Appeal From Order (St) No. 19392 of 2013,Civil Application (St) No. 20457 of 2013

28th August, 2013

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. D.S. Parikh,Mr. P.M. Rustom Khan
Respondent Counsel: Mr. K.D. Jha

Cases Cited:
Ashok Chintaman Juker & Ors. Vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri & Anr., 2001(3) ALL MR 509 (S.C.)=AIR 2001 SC 2251 [Para 17]
Vasant Pratap Pandit Vs. Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis, 1994 Mh. L.J. 1450 [Para 26]
Mrs. Mary Dowling Vs. Mrs. Margaret Merwan, AIR 1991 Bombay 389 [Para 33]
Kanji Manji Vs. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 468 [Para 36]
Mohinder Kaur Kochar Vs. Mayfair Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2012(6) ALL MR 862 =AIR 2013 Bom 57 [Para 36]
Vardhman Developers Vs. Thailambal Co-Op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Ors., Notice of Motion No.3274/2010, Suit No.2725/2010, Dt.7/3/2011 [Para 36]
Laxmipat Singhania Vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd., AIR (38) 1951 Bombay 205 [Para 38]
Chandradhoja Sahoo Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 2013 SC 367 [Para 44]
Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. Vs. Nirmala Devi & Ors., 2011(4) ALL MR 904 (S.C.)=Civil Appeal Nos. 4912-4913/2011 [Para 45]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Rule. Made returnable forthwith.

The plaintiffs have challenged the order of return of plaint for presentation to the Small Causes Court, Mumbai under Order 7 Rule 10 of the CPC passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai on 4th April, 2013.

2. The plaintiffs sued for recovery of occupation of the plaintiffs in the suit premises for injunction, against the entry of the defendants in the suit premises, and preventing the plaintiffs' entry thereto and for the ancillary relief of damages until possession was delivered. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the suit is on trespass. The plaintiffs sued on 31st May, 1989 upon trespass of defendant Nos. 1,2 and 3 in the suit premises after having sued only the original defendant No.4 (defendant No.4) in an earlier suit filed in the Bombay City Civil Court on 8th July, 1988 being Suit No.5460 of 1988.

3. The defendants claimed that the defendant No.4 was the plaintiffs' tenant, the suit is between the landlord and tenant and hence the Civil Court's inherent jurisdiction is barred.

4. In the extensive pleadings between the parties various other issues were also raised. The learned Judge raised six and additional five issues. The parties led evidence on all the issues. Their Advocates argued upon all the issues. The learned Judge disposed of the suit on two issues being issue Nos. 1 and additional issue No.5 taken together. Having observed that the Court has no jurisdiction and also that the original defendant No.4 was a beneficiary of the deceased tenant and entitled to the suit premises the learned Judge returned the plaint for presentation to proper Court.

5. Return of a plaint for presentation to proper Court under Order 7 Rule 10 of the CPC though allowed at any stage of the suit may not be when the Court, comes to the conclusion, as it has done in this case, that the plaintiffs' case that the defendants are trespassers is seen to be incorrect. The Court can proceed under that provision only if the Court finds that the plaintiff's case on the plaint itself shows lack of its jurisdiction, inherent, pecuniary or territorial. Then the Court may return the plaint for presentation in the Court having jurisdiction. In this case the Court has held, upon the evidence led by the parties, that the plaintiffs' case of trespass is false. It has rejected such a case. It has observed that the defendants are protected tenants of the plaintiffs whilst answering the aforesaid issues.

6. It would, therefore, require this Court to go through the pleadings between the parties, and the evidence led by the parties, both oral and documentary, in respect of issue No.1 and the additional issue No.5 to determine whether or not those issues has been correctly answered to hold the lack of the Court's inherent jurisdiction.

7. It may be mentioned that if this Court confirms the answers to the aforesaid issues given by the Court, the suit would have to stand dismissed. Yet judgment on all the other issues would have to be passed. If this Court holds otherwise, to conclude that the aforesaid issues are not correctly answered and would uphold the inherent jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the remainder of the issues would have to be answered to pass the final judgment.

