First Appeal No. 2860 of 2007

29th October, 2013

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. MADHAV JAMDAR
Respondent Counsel: Mr. SUMEET KOTHARI, Mr. S.M.GORWADKAR

Cases Cited:
H.S. Khan Vs. Homi J. Mukadam, 1991 (2) Bom. C.R. 61 [Para 6]
Koli Para Sriramulu Vs. T. Aswatha Narayana, AIR 1968 SC 1028 [Para 6]
Vijaykumar Ramrang Vs. D.K. Soonawala, 2005(4) ALL MR 138 [Para 7]
In Re : Bora Narsimhulu, AIR 1952 Madras 165 [Para 7]
P.D'Souza Vs. Shondrilo Naidu, 2005(5) ALL MR 15 (S.C.)=2004 (6) SCC 649 [Para 8]
Prakash Chandra Vs. Angadlal, 1979 (4) SCC 393 [Para 11]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard submissions at the Bar. Written submissions tendered on behalf of the Plaintiff and Defendant -Respondent no1 are also seen. Perused record and proceedings. The Appeal is against the Judgment and order dated 16-11-2007 passed by learned Jt. Civil Judge S.D., Pune whereby the suit was dismissed with Costs.

2. The Plaintiff had filed the suit for the specific performance of the Suit agreement being labeled as "Visar Pavati" dated 28-03-1979. The plaintiff had paid sum of Rs 600/- on 15-11-1985, Rs.2000/- on 07-01-1985 Rs 3000/- on 04-02-1985 towards part payment of the consideration. It is case of the Plaintiff - appellant that Smt. Sarubai Narayan Mulik (Original Defendant no. 1 ) had agreed to sell the suit property described as all that piece and parcel of the agricultural land or ground situated at Survey No. 16 admeasuring five Acres on Southern Side of village Vadgaon Sheri, Taluka Haveli District Pune (Now within limits of Pune Municipal Corporation) bounded on east by S.No. 14, on west by village boundary of Vadgaon Sheri and Yeravada and village Road, On North by remaining portion of S. No. 16/2 Vadgaon Sheri. The plaintiff averred in the plaint that Sarubai's earlier Pending suit no. 1102 of 1967 filed by her against her Husband in the Court of CJJD Pune, was decreed on 25-03-1970. Sarubai acquired absolute ownership of five acres (Suit land) in the later suit no. 955 of 1974. On 26-10-1987 Sarubai's Advocate Shri V. G. Joshi had entered into correspondence with the Plaintiff. The plaintiff had replied the notice on 10-11-1987. The plaintiff received a letter from the Advocate Shri V. G. Joshi on 05-02-1988 informing about the pending suit no. 955 of 1974 and about the readiness of sarubai to sell the suit land at enhanced price of Rs 50,000/- per Acre and Sarubai had acknowledged letter from the Plaintiff dated 25-01-1988 whereby the plaintiff had reminded Sarubai of her agreement to sell the suit land to Plaintiff and part payments received by her. Sarubai had informed the Plaintiff about the legal impediments for to complete the suit transaction and promised to complete the transaction. Due to longstanding relations with the defendant, the Plaintiff had raised the offer to Rs 50,000/- per acre and insisted clear title, removal of the impediment under the Urban land Ceiling Act, fixation of boundaries for to hand over the possession of the suit land. The Plaintiff had also agreed to bear expenses of the Sale Deed. The Plaintiff also came to know that Dyaneshwar Narayan Mulik, the step Son of Sarubai filed Special civil suit 217 of 1990 seeking declaration that Sarubai has no right , title and interest in the suit land and temporary injunction which was granted in favour of Dyaneshwar. The said suit was withdrawn by Dyaneshawar on 30-10-1996. Sarubai, thus could not legally execute the Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff and could not hand over possession of the suit land to the Plaintiff. The sale Deed was to be completed within three months after Sarubai's obtaining all the necessary permissions required under the law for Sale of the suit property. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the Contract but Sarubai had avoided to obtain necessary permissions according to law to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff. Sarubai had failed to obtain clearance under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation ) Act, 1976 and also demarcation certificate in respect of the measurement of the suit land. The Plaintiff came to know in May 1994 that Sarubai had entered in to another transaction in October 1989 with shri Bachulal Pukhraj Oswal (defendant no 2) and was in the process to sell suit land to him for Rs 900,000/- only. The plaintiff met Sarubai reminded her of her contractual obligation and objected for her attempt to defeat the right of the Plaintiff in respect of the suit property. Since Sarubai was attempting to back out of the transaction and willfully avoided to carry out her obligations under the agreement to sell the suit property, the Plaintiff was thus left with no other alternative but to file the present suit for specific performance of the Contract. It is case of the Plaintiff that since the prices of the lands in Pune and around rose up sharply and the defendant Sarubai avoided her obligations under the Contract the Plaintiff prayed for specific performance of the Contract and damages of Rs 40,09,440/- as detailed in the plaint alternatively with interest @ 18 % p.a. from the date of the suit till full payment.

