Second Appeal No. 423 of 2011,Civil Application No. 10105 of 2011

14th March, 2012

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. S.S. THOMBRE
Respondent Counsel: Mr. V.I. THOLE

Cases Cited:
Narayan S. Bite & others Vs. Mahadeo Shripati Pise & others, 2001 (3) Bom.C.R. 262 [Para 2]
Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami and Anr, AIR 2011 SC 2344 [Para 2]
Balkrishan Vs. Satyaprakash and others, AIR 2001 SC 700 [Para 2]
C. Natarajan Vs. Ashim Bai and Anr, 2007 ALL SCR 2663 =AIR 2008 SC 363 [Para 2]
Mool Chand Bakhru and another Vs. Rohan and others, AIR 2002 SC 812 [Para 2]
Kalika Prasad and another Vs. Chhatrapal Singh (dead) by L.Rs, AIR 1997 SC 1699 [Para 2]
S. Kaladevi Vs. V.R. Somasundaram & Ors., 2010(3) ALL MR 477 (S.C.) =AIR 2010 SC 1654 [Para 3]
Tej Narain & Anr. Vs. Shanti Swaroop Bohre & Anr., 2005(5) ALL MR 61 (S.C.) =AIR 2004 SC 5113 [Para 3]
Janki Vishdeo Bhojwani Vs. Indusind Bank Ltd., 2004(5) ALL MR 396 (S.C.) =AIR 2005 SC 439 [Para 5,8,9]
Corporation of City of Bangalore Vs. Papaiah & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 1809 [Para 6]
Ramchandra Jyoti Jadhav Kaikadi & Ors. Vs. Gajendra Nana Gund & Ors., 2009(6) ALL MR 915 =2009 (6) Bom.C.R. 598 [Para 7,15]
Vamanrao Sawalaram Bhosale Vs. Vithal Tukaram Kadam, 2006(1) Bom.C.R. 448 [Para 8]
Nathu Ananda Ghorpade & Ors. Vs. Yashoda Jagannath Ghorpade & Ors., 2012 (2) Mh.L.J.258 [Para 8]
Budh Ram & Ors. Vs. Bansi & Ors., 2010 ALL SCR 2479=2010 AIR SCW 5071 [Para 11]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard Counsels appearing for the parties.

2.Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the grounds taken in the second appeal and submitted that all the grounds No.I to XV would form substantial questions of law for consideration in this Second Appeal. The learned Counsel submitted that the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court failed to frame specific point about the limitation for filing the suit. It is submitted that the suit which was filed by the plaintiffs was not within limitation. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs have not brought on record the legal representatives of deceased Sakhubai W/o Bhimaji Kharat, though she died during the pendency of the Regular Civil Appeal filed by the appellant herein. It is submitted that said Sakhubai died on 13th November, 1997. The suit was filed on 30th November, 1992 and appeal filed by the appellant herein came to be allowed in the year 2001. It is further submitted that agreement for sale which was executed on 25th January, 1954, was proved by defendant No.1 i.e. appellant herein, by examining the witness by name Balwant Kulkarni, who specifically stated that on 25th January, 1954, the agreement was executed and entire amount of consideration was paid. It is further submitted that defendant No.1 has mortgaged the property with defendant No.2 and obtained the loan for development of the suit land and therefore, the suit was not maintainable as notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was not given to the said Bank. It is further submitted that the suit itself was not maintainable as per the provisions of Section 36-A of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance upon the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Narayan S. Bite & others Vs. Mahadeo Shripati Pise & others, 2001 (3) Bom.C.R. 262. The learned counsel further submitted that in Regular Civil Appeal No. 341 of 1993, judgment and order of the trial Court was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Trial Court for fresh hearing. However, in second round of litigation, the trial Court failed to frame all the issues and decided the suit only on the additional issues. It is submitted that the trial Court should have framed all necessary issues for its adjudication/determination. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami and Anr, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 2344 and in particular, paragraph No.24 of the said judgment. It is further submitted that the appellant herein, who is original defendant is in possession of the suit property since 1954. The plaintiffs have not taken steps to recover the possession since then and therefore, the appellant/original defendant has become owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Balkrishan Vs. Satyaprakash and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 700, C.Natarajan Vs. Ashim Bai and Anr, AIR 2008 Supreme Court 363 : [2007 ALL SCR 2663], Mool Chand Bakhru and another Vs. Rohan and others, AIR 2002 Supreme Court 812 and Kalika Prasad and another Vs. Chhatrapal Singh (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1699. It is further submitted that the trial Court has erred in holding that defendant No.1 did not step into witness box and through General power of Attorney, his daughterinlaw stepped into witness box. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that, as regards plaintiff No.2 one Mandabai had stepped into witness box and plaintiff No.2 had not stepped into witness box and as plaintiff No.1 was dead during the pendency of the proceedings after remand, the testimony on behalf of plaintiff No.1 ought not to have been considered. On the contrary, as per case of defendant No.1 the Court ought to have considered the statement given on behalf of defendant No.1, considering his age. It is further submitted that both the Courts below have failed to consider that, for taking defence on the basis of unregistered documents, registration is not required and also failed to consider that by way of defence, agreement of sale, which is not registered, can be taken into consideration. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rangammal (supra). Learned counsel further submitted that, since the agreement of sale is in the year 1954, under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, it has presumptive value and therefore, said documents ought to have been accepted by the Courts below. It is submitted that the Court should have compared the signature/thumb impression on the said documents under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel also invited my attention to provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel further submitted that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was specifically barred. Therefore, relying upon the grounds taken in the appeal memo and the annexures thereto, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the second appeal deserves consideration.

