Writ Petition No.619 of 2011

17th December, 2012

Petitioner Counsel: Mr.K.J. Presswala , Sandeep Goyal
Respondent Counsel: Mulla & Mulla,Mr.Satish Upadhyay

Cases Cited:
Nisha Vs. Punjab National Bank, AIR 2000 Delhi 439 [Para 13,37]
Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works Vs. the Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P., AIR 1968 SC 102 [Para 19,25]
Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1023 [Para 19,25]
The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Jayantilal Dharamsey & Ors., AIR 2001 BOM 26 [Para 23,25]
Sakuru Vs.Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279 [Para 25]
Smt. Sushila Devi Vs. Ramanandan Prasad and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 177 [Para 25]
Nityanand M. Joshi and Anr. Vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 1187 [Para 25]
Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Ors. etc., AIR 1969 SC 1335 [Para 25]
M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr, AIR 1981 SC 670 [Para 32]
Samantha Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3297 [Para 32]
Atmaram Properties Ltd. Vs. Allahabad Bank, 2004 ILR Delhi 519 [Para 33]

JUDGMENT

-Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made returnable forthwith.

2. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are praying for a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records and proceedings of the case culminating in the eviction order of the appellate authority dated 31st January 2007 and to quash and set aside the (I) Notice of Termination dated 10th/14th February 1995, (ii) the Notice of Eviction dated 19th April 1999 (iii) Order of 2nd respondent and (iv) the order of appellate authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, dated 31st January 2007 in Misc.Appeal No.261 of 2001.

3. The proceedings are under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. (for short PPE Act). The petitioner states that it was a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and continued to be so till the eviction order was passed by the Estate Officer (respondent No.2). It has its office on 9th floor Air India Building, Nariman Point, Mumbai admeasuring 2645.40 sft. since 1st August 1975 and another office on 19th floor of the same building since 16th February 1979 admeasuring 10484.16 sft. The building belongs to Air India Limited - first respondent and these premises were allotted on leave and licence basis to the petitioner.

4. Equally, the first respondent is incorporated as Government Company under the same Act having its registered office at Air India Building, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400 021. It is the owner of the Building in which the premises allotted to the petitioners are situate.

5. A notice dated 10th/14th February 1995 was issued by the Respondent No.1 to the petitioner, terminating their rights to occupy their premises on the ground that they were required by Air India for its own use.

6. The letter of Termination dated 10th/14th February 1995 was replied to by the petitioner by its letter dated 23rd February 1995. From the said letter of termination dated 10th/14th February 1995 and the reply of the petitioners dated 23rd February 1995 it will be seen that ex facie there was a dispute regarding the service charges per sq.foot, which were payable by the petitioner to respondent No.1 and that the termination notice, which runs into several pages, does not even have a whisper of the ground of security. Based on this Notice of termination dated 10th/14th February 1995 given by respondent No.1, the second respondent's predecessor, one Shri Rokkala Ranga Rao, Assistant Director, Legal & Administration, as Estate Officer issued a Notice dated 3rd November 1995 under section 4 of the PPE Act. In the said Notice the Estate Officer rightly did not mention any ground of security as the basis on which he had formed the opinion that the petitioners should be evicted from the premises as the Termination Notice dated 10th/14th February 1995 did not contain a whisper regarding security. The said notice was replied to by the petitioners and no further proceedings took place before the Estate Officer, except for another show cause notice which was issued under section 7 of the said Act on 6th January 1996 calling upon the petitioners to show cause why it should not be asked to pay damages of a sum of Rs.1,91,16,637/- after setting off the sum of Rs.15,62,420/- being the licence fee and service charges paid by the petitioners as per the leave and licence agreement as shown in Schedule II for alleged unauthorised use and occupation of the premises from 1st April 1995 to 31st December 1995 at the rate of Rs.175/- per month.

7. Thereafter, the petitioners were shocked and surprised to receive another notice dated 19th april 1999 under section 4 of the said Act from another Estate Officer (second respondent) who was appointed in place of the earlier Estate Officer. In this notice, the said new Estate Officer, the respondent No.2, for the first time after the lapse of almost six years of the Bomb Blast which took place in 1993 added the ground of security as one of the reasons why he was of the opinion that the petitioners should be evicted from the premises. It is pertinent to note that although the said 2nd respondent relies on the termination notice given by the 1st respondent dated 10th/14th February 1995, for coming to the opinion that the petitioner should be evicted, it is not understood where from he formed the opinion that the premises were required from the security point of view. This ground was unilaterally added by the respondent No.2 without any basis whatsover and without there being any material before Estate Officer for him to form this opinion as the Estate Officer can only form his opinion on the basis of the material which led to the issuance of the notice of termination by respondent No.1. The notice is therefore void as the jurisdictional facts did not exist at the time of issuance of the notice. There was no material present before respondent No.2 to enable him to form the opinion that the petitioners were in unauthorised occupation. Hence, the notice and all subsequent proceedings and the eviction order are all vitiated.

8. The petitioners filed their detailed reply/written statement dated 19th June 1999 to the said notice and inter alia contended that present proceedings are not valid in law in view of the earlier proceedings bearing No.8 of 1995 which have been allowed to lapse or not to reach its logical conclusions of either confirming the show cause notice and/or dismissing the same. The petitioners also contended that they are a Government Undertaking and the dispute between them and respondent No.1 should be referred to a High Power Committee for Arbitration and Reconciliation. It was further contended by the petitioners that even after the Bomb Blast which took place in March 1993, the respondent No.1 has let out premises to various parties including Mashreque Bank and Citi Bank on the ground floor of Air India building. The petitioners also contended that the eviction notice is directly contrary to and in gross defiance of the guidelines and instructions issued by the Government of India in its office Memorandum dated 19th February 1992 regarding the manner in which said Act is to be enforced and the persons against whom it is to be invoked.

