Civil Revision Application No. 18 of 2011

7th December, 2012

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. V.B. Nadkarni,Mr. V.R. Tamba,Mr. Manoj Munshi,Mr. D.D. Zaveri
Respondent Counsel: Mr. Hiroo Advani,Mr. Asif Lambwala,Mr. Sushil Curiae,Mr. Pravin Faldessai

Cases Cited:
State of U.P. and others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc., AIR 1989 SC 997 [Para 5,12]
T. Arivandandam Vs. T. V. Satyapal & Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467 [Para 5,10]
N. V. Srinivasa Murthy & Others Vs. Mariyamma & Another, 2005(5) ALL MR 838 (S.C.)=(2005)5 SCC 548 [Para 5,14]
Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd., Vs. M/s Hede & Co., 2007 ALL SCR 1995 : AIR 2007 SCW 3456 [Para 5,13]
Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and another, 2011 ALL SCR 2540 : (2011) 9 SCC 126 [Para 5,11]
Ram Prakash Gupta Vs. Rajiv Kumar Gupta, 2007(6) ALL MR 953 (S.C.) [Para 7,15]
Popat and Kotecha Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, 2005(7) SCC 510 [Para 7,16]
Ibrahim Vs. Sharifan, AIR 1980 P & H 25 [Para 7,17]
Arjan Singh Vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 165 [Para 7,18]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- By this revision application, the petitioner takes exception to the order dated 16.04.2011 passed by the learned IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao, in Special Civil Suit No. 162/2009/III by which the application filed by the petitioner who is the defendant in the above suit under Order VII Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code for rejection of the plaint has been dismissed.

2. Briefly, the facts relevant for the disposal of the revision application are as under :

In December, 2009, the respondent herein filed a Special Civil Suit No. 162/2009/III before the Civil Judge Senior Division, Margao, seeking relief of declaration and injunction. On 4.3.2010, the petitioner who is the defendant in the above suit, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 and Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on the following grounds :

(a) The plaint does not disclose any cause of action for the reliefs claimed and is therefore liable to be dismissed for want of cause of action.

(b) The suit is barred by the law of limitation.

(c) The suit is barred under the provisions of Order I Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code since the plaintiff had earlier filed suit bearing No. SCS No.47/1991.

3. The application was opposed by the plaintiff. By order dated 25.5.2010, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application. Being aggrieved, the petitioner herein preferred Civil Revision Application No.16/2010. By order dated 6.10.2010, this Court partly allowed the revision application and remanded the matter to the learned trial Judge for deciding the matter afresh, by giving a reasoned order. Thereafter, both the parties were heard. The learned trial Judge, by order dated 16.4.2011, rejected the application. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant has filed the present revision application.

4. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the revision application was taken up for final hearing and hence Rule. By consent heard forthwith.

5. Shri Nadkarni, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/defendant at the outset submitted that the petitioner is only pressing the ground of limitation and the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation. According to the learned Senior Counsel, having regard to the prayers (b), (c) and (d) in the suit which are founded on the notice dated 31.01.1991 given by the plaintiff to the defendant. The suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 2009 is hopelessly barred by limitation. According to the learned Senior Counsel, by the said composite notice dated 31.01.1991, the plaintiff called upon the defendant to remedy the breach and also claimed forfeiture of lease and in the event, the breach was not remedied within a period of 60 days, further claimed a consequential right of re-entry in the premises. The notice period ended on 31st March, 1991 and according to the plaintiff, the defendant had failed to remedy the breach and consequently the lease was forfeited and terminated w.e.f. 1st April, 1991 and as such the right of re-entry had accrued to the plaintiff on the said date. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that the cause of action based on notice dated 31.01.1991, accrued to the plaintiff in April, 1991 and as such the limitation period for filing the suit on the basis of the suit, the cause of action expired in April, 1994. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the case of the plaintiff that since the receiver was appointed by this Court in July, 1991, who took possession of the suit premises and as such the plaintiff could not have filed a suit for possession is untenable in law in view of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the time to file the suit on the basis of notice dated 31.01.1991 had began to run w.e.f. 01.04.1991 and therefore the subsequent disability or inability on account of the appointment of the receiver in July, 1991 could not stop the limitation which had already began to run from 01.04.1991. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the learned Trial Judge overlooked this provision of the Limitation Act and has come to the conclusion that the receiver having taken over the possession of the suit premises in July, 1991 as contended by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not have filed a suit within a period of three years from April, 1991. According to the learned Senior Counsel, by clever drafting of the plaint, the plaintiff cannot get over the question of limitation by camouflaging the real issue in the suit. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the reliefs sought by the plaintiff in the suit are hopelessly barred by limitation on the basis of the pleadings of the plaintiff itself and therefore the plaint in the above suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the suit filed by the plaintiff was hopelessly barred by limitation and as such the learned Trial Judge ought to have allowed the application on the ground of limitation and ought to have rejected the plaint. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments :

(I) State of U.P. and others V/s Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc., AIR 1989 SC 997;

(ii) T. Arivandandam V/s T. V. Satyapal & Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467;

(iii) N. V. Srinivasa Murthy & Others V/s Mariyamma & Another, (2005)5 SCC 548 : [2005(5) ALL MR 838 (S.C.)];

(iv) Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd., V/s M/s Hede & Co., AIR 2007 SCW 3456 : [2007 ALL SCR 1995]; and

(v) Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and another V/s Union of India and another, (2011) 9 SCC 126 : [2011 ALL SCR 2540].

6. Per contra, Shri Advani, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the learned Trial Judge has gone into the issues raised before it in the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and has rightly observed that all these questions and issues raised by the defendant are disputed questions of fact and interpretation of law could not be decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The same have to be dealt with at the stage of trial after the parties lead evidence. According to the learned Counsel, the scope of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code is restricted and the Court has to merely see whether the plaint discloses cause of action as a pure question of fact as rightly observed by the learned trial Judge. According to the learned Counsel, whether the plaint discloses the cause of action or not must be found from the simple reading of the plaint assuming that all the averments in the plaint are correct. In ascertaining whether the plaint discloses the cause of action, the Court is not required to hold elaborate inquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. According to the learned counsel, the cause of action has been clearly spelt out by the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of the plaint.

7. In so far as the issue of limitation is concerned, the learned Counsel submitted that the defendant had issued a notice of termination on 31.01.1991 calling upon the petitioner/defendant to remedy the breach committed by them within a period of 60 days failing which the lease would be terminated/forfeited. However, the defendant neither took any step to remedy the breach nor replied to the said notice and as such accepted the termination of the lease. The learned Counsel further submitted that though the lease was terminated in April, 1991, the plaintiff was not in a position to claim the possession on account of appointment of receiver in Suit No. 2654 of 1990 by the Principal Bench of this Court at Bombay which was filed by the Financial Institutions. According to the learned Counsel, till date the receiver is in possession of the suit premises. According to the learned Counsel, the plaintiff has clearly stated in the plaint that the cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit arose in the year 2008 when the defendant filed the written statement in the Suit No. 116/2007-08 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, in Mumbai and claimed to be lessee of the suit property. According to the learned Counsel, the cause of action further continued in the year 2009 when the defendant claimed to be the owner of the property by filing an affidavit in D.R.T. Moreover, the defendant deposited a sum of Rs.6.04 crores in D.R.T. for claiming possession of the suit property and in this factual background, the plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit for declaration and termination of lease against the defendant. According to the learned Counsel, the defendant was granted lease for specific purpose of constructing and operating a five star hotel project and the defendant not only failed to construct the same but abandoned the project and having accepted the termination has no right to claim to be lessee in respect of the suit property. According to the learned Counsel, it is well settled that the cause of action accrues only when some right or title was disputed or denied by any person. According to the learned Counsel, in the present case also though the plaintiff issued notice terminating the lease in the year 1991, the defendant never disputed or challenged the same till 2008 and it was only in the year 2008 for the first time the defendant denied the termination of lease and claimed right in respect of the suit premises, on account of which the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit in December, 2009. The learned Counsel therefore submitted that in view of the above factual position, the suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 2009 cannot be said to be barred by limitation and as such the plaint is not liable to be rejected and consequently the revision application filed by the defendant is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel relied upon the following judgments.

(i) Ram Prakash Gupta V/s Rajiv Kumar Gupta, 2007(6) ALL MR 953 (S.C.)

(ii) Popat and Kotecha V/s State Bank of India Staff Association, 2005(7) SCC 510

(iii) Ibrahim V/s Sharifan, AIR 1980 P & H 25, and

(iv) Arjan Singh V/s Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 165.

8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions, perused the records and judgments relied upon.

9. Before I deal with the rival submissions made by learned Counsel on merits, I deem it appropriate to deal with the authorities cited by both sides.

