Criminal Application No.1913 of 2010,Criminal Application No.2013 of 2010,Criminal Application No.328 of 2010

29th November, 2010

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. A.P. MUNDARGI, Mr. YUSUF IQBAL YUSUF, Mr.N. MAJRA i/b Mr. SUTAPA SAHA, Mr. A.H.H PONDA, Mr.UDAY SANKAR SAMUDRALA
Respondent Counsel: Mr. D.J. KHAMBATA with Mr. K.SUDHAKAR, S.K. SHINDE

Cases Cited:
R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, 2009 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 80=AIR 1960 SC 866 [Para 5]
State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & others, AIR 1992 SC 604 [Para 5]
Ashim Kumar Roy Vs. Bipinbhai Vadilal Mehta and Others, 1998 SCC (Cri) 269 [Para 5]
Dr. R.R. Kishore Vs. CBI, 142 (2007) Delhi Law Times 702 [Para 5,6,7,28]
Karnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 2010 ALL SCR 968=(2009) 8 SCC 539 [Para 6,27]
Sailendranath Bose Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292 [Para 6,7]
The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707 [Para 6]
Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India, 1998 (1) SCC 226 [Para 6,7,12,24]
G. Narayanswami Vs. G. Pannerselvam and others, (1972) 3 SCC 717 [Para 6]
K. Veerswami Vs. Union of India and others, (1991) 3 SCC 655 [Para 6]
Duni Chand Rataria Vs. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., 1955 AIR 182 [Para 6,7,22]
Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, AIR 1980 SC 387 [Para 6,7,22]
The Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust Vs. IT Commr Mysore, AIR 1970 Mysore 285 [Para 6,7,22]
Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Director CBI & others, (2005) 2 SCC 317 [Para 6]
P.M. Singh Vs. CBI, Cri. Rev. Petition 206 of 2007 Dt.22/10/2007 [Para 6]
State of M.P. And others Vs. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 [Para 7]
Balram Kumawat Vs. Union of India and others, (2003) 7 SCC 628 [Para 7]
Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P. Venku Reddy, 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2568 (S.C.)=(2002) 7 SCC 631 [Para 7]
M.C. Sulkunte (Dr.) Vs. State of Mysore, (1970) 3 SCC 513 [Para 7]
M/s. New India Mills Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Sale Tax, Bihar, 1963 SC 1207 [Para 18]
Carew and Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260 [Para 18]
M. Pentiah and others Vs. Muddala Veeramallappa and others, AIR 1961 SC 1107 [Para 18]
Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. Vs. Asher, 1949 Vol. 2 ALL ER 155 [Para 18]
Zee Telefilms Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 4 SCC 649 [Para 25]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT, J. :- An interesting question which falls for my consideration in these criminal applications is: what is the meaning of the expression 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot' which is used in section 6-A(2)?

2. Both the applicants have filed these applications to quash R.C. Case No. BA1/2010/A0006 dated 18th February, 2010 registered by CBI against the applicants under sections 7 & 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. Applicant Manjit Singh Bali in Criminal Application No. 1913 of 2010 was holding the post of Chief Post Master General, Maharashtra & Goa at Mumbai from August, 2008. It is an admitted position that the said post was of the level of Additional Secretary to the Government of India. A case was registered against the said applicant Manjit Singh Bali on 18/02/2010 on the basis of letter written by the complainant dated 16/02/2010. Brief background regarding the said case is as under:-

The complainant one Smt. Rita Subhash Shah visited applicant's office in the second week of December, 2009 demanding grant of No Objection Certificate (NOC) for a particularly property (hereinafter referred to as "the said property") in Mira Bhayander which was reserved for Department of Posts. The Post Master General, Mumbai Region sent the case file in third week of December to the applicant recommending issuance of NOC in the case. There were five other plots reserved for the Department of Posts in different localities of Mira Bhayaner area and, therefore, the applicant sent the file back and requested that integrated view be taken for the whole area.

According to the complainant, in January, 2010 one Mr. Harsh Dalmia, who is the applicant in Criminal Application No.2013 of 2010, alongwith the complainant visited office of the applicant Mr. Bali and made a request for release of NOC on the said property. However, the applicant said that the Department was examining the proposal of acquiring the said land and a decision would be taken soon. Thereafter, in the month of February, 2010 the case was again submitted to the Post Master General, Mumbai, recommending issuance of NOC on the basis of recommendations of the Divisional Superintendent of Post Offices of that area wherein the property was situated. The file, however, was returned to the Post Master General since the details of the integrated plan etc. were not given. A complaint was made by the complainant by writing a letter to the CBI dated 16/02/2010. On 17/02/2010, complainant visited office of the applicant alongwith Mr. Harsh Dalmia, Mr Arun Dalmia and another person who was introduced as Mr. Pravin Trivedi, the interested developer of the plot. Applicant was asked to expedite the decision since the matter was pending for a year.

On 18/02/2010, the CBI took cognizance of the letter of the complainant and registered FIR against the applicant.