9. The petitioners submit that pursuant to the notice at Exh.E, the proceedings commenced before the 2nd respondent for eviction of the petitioners. Evidence was recorded and finally the Estate Officer, 2nd respondent, passed the impugned order of eviction on the 6th day of December 2000. From the said order, the petitioners filed a statutory appeal under section 9 of the Act before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai being Misc.Appeal No.261 of 2001. The said appeal was decided by the appellate authority on 31st January 2007. A certified copy was applied for on 2nd February 2007 and the same was ready and received by the petitioners only on 22nd February 2007.

10. The petitioners submit that the 2nd Eviction Notice issued by 2nd respondent dated 19th April 1999 is totally illegal, bad in law and without jurisdiction on the grounds that the Estate Officer is a statutory post which may be held by any officer who is designated from time to time and under section 4 the Estate Officer had to form a prima facie opinion that a party was in unauthorised occupation and was required to be evicted from the premises. The said opinion was already formed by the 1st Estate Officer which led him to issue the notice of eviction dated 3rd November 1995 (Exh.D) on the basis of the letter of Termination issued by the first respondent dated 10th/14th February 1995. Once this is done, t he authority of an Estate Officer to issue a show cause notice is exhausted. it is not correct to state that since the Estate Officer had to form an opinion, a fresh appointee would have to form a fresh opinion and issue a fresh notice on the spacious plea that the satisfaction had to be of the particular person holding that post and that only that particular person had to complete the inquiry if he had given the notice. In any event, assuming without admitting, that it was to err on the side of caution that the second respondent issued a fresh notice, it was not possible for him to rely on fresh material for coming to the prima facie opinion that the petitioners were required to be evicted on the additional ground of security. This clearly shows that the Estate Officer, the 2nd respondent herein was trying to take advantage of the situation of the change of the Estate Officer to add additional grounds for eviction of the petitioner and was thereby trying to improve the case of the respondent No.1. A bare perusal of the letter of termination dated 10th/14th February 1995 (Exh.A) shows that there was not a whisper regarding security in the said notice apart from the fact that there was no definite statement that the additional premises were required by the 1st respondent for their own use. All that the notice stated was that "It has been decided by our Management to retain the said premises ourselves for our own use." This did not necessarily mean that the 1st respondent had need for additional space. In any event, it is submitted that the 2nd notice is not based on any material. There was no basis for issuance of the 2nd notice. The 2nd respondent is required by law to be satisfied that a valid reason exists for eviction. There was no material before the 2nd respondent so as to enable him to form an opinion. Hence, in the absence of jurisdictional facts, respondent No.2's action of issuance of 2nd Notice and instant proceedings are all void ab initio. Hence, the eviction order is also bad and liable to be quashed.

11. After the parties appeared before the Estate Officer who passed an order on 6th December 2000 and directted the petitioners to quit and hand over quiet and vacant possession of the said premises within 15 days of the date of publication of this order and in the event of their refusal or failure to comply therewith, they were liable to be evicted by use of force.

12. The petitioners being aggrieved and dissatisfied with this order, preferred Appeal No.261 of 2001 invoking jurisdiction of the appellate authority under section 9 of the PPE Act. The appellate authority in this case is Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai. The Principal Judge by detailed order dismissed the appeal.

13. Aggrieved by the above orders, this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr.Presswala, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, while not disputing that because of the eviction orders passed, the physical possession of the premises has been taken over by the respondent Air India. However, the controversy is still at large. According to him, the basic controversy is that both the petitioner and the respondent Air India are public sector corporations. The provisions of the PPE Act cannot be utilised to evict another Government Corporation. It is not intended by the Parliament that the said Act should be invoked by a Government Company like Air India against the Government company like petitioner herein. The object behind enacting the Act was the dominant public interest of the Government so that Government and Government companies and Corporation may be able to obtain the premises occupied by the private parties and individuals unauthorisedly, in an expeditious manner. This being the sole object, the provisions of the Act and summary procedure provided therein can never be used against any Government body and it would be preposterous to suggest that public interest will be served and fulfilled in evicting Government body. Mr.Presswala submits, the position is that the petitioner was a Government company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act at the relevant time. It being a Petro Chemical Corporation, by virtue of section 617 of the Companies Act, it is a public enterprise. A public enterprise cannot be said to be in unauthorised occupation of public premises. The Act cannot be utilised to evict the petitioner herein. Mr.Presswala has relied upon a judgement of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Nisha Vs. Punjab National Bank, A.I.R. 2000 Delhi 439.

14. In the alternative Mr.Presswala submits that the show cause notice in this case has been issued based on the act of terminating the occupation of the premises by letter dated 10th/14th February 1995. There is a termination effected with effect from 31st March 1995 and the occupation of the premises is termed as unauthorised but the proceedings do not rest on this termination. The proceedings are on the footing that Air India requires the premises for their own use and occupation as also there is security risk and threat to the building and, therefore, the petitioner is liable to be evicted.

15. The petitioner pointed out that the eviction notice of 10th/14th February 1995 resulted in filing of eviction case No.8 of 1995. However, these eviction proceedings were not pursued by Air India. After three and half years, another eviction notice has been issued on 19th April 1999 and eviction case No.10 of 1999 was filed. This show cause notice could not have been issued simply because it relies upon the contents of the earlier notice. There is nothing in the show cause notice dated 19th April 1999 which would enable the Estate Officer to proceed to evict the petitioners. Once, the proceedings in relation to identical show cause notice were initiated and not pursued, then, a fresh notice on same grounds could not have been issued and the proceedings, therefore, are bad in law, as the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to commence and continue them. Further, the ground that there is a security risk is equally fallacious because the eviction is sought only to take advantage of the current market conditions. It has no relation to the security aspect because as pointed out by the petitioners in para 3 of this petition, the Air India did not deem it fit to secure eviction of all entities and units in occupation. If there was indeed a security risk on account of a bomb blast, then, the reasonable expectation is that Air India will not allow any occupant to continue in the premises. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason to seek eviction. Therefore, the eviction order should be set aside.

