Second Appeal No. 112 of 2001

26th August, 2011

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. KHANDARE, Mr. SACHIN DESHMUKH
Respondent Counsel: Mr. M.V. DESHPANDE

Cases Cited:
Bhagat Ram (Dead) by L.RS. Vs. Teja Singh (Dead) by L.Rs., 2002(1) ALL MR 270 (S.C.)= (2002) 1 SCC 210 [Para 6]
Omprakash and others Vs. Radhacharan and others, 2010(1) ALL MR 453 (S.C.) =(2009) 15 SCC 66 [Para 6]
S.R. Srinivasa and others Vs. S. Padmavathamma, 2010 ALL SCR 1582 = (2010) 5 SCC 274 [Para 6]
Radhika Vs. Aghnu Ram Mahto, (1994) 5 SCC 761 [Para 6]
Seethalakshmi Ammal Vs. Muthuvenkatarama Iyengar and another, 1998(3) ALL MR 431 (S.C.)=(1998) 5 SCC 368 [Para 6]
V. Dandapani Chettiar Vs. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) by L.Rs. and others., 2004(5) ALL MR 171 (S.C.) [Para 6]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT:- This appeal takes exception to the judgment and decree passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ambajogai in Regular Civil Appeal No. 85/1990 decreeing the suit of respondents. The factual aspect of this case was as under.

2. One Vatsalabai of Anegaon Tq. Kej, District Beed was owner of the suit property, a piece of agricultural land at village Anegaon.She had inherited this property on her husbands death. This property thus originally belonged to her husband. On 15/01/1982, the appellants apparently purchased this land through a registered sale deed from Vatsalabai, but on the same day Vatsalabai died. The respondents happened to be her sister's sons. According to them, they are her only legal heirs. They asserted that the sale deed was void as Vatsalabai was not in a position to enter into a contract for sale due to her ill health. They said that since Vatsalabai has no legal representative, they have succeeded to the suit property and filed suit for declaration that the sale deed was void and for possession.

3. At the trial stage, the suit was dismissed. But the learned II Additional District Judge, Ambajogai allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs / respondents and decreed the suit fully.

4. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were noticed.

I. Whether judgment and decree states correct position of law as regards Section 15 and 16 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ?

II. Whether the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court that "In view of failing the heirs under entry (a) to (c) of Section 15 then naturally the property will devolve upon the heirs under entry (d)"

is legal and give correct meaning to the provisions of Section 15 and 16 where sub-section 2 of Section 15 is in nature of exception to the general rule of succession contemplated under sub-section -1 of Section 15.

5. Both these questions can be decided simultaneously if one answers the question

"Whether the respondents / plaintiffs were legal heirs of deceased Vatsalabai ?"

The relevant provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read as under.

Section 15 :- General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.-

(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16,-

(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband.

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband.

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father, and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),-

(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father, and

(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.

6. Vatsalabai apparently did not leave any heir falling under section 1 (a)(b)(c) of the above mentioned provision. On the other hand the respondents/plaintiffs who are her only legal heirs would fall under clause (d) being heirs of father of Vatsalabai. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that even though the respondents/plaintiffs are legal heirs of deceased Vatsalabai, he said that since they are sons of sister of Vatsalabai, they are not related to Vatsalabai's husband but are related to Vatsalabai from her father's side. He further pointed out that admittedly the suit property was inherited by Vatsalabai from her husband. He therefore, suggested that Clause 'b' of sub section (2) referred to above, will apply to the facts of this case and he suggested they are unable to inherit this property. Indeed if any property is inherited by a female Hindu from her husband, it would not devolve upon heirs from her father's side but it would devolve upon heirs of her husband only. So, in ideal situation, had there been an heir of Vatsalabai's husband alive, the suit property would certainly devolve upon such heir and would not go to the respondents/plaintiffs. Unfortunately, there is nothing on record to show that an heir of Vatsalbai's husband is alive. The appellants no doubt are not related to Vatsalabai or her husband. So, in such situation and in absence of an heir from Vatsalabai's husband, the suit property would naturally go to the her only existing heirs, though they are not heirs of her husband. Section 15 as well as section 16 nowhere suggested that in a situation of this nature, the property would be escheated. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants too did not suggest such a consequence. However, he pointed out that the peculiar provision of sub section (2) was enacted to secure that a property should not go in the hands of a person who is not related to the original owner. In other words, the legislature intended very clearly that in case the property belonged to husband of a female Hindu and if she inherited it after his death, her relative from father's side should not get it. Such property should not fall in the hands of a person who is not related to her husband. Same can be said about her father's property. But since there is none else at present, who claims to be Vatsalabai's husband's heir, the only existing legal heirs i. e. respondents / plaintiffs should inherit the property. The property would devolve upon them because they are the only existing legal heirs. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants placed reliance on certain judgments of the Supreme Court but unfortunately the Supreme Court did not deal with the question that arose in this case in such judgments. None of the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the appellants had dealt with a situation that has occurred in this particular case. I will at the insistence of the counsel for the appellants still would discuss the judgments of the Supreme Court one by one.