10. In T. Arivandandam (supra), the Apex Court held that the trial Court upon meaningful, and not formal, reading of the plaint, ought to find out a clear right to sue and if such a right is not made out, ought to exercise its power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C.. The Apex Court further held that if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, the Court must nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searching under Order X C.P.C..

11. In the case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited, [2011 ALL SCR 2540] (supra), the Apex Court held that the Limitation Act prescribes time limit for all conceivable suits, appeals, etc. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted, appeal preferred or application made after the prescribed period, shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. The Apex Court further held that if a suit is not covered by any specific articles, then it would fall within the residuary article. In other words, the residuary article is applicable to every kind of suit, not otherwise provided for in the schedule.

12. In the case of Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc. (supra), the Apex Court held that a lessor with best title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force from a lessee even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression "re-entry" in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under the law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination, is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited. A lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.

13. In the case of Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd., [2007 ALL SCR 1995] (supra), the Apex Court held that whether a plaint discloses the cause of action, is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself and for this purpose all the averments in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands. The Apex Court further held that the plaint deserves to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC since the suit appeared from the statements in the plaint to be barred by law of limitation.

14. In the case of N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and others, [2005(5) ALL MR 838 (S.C.)] (supra), the Apex Court held that omitting to claim relief warranted on facts and claiming other reliefs, to get around bar of limitation is impermissible in law.

15. In the case of Ram Prakash Gupta (supra), the Apex Court held that for rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC., only the facts averred in the plaint must be looked into and such a power can be exercised at any stage of the suit, before conclusion of the trial and for this purpose all the pleadings in the suit have to be read as a whole.

16. In the case of Popat and Kotecha Property (supra), the Apex Court considered its several judgments and held that the real object of Order VII, Rule 11 CPC is to keep out of Courts irresponsible law suit and if the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the Court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised. The Apex Court further held that in terms of Order VI, Rule 2(1) of CPC., the cardinal rule of pleadings has to state material facts and not the evidence and every pleading shall contain only a statement in a concise form of material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.

17. In Ibrahim (supra), the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, on facts, held that the word 'first' occurring in Article 58 of the Limitation Act has great significance and the same could not be construed in any other manner, except that the limitation in a declaratory suit shall begin to run when the cause to sue for the property first accrues to the plaintiff. In the facts of the case, the High Court held that it was in the year 1957 that a cloud was cast on the right of the plaintiff to succeed to the entire land in dispute and that the period of limitation began to run from the year 1957 and not afterwards.

18. In the case of Arjan Singh and others (supra), the Delhi High Court held that if the plaint itself shows that the claim is barred by time, then the plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC.

19. Perusal of the impugned order discloses that though the ground that the suit was barred by limitation was raised, the petitioner did not place reliance upon Section 9 of the Limitation Act and consequently, the trial Court did not deal with the same. No doubt, the defendant ought to have raised the issue before the learned trial Court by placing reliance upon Section 9. But the fact remains that the issue of limitation raised by the petitioner based on Section 9 of the Limitation Act, goes to the root of the matter inasmuch in the event the submission of the defendant that Section 9 is attracted is accepted, the necessary sequitur is that the plaint will have to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation.

20. In the above factual background, there are two options available to me. Firstly, to decide the issue on the basis of the submissions made and the averments made in the plaint, and secondly, to remand the matter to the learned trial Court for fresh adjudication on the issue of limitation in the light of Section 9 of the Limitation Act. I would prefer to adopt the second course, so that the trial Court which has to deal with the application under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC considers the rival submissions on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the documents annexed to the plaint and gives findings. However, since the petitioner chose not to raise the issue of limitation on the basis of Section 9 which it ought to have raised before the trial Court, while remanding the matter to the trial Court, I deem it appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner.

21. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 16th April, 2011 passed by the learned IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao in Special Civil Suit No.162/2009/III, is quashed and set aside and the matter remanded to the learned trial Court to decide the application under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC made by the petitioner/defendant only in respect of the issue of limitation, in the light of the observations made above and keeping in view the principles laid down by the Apex Court, to be considered by the trial Court while dealing with a application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. The petitioner shall pay costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) to the respondent. The costs shall be deposited in the trial Court within four weeks and upon deposit, liberty to the respondent to withdraw the same.

22. The parties to appear before the trial Court on 14th January, 2013 at 10.00 a.m.. The learned trial Court shall decide the issue of limitation raised in the application dated 4.3.2010 filed by the defendant under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties in the light of the observations made above.

23. It is made clear that I have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions.

Ordered accordingly.