3. On these averments the plaintiff commenced the said suit and Plaintiff prayed for specific performance of the agreement directing defendant for execution of the sale deed of the suit property. The stand taken by the defendant-respondent, inter alia, was that the plaintiff had no legal right to claim specific performance of the 'Visar Pavati' in question, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to the relief claimed by him. It may be mentioned that having raised the relevant plea in his written statement the defendant remained absent and the suit proceeded ex-parte. It appears that even her learned advocate did not remain present to assist the Court. The plaintiff's evidence affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 was sworn recorded on 05-09-2006. The Plaintiff was cross-examined on 09-10-2007. But nothing significant was elicited from the Plaintiff for to disbelieve the affidavit-evidence of the Plaintiff permitted by the learned trial Judge, upon which the Plaintiff was cross examined. Thus the Plaintiff's evidence remains unchallenged on record. Defendant did not lead any evidence to the contrary. Undisputedly, the defendants did not lead any evidence in spite of availing several opportunities. Thus, it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the Appellant that in the absence of any evidence on record in special civil Suit no 1792 of 2004 on behalf of the defendants, merely her pleadings in the written statement cannot be accepted as evidence. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the record with their assistance. Learned Advocate Shri Jamdar for the Appellant contended that whatever evidence was led in the suit was that of the Plaintiff only. It is submitted that Plaintiff due to his suffering from acute diabetes and high sugar was not in physical and mental ability to fully withstand the rigors of cross examination by a well versed lawyer with refined sense of law in the trial Court and under the circumstances was required to obtain adjournment. But the plaintiff had applied for appointment of Court Commissioner for his further cross examination but for unjustifiable reasons the Defendant had objected the appointment of the court commissioner to complete the cross examination of the Plaintiff. On the available evidence of the Plaintiff therefore, the burden of rebuttal was on the defendant Sarubai, and She had to prove that the contract between the parties was for advance and allegedly for securing the loan and not by way of an agreement of sale, though the document was in the form of an agreement of sale, and was executed as such, The defendant was also bound to explain facts leading to execution of agreement why further cross examination of the Plaintiff was not agreed by her through the Court commissioner. Responsibility was on the Defendant Sarubai to obtain requisite permissions to execute the sale deed and to inform the Plaintiff. That was not done. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that initial onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act reads thus:-

"10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.- Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced-

(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or

(b) when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief. Explanation.- Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume-