16. On the other issue with regard to the rate of Rs.300/- per sft. per month, there is absolutely no material. What the Estate Officer and the appellate authority failed to note is that although eviction was ordered in cases of other statutory and public corporations, the respondents have not secured their eviction and thus, large area is excluded from the entitlement of respondent Air India. Further, the so called security is also no ground because a party in the occupation of the higher floors such as the petitioner, cannot be prevented from using and occupying the premises. If the premises are on higher floors, then, there is no security risk whereas the offices on ground floor do present a security risk, is a conclusion difficult to accept and thus, the impugned order violates the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this behalf, Mr.Presswala has relied upon the examination in chief of one A.N.K.Kaimal Witness of respondent No.1.

17. On the other hand, Mr.Upadhaya learned Advocate appearing for respondent submitted that the word "person" appears in Section (4) of the PPE Act includes natural persons as well as jural person. The Company is a jural person. The Public Sector comes under the meaning of a legal entity with certain right and duties given and recognized by law. The section is silent on the issue of exclusion of Public Sector out of its purview. This Respondent states that the Petitioner has entered into Leave & License Agreement with the Respondents to use its premises for its business. If a Public Sector can enter into Leave & Licence Agreement and make payment against the occupation of premises, it can be asked to vacate the premises and make the payment of any dues like rent or damages or mesne profit. Public Sector being a juridical person can be sued by this Respondent under PPE Act after it terminates the license for its own requirement and security purpose. Respondents also can claim damages as per Section 7 of the PPE Act.

18. The Appellant has not challenged the notices under PPE Act issued by the Respondent No. 2 in appellate Court/in appropriate proceedings, rather than contested the same before the Respondent No. 2 and challenged the order of Respondent No. 2 before the Appellate Authority. It is pertinent to note that if a Public Sector Company can enter into Leave and License Agreement with another Public Sector Company, it only shows that a legal entity can enter with legal capacity into an agreement or contract and pay the rent/damages etc. in its own right. Public Sector Companies are created by law other than natural person and recognized as a legal entity or juridical person.

19. The Appellant has never raised the question of being Public Sector Company before the Estate Officer and not argued before the Appellate Authority, therefore, the Judgment cited by Appellant is not applicable in this matter, since this Judgment is against the proceedings filed by the Private Landlord against the Public Sector Company. The observations of the learned Judge of Delhi High Court is not applicable in this matter as in para 11, it is observed by the Supreme Court in the case Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works - vsthe Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. reported in AIR 1968 SC 102 that statute is an addict of legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. Therefore, it is to be construed according to the intent of those who make it. it is also observed that the duty of the Judicature is to act upon the true intention of the legislature - the mens are scententia legis. The Supreme Court also observed in another occasion that words and phrases take colour and character from the context and times and speak differently in different context and times. Since the State Trading corporation of India Ltd. and Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. being Public Sectors have been evicted from the same premises and have paid the damages which are reasonable, this petitioner is also liable to make payment of damages in the same way. Similarly in Reserve Bank of India vsPeerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1987 SC 1023 the Supreme Court, speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. echoed the principle in the following words "Interpretation must depend on the text and context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textural interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted." (para33).

20. The Respondent further submitted that the petitioner ceased to be PSU in 2002 and amalgamated with Reliance Industries Ltd. Since the Petitioner has vacated the premises in 2009; it remained for 7 years as a Private Organization in the premises. The Petitioner entered into an agreement with the 1st Respondent on 11.11.1975 and its license was renewed on three/four occasions. It was in arrears of Rs.94,53,283.20 upto December, 1994. Its agreement expired on 31st march, 1995 whereas Respondent No. 1 had issued a notice on 10th/14th February, 1995 terminating the Leave & License. In the Leave and License Agreement, Clause (x) at page 12 stated that on the expiry by efflux of time, or otherwise or sooner, determination of this license or on this Leave and License coming to an end for any reason whatsoever, neither the Licensee nor its agents shall have any right to continue to be or to enter upon the licensed premises or any part thereof. Clause (xvi) at page 17 of the Agreement further states that Lincesee was given only permissive use and occupation of the licensed premised and the Licensee shall have no exclusive right to the use and occupation of the licensed premises. The possession of the premises shall always be with the Licensor. Clause (xvii) states that the Agreement shall not be deemed to create any tenancy right or any interest in the licensed premises or any part thereof in favour of the Licensee. The Respondent has terminated the license in view of Board Meeting of Air India and direction from the Board to Air India for the termination of Leave & License of the occupants and also revision of rent in view of the prevailing market rent. The Board has authorized the Managing Director to initiate such steps to enhance the Leave & License charges paid by various Licensees. It is observed in the Order of Appellate Authority in para No. 22 of Misc. Application No. 261 of 2001 that the appellant was in arrears of Rs.11,20,21,405.90 upto 30th September, 1999. It is also correct that Respondent has given genuine reason and evidence of security threat to Air India Building, which is also observed by the Appellate Authority and its own requirement to centralize the activities of Air India and its 700 employees at one centre.

21. The Respondent has through his officiating Director, Mr. A.N.K. Kaimal, has submitted several documents related to security threat to Air India Building and proved its case that security and own requirement of the premises are the only reason of the termination of the Leave and License. It is observed by the citation submitted by the Petitioners in the case of Persis Kothawalla vs LIC of India & Anr. It is observed by the Court that principle of reasonableness and fairness is essential requirement of State action in case of Eviction under PPE Act. It is also observed that PPE Act has overriding effect on other Acts. The guidelines submitted by the Petitioner are not a bar to initiate and proceed with eviction proceedings.

