Criminal Application No.2987 of 2010

12th January, 2011

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. A.H.H. PONDA
Respondent Counsel: Mr. A. S. SHITOLE,Mr. AMOL PATANKAR

Cases Cited:
G. Someshwar Rao Vs. Samineni Nageshwar Rao, 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 2815 (S.C.) [Para 4,9,11]
Mrs. Kalyani Baskar Vs. Mrs. M. S. Sampoornam, 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.) [Para 4,9]
T. Nagappa Vs. Y. R. Muralidhar, 2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.) [Para 4,9,11,13]
S. Gopal Vs. D. Balachandran, 2008 DGLS (DOC) 56 [Para 15]
Rajendra Vs. Usharani, 2001 LW (Crl) 319 [Para 15]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, the learned APP appearing on behalf of the State and the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original complainant.

2. Applicant has filed this application challenging two orders passed by the learned Magistrate; one dated 21/4/2010 by which application filed by the applicant for sending disputed cheques to the handwriting expert was rejected and the other dated 15/06/2010 by which application made by the applicant for recalling the witness for cross-examination was rejected.

3. Brief facts are that a complaint was filed by Respondent No.2 for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the complaint, it is alleged that the complainant is a businessman and a Proprietor of M/s. Mannit Jewels which is a Proprietory Firm dealing in business of diamonds. It is alleged that the accused applicant herein is also a Proprietor of Prakash Corporation which is dealing in diamonds. According to the complainant, he sold cut diamonds under Invoice dated 07/06/2007 worth Rs.3,25,220/- to the accused and, according to him, in discharge of the said liability, the accused issued two cheques to the complainant drawn on Bank of Baroda, Altamount Road Branch, Mumbai; one dated 05/07/2007 for an amount of Rs.1,45,000/- and the other dated 10/07/2007 for an amount of Rs.1,75,000/-. According to the complainant, the said cheques were signed by the accused in his capacity as an authorized signatory of M/s. Prakash Corporation. The said cheques, when they were deposited, were returned unpaid by the Banker of the accused. The complainant issued legal notice dated 27/09/2007 and called upon the accused to make payment of the aforesaid amount within 15 days from the date of receipt by the accused. This notice was served. However, thereafter, since the amount was not paid, complainant filed this complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Alongwith the complaint, both the cheques were annexed so also the Bank Memo, intimation of dishonour, legal notice, postal receipt and the Invoice. List of witnesses was also given. This complaint was filed in October, 2007. Process was issued. Plea of the accused was recorded. Affidavit in lieu of evidence of the complainant was filed. The complainant was cross-examined by the counsel for the accused. Thereafter, application was filed by the applicant herein for sending both the cheques involved in the case to the State Examiner of Handwriting on 21/04/2010. Both, the applicant and complainant were heard. The said application, however, was rejected. Thereafter, another application was filed by the applicant herein dated 31/05/2010 seeking an order of recalling of the complainant for cross-examination. This second application was also rejected by the trial court.

4. Shri. A.H.H. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, submitted that he does not wish to press the application so far as it relates to challenge to the order passed by the Trial Court rejecting his application filed under section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code. So far as the application for sending the two cheques to the Handwriting Expert is concerned, he firstly submitted that there are material alterations in the cheques that have rendered the Negotiable Instruments void. He submitted that these alterations have been carried out without the consent of the applicant. He invited my attention to the provisions of sections 20 and 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He submitted that if it is proved that there are material alterations in the Negotiable Instrument, it makes the said Negotiable Instrument void. He submitted that the said cheques were given only as a security and though signatures were not disputed, it is the case of the applicant that the cheques were not filled up by him. He submitted that the learned Magistrate has erred in holding that there could be implied authority of filling up the contents of the cheque. He submitted that, however, the said implied authority had to be decided upon the totality of the facts of the case and upon the circumstances available on record which has to be established in the trial by leading evidence. It is submitted that, therefore, the accused was entitled to be given a fair opportunity for proving the said fact. In support of the said submission, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant has relied upon the Judgments of the Supreme Court in Someshwar Rao Vs. Samineni Nageshwar Rao & Anr. [2009 ALL MR (Cri) 2815 (S.C.)]; Mrs. Kalyani Baskar Vs. Mrs. M. S. Sampoornam [2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.)] and also in T. Nagappa Vs. Y. R. Muralidhar [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)]. Shri. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant was at pains to point out that in the cross-examination the complainant in para 2 has stated "It is not correct to say that except signature, all details of the cheque are not written by accused". He also submitted that the complainant had denied the suggestion of the accused that the complainant had told the accused to give two blank cheques on security basis before showing the diamonds to prospective buyers. He also submitted that the complainant had denied that he had written other details of the cheques as per his convenience. He submitted that in view of the said denial of the suggestions made by the counsel for the accused, it has become necessary to prove that the accused had not filled up the said cheques.