8. Mr. Parikh on behalf of the appellants drew the Court's attention to the provision contained in Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC with regard to the judgment on all the issues. Order 14 Rule 2 runs thus:

"ORDER XIV

2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues. -

(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.

(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to -

(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue".

9. Rule 2(1) is subject to Rule 2(2). Rule 2(2) deals with issues of law as well as fact. Mr. Parikh argued, and rightly, that only if the issue of law relating to the jurisdiction or the bar created by any other law was answered, it would dispose of the suit. In this case admittedly the issue of jurisdiction which has been raised and decided is a mixed question of law and fact. Counsel on behalf of both the parties has taken the Court through the facts and the law in that behalf. Consequently Rule 2(2) would enjoin the Court to pronounce judgment on all the issues under Rule 2(1) of Order 14.

10. In any event the last part of the rule shows the postponement of the settlement of the other issues until the issue relating to the jurisdiction and the bar is decided which has also not been done in this case; the learned Judge has framed and settled 5+6=11 issues. Consequently the above appeal from order would require this Court to determine the issues relating to the jurisdiction tried and decided by the Court being issue No.1 and additional issue No.5, and pass appropriate directions.

11. It has been the contention of the defendants that defendant No.4 was a tenant of the plaintiffs under Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and consequently the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred. This contention has been upheld. The appeal would require its consideration.

12. The plaint shows that the plaintiffs are owners, which is undisputed. It shows that the defendants are the trespassers in the suit property which is one large room admeasuring 1134 sq. ft. on the first floor of the Eastern side of Regal Theater building (the suit premises). The plaintiffs have set out the circumstances under which one Hector Mac Donald used the suit premises as a dancing school. He died on 21st December 1987. Defendant No.4 for the first time wrote to the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs had given him premises to run the dancing classes till 31st December 1987. The plaintiffs have set out how defendant No.4 claimed to be a partner of Hector Mac Donald under a partnership deed. The defendant No.4 inducted defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the suit premises under another partnership deed. The plaintiffs consequently claimed that they have continued in wrongful and illegal occupation of the suit premises owned by the plaintiffs and hence the suit for the above injunctions, prohibitory and directory and for damages.

13. The written statement of the defendants is filed by the defendant No.1 and on behalf of defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 though it is shown to be for defendant No. 4 also. The written statement shows facts constituting the history of the tenancy of the suit premises created by the plaintiffs since 1936 in favour of one Ethel and Hector Mac Donald shown as Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald. It would be proper to set out those facts, serially:

1. Ethel and one William Gilbert were married.

2. Defendant No.4 was born to them in May, 1919.

3. Ethel divorced William and married Hector Mac Donald. They were dancers.

4. Defendant No.4 was residing with Ethel and Hector Mac Donald.

5. In 1936 the plaintiffs constructed Regal Theater building and tenanted the suit premises to "Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald". The letter creating the tenancy annexed to the written statement is dated 11th January, 1936. One of its terms and conditions was that the premises will be used for "your dancing school only". The other term was that the room shall not be used for residential or any other purposes.

6. Ethel and Hector Mac Donald were residing in the suit premises and running the school of dancing since 1935.

7. The tenancy was to commence from 15th January, 1936.

8. The defendant No.4 lived in New Delhi between 1965 to 1975 when he went to Australia.

9. Hector Mac Donald used to write letters to defendant No.4 at Delhi.

10. Ethel expired in August, 1975.

11. Joint tenancy continued until October, 1975.

12. The plaintiffs issued rent receipts in favour of Hector Mac Donald from October, 1975.

13. The dancing school continued under license issued by the Commissioner of Police.

14. The defendant No.4 was living in Australia at the time of the death of his mother, Ethel.

15. Hector Mac Donald wrote a letter on 23rd July, 1977 to defendant No.4 in Australia.

16. In 1986 Hector Mac Donald called defendant No.4 to Bombay.

17. Hector Mac Donald entered into a partnership deed with defendant No.4 on 28th September, 1986.

18. The Controller of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a letter dated 9th January, 1987 granting approval to the partnership between Hector Mac Donald and defendant No.4.

19. Hector Mac Donald expired on 21st December, 1987/ 15th February, 1988 leaving behind a will dated 12th November, 1987, left unprobated.

