Criminal Writ Petition No.4435 of 2012

23rd August, 2013

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. ANAND PATIL
Respondent Counsel: Mr. J.P. YAGNIK, Mr. KULDEEP PATIL

Cases Cited:
Sunil Batra Vs. Delhi Administration & Ors., 2011 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 113=AIR 1978 SC 1675 [Para 6,12]
Prem Shankar Shukla Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SCC 1535 [Para 6,9,11,12,14]
D.K. Basu Vs. State of W.B., 2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65=(1997) 1 SCC 416 [Para 6,12,13,14]
Citizen for Democracy through its President Vs. State of Assam, AIR 1996 SC 2193 [Para 6,12]
Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1321 (S.C.)=(2005) 3 SCC 647 [Para 6,12]
Vasantkumar Jivrambhai Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2005 ALL MR (Cri) 2951=2006 Cri.L.J. 1135 [Para 16]

JUDGMENT

S. B. SHUKRE, J. :- By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the action of the police station, Gandhinagar, in arresting him in a Chapter Case bearing No.8/12, putting him under handcuffs and parading him in public with handcuffs. The petitioner has also claimed compensation for the said action, alleged to be illegal.

2. This petition has been heard finally at the stage of admission with the consent of the parties. Hence, Rule, made returnable forthwith. Learned A.P.P. for the State waives service of notice for the respondents.

3. The petitioner has seriously questioned in this petition the action of the police station, Gandhinagar, Kolhapur in arresting him and parading him in public in the state of his being handcuffed and, therefore, in order to understand the nature of action and its possible legal consequences, it would be necessary to make a brief reference to the admitted facts of the case.

4. The petitioner is a resident of Gandhinagar, Kolhapur. Police Station Gandhinagar, had proposed to initiate Chapter proceedings as per the provisions of Section 110(e) and (g) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The proposal of the Chapter Case was forwarded on 8th June, 2012 by the Assistant Police Inspector, police station, Gandhinagar, Kolhapur, the respondent No.2 to the Special Executive Magistrate/ Police Inspector, Local Crime Branch, Kolhapur. However, one day before i.e. on 7th June, 2012, the petitioner was called to the police station, Gandhinagar with a view to producing him before the learned Executive Magistrate together with the proposal of the said Chapter Case. The petitioner responded and presented himself at the police station on 7th June, 2012. According to the petitioner, the time at which he reported to the police station was 10.15 a.m. on 7th June, 2012 and according to respondent No.2, as submitted in his affidavit, this time was of 12.10 p.m. on 7th June, 2012. The relevant station diary entry vide document marked as 'X' annexed to the affidavit in reply, shows that the time of arrest of the petitioner was of 12.10 p.m. From these contentions, it could be taken that the petitioner must have presented himself at the police station some time between 10.15 a.m. and 12.10 p.m. and thereafter he was placed under arrest. The petitioner was arrested by respondent Nos.4 & 5 on the directions of respondent No.2 in view of the provisions of Section 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Immediately after the arrest, the petitioner was sent to the nearest Public Health Center for his medical examination and at that time, the petitioner was escorted by respondent Nos.4 & 5 who are the police constables attached to the police station, Gandhinagar. The petitioner, while being taken from police station, Gandhinagar to Public Health Center situated very close to the police station, was put under handcuffs with a rope attached and in that state, was made to walk down the distance from the police station to the Public Health Center while the respondent Nos.4 & 5 held the other end of the rope. The petitioner, after his medical examination in Public Health Center, was referred to C.P.R. Hospital, Kolhapur for his hospitalization there, as he was suffering from high blood pressure. He was taken to the C.P.R. Hospital, Kolhapur from Public Health Center in a police vehicle without any handcuffs. The memo of arrest of the petitioner was prepared by police station, Gandhinagar and friend of the petitioner by name Prem Chelaram Gidwani was also intimated about his arrest. The petitioner was released on execution of P.R. Bond in the early morning hours of 8th June, 2011 while he was still at C.P.R. Hospital and undergoing treatment.