Applicant approved the proposal on 24/2/2010. However, he listed certain additional relevant conditions. According to the complainant, Mr. Harsh Dalmia, co-accused approached the applicant. After a few moments, another person approached the applicant and stated that a bag had been kept in the dicky of the applicant's car and further stated that the bag contained Rs 2 crore and, thereafter, he identified himself as CBI Officer. Applicant was taken into custody. According to the applicant, he was kept in the said Restaurant till the next morning and, thereafter, he was produced by the CBI before the Sessions Court in the evening at about 5.00 P.M., seeking police custody for 10 days. Remand was granted on 03/03/2010. The Special Judge remanded the applicant Mr. Bali to judicial custody till 15/03/2010 and on 12/03/2010 the applicant Mr. Bali was released on bail.

4. Applicant No.1 in Criminal Application No. 2013 of 2010 is the Chief Operating Officer of Watermark Financial Consultants Limited ("WFCL"). Applicant No.2 is the Chairman of WFCL.

5. Mr. Mundargi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants in Criminal Application No.1913 of 2010 submitted that in view of the provisions of section 6-A of the DSPE Act, initiation of investigation and any subsequent prosecution is without jurisdiction and the CBI had no authority whatsoever to register a case against the public servant of the rank of Joint Secretary and above without obtaining previous approval of the Central Government and, therefore, on this ground alone, the FIR was liable to be quashed. He submitted that there are several judgments of the Apex Court right from the judgment in R.P. Kapur vs. The State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 : [2009 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 80], State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & others AIR 1992 SC 604 and in Ashim Kumar Roy vs. Bipinbhai Vadilal Mehta and Others 1998 SCC (Cri) 269 wherein it has been held that if there is a statutory bar imposed by the Act then the FIR so filed and the investigation initiated on the basis of the said FIR is liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.R. Kishore vs. CBI 142 (2007) Delhi Law Times 702. It is submitted that if the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction under section 6-A of the Act is raised at the very inception then further investigation is liable to be stayed and the FIR could be quashed. It is submitted that section 6-A of the DSPE Act was amended by the Central Vigilance and Commission Act in the year 2003 and by virtue of the amendment, prior approval of the Central Government is necessary in the case of inquiry/investigation against the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above. It is submitted that the DSPE Act is the only Act in which obtaining prior approval is made compulsory. It is submitted that the said bar in the section operates from inception i.e. from the time of the information received by the CBI about commission or likelihood of commission of such offence by the employee above certain rank in the Central Government. It is submitted that sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act permitted the CBI to arrest a person on the spot, meaning thereby that the CBI would invoke the said section only in cases of a chance arrest of a public servant on the spot while accepting or attempting to accept any gratification without any prior information about the same. It is submitted that, in the present case, the CBI was aware of the complaint being received on 16/02/2010 and, therefore, it had sufficient time to obtain prior approval and, instead of doing that, it had registered the FIR on 18/02/2010 and on 24/02/2010, it conducted a raid. It is, therefore, submitted that this is not a case where the CBI had arrested the accused on the spot. It is submitted that the CBI had an ample time to deliberate and take prior approval after the complaint was received on 16/02/2010. Reliance is also placed on remand application dated 03/03/2010. It is submitted that sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act dealt with the situation where obtaining prior approval of the Central Government would be entirely illogical or contrary or inconsistent to the demand of the situation indicated in the said sub-section. It is submitted that the words 'on the spot' clearly depict the legislative intent that where in the view of the Act any employee or officer as mentioned in Clause (a) and (b) respectively of section 6- A(1) is found to be accepting or attempting to accept any gratification other than any remuneration, the CBI need not await for the approval of the Central Government. It is submitted that, in the instant case, a complaint/letter was sent by the complainant on 16/02/2010 and the FIR was registered against the applicant on 18/2/2010. The CBI started conducting the inquiry/investigation from 18/02/2010, leading to the arrest of the applicant on 25/02/2010. It is, therefore, submitted that the said arrest of the applicant was not "on the spot" arrest as envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act. It is, therefore, submitted that the arrest of the applicant was not covered under sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act.