20. The defendant No.4 entered into another partnership deed with defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as he wanted assistance in the business on 1st July, 1988 and obtained RBI permission on 21st July, 1988.

21. Defendant No.4 has since been absent from the suit premises as well as the suit.

14. Several of the aforesaid statements of the defendants in their written statements are accepted by the plaintiffs. Some of these statements are disputed and which dispute must be considered. It is upon the case made out by the defendants that the plaint has been returned for presenting in proper Court. The above statements require to be analyzed.

15. The kind of tenancy in favour of Mr & Mrs. Mac Donald would have to be first considered from the evidence of tenancy. The initial rent receipt was made out in the name of "Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald". They both were tenants. The tenancy was created at one time. It would have to be seen whether it is joint tenancy or co-tenancy. Black's Law Dictionary Ninth Edition at page 1603 defines joint tenancy thus:

"Joint tenancy. A tenancy with two or more coowners who take identical interests simultaneously by the same instrument and with the same right of possession. A joint tenancy differs from a tenancy in common because each joint tenant has a right of survivorship to the other's share".

"The rules for creation of a joint tenancy are these: The joint tenants must get their interests at the same time. They must become entitled to possession at the same time. The interests must be physically undivided interests, and each undivided interest must be an equal fraction of the whole - e.g., a onethird undivided interest to each of three joint tenants. The joint tenants must get their interests by the same instrument - e.g., the same deed or will. The joint tenants must get the same kinds of estates - e.g., in fee simple, for life, and so on." Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, 'Preface to Estates in Land and Future interests 55(2d ed.1984)".

The suit tenancy is one such. It was created on a single day. Both Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald got identical interests under the same tenancy agreement, upon the same tenancy terms giving them the same right of possession - to use the premises "for your dancing school only" They, therefore, had undivided equal interest in the suit premises by the same instrument.

Tenancy in common is also defined in Black's Law Dictionary Eighth Edition at page 1506 thus:

"Tenancy in common: A tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the whole property but no right of survivorship - also termed common tenancy; estate in common".

The tenancy in favour of Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald under a single document on a given date was not under separate and distinct title and consequently was not a tenancy in common.

16. Joint tenancy results in survivorship upon the death of one of the tenants. Each joint tenant has a right of survivorship to the others' share as defined hereinbefore. Consequently upon the death of one of the tenants the other would have the right of tenancy survived to him/her.

This is neatly explained in Sanjiva Row's Transfer of Property Act under Section 44 at page 396 which is relied upon by the appellants thus:

"The death of one joint tenant creates no vacancy in possession, only the interest of the deceased is extinguished, and the survivors become possessed of the whole".

17. In the Judgment in the case of Ashok Chintaman Juker & Ors Vs. Kishore Pandurang Mantri & Anr., AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2251 : [2001(3) ALL MR 509 (S.C.)], the members of the family of the original tenant are observed to have succeeded to the tenancy in Paragraph 16 thereof. In that case on the death of the original tenant the rent bills were issued in the name of the elder son and on his death in the name of his widow without division of premises. It was held the tenant impleaded in the suit by the landlord who was one of the heirs represented all the tenants and that was on the analogy that all of them succeeded to the tenancy together as joint tenants. Hence upon the death of one joint tenant it would survive to the other who would become the sole tenant. Upon death of Mrs. Mac Donald it survived to Mr. Mac Donald.

18. Upon such survivorship the tenancy would not devolve upon the heir of the deceased living with the deceased at the time of the death of the deceased in the tenanted premises under Section 5(11)( c) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) which was in force at the relevant time. That statutory provision would come into effect only at the demise of the last joint tenant viz. the survivor. Mrs. Mac Donald died in 1975 when the aforesaid provision would not have been applied. Indeed the joint tenancy is stated to have continued up to October, 1975 after which the plaintiffs issued rent receipts in favour of Hector Mac Donald until his death. Hence not only was the tenancy joint but the joint tenancy is accepted by all the parties. It is upon the death of Hector Mac Donald as the sole tenant that the statutory provisions of 5(11)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, which governed at the relevant time, would apply. Hence upon the death of Mrs. Mac Donald as the first of the joint tenants, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 would not apply. The tenancy would simplicitor survive to the joint tenant Mr. Hector Mac Donald. Her heirs living with her at the time of her death or carrying on business with her at the time of her death would not become the statutory tenants under Section 5(11)(c)(i) or 5(11)(c)(ii) respectively. Of course, there was no heir of Mrs. Mac Donald living with her at the time of her death or even carrying on business with her at the time of death in the suit premises. That is not even been the defendants' case. Her only heir, defendant No.4, was admittedly living in Australia at the relevant time as shall also be seen presently.

