Second Appeal No.279 of 2013

16th July, 2013

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. P.R. PATIL
Respondent Counsel: Mrs. L.R. LANGHE, Mr. V.R. LANGHE

Cases Cited:
Phiroze Bamanji Desai Vs. Chandrakant N. Patel & Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 661 [Para 2]
Saygo Bai Vs. Chueeru Bajrangi, 2010 ALL SCR 2873=(2010) 13 SCC 762 [Para 2]
Man Kaur (Dead) By LRs Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2010 ALL SCR 2511=(2010) 10 SCC 512 [Para 2]
Vidhyadhar Vs. Mankikrao & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1441 (1) [Para 2]
Roop Kumar Vs. Mohan Thedani, AIR 2003 SC 2418 [Para 2,6]
Smt. Gangabai Vs. Smt. Chabubai, AIR 1982 SC 20 [Para 6]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- The unsuccessful plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 1291 of 2001, decided on 9th April, 2008, by Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad, so also in Regular Civil Appeal No. 193 of 2008, decided on 11th February, 2013, by District Judge-III, Aurangabad, has challenged the concurrent judgment and decree in the instant second appeal.

2. In support of the second appeal, Mr. P.R. Patil, learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions :-

[i] The Courts below committed an error on facts as well as in law in not passing a decree of specific performance of contract in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff when there was a written agreement [Exh.68] duly signed by the defendant and proved on record, and in addition, signed by the husband of the defendant as an attesting witness; and when the said agreement did not contain even a word about grant of possession on 'leave and licence' to the plaintiff by the defendant in respect of the suit property under the said agreement.

[ii] Agreement [Exh.68] clearly reveals that the suit shop No.3 was agreed to be sold for total consideration of Rs.75,000/- and was paid to the defendant-vendor, which fact was admitted by her in her written statement, and further that the possession of the shop was handed over to the plaintiff on the date of agreement dated 9th July, 1996 before Notary Public. There was no reason for the Courts below to assume contrary to the recitals in the agreement [Exh.68] that the said amount of Rs.75,000/- was towards the deposit for taking the premises on leave and licence which runs counter to the document [Exh.68] and by invoking Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Such a course was not permissible.

[iii] The document [Exh.68] was duly proved by PW 3 Ashok Abak, the attesting witness, according to law, and therefore, there was no reason to reject document [Exh.68].

[iv] Neither the defendant nor her husband at all entered the witness-box to disprove the case of the plaintiff or even proved their defence that was taken by them in the written statement, and therefore, adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the defendant and the suit ought to have been decreed.

[v] The circumstance that in the newspaper 'Daily Lokmat', dated 14th September, 2001, suit shop was not advertised for sale, but other two shops were indicated that the defendant consciously accepted the agreement [Exh.68]. The Courts below committed serious error of law in relying upon the stray admission in the cross-examination of the plaintiff and one of his witnesses, ignoring the settled legal position that the admission cannot be read in isolation. He relied upon the following decisions :

(1) Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel and others - (1974) 1 Supreme Court Cases 661;

(2) Saygo Bai v. Chueeru Bajrangi - (2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 762 : [2010 ALL SCR 2873];

(3) Man Kaur (Dead) By LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha - (2010) 10 Supreme Court Cases 512 : [2010 ALL SCR 2511];

(4) Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and another - AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (1); and

(5) Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani - AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2418.

3. Per contra, learned counsel Mrs. L.R. Langhe for the respondent opposed the second appeal and argued that;

[i] Two Courts have concurrently held that the agreement [Exh.68] is sham and bogus and is required to be rejected, since the transaction in fact was one of the leave and licence and not an agreement of sale of the suit shop which is located in the prime locality of Aurangabad.

[ii] All questions of facts have been discussed by the Courts below on evidence, and as such, no substantial question of law, which is a pre-requisite of Section 100 of the Evidence Act, is at all involved.

[iii] Though the agreement [Exh.68] did not recite anything about leave and licence, fact remains that the plea of leave and licence was specifically stated in the written statement with necessary details and that the amount of Rs.75,000/- was accepted by the defendant towards deposit for the leave and licence when the possession was given. The defence about leave and licence was not specifically denied in the plaint by the plaintiff by amendment. On the contrary, the plaintiff himself and his witness in the cross-examination voluntarily, openly and consciously made admission of fact that the transaction was one of leave and licence. There is no stray admission if the evidence is carefully perused as alleged by the appellant. The admissions given by his witness are loud and clear, bereft of any doubt.