6. Mr. A.H.H. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicants in Criminal Application No.2013 of 2010 has also argued at length and has also filed written submissions and has relied on number of judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts and has filed compilation of judgments and list of documents. It is submitted that, "arrest of a person on the spot" as laid down under sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act does not come into play in cases involving the arrest which is not on the spot. He then proceeded to elaborate the meaning of the words 'on the spot' with reference to dictionary meaning of the said words in WebSter's Online Dictionary, Webster Dictionary, Macmillan Dictionary, Oxford Dictionary, www.dictionary.com, Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary and Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Reliance is also placed on CBI's own Rules of investigation from CBI Crime Manual. Reference is also made to Rule 10.6 of the CBI Crime Manual. It is also urged that section 6-A is similar in its import to section 42 of the NDPS Act as it stood before amendment. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Karnail Singh vs State of Haryana (2009) 8 SCC 539 : [2010 ALL SCR 968]. It is submitted that the words used in the said section are 'on the spot' and not 'from the spot' and only in cases of urgent circumstances when practically there is no time to take such approval, the CBI could arrest the accused on the spot. Reliance is also placed on Rules 8.3 and 8.24 of the CBI Crime Manual. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sailendranath Bose vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1292, The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mubarak Ali AIR 1959 SC 707. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.R. Kishore vs. CBI 142 (2007) Delhi Law Times 702 and more particularly on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the said judgment. It is, therefore, submitted that provisions of section 6-(A)(2) were not applicable to the present case. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex court in Vineet Narain vs. Union of India 1998 (1) SCC 226 more particularly on paras 42 to 45. It is submitted that in view of the said observations of the Apex Court, screening mechanism with statutory backing has been introduced in the form of section 6-A of the DSPE Act only from 11/09/2003 and sub-section (2) of Section 6-A exempted the CBI from taking previous approval in cases of acceptance of illegal gratification involving arrest of the accused on the spot on account of non-availability of time for obtaining previous approval. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in G. Narayanswami vs. G. Pannerselvam and others (1972) 3 SCC 717 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in K. Veerswami vs. Union of India and others (1998) 3 SCC 655. It is submitted that meaning of the word 'involving' in subsection (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act could not be interpreted to mean cases leading to arrest at any stage. Reliance is placed on the judgments in Duni Chand Rataria vs. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd. 1955 AIR 182, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association AIR 1980 SC 387, The Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust v/s IT Commr Mysore AIR 1970 Mysore 285. It is submitted that the interpretation suggested by the respondent - CBI would have a nullifying effect on section 6-A. It is submitted that validity of section 6-A was under challenge and the matter had been referred to the larger Bench by the Supreme Court. This was done in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Director CBI & others (2005) 2 SCC 317. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in P.M. Singh vs. CBI Cri Rev Petition 206/2007 decided on 22.10.2007 in which it has been held that provisions of section 6-A could not apply retrospectively.

7. On the other hand, Mr.Khambata, learned Additional Solicitor General, vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants. He has also filed detailed written submissions. He submitted that section 6-A of the the DSPE Act was introduced by inserting section 26(c) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 with effect from 11/09/2003 and prior to the amendment, a Single Directive was first issued in 1969 by the Executive and amended on many occasions. However, the relevant portion of the Single Directive was eventually struck down by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain vs. Union of India 1998 (1) SCC 226. He invited my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in the said case and referred to para 44. He also invited my attention to the debate in the Parliament on the Central Vigilance Commission Bill. He then invited my attention to paras 45 and 46 of the said judgment and submitted that where the accusation was based on direct evidence and did not require any inference to be drawn depending on the decision making process including trap cases, the Single Directive could not be applied. He submitted that purpose of the Single Directive was to prevent the decision making process of officers from being subjected to scrutiny of the CBI even where the complaint was frivolous. He submitted that the Single Directive was meant to protect the honest decision-making officers from facing inquiries and investigations. He submitted that, however, this did not arise in cases of direct evidence such as trap cases, where the question of drawing an inference to establish corrupt motive did not arise. He then invited my attention to the report presented to the Parliament by the Joint Committee on the Central Vigilance Commission Bill, 1999. It is submitted that while interpreting section 6-A, the rule of purposive construction must be adopted to interpret section 6-A. It is necessary to see the position before it was enacted and the mischief and defect the Legislator sought to remedy has to be seen. He relied on three judgments of the Apex Court on this point viz. State of M.P. And others vs. Ram Singh (2000) 5 SCC 88, Balram Kumawat vs. Union of India and others (2003) 7 SCC 628 [para 24] and in Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Venku Reddy (2002) 7 SCC 631 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2568 (S.C.)] [para 12]. So far as the word 'involving' which is found in sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act is concerned, he submitted that the word 'involving' used in the expression 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot' (hereinafter referred to as "the said expression") would mean the cases resulting in arrest based on direct evidence. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Duni Chand Rataria vs. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd 1955 AIR 182 [Para 16]. He submitted that reliance placed by the applicants on the judgments in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association AIR 1980 SC 387, The Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust v/s IT Commr Mysore AIR 1970 Mysore 285 is erroneous. He then submitted that sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act used the words 'on the spot' in the said expression. He submitted that the words 'on the spot' does not mean spontaneous arrest or chance arrest nor arrest at exact place or time of commission of the offence and the words are used in reference to the nature of evidence in terms of the accusation and, therefore, it is submitted that it is not the question of time or place but the question of nature of evidence in such accusation at the scene of the offence as set out in para 45 in Vineet Narain 1998 (1) SCC 266 (supra). It is, therefore, submitted that purposive and contextual interpretation should be adopted and preferred not to ascribe the dictionary meaning literally to the words 'on the spot'. He submitted that the reliance placed on Rule 10.6 of the CBI Crime Manual is incorrect. He further submitted that the applicants cannot acquire a legal right from the CBI Manual. It is also submitted that reference to the provisions of NDPS Act while interpreting section 6-A of the the DSPE Act could not be made since section 6-A(2) does not depend on the success or failure of the trap. So far as the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.R. Kishore vs. CBI 142 (2007) Delhi Law Times 702 is concerned, it is submitted that the said judgment had been challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court by its order dated 12/03/2007 had granted leave and notice had been issued on the prayers for interim reliefs. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, candidly admitted that no stay to the judgment of the Delhi High Court was granted. It is submitted that finding of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.R. Kishore (supra) on the meaning of the words 'on the spot' was without reasons and no supporting authority was relied upon by the Delhi High Court. It is submitted that the finding of the Delhi High Court is contrary to the finding of the Apex Court in para 45 in the case of Vineet Narain 1998 (1) SCC 226. It is submitted that in the said judgment, reliance was placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in M.C. Sulkunte (Dr.) vs. State of Mysore (1970) 3 SCC 513 [para 15] and in Shailendranath Bose vs. State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1292 [para 5]. It is submitted that section 6-A starts with non obstante clause and, therefore, it is submitted that the interpretation given by the Delhi High Court is incorrect. The learned Additional Solicitor General further distinguished the judgments on which reliance is placed by the Counsel for the applicants.