22. In para No. 56, the Supreme Court in Wadia's case observed as reproduced hereunder:

23. It was argued by the Learned Counsel that LIC being a State, it is bound by the injunction contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and therefore, bound to act in a fair and reasonable manner in fixing the rent of the premises. Neither the Rent Act is applicable to LIC nor the principles of analogous to Rent Act can be made applicable to the LIC. In the case of board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai vs Jayantilal Dharmashi a Division Bench of this Court has held that no fault can be found if a Public Body like Port Trust recovers rent for its premises on the basis of market value.

24. The Respondent further urged that the guidelines issued by the Government of India have no statutory backing but it constitutes administrative instructions. It is also submitted that as far as such Government Resolutions are concerned, they were administrative guidelines or norms which were to be kept in mind by the Authority.

25. For all the above reasons, it is submitted that the writ petition be dismissed. The respondent Air India's Counsel has relied upon the following judgements:

"1. AIR 2001 Bombay 26 (The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Jayantilal Dharamsey & Ors.).

2. AIR 1987 SC 1023 (Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors.).

3. AIR 1985 SC 1279 (Sakuru Vs. Tanaji).

4. AIR 1976 SC 177 (Smt. Sushila Devi Vs. Ramanandan Prasad and Ors.).

5. AIR 1969 SC 1187 (Nityanand M. Joshi and Anr. Vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors.).

6. AIR 1968 SC 102 (The Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P) Ltd. Vs. The Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P.).

7. AIR 1969 SC 1335 (Town Municipal, Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Ors. etc.)."

26. With the assistance of learned Counsel appearing for parties, I have perused the petition and all annexures thereto, including the impugned order. It is not necessary to decide any other issue save and except dealing with the primary contention of Mr. Presswala that PPE Act should not have been invoked to evict the petitioner from the said premises as the petitioner is also a public sector enterprise or a Government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956.

27. The argument is that both the petitioner and respondent are public sector corporations. The petitioner is a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 being a company in which not less than 51% paid up share capital is held by the Central Government. Therefore, when such entity is in occupation and possession of the premises, its occupation may not enable it to rely on the definition of the term Public premises appearing in section 2(e) of the PPE Act, still, the petitioners' use and occupation is in Public Interest and for public good. Hence, it cannot be evicted therefrom by taking recourse to the summary remedy provided by the PPE Act.

28. It is not possible to accept this contention. The PPE Act 1971 is an act to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The statement of objects and reasons of the present PPE Act states that it was enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. Pertinently, the Act, as it originally stood did not debar the Government from taking recourse to Civil Court to seek reliefs provided by sections 5 and 7. However, in certain judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this section 5 was declared as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.Therefore, after considering all the judgements what the Parliament enacted is that there were serious difficulties for the Government to take expeditious action even in flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation of public premises and recovery of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation. It is therefore, considered imperative to restore a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the mandate of the Constitution and the Judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the Act came to be enacted and later on it was amended by Amendment Act 61 of 1980 and Amendment Act 35 of 1984. Thus, the Act is enacted to deal with unauthorised occupants of public premises. Section 2(c) defines the term "premises". Section 2(e) defines the term "Public Premises" and reads as under:

"2(e)"Public premises" means (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 (61 of 1980) under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat"

(2) Any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of

(i) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty one percent of the paid share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first mentioned company;

(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or a local authority established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government,

(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act;

(iv) any institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961),

(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963),

(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra Beas Management Board under subsection (6) of section 80 of that Act,

(vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union Territory,

(viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924) and

(3) in relation to the National Capital Territory of Delhi -

(i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee,

(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority, and

(iii) any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory"

29. Then comes another important definition and that in relation to section 2(e) itself. That is a definition of the term "Statutory Authority" and that is to be found in section 2(fa) and lastly what is important is section 2(g) defining "unauthorised occupation". That definition reads as under:

"2(g). "Unauthorised Occupation" in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."

30. A bare perusal of this definition together with substantive provisions would denote that the public premises means any premises owned, belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of Central Government and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation of the staff of that Secretariat. Equally, the definition means any premises belonging to, taken on lease or by or on behalf of the entities enumerated in section 2(e)(1), (2) and (3). The authority to whom the public premises belonged is a statutory authority though it may be a company or any Corporation or any University or any Institute and equally any Board of Trustees and the above enumerated entities. The Statutory Authority has been defined only to identify the authority and to clarify that the public premises belonging to companies or Corporations etc. are public premises. However, by all this, it does not mean that if the premises are in occupation of any statutory authority or any of the entities styled as or covered by section 2(e), then, such authorities cannot be evicted by another statutory authority from the public premises. For illustration, both A and B are public sector Corporations or companies in which not less than 51% of the paid up share capital is held by Central Government. "A" as a statutory authority has inducted in the public premises, "B" another Government Company or Statutory Authority. If "B" does not vacate the premises even after a notice of termination of its occupancy rights or other rights is served by A on B, thereupon, A can take recourse to PPE Act, 1971 to evict B from the public premises. There is no prohibition in law that in such cases the PPE Act cannot be taken recourse to. In these circumstances, the term "unauthorised occupation" as defined denotes that all those in possession and occupation of public premises, be it individuals or statutory bodies, can be held to be as such, if the continuance of any person of the public premises after the authority whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer under which he or it was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. A faint attempt is made by Mr.Presswala to suggest that this term will not cover a public sector Corporation like the petitioner. Mr.Presswala does not dispute that when such public sector corporation is inducted in possession and occupation of public premises, the relationship between the statutory authority and that of the occupant company is that of a lessor or lessee or licensor or licensee or a owner and occupant or tenant. If their relationship is covered by the general law and the general law permits, occupation and equally termination of such occupation and possession, then, one fails to understand as to why any public sector Corporation, continuing in occupation even after the authority to occupy the said premises has been determined or such authority has expired cannot be termed as unauthorised occupant. A Statutory Authority being the owner of the public premises if its licensee or tenant continues in occupation, despite such expiration or determination, then, it can proceed against it under PPE Act as there is no prohibition therein. In this behalf, what one can notice straight away are the chapters in the PPE Act and the order in which the sections therein have been placed. Part I of the Act contains short title and commencement and, thereafter, the definitions. Section 3 provides for appointment of Estate Officer and section 3A provides for eviction from temporary occupation. Then comes section 4 which contemplates issuance of notice to show cause against the order of eviction and followed by section 5 which deals with eviction of unauthorised occupants. Section 5A confers powers to remove unauthorised construction etc. whereas section 5B provides for demolition of unauthorised construction. There are various powers thereafter, including to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises, powers of estate officer, Appeal, finality of orders, offences and penalty, power to obtain information, liability of heirs and legal representatives, recovery of rent etc. as arrears of land revenue. Section 15 is important and it reads thus:

"15. Bar of jurisdiction:No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of

(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises; or

(b) the removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal from any public premises under section 5A; or

(c) the demolition of any building or other structure made, or ordered to be made under section 5B; or

(d) the arrears of rent payable under subsection (1) of section 7 or damages payable under subsection (2), or interest payable under subsection (2A) of that section; or

(e) the recovery of -

(i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, cattle or other animal under section 5A, or

(ii) expenses of demolition under section 5B, or

(iii)costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory authority under subsection (5) of section 9; or

(iv) any portion of such rent, damages, costs of removal, expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the Statutory authority"

31. A bare perusal of the same would indicate that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the arrears of rent payable under subsection 1 of section 7 or damages payable under subsection 2, interest payable under subsection 2A of that section.

32. This itself would indicate as to how the Legislature provided for a summary remedy to deal with unauthorised occupation of public premises. If a power to summarily evict any person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises has been conferred in widest terms and no court other than the authorities prescribed by the PPE Act have powers to deal with the case of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, then, to hold that the Act cannot be invoked to evict a public sector corporation which is in occupation of the public premises and even if such occupation is unauthorised, would be doing violence to the plain language of the Act. No construction or interpretation by which plain words or language of a statute are ignored or brushed aside can be placed on its provisions. Any interpretation by which the provisions become meaningless or susceptible or capable of being challenged as unconstitutional has to be avoided at all times. If the act gives a wide power to evict any unauthorised occupant from any public premises and no court other than the Authorities in PPE Act can take cognisance of the cases of this nature, then, it is not possible to accept the contentions of Mr.Presswala. It would mean that the Act applies to employees of the public sector corporation and they can be evicted if they are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises. In other words, an individual employee or Tenant of tenant of a public sector Corporation, if he overstays or continues to occupy the premises even after the authority to occupy the same has been determined can be evicted by taking recourse to the PPE Act by that public authority. However, if that very statutory authority is a tenant of another public sector Corporation, the landlord/ owner Public Sector Corporation will not be able to proceed against the tenant Public Corporation. The words "any person" are not confined to only Natural and will not include a artificial person. Such is not the intent of the Legislature and when it used the words "any person" and "any public premises", it in clear and unmistakable terms says that this Act can be resorted to evict all unauthorised occupants, irrespective of whether they are Natural or artificial persons. In the case of M/s.Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr., reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 670, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in paras 4, 8 and 9 held as under:

"4. In support of the appeal, Mr.Parmeshwar Rao submitted three main contentions before us. In the first place, he submitted that the provisions of the Premises Act would have no application to the present premises because the appellant could not be described as an unauthorised occupant as he had entered into possession of the premises long before they were purchased by the LIC. It was argued that the condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Estate Officer was that the appellant must be an unauthorised occupant, and if the possession of the appellant was lawful, though the property changed hands subsequently, the appellant could not be dubbed as an unauthorised occupant. In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Rajkumar Devinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1973) 2 SCR 166: (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 66). We have gone through the decision cited before us and we find that the provisions of the Punjab Act, which was the subject matter of interpretation by this Court in that case, were substantially and materially different from section 2(2)(g) of the Premises Act which defines unauthorised occupation. Mr.Rao, however, strongly relied on the following observations made by this Court in the case supra:

"If the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the Government, it could not be said that the appellants entered into possession of public premises, for, at the time when they were in occupation of the property was not public premises. Then, it was either the joint family property or the property of the Maharaja, namely, Yadavindra Singh. The property was not public premises before it was sold to the Government. If these observations of this Court are torn from the context they may presumably support the argument of the appellant but we have to read these observations in the light of the specific provisions of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the "Punjab Act"). Relevant portion of section 3 of that Act may be extracted thus:

"For purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises:

(a) where he has whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise then under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant." (emphasis ours)."

"8. In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases we would test the position in the present case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned, it operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. That the authorities to which the Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the Counsel for the appellant as even in the case of Northern India Catterers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Punjab (1967) 3 SCR 399: (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1581) such authorities were held to form a class and, therefore, immune from challenge on Article 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Article 14 as held by this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1975) 1 SCR 1 : (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2009)"

"9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. it would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act."