3.The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant further submitted that the Consolidation Officer, has declared the appellant as owner of the suit property in the year 1966. Therefore, in the first instance the suit itself was not maintainable and secondly if at all the suit is filed, that was not within limitation. Learned Counsel further submitted that as per the date of taking revenue entries, the suit should have been filed within 12 years. Learned Counsel also placed reliance upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.Kaladevi Vs. V.R. Somasundaram & Ors., AIR 2010 S.C.1654 : [2010(3) ALL MR 477 (S.C.)] and submitted that even unregistered document is admissible in evidence. Learned Counsel also pressed into service the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tej Narain & Anr. Vs. Shanti Swaroop Bohre & Anr., AIR 2004 S.C. 5113 : [2005 (5) ALL MR 61 (S.C.)] and submitted that in view of provisions of Articles 64 and 65, the limitation to file the suit was of 12 years from the taking over possession of the suit property. Therefore, according to learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, the Second Appeal deserves consideration.

4.On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was on the basis of title and therefore there was no question of limitation as such. It is submitted that both the Courts have held that there was no any specific averment in respect of claim of adverse possession and therefore there is no question of limitation for filing the suit. It is submitted that when the suit was decided in first round of litigation, Bhikubai died during the pendency of the suit. However, her legal representatives were brought on record by the plaintiffs. R.C.S. No. 225 of 1991 was decided on 30th November, 1992. During pendency of said, suit legal representative of Bhikubai was brought on record. The appellant herein challenged the judgment and order in R.C.S. No. 225 of 1991 by way of filing R.C.A. No. 34 of 1993. It is submitted that Sakhubai died during the pendency of the appeal and her legal representatives were not brought on record till the disposal of the appeal. It is submitted that the appellant should have brought on record the legal representatives of said Sakhubai. Since the legal representatives of said Sakhubai were not brought on record, the Lower Appellate Court should have ordered that, the appeal in its entirety stands abated since the decree which was passed by the Trial Court is indivisible and inseparable. It is submitted that the judgment and order in R.C.A. was passed as against a dead person. Said judgment and order was passed on 20th October, 2001 and admittedly, prior to that the legal representatives of Sakhubai were not brought on record. It is submitted that M.A.R.J.I. No. 315 of 2004 was filed by the appellant herein for bringing legal representatives of Sakhubai on record. However, same came to be rejected on the ground that since R.C.A. No. 34 of 1993 is already decided.