[iv] Merely because the respondent/defendant has not examined herself or her husband, one cannot jump to a conclusion that the plaintiff has proved his case because the burden of proof to prove his case is always on the plaintiff. When the plaintiff failed to prove his case and rather admitted the case of the defendant in the cross-examination, no occasion arose for the defendant to prove her defence by entering into the witness-box or by asking her husband to enter the witness-box. Therefore, the question of drawing adverse inference does not arise.

[v] Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act as has been interpreted by the Apex Court time and again, clearly provides that when a true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible. Hence, there is no fault on the part of the Courts below in examining the real nature of the transaction.

[vi] Admission is the best piece of evidence as has been held by the Apex Court and that has been pressed into service by the Courts below. The counsel further contended that the trial Court directed the defendant to repay the advance amount of Rs.75,000/- with 6% per annum interest to the plaintiff/appellant, and thus has balanced the equity in favour of the appellant. The counsel therefore prayed for dismissal of the second appeal.

CONSIDERATION:-

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I have seen the impugned judgments. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the evidence, pleadings and documents from the paper-book during the course of argument. Hence, I proceed to frame following substantial questions of law and also proceed to answer the same.

i. Whether the agreement [Exh.68] showing it to be an agreement of sale of the suit-shop, could be treated as the one of leave and licence on the basis of oral evidence with reference to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, and particularly when the defendant Maya or her husband Dashrath did not enter the witness-box to explain the nature of agreement [Exh.68] ? Yes.

ii. Whether the Courts below were required to draw an adverse inference against the defendant for not entering into the witness-box in order to show the real nature of transaction viz. leave and licence in place of agreement of sale through the document [Exh.68] ? No.

iii. Whether the admission given by the plaintiff and his witness PW 2 - Ashok Mule about the nature of transaction as the one of leave and licence, was a stray admission, not to be utilized by the Court against the plaintiff ? No.

iv. Whether the appellant/plaintiff discharged the burden of proof about the real nature of transaction when the defendant specifically set up a plea in the written statement about the nature of transaction as the one of leave and licence and not agreement of sale under document [Exh.68] ? No.

5. I have gone through the document [Exh.68] which is duly proved on record, which in no uncertain terms show that the document is styled as the 'agreement of sale' upon receipt of payment of Rs.75,000/- as total consideration of the suit-shop by the defendant. It is signed by the defendant and her husband as an attesting witness.

6. Apropos the submissions based on Sections 91 and Section 92 of the Evidence Act, are required to be first examined. In Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani [AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2418], the Apex Court in paragraph Nos.16 to 22 held thus:

"16. The practical consequence of integration is that its scattered parts, in their former and incohate shape, have no longer any jural effect; they are replaced by a single embodiment of the act. In other words, when a jural act is embodied in a single memorial all other utterances of the parties on the topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act. This rule is based upon an assumed intention on the part of the contracting parties, evidenced by the existence of the written contract, to place themselves above the uncertainties of oral evidence and on a disinclusination of the Courts to defeat this object. When persons express their agreements in writing, it is for the express purpose of getting rid of any indefiniteness and to put their ideas in such shape that there can be no misunderstanding, which so often occurs when reliance is placed upon oral statements. Written contracts presume deliberation on the part of the contracting parties and it is natural they should be treated with careful consideration by the Courts and with a disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of the parties. (See Mc Kelvey's Evidence p.294). As observed in Greelea's Evidence page 563, one of the most common and important of the concrete rules presumed under the general notion that the best evidence must be produced and that one with which the phrase "best evidence" is now exclusively associated is the rule that when the contents of a writing are to be proved, the writing itself must be produced before the Court or its absence accounted for before testimony to its contents is admitted."