In this context, the following pertinent observations and conclusions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Samantha Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3297 must be noted. The Supreme Court in paras 54, 55 and 62 has observed as under :

"54. The word 'person' in the interplay of juristic thought is either natural or artificial. Natural persons are human beings while artificial persons are Corporations. Corporations are either Corporation aggregate or Corporation sole. In "English Law" by Kenneth Smith and Denis Keenan (Seventh Edition) at page 127, it is staled that "[L]egal personality is not restricted to human beings. In fact various bodies and associations of persons can, by forming a corporation to carry out their functions, create an organisation with a range of rights and duties not dissimilar to many of those possessed by human beings. In English law such corporations are formed either by charter, statute or registration under the Companies Acts; there is also the common law concept of the Corporation Sole". At page 163, it is further stated that "[T]he Crown is the executive head in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, and government departments and civil servants act on behalf of the Crown". In "Salmond on Jurisprudence" by P. J. Fitzgerald [Twelfth Edition], at page 66, it is stated that "[A] legal person is any subjectmatter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personality beyond the class of human beings is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination...".At page 72, it is further amplified that "[T]he King himself, however, is in law to mere mortal man. He has a double capacity, that is to say, a corporation sole. The visible wearer of the crown is merely the living representative and agent for the time being of this invisible and underlying persona ficta, in whom by law the powers and prerogatives of the government of this realm are vested". In "Jurisprudence" by R. W. M. Dias [Fifth Edition], at page 265, it is stated that"..............the value of personifying group activities is further reduced by the fact that courts have evolved ways of dealing with such activities without resorting to the device of persona".

55. In Madras Electric Corporation v. Boarland (1955) 1 All ER 753, relied upon by Shri Dhawan, it has been held that the word 'person' in its ordinary and natural sense includes Crown. The same view was reiterated in I. R. Commissioner v. Whiteworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. (1958) 2 All ER 91 at 108. On the concept of "legal personality" and the concept of "person", in "Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence" by Keeton (1949 Edition) relied on by Shri Rajeev Dhawan, in Chapter XIII at page 150, it is stated that in modern law, this personification by law is confined to certain definite limits, although this restriction is based, not upon principle, but upon convenience. In law, however, we are concerned with legal persons, whether they are natural, i.e., human beings capable of sustaining rights and duties, or artificial or juristic, i.e., groups or things to which the law attributes the capacity to bear rights and duties, Legal personality is itself nothing but a fiction, in so far as it is intended to imply no more than that a legal person is simply a complex of legal rights and duties. At page 151, it is stated that juristic persons may be defined as those persons or groups of persons which the law deems capable of holding rights and duties, with a few exceptions. At page 152, he has amplified that corporation sole is a juristic person and it succinctly describes the position in modern English law. The conception of separate personality attaching to the successive occupants of a particular office is as valid juristically as the conception of incorporation of the members of a group. The Law of Property Act, 1925, Section 180 contents itself with addition briefly, that a corporation sole may now hold personal property with rights and duties. At page 154, it is stated that principles applying to corporation aggregate are not fully applicable to corporation sole. "Court regarded the corporation sole not as a person, but as a device for the transmission of rights from one natural person to another". He quotes Black-stone: that "Corporation sole consists of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them legal capacities and advantages in particular that of perpetuity, which in the natural persons could not have had. In this sense the King is a corporation sole". At page 155, it is further stated that the law, therefore, has wisely ordained, that the person, qua tenus person, shall never die, any more than the King; by making him and his successors a corporation sole. By which means all the original rights of a personage are preserved entirely to the successors. At page 169, it is stated that the reason for King personality, a corporate sole, is that corporate personality is a technical device, applied for a multitude of very divers aggregations, institutions and transactions, whereas each of many theories has been conceived for a particular type of juristic personality. None of them foresaw the extent to which the device of incorporation would be used in modern business, or we may add, to cloak the activities of some branch of Government.

62. In Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta (1967) 2 SCR 170: (AIR 1967 SC 997) a Bench of nine Judges of this Court was to consider whether the State of West Bengal, when it was carrying on trade, as owner and occupier of the market at Calcutta, without obtaining the licence, was bound by the Calcutta Municipality Act or, by necessary implication, was exempted to obtain licence. A complaint against the State, for its failure to obtain licence was filed by the Municipal Corporation. It was contended that the State is not a person under Section 218 of the said Act. Per Majority, it was held that the Common Law rule of construction that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly intended, bound to be a State, was held to be not acceptable as a rule of construction. It was held that the archaic rule based on prerogative and protection of the Crown has no relevance to a democratic republic. It is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the doctrine of equality and introduces conflicts and anomalies. The normal construction, viz., that an enactment applies to citizens as well as to the State, unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution. Under the Act there is a distinction between fine imposed under Section 537 and under Section 541 of the Act, the fines under Section 537 are in respect of offences enumerated therein they certainly go to the coffers of the States. In respect of such offences it may be contended that, as the fines paid reach the State itself, there is an implication that the State was not bound by the Sections enumerated therein, for a person who receives the fine, cannot be the same person who pays it. This incongruity may lead to the said necessary implication. Another Bench of nine Judges in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1963 SC 1811 at 1817 per majority interpreted the word 'citizen' in a broader perspective. In Union of India v. Jubbi , AIR 1968 SC 360 at 362 a three-Judge Bench had held that a statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen, unless, it expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from its operations. If the Legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Act to the State, it could have easily stated in Section 11 itself or by a separate provision that the Act was not to be applied to the Union or to the lands held by it. In the absence of such a provision, in a constitutional set up like the one we have in this country, and of which the overriding basis is the broad concept of equality, free from any arbitrary discrimination, the presumption would be that a law of which the avowed object is to free the tenant of landlordism and to ensure to him security of tenure would bind all landlords irrespective of whether such a landlord is an ordinary individual or the Union. In that case, it was contended that Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 and Section 11 thereof does not apply to the land held by the Government. This Court rejected that contention. It would, therefore, be settled law that the question whether or not the word 'person' used in a statute would include the State has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Act, the aim and its object and the purpose the Act seeks to subserve. There is no reason to consider the word 'person' in a narrow sense. It must be construed in a broader perspectivity, unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, exempts the State from the operation of the Act as against the State and would include "State Government". Property of the State how dealt with under the Constitution."