5.It is further submitted that the evidence of Balwant Kulkarni has been considered by both the Courts below. The Court upon appreciation of his evidence, found that, though Balwant Kulkarni said that he is Patwari, however, he admitted that, entries about said transaction were not taken in the Patwari register. Both the Courts on appreciation of evidence of said Balwant Kulkarni held that his evidence cannot be believed or trusted, since Gajananthe appellant herein did not step into witness box. Learned Counsel further submits that, it was assertion of defendant Gajanan that there was agreement of sale in the year 1954 and therefore burden to prove such agreement was on said defendant. However, in second round of litigation, he did not enter into witness box. It is submitted that the power of attorney of said Gajanan, namely, Satyabhamabai came in the family of appellant-Gajanan in the year 1967. Therefore, what Gajanan has stated in earlier round of litigation, could have been stated by Gajanan himself even in second round of litigation. Both the Courts below on appreciation of evidence of said daughter-in-law Satyabhamabai found that she is not aware of the contents of the agreement or anything about said agreement and contention of Gajanan in earlier round of litigation. Therefore, both the Courts placing reliance upon reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janki Vishdeo Bhojwani Vs. Indusind Bank Ltd., AIR 2005 S.C. 439 : [2004(5) ALL MR 396 (S.C.)], discarded evidence of power of attorney, namely, Satyabhamabai. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to the provisions of Order 3 Rules 1 & 2 of the C.P.C. and submitted evidence of power of attorney is admissible to the extent and confined to the acts done by the power of attorney herself or himself. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the Courts below are not perverse. It is submitted that, after appreciation of evidence both the Courts have recorded concurrent findings and unless those findings are illegal or perverse, interference in the Second Appeal is not warranted.

6.It is submitted that, the entries which are mentioned by the Consolidation Officer are not disputed by the plaintiff. However, the suit was filed claiming relief of possession on the basis of title. Therefore, according to learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, the suit was not barred by the law of limitation and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and same was not barred in view of Section 36-A of the said Act. It is submitted that the financial institution was made party defendant in the suit. Therefore, whether the notice was issued to said institution or not, is not of much significance. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that though in second round of litigation only two issues were framed by the Trial Court, the Lower Appellate Court taking recourse to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 24 did frame all the necessary points for its determination and invoked its jurisdiction and considered all the points. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Trial Court did not frame all the issues for its consideration. It is submitted that the Lower Appellate Court did frame all the points for its consideration and decided the appeal filed by the appellant. It is further submitted that when the appellant has claimed ownership by adverse possession, that pre-supposes that the original plaintiffs are owners of the suit property and the appellant has accepted ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property. It is submitted that burden to prove agreement of sale was on the defendant who asserted that there was agreement of sale in the year 1954. However, said burden is not discharged by Gajanan himself and therefore both the Courts below upon appreciation of evidence brought on record, held that there was no such agreement between the plaintiff and defendant as such. It is submitted that both the Courts on appreciation of evidence found that there are no specifications or assertion of the appellant that their possession has become hostile to the owner of the suit property and therefore there is no question of limitation to file this suit. It is submitted that section 90 of the Evidence Act would not come to aid of the appellant since the contents of the agreement of sale was not proved by the appellant. Learned Counsel pressed into service reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of City of Bangalore Vs. Papaiah & Anr., AIR 1989 S.C. 1809. Relying upon head-note "B" of the judgment, Counsel for the respondent would submit that the revenue record is not a document of title. Interpretation of revenue record is not question of law. Finding of fact rendered by lower Court are on the basis of interpretation of revenue record. Interference with said findings by this Court is unwarranted. Learned Counsel further submitted that the provisions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which are relied upon by the appellant and the contention of the appellant that he should be declared owner in view of those provisions on the basis of revenue entries cannot be accepted. The counter claim which was filed by the appellant to declare him owner on the basis of revenue entries cannot be considered under the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The inconsistent pleas are taken by the appellant which cannot go hand in hand under the provisions of section 53-A of the T.P. Act. The appellant could not have claimed ownership of the suit property. At the most by invoking provisions of section 53 of the T.P. Act, on the basis of possession, the appellant can claim retaining possession of the suit property. It is further submitted that the counter claim can be considered only at the time of hearing of the suit and said claim cannot be considered in isolation. It is further submitted that Gajanan himself did not step into witness box and that was fatal for the case of the appellant. Appellant Gajanan claims to be party to the agreement of sale. The power of attorney Satyabhamabai who entered into witness box became family member of Gajanan in the year 1967 and she had no occasion to act or observe any such agreement of sale which was according to Gajanan was in the year 1954. Therefore, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the Second Appeal is devoid of any merits.