(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money; and

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The provision clearly indicates that when an obligation enforceable by law is created, the party under the obligation cannot be allowed to escape from it on flimsy excuse especially in a transaction wherein a promise is made to transfer valuable immovable property. There must be proof or a proper explanation or justification from the defendant to avoid the agreement or for the delay that has occurred to execute the Sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff. The trial Court it appears have needlessly and unfairly tolerated the unexplained inaction on the part of the defendant Sarubai and after her death also the procrastination by her legal heirs and legal representatives has continued. Therefore in my opinion, the learned trial Judge has wrongly exonerated the Defendant Sarubai and her legal heirs / legal representatives from the responsibility of performing her part of the agreement to sell the suit property while unreasonably ignoring the ongoing desire of the Plaintiff and continuing readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff to get the Sale deed executed as agreed by paying fair market price as consideration for the suit property. The learned trial judge ignored the obligation which arose from the suit transaction indicating that the defendant was under moral or legal duty to obtain all permissions required to execute the Sale Deed and to inform the Plaintiff before the plaintiff owed in return to get the Sale Deed executed as agreed between the Parties.

4. It is well settled that in civil matters, the general rule is that the burden of proof falls on the party advancing the matter in question. For example, the Plaintiff who asserts that the defendant was negligent to perform her part of the agreement would begin on the plaintiff advancing his evidence, then Defendant cross examining the plaintiff will have to discharge the burden of proving that, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant had discharged a duty of care towards the Plaintiff, If it is established that the defendant breached the duty of care-obligation- and that the breach has caused damage/harm to the Plaintiff, then the Plaintiff is bound to succeed. If it is case of the defendant and the defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's own negligence had contributed to the damage, then the defendant will have to discharge the burden of proving the Plaintiff's contributory negligence for it. These equitable principles are required to be borne in mind for just decision in the case.

5. In the aforesaid manner, the burden lies on both the parties to prove their respective contentions. True it is that, specific performance of a contract is an equitable relief and equity of both the sides has to be weighed. As a general rule, one cannot say that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for him alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the suit property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the consideration to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether any party is trying to take undue advantage over the other party as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing the relief of specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen. Ordinarily as of rule the relief of specific performance ought to be granted and only very rarely the relief of specific performance is to be denied. In the present case it was the original respondent Sarubai Narayan Mulik, who was the defaulting party and who in any case was responsible for escalated cost. In my opinion if at all the remedy of specific performance of contract cannot be availed of, then only, the sum of damages may be considered as an alternative. But it must be ensured as sufficient and exemplary enough to discourage rampant breach of obligation in such cases, by way of grant of exceptionally higher interest. If for any reason specific relief of performance cannot be granted then trial Judge may certainly grant alternative relief . I therefore reject the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent no. 1 that specific performance cannot be granted and at the most only damages should be granted.

6. There is no dispute that defendant No.2 did not choose to contest the suit and at the hearing of this appeal, added respondents except respondent no. 1 represented by learned advocate Shri Gorwadkar, herein also remained absent for the reasons best known to them. Moreover, there is no any evidence led by the defendants in support of their case set up in the written statement and it is well settled legal position that mere pleadings alone cannot take the place of proof, therefore, in the absence of any acceptable evidence on record which can prove Defendant's pleadings on record, no order could have been passed by the learned trial Judge in favour of the defendants by dismissal of the suit denying the just relief of specific relief prayed for by the Plaintiff .The suit ought to have been decided based on legal evidence which was led and available on record. It must be understood that market Value of the suit property cannot remain static. It is fact of common knowledge that the prices of immovable property are bound to increase with passage of time. The suit property is located in a prominent place at Kalyani Nagar within limits of Pune Municipal Corporation and it is a vast extent of five acres. The parties to the suit cannot dispute the market value of suit property had increased multi-fold. Even though the price has been escalated from the date of the execution of the agreement to Sell and the suit has been filed within the period of limitation, it is pending long for years for variety of reasons. No doubt, the suit property is an urban property and no evidence has been adduced regarding its present market value. But the learned advocate on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, in fairness had put forth an bonafide offer by filing written submissions that the Plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and is ready to pay current market price of the suit property and ready to bear other expenditures for the execution of the Sale Deed of the suit property. Learned Advocate Mr. Jamdar submitted that in case, this Court has come to a conclusion that the value of the property had increased multi-fold then court executing the decree can be directed to inquire about the present real value of the suit property and order payment of market price accordingly. The said gesture though bonafide is bluntly negatived by the learned Advocate appearing for the defendants by maintaining the stand that specific performance must not be granted due to rising prices of the lands in Pune City and around. According to learned advocate for Respondent no. 1, Section 33 of the Evidence act is not applicable and Decree shall not be passed on the ground that the Visar pavati was not complete agreement to sell the Suit property. He wants to rely upon the ruling in H.S. Khan Vs Homi J. Mukadam reported in 1991 (2) BOM.C. R. 61 to argue that the parties had not finalized the terms of the agreement to Sell and therefore it was not a Concluded Contract. Learned advocate for the appellant was quick to point out from the Para 9 of the same ruling reference made to Koli Para Sriramulu Vs T. Aswatha Narayana reported in AIR 1968 SC 1028 that the Honourable Supreme Court was dealing with the effect of a reference to future formal contract in an oral agreement, whereby the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon are to be put in a more formal shape does not prevent a binding Contract. There are however cases where reference to a future Contract is made in such terms as to show that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal contract is signed. The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of each particular case. In the present case the ruling is not attracted as the terms of the visar Pavati has adequately spelt out the terms of the agreement to sell the suit property.