8. I have heard Mr. Mundargi the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, Mr. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf other applicants and Mr. Khambata, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondent - CBI at length.

9. The question which falls for consideration before this Court is regarding interpretation of the words 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot' which are mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 6-A of the DSPE Act. The controversy which has been raised in these applications is that though the applicants are arrayed as accused in the FIR which is registered by CBI on 18/02/2010, the entire inquiry and investigation into the said offence which is initiated against the applicant Manjit Singh Bali who is admittedly an employee of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government is liable to be quashed since the previous approval of the Central Government was not obtained.

10. In order to consider the rival submissions, it will be necessary to take into consideration the provisions of the DSPE Act more particularly provisions of section 6-A which were inserted by the Act 45 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act') with effect from 12/09/2003. The said Act was passed for the constitution of Special Police Force in Delhi for investigation of certain offences in Union territory and also for extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard to investigation of the said offences. Section 2 of the said Act has laid down the constitution and powers of special police establishment and sub-section (1) of section 2 lays down that notwithstanding anything in the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861), the Central Government may constitute a special police force. Sub-section (2) of section 2 further lays down that the members of the said police establishment shall have all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which the police officers of the Union Territory have in connection with the investigation of offences committed therein while carrying on investigation and arrest in respect of such offences and any member of the said police establishment above the rank of Sub-Inspector was deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station. Sub-section (3) of section 2 lays down the classes of offences which could be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (hereinafter referred to as "DSPE") which are notified by the Central Government by issuing notification in the Official Gazette. Section 4 lays down power of the superintendence and administration of special police establishment in respect of the offences alleged to have been committed under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Sections 4-A, 4-B and 4-C lay down Committee for appointment of Director, terms and conditions of service of Director and appointment for posts of Superintendent of Police and above. Section 5 lays down extension of powers and jurisdiction of special police establishment to other areas in State. Section 6 lays down that consent of the State Government has to be obtained to exercise powers and jurisdiction under the DSPE Act. Section 6-A is regarding approval of the Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation.

11. In the present case, we are concerned with the interpretation of section 6-A and, therefore, it would be relevant to reproduce the said section which reads as under:-

"6-A. Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation.- (1) The Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegation relates to-

(a) the employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above; and

(b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration referred to in clause (c) of the Explanation to section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988)"

Perusal of the said section clearly reveals that the said section is divided into two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) clearly prohibits DSPE from conducting any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without previous approval of the Central Government in respect of the employees falling under categories (a) and (b) mentioned in the said sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of section 6-A, however, starts with non obstante clause and state "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot,......." On the plain interpretation of the said provision of section 6-A, it is evident that embargo put on the CBI in sub-section (1) is not applicable to certain classes of cases viz. 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot'. In this context, therefore, it will have to be seen with reference to the rival contentions as to what is the exact interpretation of the said expression viz. 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot'.

12. In this context, it would be relevant to examine the circumstances under which section 6-A was inserted by inserting section 26(c) of the Central Vigilance and Commission Act, 2003 with effect from 11/09/2003. Prior to the introduction of the said section 6-A, what is known as Single Directive was issued in 1969 by the Executive and it was amended on number of occasions. The Single Directive contained certain instructions to CBI regarding modalities of initiating inquiry or registering a case against certain categories of civil servants. The Apex Court in Vineet Narain 1998 (1) SC 226 (supra), in para 19 of its judgment, has produced the said Single Directive which reads as under:-

"4.7(3)(i) In regard to any person who is or has been a decision-making level officer (Joint Secretary or equivalent or above in the Central Government or such officers as are or have been on deputation to a Public Sector Undertaking; officers of the Reserve Bank of India of the level equivalent to Joint Secretary or above in the Central Government, Executive Directors and above of the SEBI and Chairman & Managing Director and Executive Directors and such of the bank officers who are one level below the Board of Nationalised Banks), there should be prior sanction of the Secretary of the Ministry/Department concerned before SPE takes up any equiry (PE or RC), including ordering search in respect of them. Without such sanction, no enquiry shall be initiated by the SPE.

(ii) All cases referred to the Administrative Ministries/Departments by CBI for obtaining necessary prior sanction as aforesaid, except those pertaining to any officer of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary, should be disposed of by them preferably within a period of two months of the receipt of such a reference. In respect of the officers of the rank of Secretary or Principal Secretary to Government, such references should be made by the Director, CBI to the Cabinet Secretary for consideration of a Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary as its Chairman and the Law Secretary and the Secretary (Personnel) as its members. The Committee should dispose of all such references preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by the Cabinet Secretary.