33. Mr.Presswala has placed heavy reliance on the decisions of Delhi High Court in the case of Atmaram Properties Ltd. Vs. Allahabad Bank, reported in 2004 ILR Delhi 519 (writ petition No.3800 of 1991 decided on 16th August 2004.) The learned Judge in this decision as held in paras 8 and 9 as under:

"8. It is apparent from the reading of the aforesaid that the object is to evict the unauthorised occupants without recourse to civil suits for recovery of possession. An unauthorised occupant is defined in Section 2(g) of the PP Act which is as under:

"(g) "unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever."

"9. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that the unauthorised occupation is an occupation by any person of the public premises. This is not a reference to either the Central Government or the Corporation as referred to in the definition of "Public premises". It is thus apparent that section 2(g) does not include the Government or the Corporation as the occupation of the building which could be evicted by a private party through the process of the provisions of the PP Act."

34. After reading this judgement carefully what one finds is that a private limited company was a perpetual lessee of the premises in question. These premises were given on lease by that private limited company to the nationalised bank namely Allahabad Bank. That private limited company was itself a perpetual lessee and it determined the lease of Allahabad Bank by a legal notice dated 17th August 1991, issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Properties Act. The notice was replied by the Bank on 8th September 1991 alleging that the premises in question are covered by the provisions of PPE Act and claiming that provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Rent Act) are not applicable, it refused to vacate the premises.

35. Thereafter, the private limited company sought to take recourse to the PPE Act. To my mind, in the peculiar facts of that case the learned Judge held that the occupation of Allahabad bank cannot be said to be unauthorised. The stand that the bank took that the premises are public premises by itself and without anything more, does not mean that a private limited company which is claiming that the premises belong to it, can take recourse to the PPE Act. The premises are claimed by a private limited company and it does not fall within the definition of the term "statutory authority", as defined in Section 2(fa) of the PPE Act. Therefore, it could not have taken recourse to the PPE Act to evict the Allahabad bank but it will have to file a Civil Suit or proceed under general law. Such observations of the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court must be seen in the backdrop of the peculiar facts before him.

36. It cannot be held that Delhi High Court laid down any principle much less that PPE Act cannot be resorted to evict a unauthorised occupant, which is a public sector Corporation and in unauthorised occupation of public premises. Therefore, far from assisting Mr.Presswala the observations in paras 8 and 9 of the judgement would militate or go against the stand of the petitioner.

37. The other judgement in the case of Mrs.Nisha Vs. Punjab National Bank, reported in A.I.R. 2000 Delhi 439, also cannot assist Mr.Presswala. In that case, Mrs.Nisha was the owner/landlady of the suit property. The premises which were subject matter of the suit were let out by her to New Bank of India. The lease was renewed and, thereafter, the said Nisha addressed a letter dated 3rd June 1991 to the Bank informing that their occupancy has come to an end but when the Bank did not vacate, she filed a suit for possession against the bank. That suit was contested by filing a written statement. In the light of pleadings, an issue was framed as to whether the suit was maintainable in view of section 15 of PPE Act, 1971. That was a purely legal issue but eventually it was answered against Mrs.Nisha holding that the premises are public premises and covered by PPE Act and, therefore, the suit was held to be barred.

38. In dealing with such a situation, the Delhi High Court noted the judgements of the Supreme Court in the field, the provisions of PPE Act and made the observations in paras 9 and 10, which are heavily relied upon by Mr.Presswala. The said paras read thus:

"9. We have considered the arguments advanced by both the parties and have also gone through the records. We are of the opinion that view taken by the learned Trial Court is not a correct view in law and calls for interference. In fact the whole approach of the learned Trial Court is misdirected. The PP Act treads altogether different field as is clear from the preamble of the said Act. The Act was enacted to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The purpose was to enact law, as would be clear from the statement of objects and reasons, to take speedy action to evict unauthorised occupants of public premises and the Government did not want to rely upon the ordinary process of law which often involves considerable delay. The intention was to provide speedy machinery for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provisions of the Constitution. The whole genesis of this Act presupposes that the premises in question are public premises belonging to the Government/statutory authority. They are in occupation of a person who is or has become unauthorised occupant of these premises and Government/statutory authority wants him to be evicted. Thus the premises are to be in occupation of a person who is not the Government/statutory authority itself but other than the Government/statutory authority to whom in fact the premises were given/allotted by the Government/statutory Authority who trespassed into the premises belonging to the Government. The Statute has conferred a right of speedy recovery of possession on the Government or statutory bodies from persons occupying their premises. It is in this context that the definition of public premises as contained in section 2(e) of the PP Act is to be understood. Here the premises would either belong to or taken on lease by the Government/statutory authority. The occupant of such premises, who has now become unauthorised occupant, would be a person other than the Government/ statutory authority. And, now Government/ statutory authority wants such person to be evicted from the public premises. Therefore, while interpreting definition of unauthorised occupant as contained in Section 2(g) of the PP Act would be a person other than Government/statutory authority. The very essence of legislating PP Act is to enable Government/statutory authority to evict 'unauthorised occupants' from 'public premises' and by no stretch of imagination one can conceive of a situation where Government/statutory authority itself is in 'unauthorised occupation' of the "public premises". Therefore, PP Act would not at all govern the proceedings filed by a private landlord/owner against the Government/statutory authority as tenant. These proceedings would be governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Delhi Rent Control Act as the case may be. The machinery which is provided under the PP Act is to enable Government/statutory authority to evict a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises and such 'person' has necessarily to be a person other than Government/statutory authority. It was never intended that in a lease between private landlord/owner and the Government/statutory authority (as tenant), landlord will be entitled to invoke the machinery provided under the provisions of PP Act to evict Government or statutory authority treating it to be a "person" in "unauthorised occupation" of the public premises. Therefore, the whole approach adopted by the learned Trial Court is erroneous whereby it has relegated the plaintiff/appellant to the remedy provided under the provisions of PP Act by directing it to approach an Estate Officer for the eviction of the respondent. It is not realised that this course would eventually do more harm to the Government/statutory authority."