7. In the present case though the document is labeled as the 'Visar Pavati' dated 28 th march 1979 Wedenesday between the Plaintiff Appellant Kanhaiyalal Motilal Talera and Sau. Sarubai Narayan Mulik,when translated in English indicate intention of the parties in this case and the fact that Said Sarubai voluntarily executed the writing in Marathi that she had agreed to Sell the suit property five acres of land S. No. 16 situated at Mauje Vadgaon Sheri Taluka Haveli District Pune at the rate of Rs 10000/- per acre without any encumbrances and in perpetuity and accepted earnest amount of Rs 1000/-. The plaintiff had also agreed to pay sum of Rs. 3000/- towards the agreement to Sell and the Plaintiff had agreed to bear all the expenses required for the execution of the sale Deed. The Parties also agreed to execute the Sale Deed within three months from the time all permissions are obtained to execute the Sale Deed need to be gathered from the recitals of the document and the subsequent correspondence between the parties. The intention of the parties was clear to complete the Sale deed in respect of the suit property within three months after obtaining all the requisite permissions by the Defendant Sarubai. In the trial Court, the Plaintiff was permitted by the trial judge to tender evidence by Affidavit and he was also cross examined partly in the Court. The record would show that the Plaintiff suffered from physical ailments. He had acute diabetes and fluctuating sugar levels. The Plaintiff was offered to be fully cross examined through Court Commission. But that was objected on behalf of the Defendant. The litigative battle also indicated the chequred history that in stead of completion of hearing of the suit expeditiously it was taken before the High Court at interim stages of the suit. The Plaintiff and defendant had to face the litigation initiated from the third party Dyaneshwar Narayan Mulik, an alleged step-Son of Sarubai, possibly collusive to prolong the litigation between Sarubai and the Plaintiff because in the course of his submissions learned Advocate Shri Jamdar submitted that learned Advocate Shri Gorwadkar appearing for Sarubai had also represented Step-Son of Sarubai in the High Court proceeding. Be that as it may, it was clearly duty and obligation on the part of defendant Sarubai to obtain all the requisite permissions for to execute the sale Deed as agreed and to inform the Plaintiff about her readiness and willingness to execute the Sale deed as agreed. She was in continuing breach of this obligation under the Contract and therefore the limitation for the suit never really started for to bar the suit. The argument advanced by the learned advocate Shri Gorwadkar that the suit is not maintainable on the ground that it is barred by limitation cannot be accepted. Shri Gorwadkar with reference to the ruling in Vijaykumar Ramrang Vs. D.K. Soonawala 2005(4) ALLMR 138 submitted that unless the examination in chief is tested with touchstone of the cross examination it cannot be considered. In the present case the Plaintiff was permitted to lead evidence by his affidavit and was also cross examined. Opportunity to cross examine was availed of, though not to the fullest extent. The present case is not the case of the evidence of the Plaintiff without any cross-examination of the Plaintiff so as to brush aside the entire evidence of the Plaintiff. The single Judge ruling would not apply on all fours to the present case. The blame is imputable to the defendant for conduct of the refusal by the Defendant to attend the court to be available for cross examination. In the case in hand the plaintiff was cross examined partly when unfortunately his sugar level was increased due to acute diabeties and he became sick in trial Court. No prudent person would expect a witness who is senior Citizen and ill, and not in proper frame of mind at the relevant time to continue to withstand rigors of the cross examination by a well-versed, refined lawyer despite physical inability of a witness. The fact cannot be overlooked that the plaintiff had applied for the appointment of court commissioner to record his further evidence. Defendant took objection to appoint commission for to complete the cross examination. Hence the Defendant had opportunity to cross examine the Plaintiff which was deliberately not availed of by the Defendant. As observed in re Bora Narsimhulu AIR 1952 Madras 165, what is contemplated under Section 33 of the Evidence Act is an opportunity offered for cross examination and not the effective use of it. Thus within the meaning of section 33 of the Indian evidence Act, the evidence of the Plaintiff as available with the cross examination conducted in the trial Court was bound to be considered on merits as it was admissible, it remained unchallenged and was not washed off the record. The trial court was in gross error of law to overlook and brush aside the entire evidence of the Plaintiff. Dismissal of the Suit is unreasonable and unsustainable.