7.Learned Counsel for the respondent invited my attention to the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Ramchandra Jyoti Jadhav Kaikadi & Ors. Vs. Gajendra Nana Gund & Ors., 2009 (6) Bom.C.R. 598 : [2009(6) ALL MR 915] and submitted that if the claim or suit is filed for relief based upon title, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and said suit is not hit by the provisions of section 36-A and 36-B of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. Learned Counsel further submitted that the powers of Consolidation Officer are only under the provisions of section 24 of the said Act, and so far as issue of ownership or title is concerned, the Consolidation Officer has no powers to deal with said aspects. Issuance of transfer certificate by Consolidation Officer is a matter of procedure and is only evidence of transfer which has already taken place and vesting of the title in the Consolidation of Holdings does not depend upon grant of certificate of transfer. It is further submitted that the respondents are owners of the suit property and their claim was on the basis of title and by way of claim of adverse possession, even the appellant has admitted ownership and possession of the respondents/original plaintiffs.

8.Learned Counsel also invited my attention to the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janki, [2004(5) ALL MR 396 (S.C.)] (Supra) and submitted that Satyabhamabai, the power of attorney of Gajanan had no authority or power to depose for the acts which are performed by Gajanan in the year 1954, since he was party to the agreement of sale. Said Satyabhamabai entered the house of Gajanan in the year 1967. Learned Counsel invited my attention to paras 12, 13, 14, 22 and also 25 and 30 of the said judgment. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to another reported judgment of this Court in the case of Vamanrao Sawalaram Bhosale Vs. Vithal Tukaram Kadam, 2006(1) Bom.C.R. 448 explaining the authority and power of attorney holder. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to the reported judgment of this Court in the case of Nathu Ananda Ghorpade & Ors. Vs. Yashoda Jagannath Ghorpade & Ors., 2012 (2) Mh.L.J.258 and submitted that when the decree is inseparable and indivisible and the legal representatives of one of the decree holders are not brought on record, after her death, the appeal shall abate in its entirety. Therefore, according to learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, this Second Appeal does not raise any substantial question of law for consideration. Therefore, this Second Appeal may be dismissed.

9.I have given due consideration to the rival submissions. Learned Counsel for the parties are heard at length. Learned Counsel for the appellant advanced arguments relying upon each ground taken in the appeal memo and also learned Counsel for the respondent has replied to each ground in the appeal, which is raised by the appellant. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously argued that the suit which was filed by the original plaintiffs/respondent was not within limitation. Since the agreement of sale is of 1954 and even the consolidation record shows that they are owners from 1965, therefore, the suit should have been filed within 12 years at least from 1965. In this respect, it is necessary to appreciate rival contentions. It is case of original plaintiffs/respondents herein that the suit land was given for 15 years to the appellant for cultivation by accepting Rs. 1000/- from him. Since the respondent had no means to perform the last rituals/funeral expenses to bear, after death of their husband Bhima and therefore said suit land was given to the appellant for 15 years for cultivation. On the other hand, it is case of the appellant that there was agreement of sale in the year 1954 and amount of Rs. 1000/- was paid towards consideration. In that respect appellant Gajanan stepped into witness box in first round of litigation. However, his evidence was discarded by the Trial Court. The Lower Appellate Court did remand the matter back for fresh adjudication to the Trial Court.