(iii) When there is any difference of opinion between the Director, CBI and the Secretary of the Administrative Ministry/Department in respect of an officer up to the rank of Additional Secretary or equivalent, the matter shall be referred by CBI to Secretary (Personnel) for placement before the Committee referred to in clause (ii) above. Such a matter should be considered and disposed of by the Committee preferably within two months from the date of receipt of such a reference by Secretary (Personnel).

(iv) In regard to any person who is or has been Cabinet Secretary, before SPE takes any step of the kind mentioned in (i) above the case should be submitted to the Prime Minister for orders."

According to the Central Government, the said Directive was limited to officials at decision-making levels in the Government and certain other public institutions like the RBI, SEBI, nationalised banks, etc. and its scope was limited to official acts. According to the Central Government, the objective of the Directive was to protect decision-making level officers from the threat and ignominy of malicious and vexatious inquiries/investigations. According to the Central Government, such protection to the officers on the decisionmaking level was essential to protect them and to relieve them of the anxiety from the likelihood of harassment for taking honest decisions. The Apex Court, in this context, considered the said Single Directive. The Apex Court then took into consideration the provisions of the DSPE Act and held that the said Single Directive was contrary to the statutory provisions of the DSPE Act, 1946 and, therefore, it could not be upheld as valid on the ground that it being permissible in exercise of power of superintendence of the Central Government under section 4(1) of the Act. While coming to the said conclusion, the Supreme Court made the following observations in paras 41 to 45 of its judgment, which read as under:-

"41. The view does not conflict with the decision in J.A.C. Saldanha as earlier indicated. In Saldanha the question was whether an unsatisfactory investigation already made could be undertaken by another officer for further investigation of the offence so that the offence was properly investigated as required by law and it was not to prevent the investigation of an offence. The Single Directive has the effect of restraining recording of FIR and initiation of investigation and not of proceeding with investigation as in Saldanha. No authority to permit control of statutory powers exercised before us except K. Veeraswami which we have already distinguished. The view we take accords not only with reason but also with the very purpose of the law as it is in consonance with the basic tenet of the rule of law."

"42. Once the jurisdiction is conferred on the CBI to investigate an offence by virtue of notification under Section 3 of the Act, the powers of investigation are governed by the statutory provisions and they cannot be estopped or curtailed by any executive instruction issued under Section 4(1) thereof. This result follows from the fact that conferment of jurisdiction is under Section 3 of the Act and exercise of powers of investigation is by virtue of the statutory provisions governing investigation of offences. It is settled that statutory jurisdiction cannot be subject to executive control.

43. There is no similarity between a mere executive order requiring prior permission or sanction for investigation of the offence and the sanction needed under the statute for prosecution. The requirement of sanction for prosecution being provided in the very statute which enacts the offence, the sanction for prosecution is a prerequisite for the court to take cognizance of the offence. In the absence of any statutory requirement of prior permission or sanction for investigation, it cannot be imposed as a condition precedent for initiation of the investigation once jurisdiction is conferred on the CBI to investigate the offence by virtue of the notification under Section 3 of the Act. The word "superintendence" in Section 4(1) of the Act in the context must be construed in a manner consistent with the other provisions of the Act and the general statutory powers of investigation which govern investigation even by the CBI. The necessity of previous sanction for prosecution is provided in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Section 19 of the 1988 Act) without which no court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 5 of that Act. There is no such previous sanction for investigation provided for either in the Prevention of Corruption Act or the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act or in any other statutory provision. The above is the only manner in which Section 4(1) of the Act can be harmonised with Section 3 and the other statutory provisions.

44. The Single Directive has to be examined in this background. The law does not classify offenders differently for treatment thereunder, including investigation of offences and prosecution for offences, according to their status in life. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner in accordance with law, which is equal in its application to everyone. The Single Directive is applicable only to certain persons above the specified level who are described as "decision-making officers". The question is whether any distinction can be made for them for the purpose of investigation of an offence of which they are accused.

45. Obviously, where the accusation of corruption is based on direct evidence and it does not require any inference to be drawn depending on the decision-making process, there is no rational basis to classify them differently. In other words, if the accusation be of bribery which is supported by direct evidence of acceptance of illegal gratification by them, including trap cases, it is obvious that no other factor is relevant and the level or status of the offender is irrelevant. It is for this reason that it was contended that such cases, i.e. of bribery, including trap cases, are outside the scope of the Single Directive. After some debate at the Bar, no serious attempt was made by the learned Attorney General to support inclusion within the Single Directive of cases in which the offender is alleged to be in possession of disproportionate assets. It is clear that the accusation of possession of disproportionate assets by a person is also based on direct evidence and no factor pertaining to the expertise of decisionmaking is involved therein. We have, therefore, no doubt that the Single Directive cannot include within its ambit cases of possession of disproportionate assets by the offender. The question now is only with regard to cases other than those of bribery, including trap cases, and of possession of disproportionate assets being covered by the Single Directive."