"17. It is likewise a general and most inflexible rule that wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is of principle because such instruments are in their own nature and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of credit than parol evidence. It is of policy because it would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon which men's rights depended, were liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence. (See Starkie on Evidence p. 648)"

"18. In Section 92 the legislature has prevented oral evidence being adduced for the purpose of varying the contract as between the parties to the contract; but, no such limitations are imposed under Section 91. Having regard to the jural position of Sections 91 and 92 and the deliberate omission from Section 91 of such words of limitation, it must be taken note of that even a third party if he wants to establish a particular contract between certain others, either when such contract has been reduced to in a document or where under the law such contract has to be in writing, can only prove such contract by the production of such writing."

"19. Sections 91 and 92 apply only when the document on the face of it contains or appears to contain all the terms of the contract. Section 91 is concerned solely with the mode of proof of a document which limitation improved by Section 92 relates only to the parties to the document. If after the document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91, provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 92, and similarly Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91."

"20. The two sections are, however, different in some material particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined to only to bilateral documents. (See Bai Hira Devi and Ors. vs. Official Assignee of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 448). Both these provisions are based on "best evidence rule". In Bacon's Maxim Regulation 23, Lord Bacon said "The law will not couple and mingle matters of speciality, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment which is of inferior account in law". It would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory."

"21. The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory."

"22. This Court in Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chhabubai (AIR 1982 SC 20) and Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) thr.Lrs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by Lrs.(AIR 2000 SC 426) with reference to Section 92(1) held that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend that the deed was not intended to be acted upon, but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties."

In Smt. Gangabai v. Smt. Chabubai [AIR 1982 Supreme Court 20], the Apex Court held thus in paragraph No.11:-

"11. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that sub-sec.(1) of s. 92 of the Evidence Act bars the respondent from contending that there was no sale and, it is submitted, the respondent should not have been permitted to lead parole evidence in support of the contention. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 92 declares that when the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms. And the first proviso to S.92 says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contradicting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. It is clear to us that the bar imposed by sub-sec. (1) of S. 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar v. Vedathanni, AIR 1936 PC 70. The Trial Court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parole evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parole evidence is admissible, the finding of the court below in favour of the respondent must be accepted. The second contention on behalf of the appellant must also fail."

It is thus clear from the legal position set out above that when a true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible

7. The plaintiff relied upon Exh.68-agreement of sale in the plaint, and the defendant in the written-statement [Exh.18] took a specific plea about the transaction, and it would be appropriate to reproduce the same, which runs as under :-

"6. That in reply to the contents of para no.2 this Defendant submits that, she never entered into the agreement of sale of shop no.3 as alleged by plaintiff. It is a fact that, the plaintiff's father was working with the husband of defendant in Garware co. therefore their relations were cordial. Looking to that circumstances the father of plaintiff told to the husband of defendant to give the shop on leave and licence basis. Therefore Rs.500/- per month was fixed as licence fees, with this Rs.75,000/- was given as deposit by the father of plaintiff to the defendant. For the first year no writing was made but lateron it was told by the father of plaintiff that he is in need to show the books of accounts and balance sheet of his business to the tax authorities, therefore he is need of some written document. By believing upon the request of plaintiff's father the husband of defendant told to the defendant that, the plaintiff wants to written documents of leave licence agreement. This defendant signed on document which was called to her as an leave and licence agreement. The plaintiff might be played mischief and prepared the alleged false and forged agreement of sale. Defendant is challenging the said agreement of sale and not only this but she is filing criminal complaint against the plaintiff u/s 420, 468 and 471 of I.P.C. because of plaintiff by misleading to her prepared a false agreement to sale with the intention to grab her property. No point of time the recitals of said documents was read over to the defendant. In this circumstances defendant specifically denied that she has entered into the agreement of sale with plaintiff nor she has been executed any such document in favour of plaintiff. The alleged agreement of sale is false and forged document therefore denied in toto."

"18. .....It is a fact that due to goodwill of the business, the plaintiff changed his mind to vacate the shop according to the terms and conditions of the leave and licence agreement. Till today no copy of alleged agreement has not been provided and supplied by plaintiff to this defendant.".....

