Application No. 433 of 2013

12th June, 2013

Petitioner Counsel: S/Shri A.P. MUNDARGI, JAYANT BARDESKAR
Respondent Counsel: Shri A.S. SHITOLE, Ms. NEHA PRASHANT

Cases Cited:
Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2013 ALL SCR 171=(2012) 10 SCC 303 [Para 4]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Rule. Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State and the learned counsel for respondent No.2 waive service. By consent, rule is made returnable forthwith and taken up for final hearing. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor (for short, "APP") for the State.

2. This is an application for quashing of proceedings in Regular Criminal Case No.3933 of 2012 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (A.C.), Pune, arising out of Crime No.168 of 2011 of Deccan Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC").

3. The investigation had commenced on the report of respondent No.2. In fact the applicant and respondent No.2 seem to have had some civil dispute also which was resolved by an order of the Civil Court dated 1-2-2013. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submitted that respondent No.2 has no objection to the proceedings being quashed. The learned APP, however, vehemently objects to the proceedings being quashed. He submitted that respondent No.2 had misused the police machinery, possibly to settle respondent No.2's civil dispute with the applicant. He submitted that this dispute had a criminal flavour, in as much as there was an allegation of forgery and, therefore, he strongly objects to quashing of the proceedings.

4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant placed reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2013 ALL SCR 171]. He submitted that the Supreme Court had noted in para 48 of the Judgment observations of a Five Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which dealt with the question of power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in matters pertaining to non-compoundable offences in which parties had reached a settlement. It would be useful to reproduce the said observations, which read as under:

"48.A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab {(2007) 4 CTC 769} was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the compounding of the offences in the cases which have been specified as noncompoundable offences under the provisions of Section 320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashra {(1977) 4 SCC 551}, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal {1992 Supp (1) SCC 335}, State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy {(1977) 2 SCC 699}, Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee {(1990) 2 SCC 437}, B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana {(2003) 4 SCC 675} and Ram Lal {(1999) 2 SCC 213} and framed the following guidelines: (Kulwinder Singh case, CTC pp.783- 84, para 21)

"21..... '(a) Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.

(b) Cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to larger number of people.

(c) Cases of dispute between old partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim.

(d) Minor offences as under Section 279, IPC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506(II), IPC, which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an offence under Section 506 IPC in most cases is based on the oral declaration with different shades of intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148, IPC, more particularly where other offences are compoundable. It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act No.17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made Sections 506(II) IPC, 147 IPC and 148, IPC compoundable offences by amending the schedule under Section 320, Cr.P.C.

(e) The offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of transaction would fall in the category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Offences committed by Public Servants purporting to act in that capacity as also offences against public servant while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain non-compoundable. Offences against the State enshrined in Chapter-VII (relating to army, navy and air force) must remain non-compoundable.

(f) That as a broad guideline the offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when the court is in the position to record a finding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair.

While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution.'

To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., 'to prevent abuse of the process of any Court' or 'to secure the ends of justice'."

5. The Supreme Court then concluded in para 61 as under:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz: (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

6. In view of this, since the dispute was essentially between the applicant and respondent No.2 and had no fall out for the public, the application may have to be allowed. However, as the learned APP submitted that respondent No.2 seems to have used the police machinery to settle a private score in which time and energy of the police machinery must have been wasted in investigating into the matter and filing charge-sheet, it would be appropriate to direct the applicant and respondent No.2 to deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards costs with the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pune within a period two weeks. Upon such deposit of costs, the proceedings in Regular Criminal Case No.3933 of 2012 pending before the learned Magistrate shall stand quashed and set aside. The costs so deposited shall go to the State Government. Rule is made absolute in above terms.

Application allowed.