5. With the assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State, we have carefully gone through the petition, the affidavit in reply filed by respondent No.2 together with the documents annexed to it and all the documents forming part of the paper-book to the petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has forcefully argued that the petitioner was not only illegally arrested in Chapter Case proceedings not justified under the law but was further given inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment by being paraded in the street in a handcuffed state. He submits that there was absolutely no justification for handcuffing and parading of the petitioner as there was never any threat of his escape from the custody nor was there any material to show the proneness of the petitioner to escape from the custody. He has further submitted that law in this regard is well settled and Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued clear guidelines as to in what cases, exceptional as they would be, handcuffing of an under-trial person or prisoner is permissible. He further argued that all these directions are issued in the cases of Sunil Batra V/s. Delhi Administration & Ors. A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court 1675 : [2011 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 113], Prem Shankar Shukla V/s. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court Cases 1535, D.K. Basu V/s. State of W.B., (1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 416 : [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65], Citizen for Democracy through its President V/s. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 2193 and Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti V/s. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 647 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1321 (S.C.)]. By placing reliance upon the law settled in these cases, learned counsel for the petitioner has not only sought quashing of the Chapter Case against the petitioner but also compensation for cruel and degrading treatment given to the petitioner while in custody which has resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of the petitioner.

7. Learned A.P.P. for the State submitted that the petitioner has consistent criminal record and that he is a habitual offender. He further submits that after his arrest, the petitioner had threatened to escape from police custody and had also threatened that he would either sit on fast or immolate himself in front of the office of the Superintendent of Kolhapur in protest against the action taken by respondent No.2. These facts necessitated restraining of the petitioner by putting him under handcuffs, so submitted learned A.P.P. for the State. He further argued that the threats and dangerous criminal character of the petitioner put together justified his being held under handcuffs and rope by Gandhinagar police and, therefore, according to him, this case is not a case where any fundamental rights of the petitioner have been unnecessarily and unjustifiably curtailed. He, therefore, argues that the petition deserves to be dismissed.

8. Since the fact of taking of the petitioner on foot after his arrest from police station, Gandhinagar to Public Health Center situated nearby with his hands tied under handcuffs is not in dispute, the scrutiny of the said action in this case would be confined to the question as to whether such handcuffing of the petitioner and taking him in that state on foot from the police station to the near Public Health Center under the glare of public was justified or not. The direction to restrain the petitioner under handcuffs and take him in that state to Public Health Center was given by respondent No.2 and executed by respondent Nos.4 & 5. Therefore, it would be useful to refer to the affidavit in reply filed by respondent No.2. According to him, placing of handcuffs on the petitioner was necessitated by the fact that after the arrest under Section 41(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner started threatening the police personnel that he would escape from police custody and he also started abusing the police present in the police station. Respondent No.2 states that he apprehended that the petitioner might turn violent and escape from the police custody or might cause injury to himself and as such, the handcuffs were used while taking him to the Public Health Center for his medical examination, which was situated at a walking distance of five minutes. Respondent No.2 further states that all the facts have been duly recorded in the arrest memo which was caused to be drawn up on 7th June, 2012 in the presence of panchas. Respondent no. 2, however, denies that the petitioner was paraded or taken on foot in public with a view to humiliate him. He further states that putting of handcuffs under such circumstances is fully justified as per the directions issued from time to time by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