Finally, in para 58 of the said judgment, the Apex Court gave certain directions granting statutory status to the Central Vigilance Commission and in clause 12 of the said paragraph 58 observed as under:-

"12. The CBI Manual based on statutory provisions of the CrPC provides essential guidelines for the CBI's functioning. It is imperative that the CBI adheres scrupulously to the provisions in the Manual in relation to its investigative functions, like raids, seizure and arrests. Any deviation from the established procedure should be viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken against the officials concerned."

The Apex Court finally struck down Directive No.4.7(3) of the Single Directive.

13. Thereafter, the Joint Committee on the Central Vigilance Commission Bill, 1999 made following observations regarding section 6-A of the DSPE Act

"41. The Committee note that many witnesses who appeared before the Committee had expressed the need to protect the bonafide actions at the decision making level. At present there is no provision in the Bill for seeking prior approval of the Commission or the head of the Department etc. for registering a case against a person of the decision making level. As such, no protection is available to the persons at the decision making level. In this regard, the Committee note that earlier, the prior approval of the Government was required in the form of a 'Single Directive' which was set aside by the Supreme Court. The Committee feel that such a protection should be restored in the same format which was there earlier and desire that the power of giving prior approval for taking action against a senior officer of the decision making level should be vested with the Central Government by making appropriate provision in the Act. The Committee, therefore, recommend that Clause 27 of the Bill be accordingly amended so as to insert a new section 6A to the DSPE Act, 1946, to this effect."

Therefore, after the Single Directive was struck down, section 6-A was inserted in the DSPE Act in order to ensure that statutory provision is made in the said Act.

14. In the context of rival submissions, therefore, and keeping in view the background under which section 6-A was introduced into the Act, it will have to be seen what should be the interpretation which has to be given to the said section 6-A of the DSPE Act.

15. Keeping in view the background before inclusion of section 6-A in the DSPE Act, the words 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot' will have to be interpreted.

16. In my view, the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicants on this aspect is without any substance. The case of the applicants falls under section 6-A(2) and, therefore, the bar of no inquiry or investigation without prior approval of the Central Government would not operate in cases falling under section 6-A(2) because the said subsection (2) starts with non obstante clause which reads "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1).......".The non obstante clause, therefore clearly reveals that bar of inquiry or investigation without prior approval of the Central Government would not apply to cases falling under section 6-A(2). If the said section 6-A is read as a whole, it can be seen that the provision makes a clear distinction between two categories of cases viz 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot' and all other cases. In respect of all other cases not falling within the ambit of the expression 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot', no inquiry or investigation can be made without prior approval of the Central Government, whereas in cases falling under sub-section (2), inquiry and investigation is permissible without obtaining prior approval of the Central Government.

17. The crux of the entire case, therefore, would depend on the interpretation of the words 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot'. According to the applicants, the words 'on the spot' would mean chance arrest on the spot where there is no time at all to take prior approval. On the other hand, it is the case of CBI that the meaning of the said term covers cases where there is direct evidence of corruption such as 'in trap cases' or 'in cases of assets being disproportionate to the known sources of income'.

18. Since the entire controversy hinges on the interpretation of the said words 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot', it would be relevant to keep in mind the observation of the Supreme Court in respect of the interpretation of the words. The Apex Court has cited with approval the following passage which is to be found from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statute (12th Edition page 76) which reads as under:-

"The words of statute, when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, and the object to be attained."

The Courts have declined to be bound by letter which frustrates the patent purpose of the statute. The Apex Court in M/s New India Mills Ltd vs. Commissioner of Sale Tax, Bihar 1963 SC 1207 has observed as under:-

"It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statute that expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonised with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature."

Similarly, the Apex Court in Carew and Company Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 2260 has observed that when two interpretations are feasible, the Court would prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses mischief as Legislature envisioned. At the same time, it has been held that interpretation should not be such that would do violence to the plain language used by rewriting the section or substituting the words in place of actual words used by the Legislature. In M. Pentiah and others vs Muddala Veeramallappa and others AIR 1961 SC 1107, the Supreme Court cited with approval the observations of Denning J, who observed in Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. vs. Asher 1949 Vol. 2 ALL ER 155 at page 1964 that "when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature."

"A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases."

19. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court in regard to interpretation of expressions and words in the statute, it will have to be seen what meaning has to be attributed to the said expression. In my view, the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ashok Mundargi appearing for the applicant Mr. Bali and the learned Counsel Mr. A.H.H. Ponda appearing for the other applicants about interpretation of the words 'on the spot' meaning immediate arrest, cannot be accepted. The submission made by the learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Khambata that section 6-A substituted the Single Directive also cannot be accepted.

20. Firstly, on a plain reading of section 6-A, it can be seen that sub-section (1) grants complete protection to the employees of the Central Government falling under category 6A(1)(a) & (b) from being subjected to any inquiry or investigation before prior approval of the Central Government is obtained. On the other hand, sub-section (2) takes away that protection to certain classes of cases viz. 'cases involving arrest of a person on the spot'. Therefore, though complete protection is granted in certain types of cases under sub-section (1) of section 6-A, that protection is taken away in cases falling in that particular category which fall in the said expression. It has to be considered what are those cases involving arrest of a person on the spot. In my view, the words 'on the spot' cannot be construed in the context of time dimension as suggested by Mr. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of other applicants. In my view, the said expression would clearly denote that where there is direct evidence of corruption available against the employee of the Central Government, he could be arrested on the spot on the basis of such direct evidence. For example, in a trap case, CBI is not prohibited from making inquiry or investigation and register an FIR, leading to the arrest of the accused in the trap laid for that purpose, without seeking approval from the Central Government.