5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2 submitted that this application has been filed for the purpose of protracting the trial. He submitted that the accused had never raised this issue regarding signature of the cheques at any time. He submitted that after service of statutory notice upon the accused, he had not given reply to the same. He submitted that if the cheques had been issued as security and there was no liability, the accused would have immediately given reply denying his signature at that stage itself.

6. Both the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant and the Respondent No.2 have filed compilation of judgments.

7. In large number of complaints which are filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the question as to whether the application made by the accused for sending a document or cheque to handwriting expert should be allowed or not has to be decided by the learned Magistrate. On the one hand, in view of the provisions of section 243, sub-clause (2) of the Cr.P.C., the accused has a right to make an application to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing. On the other hand, discretion is vested in the Magistrate for rejecting the said application if he comes to the conclusion that it is made for the purpose of protracting the trial or for defeating the ends of justice. It will be appropriate, at this stage, therefore, before taking into consideration the rival submissions made in respect of the impugned order passed by the Magistrate, to consider the legal position and, for that purpose, it may be necessary to take a look at the relevant provisions. Section 243 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under :-

"243. Evidence for defence.- (1) The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence; and if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record.

(2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing :

Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness before entering on his defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice.

(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on an application under sub-section (2), require that the reasonable expenses incurred by the witness in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court."

The said provision clearly envisages that a fair opportunity has to be given to the accused to set up his defence and, therefore, he has a right to make an application for issuing summons for examining any witness of his choice or for production of any document or thing. However, this right is subject to permission being granted by the Magistrate. The Magistrate is also empowered under sub-clause (2) of section 243 to reject such application if he feels that it is filed for protracting the proceedings.

8. By virtue of this provision, therefore, the responsibility is cast on the Magistrate to act in a fair, judicious and yet balanced way to ensure that the accused also gets a fair opportunity of defending the case and, at the same time, also to ensure that this provision is not misused by the accused only for the purpose of protracting the trial or to defeat the ends of justice. This becomes very relevant in a complaint which is filed under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is to be disposed off in a summary manner and as is laid down under section 143(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act within six months.

9. Applications are also made for sending the document to handwriting expert. Section 45 of the Evidence Act lays down that the opinion of expert in certain circumstances is relevant. The opinion of the handwriting expert can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating circumstantial evidence. Taking into consideration the aforesaid provision under the Cr.P.C., it will have to be seen whether the ratio of the judgments on which reliance is placed by either side is applicable to the facts of the present case. The Apex Court has considered this aspect in three recent judgments viz. in G. Someshwar Rao Vs. Samineni Nageshwar Rao & Anr. [2009 ALL MR (Cri) 2815 (S.C.)]; T. Nagappa Vs. Y. R. Muralidhar [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)] and in Kalyani Baskar Vs. Mrs. M. S. Sampoornam [2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.)].

In the case of Kalyani Baskar (supra), the accused had denied the signature on the cheque and an application was made by him for sending the cheque to the handwriting expert, which was rejected and, under these circumstances, the Apex Court held that the accused cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence. After referring to provisions of section 243 of the Cr.P.C., the Apex Court observed, in the facts of the said case, that at the initial stage itself the accused had filed an application before the Magistrate under section 245 of the Cr.P.C. and had denied her signature on the cheque and its delivery to the respondent besides raising other preliminary objections in opposition to the complaint filed by the respondent under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and had requested for sending the cheque in question for the opinion of the handwriting expert after the respondent had closed her evidence and, it was, therefore observed that the Magistrate should have granted such request, unless the Magistrate had come to the conclusion that the appellant was protracting the trial. Ratio of this judgment will not apply to the facts of the present case since, in the present case, the applicant/accused has not disputed his signature on the said cheque but he is disputing the handwriting in filling up the other particulars of the said cheque.