In second round of litigation, power of attorney Satyabhamabai stepped into witness box to depose on behalf of appellant Gajanan. It is not in dispute that appellant Gajanan himself was party to the agreement of sale as claimed by him. It is also not in dispute that 'Gajanan' is alive till date and 'Satyabhamabai' who is daughter-in-law of Gajanan, entered in his house much after said agreement of sale, therefore she could not have knowledge of the acts, which are performed by Gajanan in 1950s. Therefore, the agreement of sale which is stated by Gajanan. His further assertion that there was such agreement of sale in 1954 was supposed to be proved by Gajanan himself. It is contention of the appellant that, one Mr. Balwant Kulkarni stepped in witness box and stated that he has reduced the contents of the said agreement of sale in his own hand writing. However, upon perusal of his evidence he candidly admitted in his statement that he did not make entry of said agreement of sale in 'Patwari register'. The evidence of power of attorney 'Satyabhamabai' is rejected/discarded by the Trial Court on the ground that the power of attorney cannot depose for the acts which are not performed by her and she cannot depose for the acts which were performed by Gajanan. The Trial Court has rightly placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Janki, [2004(5) ALL MR 396 (S.C.)] (Supra). The Supreme Court in said authoritative pronouncement have taken a view that, the power of attorney can depose, however, for the acts done by the power of attorney himself/herself. But the acts which are done by principal and in the present case Gajanan, could not have been deposed or stated or to that effect no statement could have been given by said Satyabhamabai. Therefore, after appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court and also the Lower Appellate Court reached to the conclusion that, said agreement of sale which is asserted by said Gajanan has not been proved.

The evidence of Gajanan was important in the case. Admittedly, Gajanan did not enter in witness box in second round, though he was available. The power of attorney holder 'Satyabhamabai' stepped in witness box for Gajanan, who entered in the house of Gajanan in the year 1967, as submitted by the Counsel for the respondent. Therefore, so far as contents of agreement of sale which were entered into in 1954, Satyabhamai had no knowledge about same and only Gajanan could depose about the same. It is not necessary to reproduce the findings of the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court about the evidence of power of attorney. Suffice it to say that both the Courts after appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that such agreement of sale, which is asserted and deposed has not been proved by the appellants. Therefore, once there is no any agreement of sale, the case of the respondent that the land was given for 15 years for cultivation, stands accepted. The plaintiffs claimed possession on the basis of title. Therefore, there is no question of limitation in filing the suit. It is not in dispute that by way of filing counter-claim, the appellants herein claimed ownership on the basis of revenue entries effected in the revenue record. Both the Courts on appreciation of evidence found that there are no specifications as such on which date the possession of the appellant became hostile. The claim of the appellant for adverse possession also pre-supposes that the original plaintiffs are owners of the suit property. The limitation, if at all, would start from the date on which the appellants claims ownership by way of adverse possession. However, in the present case, both the Courts upon appreciation of evidence found that there are no any specifications from which date the possession of the appellant became hostile.

10.Another ground taken in the appeal memo that the plaintiff failed to bring on record the legal representatives of Sakhubai and therefore the suit filed by the plaintiff should have been dismissed has no merits. During pendency of R.C.A., which was filed by the appellant herein, Sakhubai died on 13.11.1997. Said R.C.A. is decided in the year 2001. It is admitted position that during pendency of the appeal no steps were taken by the appellant herein, who was also appellant therein to bring legal representatives of Sakhubai on record. In the first round of litigation, R.C.S. No. 225 of 1991 was decreed. Operative part of said order reads thus :

"Suit of the plaintiffs' is decreed.

The defendants are hereby directed to deliver the possession of the suit land Gat No. 62, admeasuring 2 H 36 R situated at village Pisadevi, Tq. & Dist. Aurangabad, to the plaintiff.

The defendants are granted two month's time to deliver the possession of the suit land, to the plaintiffs from the date of this judgment.

Inquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be held for mesne profits, from the date of suit, till actual delivery of possession.

The defendants to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiffs and to bear their own. Decree be drawn-up accordingly."

11.Bare perusal of operative part of the order of the Trial Court would make it abundantly clear that said decree was inseparable and indivisible. Therefore, the Lower Appellate Court was not correct and justified in allowing the appeal and remanding the matter back. Infact, as a result of not bringing legal representatives of deceased Sakhubai on record during pendency of the appeal, the Lower Appellate Court ought to have held that, the appeal abates in its entirety. It is also relevant to mention that the appellants herein did file M.A.R.J.I. No. 315 of 2004 for bringing legal representatives of Sakhubai on record after dismissal of the appeal. Said M.A.R.J.I. was rejected. Therefore, in my considered opinion, in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Budh Ram & Ors. Vs. Bansi & Ors., 2010 AIR (SCW) 5071 : [2010 ALL SCR 2479] and more particularly in para 19 of the said judgment, when decree which was passed by the Trial Court was inseparable and indivisible, appeal against said decree for not bringing legal representatives of one deceased decree holder, namely, Sakhubai, stands abated in its entirety. Para 19 of said Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Budh Ram, [2010 ALL SCR 2479] (Supra) reads thus :-