21. In my view, the said expression, for the purpose of interpretation, cannot be split in two parts and the words 'on the spot' cannot be taken out of the context. Both the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants precisely made an attempt to split the said expression and only interpret the words 'on the spot' in isolation. For that purpose, they have relied on the dictionary meaning of the words 'on the spot' and contended that only in cases where there is a chance information where there is no time to take approval of the Central Government only in such emergent cases, such a person can be arrested on the spot and requirement of prior approval would not be necessary. In my view, if such interpretation is made, it would render the purpose for which sub-section (2) was inserted, nugatory because employees of the rank of Joint Secretary and above normally would not accept bribe on the spot which may happen in the case of traffic constable or ticket collector or such other categories of employees. Therefore, if the said expression is interpreted in a narrow manner as sought to be argued by the Counsel for the applicants, the very object of the Legislature in inserting the said sub-section (2) would be frustrated. The said expression, therefore, has to be read as a whole in the context in which it has been made and the purpose and object which it seeks to achieve. The purpose of inserting section 6-A is obviously to grant some protection to employees of the Central Government above a particular rank to a certain extent but not to grant blanket protection by sub-section 6-A(1) and to carve out exception by using the said expression. Further, it can be seen that the words used are 'cases involving' and not just the 'case involved'. Therefore, the section obviously includes various cases which are included in the said expression.

22. It is further sought to be argued that the word 'involving' used in the said expression would mean cases resulting in arrest based on direct evidence. Reliance is placed by the respondent - CBI on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Duni Chand Rataria 1955 AIR 182, (supra) [para 16]. On the other hand, Mr. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of applicants Dalmia & another submitted that if the interpretation suggested by the respondent - CBI is accepted, it would have a nullifying effect on section 6-A. He submitted that the said interpretation ignores the words 'on the spot' in the same phrase. The judgment on which reliance is placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General in Duni Chand Rataria 1955 AIR 182, (supra) is sought to be distinguished. It is submitted that the Supreme Court observed that the word 'involving' in the context means resulting in and this condition would be satisfied if the chain contracts as entered into in the market resulted in actual delivery of possession of goods in the ultimate analysis. It is, therefore, submitted that the word 'involving' in any statute would have to be understood in the context in which it is used, and may not necessarily meaning 'leading to'. In this context, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Additional Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association AIR 1980 SC 387, [para 14] and another judgment of the Supreme Court in The Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust v/s IT Commr Mysore AIR 1970 Mysore 285. It is submitted that the provisions of the DSPE Act, being a Special Act, have to be interpreted narrowly. Its provisions cannot be interpreted to confer authority ex post facto, by a subsequent arrest, though there is no such provision in the section. It is submitted that this ex post facto validation is untenable. It is submitted that it is not necessary that in all cases there would be arrest at the trap stage.

The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondent - CBI sought to distinguish the two judgments of the Supreme Court on which the reliance was placed by the Counsel for the applicants, contending that both these cases were under the Income-tax Act. It is submitted that, in the first case, the Court was interpreting the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity of profit' occurring at the end of the definition of 'charitable purpose' while in the second case the Supreme Court was looking at the effect of the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity of profit' on the definition of 'charitable purpose' under section 2(15). It is submitted that in the first case, the Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation of the expression and adopted contextual interpretation and, in the second case it held that the word 'involve' was of a wide import and, therefore, it held that involvement of profit should be such degree or to such an extent so as to enable to infer the real object of the trust.

23. The word 'involve', according to the Shorter Oxford dictionary, means to 'enwrap in anything, to enfold or envelop, to contain or imply'. In my view, as mentioned hereinabove, the words 'involving' or 'on the spot' cannot be read in isolation and the entire expression has to be read in the context of the provisions of section 6-A and the object for which they have been used. The object, obviously, is to carve out an exception to cases where protection is given to those employees under sub-section (1) and to bring certain cases mentioned in the said expression out of the purview of the protection granted by sub-section (1). The object, therefore, is not to give blanket protection to the employees referred to in section 6-A(1)(a) & (b) and, therefore, if a question is posed as to which are the cases involving arrest of a person on the spot, the answer obviously would be the cases similar to trap cases. Therefore, in my view, the said expression, if read as a whole, clearly would mean the cases where there is direct evidence of corruption and where there is direct demand for illegal gratification as laid down under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the judgments on which reliance is placed by both the sides, since, in these judgments, the interpretation of the word 'involving' alone is considered in the facts of the said case. The submissions made by both the Counsel for the applicants, therefore, on the interpretation of the words 'involving' and 'on the spot', cannot be accepted.

24. It has been further argued that the rules and regulations of CBI have statutory force and reliance is placed on para 58, direction No.12 in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain 1998 (1) SCC 226 (supra) where the Supreme Court gave a direction as follows:-

"12. The CBI Manual based on statutory provisions of the CrPC provides essential guidelines for the CBI's functioning. It is imperative that the CBI adheres scrupulously to the provisions in the Manual in relation to its investigative functions, like raids, seizure and arrests. Any deviation from the established procedure should be viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken against the officials concerned."