10. In fact learned counsel for the plaintiff had urged before the Trial Court that object of the PP Act was to provide summary remedy to the Government/Company/Bank/Corporation so as to avoid them from lengthy procedure of regular civil Courts as was clear from the objects and preamble. However, this contention was rejected by the learned Trial Court observing that when the language of a particular enactment was plain and clear, resort to object and preamble for interpreting same was absolutely uncalled for. The reasoning given by the learned Trial Court in rejecting this argument is clearly fallacious. As observed above, the object of the statute namely PP Act is to enable Government/statutory authority to evict another person, to whom the premises were given by the Government/statutory authority and has become unauthorised occupant now or who is a trespasser, and therefore, unauthorised occupation by the public premises, to evict such a person. It was never intended to use this Act by third person against Government/statutory authority treating Government/statutory authority as unauthorised occupation of the premises. The Act is to be interpreted keeping in view this intention of the legislature. In fact the legislature has specifically enacted Transfer of Property Act and Rent Control Act, which amongst other govern the relationship between lessor or lessee where lessor is a private person and lessee may be a private person or Government/statutory authority. The interpretation given by the Trial Court would lead to absurd results and give even the private landlords right to evict Government/statutory authority, by adopting speedy machinery provided under said Act and it would result in clearly crossing the boundaries earmarked for the PP Act."

39. A bare perusal of these observations would indicate that the premises have to be public premises belonging to Government/ Statutory Authority. These observations have been made to emphasise that the Act would not govern the proceedings filed by a private individual or a private limited company - landlord/owner against the Government/ Statutory Authority as tenant. Therefore, the statutory authority as tenant of a private owner/ landlord in relation to premises in its occupation and possession cannot contend that by virtue of their occupation and possession and being a public sector enterprise/ statutory body/ Government, the premises are "public premises" and they cannot be evicted therefrom, save and except by taking recourse to PPE Act, 1971.

40. The proceedings would be governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or Delhi Rent Control Act, as the case may be. The machinery provided under the Act is to enable Government/ statutory authority to evict a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises and such person has necessarily to be a person other than Government/ statutory authority. However, the other observation of such person as necessarily a person other than Government/ statutory authority must be seen as confined to the ownership or control of the premises and the controversy before the Delhi High Court, with regard to maintainability of the Civil Suit of Mrs.Nisha against Punjab National Bank. The findings of the Delhi High Court are restricted to the issue raised and the remedy of private landlord/ owner to evict a Government/ statutory authority from premises belonging to it. The Delhi High Court speaking through the Division Bench, with great respect, has made these observations to rule out a defence of the nature taken by Punjab National Bank, that even if it is a tenant of a private landlord by virtue of the tenancy created in its favour and its occupation of the premises, the premises become public premises and are not private premises or property. Therefore, it is to overrule such a stand and to hold that the suit was maintainable that the observations in paras 9, 10 and 15 have been made.

41. If the basis of the reasoning is that PPE Act applies to the premises and unauthorised occupants of public premises, then, these observations and findings in the Delhi High Court judgement, with respect, do not assist Mr.Presswala. I am mindful of the fact that if I hold that the Act is applicable, even to evict unauthorised occupants such as public sector corporation, Government or a statutory authority, from public premises, proceedings under PPE Act, 1971 can be initiated but indiscriminate use of powers of eviction under the Act have been controlled by the Act itself and by construing the provisions of the same as subject to the constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, indiscriminate and frequent use of the Act will be controlled, regulated and checked by not only the guidelines issued by the Central Government but equally by the law laid down by the Supreme Court underlying the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the test of reasonableness, fairness and non arbitrariness in the state action. In these circumstances, it is not as if the Act would be resorted to oust or evict another public sector Corporation by merely putting an end to its authority to use and occupy the premises. It is always presumed that when power is conferred in highly placed public officials and premises are held in trust for the public, then, the Government and equally such high powered officials would be mindful of their duty and mandate and will not overstep or exceed it. Therefore, in a given case, if these limits are transgressed and the action is found to be unreasonable and violative of the constitutional mandate, it can always be interfered with and even struck down.

42. Once the above view is taken, then, there is no merit in this petition because, all other contentions are based on the facts before the Estate Officer / appellate authority. Both of them have concurrently found that the eviction of the petitioner from the premises is justified not only because the authority to use and occupy the premises has come to an end but also because the premises are required by Air India. The argument that Air India is now going to profiteer by letting out the premises at higher market rate, can be taken care of by holding that in this case the orders under challenge are of eviction from the public premises and which orders have been passed long time back. While it is true that the subsequent events may be brought to the notice of this Court while scrutinising these orders, but what I find that beyond producing a paper cutting nothing has been established much less proved for me to come to a conclusion that the Act has been resorted to arbitrarily, unreasonably and unfairly in the case of petitioner. The argument that there is no security threat would mean sitting in judgement over the opinion of those in charge of the maintenance of the premises and safeguarding them. Once they find that the safety and security of the premises at the relevant time, required minimum number of tenants and visitors in the building, then, it is not for this Court to substitute their views and opinion in writ jurisdiction. Even if another view is possible, I cannot disturb this concurrent finding of fact as desired by Mr.Presswala.

43. For the reasons aforestated, this petition fails. Rule is discharged. No costs.

44. At this stage Mr.Presswala, learned Counsel for petitioners pressed for leave to file appeal. Since, the issue has been answered on the basis of provisions of the Act and equally, noting the factual aspects, leave is refused.

45. It is clarified that this Court in this judgement has not considered any of the submissions of parties with regard to correctness of the order passed by the Estate Officer under Section 7(2) of the PPE Act as that is the subject matter of a distinct proceedings namely Civil Revision Application No.508 of 2011 and Writ Petition No.617.

Ordered accordingly.