8. The Defendant who chose not to lead evidence in rebuttal cannot be allowed to defeat the suit merely because prices of the suit property are rising when the Plaintiff is ready and willing to pay the real market value of the property . It is reflection of bonafide intention on the part of the Plaintiff to complete the transaction despite rise in market price. In judgment of the Honourable Apex court reported in 2004 (6) SCC 649 : [2005(5) ALL MR 15 (S.C.)] (P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu) that escalation of price would not deter the Court to grant the relief of specific performance. The relevant passage is as follows:

"39. ...... It is therefore, too late for the appellant now to suggest that having regard to the escalation in price, the respondent should be denied the benefit of the decree passed in his favour. Explanation I appended to Section 20 clearly stipulates that mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature would not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 20."

9. The Plaintiff have led documentary evidence in the shape of Visar Pavati and correspondence with the Defendant's advocate, he was cross examined with reference to his affidavit and no evidence in rebuttal has been led by the defendants. It was duty of the Defendant Sarubai to depose in support of her own case. For her failure the learned trial Judge ought to have raised adverse inference against her. The matter was fixed for arguments. Written Arguments were addressed to the learned trial Judge on behalf of the plaintiff on 01-11-2007. The defendant and his advocate remained absent throughout. Defendant avoided performing her part of the contract to sell the suit land. Under these circumstances, the learned trial Judge erroneously dismissed the plaintiff's suit taking the wrong view that the plaintiff had no legal right to claim specific performance of Visar pavati and, Learned Trial Judge refused to grant Decree for reasons which are unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Thereupon the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Judge passed on dismissing the suit.

10. It is a basic general principle of law that no act can be done by the strength of one's own hands but help of the law should be taken and the procedure which is prescribed for that act must be acted upon. The law would always insist upon the party responsible for the breach of contractual obligation to make amends and to do the needful to remedy the breach. Time was not the essence of the Contract. The Plaintiff could never have insisted upon the execution of the sale Deed without the Defendant Sarubai informing the Plaintiff that she has crossed all the legal hurdles or impediments to enable her to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff. It is case of the Plaintiff-appellant that the Defendant continued to dishonestly avoid performing her part of the Contract to sell the suit land to the Plaintiff as evidenced in the "Visar Pavati" presumably because the price of the suit land was increasing.