19. This joint tenancy was subject to terms and conditions. The terms and conditions are in the letter creating the joint tenancy annexed to the written statement dated 11th January, 1936. One of the terms and conditions being condition No.2 is that the user of the tenanted room is for "your dancing school only". The other condition being condition No.3 is that under no circumstances the room shall be used for residential or any other purpose. Hence the residential user is barred. The residential user by either of the joint tenants is not at all shown though claimed. No ration card of Ethel or Hector Mac Donald is produced. No other evidence showing residence is produced. In fact the evidence which is produced is only of commercial premises used as dancing school. This is shown by the performance license issued and extended from time to time by the Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay, the permission to use loudspeakers by the Superintendent of Police ADivision Bombay, the premises license issued by the Municipal Corporation showing the premises as school premises in Regal building and describing it as a place of public amusement etc. Even Hector Mac Donald has shown this premises in his income tax returns as his commercial premises described as school of dancing and has been issued notice of demand under Section 156 of the Income Tax 1961 as also an assessment order at the suit address. All documents relied upon by the defendants themselves prove that the tenanted premises were used for commercial purpose of dancing school and not for the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Mac Donald.

20. The defendants have relied upon a letter dated 23rd July, 1977 written by Hector Mac Donald to defendant No.4 which they contend is the letter calling him to India from Australia after the death of his mother. A copy of the letter is also annexed to the written statement. It makes interesting reading. A part of it may be extracted thus:

"Am glad to hear that you are doing well and earning good money. When do you intend returning. Coral must be finding running the house rather onerous, especially when she has the walle right foot in plaster. I told her that it is better for your to hang on in Australia, and amase as much money as you can, so that when you return you will have sufficient capital to launch out afresh, or on the other hand shut up shop here and have them all join you.

The work on your Mum's grave is completed.............."

The letter would show that then Mrs. Mac Donald had expired. Her grave was built. Mr. Mac Donald was living alone in Mumbai. The defendant No.4 was living with his family in Australia. He was doing well. He had not shown his intention to return to India. Mr. Mac Donald advised him to amass as much money as he could so that he can start business when he returned to India. The letter would show clearly that defendant No.4 was not living with the deceased Mrs. Mac Donald as her family member, being her son with her in the suit premises at the time of her death even if Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald resided in the suit premises.

21. Mr. Jha on behalf of the defendants drew the Court's attention to a copy of the partnership deed stated to have been entered into by Hector Mac Donald with defendant No.4 on 28th September, 1986 which has not been proved by any of the signatories of the document in evidence. The defendant No.1 who led evidence on behalf of the defendants has deposed about the identification of the signature of defendant No.4 "as he has signed another document in their presence" in para 22 of his affidavit of evidence. This partnership deed is relied upon along with a letter of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) dated 7th January, 1987 which, being a document of a public authority, has been accepted by the plaintiff. Mr. Jha relied upon the letter to show that the noobjection of RBI was obtained for defendant No.4 to be carrying on business with Hector Mac Donald in partnership, though he was a nonresident Indian then. Mr. Parikh rightly drew the Court's attention to the purport and object of the letter; it was because the defendant No.4 was not an Indian resident and because he was a resident foreign national of Indian origin that he required RBI permission to enter into a partnership. The letter granted the permission making it clear that he was then resident abroad. At best, therefore, the letter may show some partnership between Hector Mac Donald and defendant No.4. He may be deriving profit from the business, but the letter shows neither any residence nor actual conducting of business by the defendant No.4. In fact this letter conclusively proves that defendant No.4 never lived or carried on business in the suit premises at least until September, 1986.