8. The trial commenced and the plaintiff examined himself and two witnesses. PW 2 Ashok Mule is an independent witness who is a Steno and as staed by PW 1 Mukesh, Mr. Mule drafted the agreement. Thus, Shri Mule is a witness involved in the transaction right from the beginning. Both the plaintiff and PW 2 Ashok Mule have made a clear breast about the real nature of transaction under Exh.68 viz. the one of leave and licence and the payment of Rs.75,000/- towards deposit. Their admissions in the cross-examination are loud and clear and after giving them full opporunity to explain. I quote the relevant portions of English translation in the cross-examination of PW 1 and PW 2, as under :-

PW 1- Mukesh s/o Ashok Sonar :-

" It is true that Dashrath Sadawarte gave me the shop as my father and Dashrath Sadawarte had faith in each-other."

"It is true that the friends of my father Shri Abak, Shri Dashrath Sadawarte, Shri Mule had helped me for compliance of the requirement of documents for bank loan. It is true that due to help extended by all these persons, I got the loan from the bank. It is true that bank had asked me to bring papers of the shop where I wanted to run my business. It is not true to say that my father had requested said Sadawarte, who prepared documents in relation to the shop. It is true that the bank does not extend the loan unless the documents are in the name of proposed borrower. It is true that Shri Dashrath Sadawarte, Shri Mule, Shri Abak and my father decided amongst them that said Sadawarte should give an agreement of leave and licence in my name to enable me to get the loan from the bank. At that time, it was decided that the leave and licence agreement should be drafted by Shri Mule. It is true that accordingly the agreement of leave and licence was prepared and on that the signature of wife of Dashrath Sadawarte, Smt. Maya was taken before the Notary."

PW 2 - Ashok Ramkrishna Mule

"In the year 1996, Dashrath Sadawarte had given the shop on the agreement of leave and licence."

"I know the shop premises about which leave and licence agreement was executed. Suit shop means Ranjanwan Housing Society, Block No.10, with 1200 square feet bungalow and three shops constructed in the open space. It is true that the three shops were constructed after breaking the compound wall. It is true that all the three shops have been illegally constructed. It is true that the agreement of leave and licence was executed on 9th July, 1996."

9. To my mind, having gone through the above admissions made by the plaintiff and his witness repeatedly, who were throughout involved in the transaction in question, the above admissions cannot be termed as 'stray admissions'. On the contrary, according to me, these admissions are made with full responsibility; and opportunity being offered to the witnesses to answer and the admissions are categorical. There is no doubt in my mind about the fact that these admissions given by these two witnesses, and particularly the plaintiff himself, have rightly been utilized by the Courts below in the matter of appreciation of evidence to find out the real nature of transaction and I have no hesitation in concurring with them while marshaling the evidence on record. It may true that the defendant Maya or her husband Dashrath were required to explain the real transaction with reference to document [Exh.68] by entering the witness-box and offer themselves for cross-examination. But, then the categorical admissions made by the plaintiff and his witness clearly must be held to exempt her from the said requirement, because initial burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff and his witness themselves disclosed the real nature of transaction in the cross-examination, as stated above. That being so, I am not inclined to accept the contentions raised by the leaned counsel for the appellant that the document [Exh.68] was in fact an agreement of sale nor I am inclined to accept that the real nature of transaction was of agreement of sale and not one of the leave and licence. In the fact situation, there is no rhyme or reason to draw adverse inference against the defendant merely because she did not enter the witness-box. It may be true that document [Exh.68] was proved by PW 3 Ashok Abak, the attesting witness, but that is not enough, particularly when the plaintiff himself and his witness PW 2 Ashok Mule demolished the case of the plaintiff. It is well settled that the plaintiff must stand or fall on his own legs. I, therefore, answer aforesaid questions [i] to [iv] framed by me accordingly.

10. The propositions of law stated in the other judgments cited by both the learned counsel for the parties have in fact been applied by me in the facts of the present case. Therefore, there is no need to discuss all the judgments, cited before me.

11. It is clear from the record that the trial Court directed the defendant to refund of amount of Rs.75,000/- with 6% per annum interest to the plaintiff. I think, the Courts below have done the right thing in the aforesaid context and asked the defendant to refund the amount. In the result, I find that this second appeal is bereft of any merit. Hence, I make the following order :-

ORDER

[i] The Second Appeal No. 279 of 2013 is dismissed.

[ii] No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.