11. Honourable Apex Court in the ruling reported in 1979 (4) SCC 393 (Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal). The relevant passage run as follows:

"9. The ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would afford adequate relief. The relief by way of specific performance being discretionary under Sec.20, the plaintiff must come to Court with clean hands and with all the materials with regard to readiness and willingness to complete the sale transaction as stipulated in the agreement. The affidavit evidence as was permitted by the trial Court of P.W.1 and the documents produced clearly established that the plaintiff has come to court with clean hands and he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he was anxious to complete the sale transaction even by payment of market price as consideration and delay occurred because of physical ailments of the plaintiff only ,the defendant Sarubai was in breach of her contractual obligation, evading the execution of the sale deed. So this Court has to necessarily exercise its discretionary power to order specific performance of the contract, now from the legal heirs and legal representatives of late Defendant Sarubai Narayan Mulik.

12. Learned Advocate for the respondent also tendered written submissions in order to emphasize upon the submission that "Visar Pavti" is not duly stamped. Therefore, specific performance ought not to be granted on that basis. It is also submitted that mere affidavit evidence of the plaintiff with limited crossexamination made upon the affidavit evidence would not be sufficient to grant decree for specific performance, and thirdly, it is submitted that suit was barred by limitation.

13. I have considered the submissions advanced at appropriate places in the judgment. The contention that "Visar Pavti" was only preparatory agreement to sale and there was correspondence to indicate novation of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and therefore, Visar Pavti dated 28 March 1979 must not be treated as an agreement to sell. These submissions have no basis in evidence recorded in the case. After affidavit evidence was tendered on behalf of the plaintiff, he was cross-examined. He had also offered himself to be cross-examined fully by making an application for appointment of Commissioner which was objected by he defendant Sarubai. Furthermore, defendant Sarubai chose not to lead any evidence in support of the contentions advanced before me. That being so, it would be unjust for these submissions to be considered to defeat the otherwise valid claim by the plaintiff (appellant). The appeal has to be considered on the basis of the evidence recorded and the facts and circumstances which revealed themselves from the record. Since Sarubai (respondent) died during the pendency of these proceedings, even otherwise, she cannot be examined before the Court.

14. Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act is therefore attracted and the case has to be decided on the basis of available evidence. The errors committed by the learned trial Judge while dismissing the suit needs to be rectified in the facts and circumstances of the case by allowing this appeal.

15. I do not find any evidence on record on behalf of the defendant to support contentions sought to be advanced at the appellate stage.

16. In the facts and the circumstances, the appeal must be allowed with costs throughout. Hence Order:

ORDER

1The impugned Judgment and Order dated 16112007 passed in Special civil suit no. 1792 of 1994 by Jt. Civil judge Junior division, Pune is hereby set aside. There shall be Decree, directing the legal heirs and legal representatives of the original Defendant Sarubai Narayan Mulik, to execute the Sale Deed of the suit property free from encumbrances in favour of the Plaintiff by accepting consideration of the fair Market price (to be fixed by the executing Court) minus earnest money already paid to Sarubai to sell the suit property and respondents shall forthwith hand over actual vacant physical possession thereof to the Plaintiff.

2Further, if for any insurmountable legal impediment or very exceptional difficulty the Sale Deed cannot be executed in favour of the Plaintiff, the plaintiff suit will be decreed alternatively for damages as prayed in the plaint in the sum of Rs 40,09,440/- together with interest at the rate of Rs 18% per annum from the date of the suit till full realization. Decree shall be drawn accordingly with all the costs of the suit payable to the Plaintiff from the legal heirs / legal representatives of the late Defendant Sarubai.

3The Appeal is allowed with costs accordingly. Decree be drawn accordingly.

4Mr.Gorwardar, learned Advocate for respondent nos.1A to 1C prays for staying operation of this order for a period of three months. Learned Advocate for the appellant left it to the discretion of this Court.

5O peration of the judgment and order shall remain stayed for a period of three months from the date of this order.

Appeal allowed.