22. On the contrary, the intrinsic evidence in this case points to the poignant fact of even Hector Mac Donald not having lived in the suit premises and not having carried on business in the suit premises until his death. His death certificate, a public document and carrying a presumption of its correctness, shows the place of his death to be "Ashadan", an old age home where he apparently lived his last days, he having no one to care for him. Consequently none, not even his stepson, could claim to be a family member eligible to inherit his tenancy right.

23. The defendants claim that the defendant No.4 resided with Hector Mac Donald during his life time. This case is made out in para 9 F of the written statement. A further case in para 25 of the affidavit of evidence of defendant No.1 is that Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald resided in the suit premises together since 1935, a case left wholly unsubstantiated by any circumstantial or corroborative evidence. The long and continued residence from 1935 to 1975 when Mrs. Mac Donald expired and thereafter until 1987 when Hector Mac Donald expired would merit and expect public documents to evidence this fact, but which has not been shown by the defendants.

24. Paragraph 29 of the oral evidence of defendant No.1 would show defendant No.4 to be residing in Australia and visiting his mother and stepfather "at times". Thus "whenever" he was in Bombay he would be residing with Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald in the suit premises. That however would not confer upon him the entitlement of the statutory tenancy under Section 5(11)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 as a family member of the tenant "living" with the tenant at the time of the death of the tenant in the tenanted premises. The evidence negates that case.

25. Even with regard to the conduct of the business by defendant No.4, the partnership deed notwithstanding, the oral evidence of defendant No.1 in para 7 of his cross examination, to which my attention has been drawn by Mr. Parikh, specifies that from 1982 to 1986 during the period that he knew defendant No.4 he was not conducting dancing classes in the suit premises.

26. The defendants claim that defendant No.4 inherited the tenancy rights of the suit premises under a certain will of Hector Mac Donald which has not been probated and which cannot be looked into. Even if it were, upon the ruling in the case of Vasant Pratap Pandit Vs. Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis 1994 Mh. L.J. 1450 a legatee is held not to be an heir as contemplated under Section 5(11)(c) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947.

The analysis of Section 5(11)(c)(i) in paras 14 & 15 of the judgment shows the protection given to members of the family residing with the tenant at the time of the death of the tenant as the tenancy would be taken by the tenant not only for his benefit but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him. Such members of the family of the tenant would be protected under the avowed object of the legislation whether or not those family members were heirs in the strict sense. The Court, therefore, held that such heirs are given priority to be treated as tenants and it is only when such members of the family are not there that the heirs would be entitled to be treated as tenants. It is observed in para 14 of the judgment that a bequest under a Will which would require the court to honour the wishes of the deceased tenant as a Testator would render nugatory a provision of the section requiring the Court to decide the tenant amongst the heirs in case of default of agreement between the heirs themselves.

Consequently it is held in para 14 of the judgment that the legislature had not intended to confer the statutory tenancy upon a testamentary heir. Even the reasoning for this ultimate conclusion is given in the said para thus:

"Otherwise the right of the landlord to recover possession will stand excluded even though the original party (the tenant) with whom the landlord had contracted is dead".

It is thereafter observed:

"Besides, a statutory tenancy is personal to the tenant".

The further analysis of the reasoning in para 15 of the judgment shows why a legatee under a Will of a tenant cannot claim as an heir. It is observed that if an "heir is to be interpreted to include a legatee even a stranger may have to be inducted as a tenant for there is no embargo upon a stranger being a legatee".

The will of Hector Mac Donald would, therefore, go only thus far and no further qua the tenancy.

27. Mr. Parikh rightly drew the Court's attention to the difference between Section 5(11)(c)(i) and 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act. Whereas the former required the family of the tenant living with the tenant at the time of the death of the tenant, the letter required a family member of a tenant carrying on business with the tenant at the time of the death of the tenant. Consequently paragraph 7 of the cross examination of defendant No.1 assumes importance in that he has admitted that defendant No.4 was not conducting dancing classes in the suit premises. This would be during the lifetime of Hector Mac Donald as his later cross examination would show that he did not know whether after the death of Hector Mac Donald defendant No.4 conducted dancing classes in the suit premises. That, of course, would not matter because only the family member of the tenant carrying on business with the tenant at the time of the death of the tenant (i.e during the life time of the tenant and before his death) would be eligible to continue the statutory tenancy. The defendant No.4 has been ineligible upon the two statements of defendant No.1 in para 7 of the cross examination.