"19. Therefore, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that as to whether nonsubstitution of LRs of the defendants/ respondents would abate the appeal in toto or only qua the deceased defendants/respondents, depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. Where each one of the parties has an independent and distinct right of his own, not interdependent 11 upon one or the other, nor the parties have conflicting interests inter se, the appeal may abate only qua the deceased respondent. However, in case, there is a possibility that the Court may pass a decree contradictory to the decree in favour of the deceased party, the appeal would abate in toto for the simple reason that the appeal is a continuity of suit and the law does not permit two contradictory decrees on the same subject matter in the same suit. Thus, whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis' vis remaining parties would suffer the vice of being a contradictory or inconsistent decree is the relevant test."

12.The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that after remand, all necessary issues were not framed by the Trial Court has no merit. The Lower Appellate Court in second round of litigation did frame all the points for its determination and invoked the powers under provisions of section 107 of the C.P.C. and after considering all the points framed for its determination decided the appeal. Therefore, merely because all the issues were not framed by the Trial Court in second round would not give rise to a ground to entertain this Second Appeal. The Lower Appellate Court has all those powers like a Court of original jurisdiction under subsection (2) of section 107 of C.P.C. Therefore, the ground that all the issues were not framed by the Trial Court in the second round of litigation has no any merits.

13.Another contention of learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that in view of section 90 of the Evidence Act, agreement of sale is of the year 1954, that raises substantial question of law is concerned, both the Courts on appreciation of evidence have come to the conclusion that the appellants have failed to prove agreement of sale.

14.Since the financial institution was made party to the suit and contested the said suit, therefore, whether notice was given under section 164 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 or not loses its importance.

15.Another contention of the appellant that in view of provisions of Section 36-A of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred, has no merit. Throughout, case of the plaintiff is based on the title of the suit property and said contention has been strengthened by the act of the appellants themselves, when they claimed ownership by way of adverse possession. That itself pre-supposes that the original plaintiffs are owners of the suit property and they have title over the suit property. Therefore, when the suit is filed based upon title, there is no bar in entertaining said suit. This issue is concluded by this Court in the case of Ramchandra, [2009(6) ALL MR 915] (Supra).

16.Further contention of the appellant that the evidence of power of attorney ought to have been believed has no merit. Gajanan himself claimed that agreement of sale was in the year 1954 and he entered into agreement of sale, in that case it was for him to enter into witness box and depose himself to prove agreement of sale. His daughter-in-law-Satyabhamabai had no occasion to perform any act in the year 1954 and therefore both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the evidence on record and reached to the conclusion that such evidence of power of attorney cannot be believed or accepted. Therefore, in my considered opinion, viewed from any angle, the respondents are true owners of the property, they have title over the suit property. Merely because original plaintiffs were in helpless situation and they had to borrow Rs.1000/- from the appellant for performing last rituals/funeral of their husband Bhima, no undue advantage could have been taken/received by the appellant. Therefore, for the reasons aforesaid, in my considered opinion, the plaintiffs, who are true owners of the property, ought not to have been deprived of their genuine claim. The Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court have rightly considered the case in its proper perspective and appreciated the evidence. The findings recorded are in consonance with the evidence brought on record. There is no perversity as such or there is no any illegality committed by the Courts below. Therefore, in my considered opinion, there is no substance in the Second appeal. The Second Appeal is devoid of any merits and same stands dismissed. Consequently, the Civil Application stands rejected.

17.At this stage, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant prays continuation of interim relief for further four weeks. The order of status-quo which was in operation during pendency of this appeal, will remain in force for another five weeks and will cease to operate on expiry of four weeks i.e. on 18.04.2012.

Ordered accordingly.