while enacting the Reorganisation Act, 1987. The Reorganisation Act merely provided for a common High Court for States of Maharashtra and Goa, to be called "High Court of Bombay" and specifically provided that the common High Court shall have in respect of the territories comprised in the State of Maharashtra and State of Goa, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day (30 May 1987), exercisable in respect of those territories by the High Court of Bombay.

49. Mr. Desai also vehemently submitted that Section 22 of the Reorganisation Act, 1987 further provided that the laws in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the existing High Court shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the common High Court. The validity of Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 which was brought into force from 1 July 1987 by Notification dated 27 May 1987, was challenged in Writ Petition No.1953/1987 (Jaimini B. Chinai's case). During pendency of the Writ Petition, the Bombay High Court stayed the implementation of the Act, but ultimately, the said Writ Petition came to be dismissed by Judgment dated 11 January 2005 of the Supreme Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar's 2005 (2) SCC 591 case. Hence, the Supreme Court having upheld the Act of Maharashtra State Legislature abolishing the Letters Patent Appeal, it would be highly incongruous to hold that Letters Patent Appeals would be maintainable against the Judgments of the single Judges of Bombay High Court, sitting at Panaji, Goa.

50. Mr. Desai also submitted that it is only 1960 Rules that were made applicable by Section 2 of 1982 Order which permitted Letters Patent jurisdiction in Goa. However, once that jurisdiction has stopped in Bombay, it stops in Goa, since the source of power for exercising jurisdiction stand extinguished.

51. Mr.Desai vehemently submitted that under the scheme of the Constitution of India, such Intra-Court, appellate power and jurisdiction can be conferred only by an appropriate legislation. He submitted that in Jamshed N. Guzdar's case, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the Parliament alone has the competence to legislate with respect to Entry 78 of the Union List to "constitute and organize" the High Court. Both the Parliament and the State Legislature can invest such a High Court with general jurisdiction by enacting an appropriate legislation referable to "administration of justice" under Entry 11A of the Concurrent List. Parliament under Entry 95 of the Union List invests the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List. The State Legislature may invest the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List. Both the Parliament and the State Legislature may, by appropriate Legislation, referable to Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, invest the High Court with jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. No such jurisdiction has been conferred on the common High Court.

52. To appreciate the submissions of Mr. Desai based on Maharashtra Act No.XVII of 1986, it is necessary to note that while the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra did enact the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 and the Government of Maharashtra also issued notification dated 27 May 1987, during pendency of the writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the said Act, the operation of the said notification was stayed. After dismissal of the said writ petition and when the matter was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court, during pendency of the appeal also, the interim order was continued. Ultimately, the proceedings culminated into dismissal of the appeal by judgment dated 11 January 2005 of the Supreme Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar's case. By the same common judgment, the Supreme Court also upheld the constitutional validity of the Bombay City Civil Court and Bombay Small Causes (Enhancement of Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Amendment) Act, 1987 but in para 85 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court provided that implementation of the Amendment Act will depend upon the report to be submitted by the High Court about adequacy of infrastructure for transfer of suits from High Court to City Civil Court of Mumbai. The matter is still pending before the Supreme Court as the affidavit of the High Court about availability of such infrastructure is pending consideration before the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 2008.

53. However, thereafter, the Government of Maharashtra has not issued a notification for implementing provisions of the said Act of 2008 even after having enquired from the High Court as to when the provisions of the said Act should be implemented.

54. In view of the above developments, it is clear that in absence of any notification of the Government of Maharashtra bringing into force the provisions of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 2008, the Bombay High Court continues to hear and decide the Letters Patent Appeals as the judgments and orders passed by the High Court during the period commencing from 1 July 1987 and ending on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, 2008 shall be deemed to have been validly passed and shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that no appeal was provided against such judgment or order of a Single Judge.

55. Apart from the above, admittedly, the Legislature of the State of Goa has not enacted any law for abolition of Letters Patent Appeals. Hence, whatever may be the consequence of the 1986 Act and the Amendment Act, 2008 enacted by the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra, those legislations cannot have any effect of abolition of Letters Patent Appeals maintainable against the judgments of the Single Judges of Bombay High Court at Panaji (Goa).

56. The entire edifice of Mr. Desai's, submissions arguing against maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal, proceeds on the premise that for an intra-Court appeal to be maintainable, the State Legislature must first pass a law conferring such a right of appeal. The premise is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co.Ltd., as already discussed in paras 24 and 25 hereinabove. At the most, it may be open to the Legislature of the State of Goa to make a legislation abolishing Letters Patent appears against judgments of Single Judges of High Court sitting at Panaji (Goa). Admittedly, the Legislature in the State of Goa has not enacted any law for abolishing Letters Patent Appeals.

57. It must be noted that his alternate argument that the Letters Patent has been abolished in the State of Maharashtra and, therefore, the appeal will not be available in Goa was not accepted even by the Division Bench in Rane's case. Further implicit from the argument is the fact that Letters Patent of Bombay High Court would be applicable and is extended to the common High Court sitting at Goa.

58. In light of the above discussion, our answers to the questions are as under:

(a) By virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of High Court of Bombay (Extension of Jurisdiction to Goa, Daman and Diu) Act, 1981, the jurisdiction of the High Court at Bombay including the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent was extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Further, by virtue of the provisions of Sections 20, 25 and 27 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987, the High Court of Bombay being the common High Court for the State of Maharashtra and the State of Goa, the same jurisdiction including the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent is exercisable by the High Court of Bombay sitting at Panaji (Goa), which is exercisable by the High Court of Bombay at its Principal seat at Bombay and its Benches at Nagpur and Aurangabad.

(b) By virtue of Section 4 of the Act of 1981, the jurisdiction which vested in the erstwhile Court of Judicial Commissioner, which was not otherwise available with the High Court of Bombay prior to coming into force of the Extension Act of 1981, was also conferred upon the permanent Bench of High Court at Bombay at Panaji (Goa).

(c) Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay sitting at Panaji (Goa) in a civil writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(d) The decision dated 22 June 2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Sanjay Z.Rane & Ors. vs. Saibai S. Dubaxi deceased through her Legal representatives, in LPA No.15 of 2000 : [2010(1) ALL MR 855], taking the contrary view does not lay down the correct law and is hereby overruled.

59. The Letters Patent Appeals shall now be placed before the Division Bench of this High Court at Panaji-Goa.

Ordered accordingly.