28. It is upon such pleadings together with the oral and documentary evidence of the parties that the issue of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court was pressed and decided. Neither the averments of the plaintiff in the plaint nor even the defendants in the written statement along with their documents show the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of tenancy or the entitlement of tenancy of defendant No.4 which came to be decided under issue No.1 and the additional issue No.5 by the learned Judge in the impugned order.

29. The additional issue No.5 decided by the learned Judge to return the plaint under the impugned order would thus have to be considered in this appeal.

30. Defendant No.4 lived in Australia. He applied for and obtained RBI permission to form a partnership concern as a resident foreign national of Indian origin in 1987. He did not carry on business of dancing school with Hector Mac Donald during the life time of Hector Mac Donald. He lived with Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald only "whenever" he was in India. He was not even a family member of Hector Mac Donald, he being a stepson, being the son of Mrs. Mac Donald through her previous marriage.

31. Sections 24 and 25 in Part IV of the Chapter on Consanguinity in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (ISA) applicable to Hector Mac Donald as also defendant No.4 shows what is kindred and lineal consanguinity thus:

Under Section 24 kindred or consanguinity is the connection or relation of the persons from the same stock or common ancestors.

Under Section 25 consanguinity is that which subsists between two persons one of whom is descended in a direct line from the other as his father, grandfather and great grandfather etc.

32. Similarly persons held related for the purpose of succession under Section 27(b) are those related to the person deceased by the full blood as also by half blood. The relationship by blood as also the lineal relationship is the basis of heirship. There is no blood relationship between Hector Mac Donald and defendant No.4. Defendant No.4 would not be considered for heirship to the estate, if any, of Hector Mac Donald to whom he is neither a lineal descendant nor related by blood.

33. In the case of Mrs. Mary Dowling Vs. Mrs. Margaret Merwan AIR 1991 Bombay 389 it has been held that part IV of the ISA for the purpose of succession, must be a relationship by blood. It may be full blood or half blood under Section 27(b) of the ISA. However, Section 27 also recognizes the relationship through a common ancestor or through a common stock only. Section 27 would also govern part V of the Act. Consequently a child under Section 37 of the Act would require to be a child by half blood or full blood since Section 27(b) contemplates "a relationship with the deceased". It is, therefore, held that under that section the relationship of full blood or half blood must be with the deceased.

The judgment further illustrates the relationship of half and full blood and concludes that if a question of inheritance of the estate of the deceased would be considered, a stepdaughter who was the daughter of the wife of the deceased through another person would not be related by blood at all. Consequently such a child is held not to be an heir entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased.

Upon this analogy even the tenancy of the deceased cannot be inherited by such heir. Defendant No.4 was at best in such relationship and consequently not an heir, the will of Hector Mac Donald notwithstanding.

34. Mr. Parikh drew the attention of the Court to the total absence of any case of adoption of defendant No.4 by Hector Mac Donald during his life time in the written statement and a bare reference thereto only in paragraph 9 of the affidavit of evidence of defendant No.1, he having learnt that defendant No.4 was "accepted" as a child of Mr. & Mrs. Mac Donald, which statements remains to be hearsay and accordingly inadmissible in evidence. Aside from there being no case of adoption and no issue in that behalf raised in the suit upon the pleadings of the parties, no legal adoption is even contemplated under the personal law by which Hector Mac Donald or defendant No.4 were governed, they being Christians.