9. Once it is established by facts on record that the petitioner was handcuffed and taken in that state on foot by a public road to a nearby Public Health Center, the justification given for it must answer the parameters of law, which is now well settled. The explanation, however, given by respondent No.2 is not convincing nor falls within the scope and ambit of the guidelines issued in this regard by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its various cases. Handcuffs being in their very nature cruel and degrading, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cannot be ordinarily put on a prisoner and it can be done only in extreme circumstances and exceptional cases. Even when the exceptionality of a case warrants putting of handcuffs on the arrestee or prisoner, recording of the reasons for doing so is an absolute necessity. These reasons cannot be recorded by a mechanical process mindlessly made and whenever arrestee or prisoner is produced before the Court, the Court must be shown the reasons so recorded and the approval of the Court must be obtained. It is also well settled that merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape proneness does not follow. There has to be some tangible evidence, documentary or otherwise or desperate behaviour directed to make good his escape, which alone would constitute a valid ground for handcuffing and fettering and as far as possible even this is required to be avoided by increasing the strength of escorts or taking the prisoner in a well protected van. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Shankar (supra) in paragraphs 28 and 30 are useful in this regard. The relevant observations are reproduced thus:-

"28 ....Merely because a person is charged with a grave offence he cannot be handcuffed. He may be very quiet, well-behaved docile or even timid. Merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape-proneness or desperate character does not follow. Many other conditions mentioned in the Police Manual are totally incongruous with what we have stated above and must fall as unlawful. Tangible testimony, documentary or other, or desperate behaviour, geared to making good his escape, alone will be a valid ground for handcuffing and fettering, and even this may be avoided by increasing the strength of the escorts or taking the prisoners in well-protected vans... "

"30. Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so. Otherwise, under Article 21 the procedure will be unfair and bad in law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is no control over possible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters.

10. It is clear from the above referred observations that absent the extreme circumstances and absent the documentary or other evidence denoting the extra-ordinary situation, there is no way a police authority can put on handcuffs and if it does, it would be a violation of fundamental right of the prisoner or arrestee flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

11. The justification of handcuffing of the petitioner sought to be given by respondent No.2 and referred to in the earlier paragraph nowhere indicates that the circumstances were extreme, and the behaviour of the petitioner was desperate and directed to make good his escape from the custody of Gandhinagar police. Except for making a bald statement in the affidavit and so also in arrest panchanama dated 7th June, 2012 that the petitioner had threatened to make good his escape from police custody, no tangible material leading to an inference of desperate character of the petitioner has been referred therein. In fact, the circumstances noted in the affidavit in reply of respondent No.2 are contradictory to the stand taken by respondent No.2 that the petitioner had shown proneness to escape from the custody of police. Respondent No.2 admits that the petitioner remained present at the police station upon being called there by him. A person who voluntarily responds to such a call by a police officer and makes himself available for inquiry at the police station is a circumstance which would sufficiently indicate that such a person does not have any escape proneness. Then, as mandated by the law laid down in the case of Prem Shankar Shukla (supra), it was necessary for respondent No.2 to specifically record all the necessary reasons in arrest panchanama or memorandum of arrest and place them before the concerned Magistrate having jurisdiction and seek his approval.

12. In the instant matter, the arrest panchanama dated 7th June, 2012 does make a mention about threats given by the petitioner that he would escape from police custody but, it does not specifically state that the petitioner was put under handcuffs. It only says that the petitioner was placed under arrest and taken into custody. The arrest panchanama ought to have shown not just arrest but also of the handcuffing of the petitioner and specific reasons why the threat of escaping from custody given by the petitioner was considered to be real. Mere mentioning of the threat was not enough and bringing on record the surrounding circumstances which made the threat look genuine was necessary. This was all the more necessary when the petitioner by voluntarily presenting himself at the police station had shown that he was not a desperate character prone to escaping from custody. Such reasons were not recorded and what were recorded were by a mechanical process resorted to mindlessly, which is not permissible as laid down by Hon'ble Suprme Court in the case of Prem Shankar (supra). Even when the threat of escaping from custody had been found to be genuine, the law is so developed, handcuffing as a first solution to the threat, is not permissible and effort be made to avoid it by increasing the strength of the escort. No such attempt has been made in this case. Besides this, there is no record produced before this Court by respondents that the action of putting of handcuffs on the petitioner was approved by the Magistrate, having jurisdiction over the police station. So, the action of handcuffing of the petitioner and the procedure by which it was made, were both arbitrary and bad in law under Article 21 of Constitution of India. This is a clear-cut violation of fundamental right of the petitioner to be treated with dignity and fairly and is a clear case of gross abuse of police powers. The petitioner has been taken on foot in handcuffs by police constables from police station to a Public Health Center. Howsoever close the distance might be between these two places, it was not at all justified under the law of the land for Gandhinagar police to have taken the petitioner in such a state. Not only that, it afforded the public at large an opportunity to see the petitioner being taken in this manner, the inevitable consequence of which, it goes without saying, the feeling of humiliation over taking the petitioner. Such an action on the part of Gandhinagar police station at the behest of respondent No.2 and at the hands of respondent Nos.4 & 5 amounted to giving of cruel and degrading treatment to the petitioner thereby violating his fundamental right with regard to his liberty and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The guarantee to a prisoner, whether convicted or under-trial, against inhuman treatment is the law of land which has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the cases of Sunil Batra, [2011 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 113] (supra), Prem Shankar (supra), D.K. Basu, [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65] (supra), Citizen for Democracy through its President (supra) to the case of Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti (supra).