Reference thereafter is made to Rule 10.6 of the CBI Crime Manual and more particularly to the following portion:-

"10.6........prior permission of the Government should be taken before enquiry/investigation as required under Section 6-A of the DSPE Act except the case where the registration is followed by immediate arrest of the accused........."

In my view, the said submission is also without any substance. The Apex Court struck down the relevant portion of the Single Directive essentially because they were executive guidelines and they were contrary to the statutory provisions of the DSPE Act and, thereafter, section 6-A was inserted in the DSPE Act. Since section 6-A is a statutory provision, it will always override the CBI Crime Manual even if it is held to have statutory force by the Apex Court since section 6-A is a substantive provision under the DSPE Act. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the applicants, therefore, is unsustainable on this point. At the same time, in my view, the submission made by the Additional Solicitor General that the Supreme Court had made an exception to certain class of cases to which the Single Directive could apply also would not be of any assistance for the purpose of interpreting section 6-A of the DSPE Act. It has to be borne in mind, that the Apex Court has made observations in paragraphs 41 to 46 in Vineet Narain 1998 (1) SCC 226 (supra) while considering the validity of the Single Directive.

25. The Apex Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others (2005 ) 4 SCC 649 has observed in paras 254, 255 & 256 as under:-

"Precedent

254. Are we bound hands and feet by Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002) 5 SCC 111? The answer to the question must be found in the law of precedent. A decision, it is trite, should not be read as a statute. A decision is an authority for the questions of law determined by it. Such a question is determined having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. While applying the ratio, the court may not pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. A judgment, as is well known, must be read in its entirety and the observations made therein should receive consideration in the light of the questions raised before it. (See Punjab National Bank v. R.L. Vaid (2004) 7 SCC 698).

255. Although decisions are galore on this point, we may refer to a recent one in State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal (2004) 5 SCC 155 wherein this Court held : (SCC p. 172, para 19)

"It is trite that any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which it was used."

256. It is further well settled that a decision is not an authority for a proposition which did not fall for its consideration. It is also a trite law that a point not raised before a court would not be an authority on the said question. In A-One Granites v. State of U.P. (2001) 3 SCC 537 it is stated as follows : (SCC p. 543, para 11)

"11. This question was considered by the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 and it was laid down that when non consideration was given to the question, the decision cannot be said to be binding and precedents sub silentio and without arguments are of no moment"

[See also State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139, Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 (SCC para 20), Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111, Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270, Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate (2005) 2 SCC 489 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2005) 2 SCC 42, See para 42.]"

26. In the present case, we are concerned with the interpretation of the said expression which is found in subsection (2) of section 6-A. Since the Apex Court has made those observations in the context of determining the validity of the Single Directive, those observations, in my view, therefore, cannot be applied or used for the purpose of interpreting the said expression found in sub-section (2).

27. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants thereafter submitted that the provisions of section 42 of the NDPS Act are similar to section 6-A and, for that purpose, reliance is placed on the interpretation of the said section 42 before and after amendment by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Karnail Singh (2009) 8 SCC 539 : [2010 ALL SCR 968] (supra). In my view, the said submission also cannot be accepted. The provisions of NDPS Act pertaining to section 42 are in the context of recording prior information and reducing it into writing and sending it to the superior officer forthwith. There was difference of opinion between the two judgments of the Apex Court and in Karnail Singh 2010 ALL SCR 968 (supra), the Supreme Court had considered the ratio of the two judgments after taking into consideration the provisions of section 42 before amendment and after amendment. The provisions of section 42 of the NDPS Act regarding search and seizure are made in the context of the provisions of the NDPS Act and, therefore, it will not be possible to rely on the said provisions for the purpose of interpreting the words 'on the spot' or the said expression which is used in sub-section (2) of section 6-A of DSPE Act.

28. Lastly, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.R. Kishore 142 (2007) Delhi Law Times 702 (supra). The Delhi High Court, while examining the provisions of section 6-A(2), came to the conclusion that non obstante provision was applicable only in respect of cases involving arrest of a person on the spot and, therefore, since the basic ingredient of arrest on the spot in the said case was missing, section 6-A(2) would not apply and, therefore, the requirement of prior approval as stipulated in section 6-A(1) was not diluted or dispensed with. I, with utmost respect, disagree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on the question of interpretation which has been given by the learned Single Judge to the words 'on the spot' or to the said expression which is found in sub-section (2). Once it is held that the said expression used in sub-section (2) includes trap cases, then non obstante clause would apply and there would be no bar for the CBI authorities to make inquiry or investigation before arresting the accused in a trap case.

29. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to entertain these applications filed by the applicants for quashing the FIR by exercising inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

30. Criminal Application No. 2013 of 2010 and Criminal Application No.1913 of 2010 are, therefore, dismissed. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Since both these Criminal Applications are disposed off, Criminal Application No.328 of 2010 in Criminal Application No.2013 of 2010 does not survive and it is accordingly disposed off.

Applications dismissed.