35. The learned Judge in the impugned order considered each of the private documents of the defendants left unproved and the oral evidence which was hearsay. The learned Judge is seen to have erred upon the appreciation of facts as also the law throughout. Having taken up issue No.1 and additional issue No.5 together for determination to decide the jurisdiction of the Court, he has set out the case of the defendants and how the suit premises was let out for commercial purpose in which defendant No.4 was residing together with the original tenants and how he inherited the tenancy rights. Having considered how the tenancy was created and how it continued, the learned Judge considered the inheritance of the tenancy rights under Section 7(15) (d) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999. The learned Judge concluded that under the aforesaid subsection any member of the tenants' family could inherit the tenancy rights or become tenant after the demise of the original tenant and rubbished the argument of Counsel on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant No.4 as a stepson could not inherit the tenancy rights as an argument without substance. He concluded that the stepson of a tenant was a member of the tenant's family and would inherit the tenancy right.

36. It is seen that the conclusion of the learned Judge in considering the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as also the status of the defendant No.4 as the beneficiary and thus having legal entitlement to the tenancy is seen to be incorrect.

An analogy can be drawn from the case of Kanji Manji Vs. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 468. A monthly lease of land was made by BPT to five lessees. BPT sued to recover the land from the lessees in the Bombay City Civil Court which suit came to be decreed. The suit was for eviction from BPT land only. Such land was not included in the definition of premises U/s.5(8) of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Similarly, U/s.4 A land belonging to BPT as local authority was exempt. Hence Civil Courts jurisdiction was held not barred.

An analogy can also be drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Mohinder Kaur Kochar Vs. Mayfair Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2013 Bom 57 : [2012(6) ALL MR 862] and Vardhman Developers Vs. Thailambal Co-Op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. & Ors. in Notice of Motion No.3274 of 2010 in Suit No.2725 of 2010 dated 7th March, 2011 in which it has been that the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred by the provisions contained in Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960 in case of redevelopment of the Society building in a suit for claiming rights upon redevelopment as redevelopment is not a business of the society.

37. The Civil Court's inherent jurisdiction in the suit as filed by the plaintiff is not barred. The Civil Court must, therefore, try the suit. If however the plaintiff's contention is seen to be incorrect on merits, the suit would have to be dismissed, but the plaint cannot be returned to any other Court for filing as no other Court is the proper Court. Mr. Parikh rightly contended that the Small Causes Court as the Rent Court would not have the jurisdiction to grant the various injunctions sought to the plaintiffs upon the case made out by the plaintiff. Hence the plaintiffs must stand or fall upon the facts of its case in the Civil Court.

38. To that extent the plaintiff has relied upon the case of Laxmipat Singhania Vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd AIR (38) 1951 Bombay 205 which was a case of a 99 year lease agreement allowing construction of a building on the land of the Lessor. The Court considered the title to the land and the title to the building in English and Indian law and the Lessee's rights thereto even after the expiration of the lease. Having concluded that the suit as filed by the Lessor fell within the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 it held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and consequently dismissed the suit.

39. At the fag end of the arguments the appellants/plaintiffs have shown to this Court the order of Justice Nirgude, as he then was, in the suit between the parties dated 4th November, 1993 observing that upon the facts of the case it can easily be said that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The observation was made upon the application of the plaintiff to lead oral evidence for determination of the issue of jurisdiction raised by the defendant. The brief statement of facts in para 1 of the order set out by the Court shows the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and holds that the Civil Court had jurisdiction. Alas, the parties raised the issue again and had it determined by the learned Judge. The Advocates of the parties, who are officers of the Court, were enjoined to know, remember and bring to the notice of the Court applications that have transpired. Once the issue of jurisdiction is decided upon the averments in the plaint, as it should be, it was unnecessary to get the issue reframed for a redecision. It is now again seen upon the evidence led by both the parties upon all the issues and upon the averments in the pleadings, including the averments in the written statement that the Civil Courts' jurisdiction is not barred.

40. Had the learned Judge been right in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, the ultimate result of this Appeal would have been only the correction of the operative part of the order by dismissing the suit instead of returning the plaint for presentation to the Small Causes Court as the proper Court. Since it is seen that upon the facts of the case the conclusion of the learned Judge with regard to the Civil Court's inherent jurisdiction is incorrect and the Civil Courts' jurisdiction is not barred and it is also seen that the original defendant No.4 was not entitled to the tenancy of Hector Mac Donald as a beneficiary under Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 or Section 15(7) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the impugned judgment and order relating to the bar of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court has to be and is set aside.