In T. Nagappa [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)] (supra), the accused had filed an application for referring the cheque in question for examination by the Director of Forensic Science Laboratory for determining the age of his signature, contending that the respondent had obtained the signed cheque from him in the year 1999 as a security for hand loan of Rs.50,000/- which had been paid back, but instead of returning the cheque, the same had been mis-used by entering a huge amount which he did not owe to the appellant. The Trial Court as well as the High Court in the said case relied on section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and rejected the contention of the accused having regard to the provisions of section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Apex Court however observed that when one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instrument either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, he gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. The Apex Court, after referring to provisions of section 243 of the Evidence Act and the right of the accused to have a fair trial and the right to defend himself as part of his human as also fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has held that an opportunity must be given to the accused for adducing evidence in rebuttal thereof. The Apex Court also took into consideration the observation made by the Apex Court in Kalyani Baskar [2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.)] (supra) more particularly in para 12 and under the said circumstances the appeal was allowed.

Lastly, in G. Someshwar Rao [2009 ALL MR (Cri) 2815 (S.C.)] (supra), application was made by the accused to refer the pronote and the cheque to the handwriting expert. The application was dismissed. The second application, thereafter, was filed for the same reason. However, the second application was also dismissed. The Apex Court, after referring its earlier judgments in Kalyani Baskar [2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.)] (supra) and in T. Nagappa [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)] (supra) observed in para 13 that since the accused had filed two successive applications; the second application was not maintainable. It also observed that this itself goes to show that he intended to delay the disposal of the matter and he could have examined his own expert. However, after having so observed, the Apex Court, in para 14, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, granted an opportunity to the accused to examine an expert at his own costs.

10. In my view, ratio of the above three judgments would not apply to the facts of the present case since the learned Magistrate has rejected the application filed by the accused on the ground that an attempt was made to protract the trial and therefore he had exercised his discretion vested in him under section 243(2) and had given elaborate reasons why he felt that the application was made to protract the trial.

11. In the case of T. Nagappa [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)] (supra) the case of the accused was that his signature was obtained in 1999. He, therefore, did not dispute his signature but disputed time at which it was made and, therefore, felt that it should be sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory to determine the age of the ink. The facts of the said case were, therefore, quite different than the facts of the present case and, lastly, in G. Someshwar Rao [2009 ALL MR (Cri) 2815 (S.C.)] (supra), the Apex Court, after having observed that the second application made by the accused was not maintainable and also after having noted that this was made to protract the trial, granted the application in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. Ratio of both these judgments therefore will not apply to the facts of the present case.

12. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 - M/s. Maanit Jewels also relied upon various judgments of other High Courts which I do not propose to deal with since those decisions have been given on the facts of the said cases.

13. Mr. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant/accused had laid much emphasis on the observations made by the Apex Court in T. Nagappa [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 1945 (S.C.)] (supra), with reference to section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. He submitted that though a blank negotiable instrument was signed, prima facie authority vested in the holder to make or complete the said instrument. The said authority was only a prima facie authority. The Apex Court in para 6 of its judgment in the said case after reproducing section 20 has observed as under :-

"6......... By reason of the aforementioned provision only a right has been created in the holder of the cheque subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Thereby only a prima facie authority is granted, inter alia, to complete an incomplete negotiable instrument.

The provision has a rider, namely, no person other than a holder in due course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid therein."

Thereafter, in para 9, the Apex Court has further observed as under :-

"9. The learned Trial Judge as also the High Court rejected the contention of the appellant only having regard to the provisions of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The very fact that by reason thereof, only a prima facie right had been conferred upon the holder to the negotiable instrument and the same being subject to the conditions as noticed hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that the application filed by the applicant was bona fide.

The issue now almost stands concluded by a decision of this Court in Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) Vs. M. S. Sampoornam (Mrs.), (2007)2 SCC 258 : 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 820 (S.C.)] (in which one of us, L.S. Panta J., was a member) wherein it was held :

"12. Section 243(2) is clear that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under Cr.P.C. in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert to compare the disputed signature or writing with the admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent and if the document viz. the cheque on which the respondent has relied upon for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the Magistrate having declined to send the document for the examination and opinion of the hand-writing expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. "Fair trial" includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of fair trial. It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should be scrupulously followed, and the courts should be jealous in seeing that there is no breach of them."

The Apex Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the application made by the accused alleging that the complainant had misused the cheque was bonafide.

14. In my view, in the present case, the learned Magistrate has rightly held that the application filed by the applicant/accused is not bonafide and he has given cogent reason for it.