(1) Bhagat Ram (Dead) by L.RS. Versus Teja Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. reported in (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 210 : [2002(1) ALL MR 270 (S.C.)].

This judgment is not at all relevant for our purpose because the question before Supreme Court was altogether different. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of an heir of husband of deceased female that "since the deceased female inherited the property from her mother who had limited interest in the property and since by virtue of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, the mother of the female became full owner of the property so when the Hindu female inherited such property it must be treated as her own property and it should go to the heir of her husband after her death".

(2) Omprakash and others Versus Radhacharan and others reported in (2009) 15 Supreme Court Cases 66 : [2010(1) ALL MR 453 (S.C.)].

Even in this case, the question before the Supreme Court was different. It was a case where the female Hindu died intestate leaving behind her self acquired property. Though this woman was married, all her life she did not stay with her husband but with her parents and it was they who supported her throughout the life. Despite of this, the Supreme Court held that the self acquired property of such female would go to her husband's heir as per Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It would not go to her heirs from father's side. This judgment thus is not at all applicable to the facts of the case.

(3) S.R. Srinivasa and others Versus S. Padmavathamma reported in (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 274 : [2010 ALL SCR 1582].

The Supreme Court in this judgment after quoting Section 15 held as under.

"A perusal of the aforesaid provisions would show that the basic aim of Section 15(2) is to ensure that inherited property of an issueless female Hindu dying intestate goes back to the source. It was enacted to prevent inherited property falling into the hands of strangers. This i also evident from the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament."

This is already discussed above and there is no dispute about the this ratio of this judgment. But it does not the appellants perpose.

(4) Radhika Versus Aghnu Ram Mahto reported in (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 761.

In this case, the dispute was about a female Hindu's property which was inherited by her from her mother's side. Her husband claimed a share in the property along with his daughter. The Supreme Court rejected his claim saying that since the property was inherited by the deceased from her mother, it would go to son or daughter and in absence of such son and daughter, it would devolve upon an heir of her father. The Supreme Court held as under.

"A reading of (S.15) clearly indicates that for the property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, in other words female's paternal side, in the absence of her son, daughter or children of the pre-deceased on or daughter, the succession opens to the heirs of the father or mother and not to Class I heirs in the order specified in sub-section (1) of Section 15 and in the order of Section 16. In other words, the children and the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter of the Hindu female alone are entitled to get such property. Thus, husband stands excluded from the succession to the property inherited by female Hindu from her father's side."

(5) Seethalakshmi Ammal Versus Muthuvenkatarama Iyengar and another reported in (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 368 : [1998(3) ALL MR 431 (S.C.)].

(6) V. Dandapani Chettiar Versus Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) by L.Rs. and others. Both these judgments are not at all relevant to the discussion on this point and therefore, they are not discussed in detail.

7. The learned advocate appearing for appellants then questioned the finding of fact recorded by learned judge of the first appellate court on the alleged fraud committed by the appellant's father Vachista. He said the learned judge did not record a finding that the respondents/plaintiffs had proved the case of fraud. Unfortunately, this is an factually incorrect submission. On going through the judgment of the first appellate court, I found that the learned judge of the first appellate court thoroughly examined the evidence on record and after recording cogent reasons, disbelieved the case of the appellants and believed the case of the respondents / plaintiffs. He discussed all the factual angles of the case and held in clear terms that the appellants' father Vachista, being guardian of the minor appellants, played fraud when he secured the sale deed from deceased Vatsalabai, the maternal aunt of the respondents. The learned judge found very clearly that the execution of the sale deed was shrouded in suspicion. So much so that it became a matter of the court's conscience and therefore, the learned judge rightly questioned truthfulness of the case of the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant admitted that in second appeal, this Court can substitute it's finding on facts, to the finding recorded by the first appellate Court, unless it is found to be grossly perverse. On careful perusal of the judgment, I found that the judgment does not suffer from any perversity. In view of this, the appeal should fail.

ORDER

The appeal is dismissed.

At the request of the appellants' advocate, the execution of the decree shall remain in abeyance for a period of eight weeks.

In view of dismissal of the appeal, Civil Applications No. 2023/2001, 5493/2009 and 5494/2009 are disposed of.

Appeal dismissed.