41. However it is seen that the suit is for recovery of possession of a large room admeasuring 1134 sq. ft in area initially tenanted as a commercial premises in Regal Theater building from the defendants as trespassers, the plaintiffs' prayer being for recovery of occupation notwithstanding. Besides the plaintiffs have also sued for the relief of damages until possession was delivered.

The suit is valued at Rs.29,529/- for jurisdiction and court fees being 100 times the monthly rent paid by Hector Mac Donald. The valuation of the suit premises on the date of the suit had to be upon the market value of the suit property if the plaintiffs claim as owners for recovery of possession or occupation of a suit premises from a trespasser. The method of valuation upon the rent paid by a previous tenant long prior to the filing of the suit is wholly incorrect as against trespassers.

42. Further order and directions are, therefore, required to be passed under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC as an order which ought to have been passed by the trial Court upon the decision on issue No.1 and the additional issue No.5 considered in the impugned judgment and even otherwise upon seeing the plaint.

43. The other issues would also require to be tried which the learned Judge has not tried in view of holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The issue of jurisdiction was a mixed question of law. Under Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC only an issue of law could have been tried first postponing the settlement of other issues until after that issue was determined. Mr. Parikh contended that since it was not a question of law only but a mixed question of law and fact, it could not have been tried first leaving the other issues undetermined.

44. Though order 15 Rule 3 contains a salutary provision that upon the satisfaction of the Court that no further arguments or evidence of the parties need be adduced upon the issues which were tried as may be sufficient for the decision of the suit and the Court may determine only such of the issues as are sufficient for its decision, and though under Order 20 Rule 5 of the CPC the Court is required to state its findings and decision on each issue unless the finding upon any one or more issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit, Mr. Parikh relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandradhoja Sahoo Vs. State of Orissa AIR 2013 SC 367 where in case of the trial being over, the mandate of the Supreme Court laid down in paragraph 19 is that:

"Courts should decide the lis before it on all issues as may be raised by the parties though in its comprehension the same can be decided on a single or any given issue without going into the other questions raised or that may have arisen".

This mandate is upon the premise that

"such a course of action is necessary to enable the next court in the hierarchy to bring the proceeding before it to a full and complete conclusion instead of causing a remand of the matter for a decision on the issue(s) that may have been left undetermined".

45. Even in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. Vs. Nirmala Devi & Ors in Civil Appeal Nos. 4912-4913 of 2011, [2011(4) ALL MR 904 (S.C.)] the same observation is made by the Supreme Court in a similar situation under Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC. The Supreme Court has observed in para 28 of the judgment about the discretion of the Court in trying the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, but in view of the fact the entire evidence was led and the matter was at the final stage of arguments, it held that treating any issue as the preliminary issue was against the spirit of Order 20 Rule 5 and Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC.

46. Even in this case the same situation has arisen. Upon the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led, both oral and documentary (of course, upon considering the admissibility of such oral and documentary evidence) the learned Judge is now be required to determine the other issues in the suit.

47. Hence the following order:

1. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay dated 4th April, 2013 is set aside.

2. Issue No.1 and additional issue No.5 are answered in the negative. It is declared that the Civil Court's inherent jurisdiction to try the suit is not barred. It is also declared that the defendant No.4 is not legally entitled to the tenancy of Hector Mac Donald in respect of the suit premises as beneficiary under Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947.

3. The suit is remanded to the Bombay City Civil Court for determination of the other issues in the suit upon the evidence already led and the arguments advanced.

4. The suit is not adequately and appropriately valued. It is thus undervalued. The plaintiffs shall value the suit premises at the market value of the suit premises prevailing on the date of the suit within two weeks from today, failing which the plaint shall stand rejected.

5. Since evidence has been led oral as well as written arguments advanced and tendered, the same learned Judge shall pass the final judgment determining the remaining issues as also upon considering the adequacy of the valuation to be made by the plaintiffs. He is requested to do so expeditiously.

6. Ad-interim relief granted to the plaintiffs and continued until now shall continue pending the disposal of the suit.

7. The appeal is accordingly allowed and rule is granted to the above extent.

Ordered accordingly.