15. The Madras High Court in S. Gopal Vs. D. Balachandran [2008 DGLS (DOC) 56] has observed that provisions contained in section 20 applies only to a stamped instrument such as pronote and bills of exchange and it has no application to the blank cheque issued after signing by a drawer. In para 7 of its Judgment in the said case, the Madras High Court has observed as under :-

"7. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads as follows :

"Inchoate stamped instruments.- Where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in India, and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. The person so signing shall be liable upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the same, to any holder in due course for such amount provided that no person other than a holder in due course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid thereunder."

A bare reading of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would go to show that it would apply to only a stamped instrument, viz. pronote and bill of exchange and not to the cheques. As per section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the holder in due course has every authority to complete the blank pronote and bill of exchange delivered by him after properly signing therein by the maker of the instrument. But, Section 20 will have no application to the blank cheques issued after signing by the drawer."

Thereafter, the Madras High Court referred to its another Judgment in Rajendra Vs. Usharani [2001 LW (Crl) 319] and accordingly observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows :-

"8. This Court in Rajendra Vs. Usharani, 2001 LW (Crl) 319, has observed that no law prescribes that in case of any negotiable instrument, the entire body of the instrument shall be written only by the marker or drawer of the instrument. Once the execution is admitted, it shall be taken that the cheque was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of the liability even in a case where the cheque was filled up by some other person."

"9. It is to be noted that there is no reference to Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the aforesaid authority. A general proposition has been made to the effect that there is a presumption, in case a signed cheque is delivered to the payee, that the cheque so issued by the drawer in favour of the payee is only towards the discharge of his subsisting liability."

Finally, the Madras High Court in the said judgment in S. Gopal [2008 DGLS (DOC) 56] (supra) has observed in para 11 has under :-

"11. Even in case of a cheque, as there is no clear provision in the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the light of the above discussion, the Court finds that if a drawer of a cheque gives authority to the payee or holder in due course or a stranger for that matter to fill up the cheque signed by him, such an instrument also is valid in the eye of law. There is no bar for the drawer of a cheque to give authority to a third person to fill up the cheque signed by him for the purpose of negotiating the same."

16. Taking into consideration the aforesaid judgments, therefore, if an application is made for sending the document to the Handwriting Expert particularly in a complaint which is filed under section 138, the Magistrate has to consider the said application and taking into consideration the facts of each case decide as to whether it is a fit case for sending the said document to the Handwriting Expert. Proceedings under section 138 are of a summary nature and the Act itself contemplates that the said trial should be over within a period of six months. There is a tendency on the part of the accused to protract the trial as much as possible. On the one hand, it is true that accused has a right to rebut the presumption which is raised under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and, for that purpose, a fair opportunity has to be given to him. On the other hand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ensure that by filing frivolous application, accused does not protract the trial. So far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned and particularly in the City of Mumbai there are about 6 lakhs cases pending in the Courts of Magistrates for the offences punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Handwriting Experts which are available in the City of Mumbai are very few. It is a common knowledge therefore that, at times, it takes couple of years for Handwriting Expert to give his opinion. Under these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate has to consider whether the application filed by the accused needs to be granted or not, taking into consideration the genuineness of the application and also after taking into consideration individual facts of the case. Merely because the accused has a right of being given fair opportunity, it cannot be said that in each and every case, whenever applications are filed for sending the document to Handwriting Expert, the same should be allowed.

17. In the present case, however, in my view, the learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the application filed by the accused. There is no dispute regarding the signature on the said cheques. The complainant has denied the suggestion that he had filled in the details of the cheques. Under these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate was justified in coming to the conclusion that it was not necessary to send the cheques to the Handwriting Expert since there were no material alterations in the form of eraser or over writings or corrections. If it is a defence of the accused that blank cheque was given as a security, whether any authority was given to the complainant to fill in the contents will have to be decided after evidence is led by both parties and, for that purpose, it is not necessary to send it to the Handwriting Expert. Secondly, this application has been filed at a belated stage. No reply was given to the statutory notice alleging that contents were not filled up by the accused. The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that only after suggestions made by the accused were denied by the complainant, it became necessary to file an application for sending the cheques to Handwriting Expert, cannot be accepted. In my view, it is clear from the facts and circumstances of the case that the application is only made to protract the trial. I am informed that the trial is on the verge of completion and the written arguments are also submitted, as a result interim order which was passed earlier by this Court was vacated on 19/11/2010.

18. Criminal Application is therefore dismissed.

Application dismissed.