13. In the case of D.K. Basu, [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65] (supra), it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that whenever there is a deprivation of fundamental right of liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, the claim in public law of compensation arises. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that awarding of compensation for established infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a remedy available in public law and is exercised by Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State. In paragraph 44 of the judgment in the said case of D.K. Basu, [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65] (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-

" 44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen."

14. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Basu, [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 65] (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. Here in this case also, there has been established infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioner in violation of the clear directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court given in the case of Prem Shankar Shukla (supra). The petitioner has been put under unnecessary handcuffs and fetters and not only that he was made to walk a distance between the police station and Public Health Center in that state under the gaze of public. The question as to how many members of the public actually watched the petitioner walking the distance in handcuffed state is immaterial, once it is established that he was taken in that state on foot and by a public road. It is also immaterial for the same reason as to whether video recording or photographs were shot and if were shot indeed, it would only add salt to injury. We do not, however, propose to examine as to whether any videos or photographs were taken as that would amount to making an inquiry into what has not come on record as admitted facts. Suffice it to say it here that what is established in the case is that respondent Nos.4 & 5 on the directions of respondent No.2 have committed the public wrongs in this case and the State, being the employer or master, would be vicariously liable for discharging the liability arising from the public wrongs so committed by its servants in this case.

15. This would bring us to fixing of the quantum of compensation to be awarded for giving solace to the petitioner from agony and pain he was made to suffer owing to unlawful action of the said respondents. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner was relieved of the handcuffs immediately after realising that he was suffering from an ailment related to blood pressure and was also released on bail on his executing P.R. Bond on the next date, in our opinion, an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- payable as compensation to the petitioner by the State should serve the ends of justice.

16. As regards the Chapter Case initiated against the petitioner, we are of the view that the proceedings cannot be sustained as it appears from the contentions raised in the affidavit in reply and also documents produced on record by both the sides that no separate order as required under the provisions of Section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been issued in this case. In order to take action under Section 110 or for that matter under sections 107, 108 or 109 of the Criminal Procedure Code, law requires that a separate order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, amount of bond to be executed, the terms for which it is to be in force and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required must be issued. [see judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered in Vasantkumar Jivrambhai Majithia V/s. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2006 Cri.L.J. 1135 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 2951]]. Since no separate order is issued in writing in this case, the Chapter proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 110 (e) & (g) of the Criminal Procedure Code would be illegal.

17. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the opinion that compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- is liable to be paid by the State to the petitioner and the chapter proceedings are also required to be quashed and set aside.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

19. The proceedings in the Chapter Case No.8 of 2012 arising from Gandhinagar Police Station, Kolhapur, are hereby quashed and set aside.

20. The State is directed to pay compensation of Rs. One lac to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of this order. Respondent No.1 State shall be at liberty to recover the compensation from respondent Nos.2, 4 and 5, if found appropriate by following due process of law.

21. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

Petition allowed.