Second Appeal No.159 of 2013

24th April, 2014

Petitioner Counsel: Shri S.S.KHEDKAR
Respondent Counsel: Shri J.B. KASAT

Cases Cited:
Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 2004(5) ALL MR 484 (S.C.) =(2004) 4 SCC 311 [Para 9]
Transcore Vs. Union of India, 2007 ALL SCR 824 =AIR 2007 SC 712 [Para 9]
Firm of Illury Subbayya Chetty and Sons Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 [Para 10]
Privy Council Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 Privy Council 105 [Para 10]
Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. Vs. The Governor General in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78 [Para 10]
Ram Swarup & Ors. Vs. Shikar Chand & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 893 [Para 11]
Dhulabhai & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78 [Para 12]
Sardara Singh (D) by LRs & Anr. Vs. Sardara Singh (D) & Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 90 [Para 13]
D.R.Chawla & Ors. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 162 [Para 14]
Pavitter Singh & Ors. Vs. Niranjan Lal Malhotra, JT 2001(8) SC 641 [Para 15]
Shri Chand Vs. Government of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 242 [Para 16]
Anwar Vs. First Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1785 [Para 16]
Sankaranarayanan Potti (D) by LRs Vs. K. Sreedevi & Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 751 [Para 17]
Shri Panch Nagar Parakh, Mandsaur Vs. Purushottam Das, AIR 1999 SC 3071 [Para 18]
P. A. Ahammed Ibrahim Vs. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1999 SC 3033 [Para 19]
Bhanu Construction Co.(P.) Ltd. Vs. Andhra Bank, Hyderabad, 2001(2) ALL MR 253 (S.C.) =AIR 2001 SC 477 [Para 20]
Vannattankandy Ibrayi Vs. Kunhabdulla Hajee, (2001) 1 SCC 564 [Para 21]
Shri Ram & Anr. Vs. First Addl. District Judge & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1250 [Para 22,30]
Ghulam Qadir Vs. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33 [Para 23]
M/s. Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Manorma Sirsi, 2004 (1) AWC 764 (SC) [Para 24]
Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rama Mishra, AIR 2002 SC 2402 [Para 25]
Abdul Waheed Khan Vs. v. Bhawani & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 1718 [Para 26]
Smt. Bismillah Vs. Janeshwar Prasad & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 540 [Para 27]
Azhar Hasan & Ors. Vs. District Judge. Saharanpur & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2960 [Para 28]
Ramaswamy (D) by LRs Vs. M. Lobo (D) by LRs., (2001) 10 SCC 176 [Para 29]
Kamla Mills Limited Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1965 SC 1942 [Para 31]
Dhruv Greenfield Limited Vs. Hukam Singh & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2841 [Para 32]
Sahebgouda (D) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. Ogeppa & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2743 [Para 33]
Dwarka Prasad Agrawal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal & Ors., 2003 (3) SCCD 1210 : AIR 2003 SC 2696 [Para 34]
Chhedi Lal Gupta & Ors. Vs. Mohammad Sattar, AIR 1963 SC 448 [Para 35]
Auto Engineering Works Vs. Bansal Trading Company & Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 630 [Para 36]
S. Govinda Menon Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1274 [Para 37]
M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta & Anr. Vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 [Para 38]
Thirurnala Tirupati Devasthanams & Anr. Vs. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 3209 [Para 39]
G.Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 [Para 39]
T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 [Para 39]
Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 [Para 39]
Nanduri Yogananda Lakshminarasimhachari Vs. Sri Agastheswaraswamvaru, AIR 1960 SC 622 [Para 39]
Ujjam Bai Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1621 [Para 39]
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 [Para 39]
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 [Para 39]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This appeal is filed by the appellants/original plaintiffs against Judgment and Order, dated 2.2.2013 passed by the learned District Judge-1, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal No.135 of 2006 whereby the appeal was dismissed. The said appeal arose from the Judgment and Order passed by the learned 6th Joint Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Amravati in Regular Civil Suit No.404 of 2005, whereby the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction in view of the finding below preliminary issue under Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. The facts, briefly stated, are thus :-

Appellant No.1 is wife of one Bhagwantrao Patil, who had purchased an open plot No.32 in the field bearing Survey No.31/1A, plot admeasuring 1150 square feet of mouza Tarkheda, Taluka and District Amravati. He had constructed a house bearing Municipal House No.320 in Ward No.1 on the said plot. Bhagwantrao Patil had abandoned appellant No.1/plaintiff No.1 since July 1995; since then he is not heard as alive. Appellant No.1 was left without any source of income. Defendant No.1, as a friend of her husband, had assisted plaintiff No.1/Savita. In December 1997, defendant No.1 sought help from plaintiff No.1/Savita to purchase a Truck/Vehicle by asking her to execute the nominal Sale deed in his favour so that he can obtain a loan from the Bank. The plaintiffs averred that the Sale Deed was nominal and void. The Bank (respondent no.2) has already initiated proceedings for realisation of loan. On 6.8.2003, notice of attachment was issued on the suit property (vide Exh.28) issued under Section 13 (2) the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the SARFAESI Act").

3. The suit was filed. The prayer in the suit was; (i) for relief of declaration that the Sale Deed, dated 19.12.1997 executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant no. 1 is void and, (ii) to restrain the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs on the basis of the said Sale Deed. Later relief (ii) was in effect to restrain the Bank from realising it's non-performing assets under the SARFAESI Act. On 12.1.2006, a preliminary issue was raised before the trial Court objecting jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and try the suit.

4. The trial Court framed the preliminary issue and heard the parties. The trial Court refused to entertain the suit for seeking the relief (ii) of injunction for want of jurisdiction but directed the parties to proceed further in view of prayer clause (i) regarding declaration sought. As the Bank has already initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, the Civil Court refused to entertain prayer for injunction by well-reasoned order.

5. The first Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 135 of 2006, decided on 2.2.2013 affirmed the order passed by the trial Court.

6. The second appeal is admitted on the substantial question of law stated as under :-

Whether the Courts below were right in holding that the suit claiming the consequential relief of injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from dispossessing the appellants / plaintiffs from the suit property is barred by the provisions of the Section 34 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security interest Act, 2002?

7. On behalf of the appellants, it is submitted that the Civil Court could not have bifurcated the prayers so as to hold the suit maintainable for the relief of declaration to determine validity of the Sale Deed and to hold that the prayer for grant of injunction to restrain the defendants by an injunction order was not maintainable for want of jurisdiction.

8. On behalf of the respondents, it is urged that, by the concurrent findings, the Courts below held that, in view of appeal provided for under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the plaintiffs have statutory remedy to pray for injunction before the special forum under the Act. Section 34 of the Act bars the Civil Court from granting relief of injunction in respect of the cases required to be heard under the Act.

9. Let us now consider the Legal position :

The object of SARFAESI Act is very good aiming at reducing 'Non-performing Asset", the constitutional Courts had to interpret the provisions of the Act dealing with many complicated issues and keeping in view the interest of the borrowers. Many issues under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act are settled now. The two most important cases in that process are Mardia Chemicals Ltd vs. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004(5) ALL MR 484 (S.C.)] and Transcore v. Union of India reported in AIR 2007 SC 712 : [2007 ALL SCR 824] wherein the Supreme Court has settled the legal position substantially with regard to the SARFAESI Act and made the rigor of SARFAESI Act for the recovery of NPAs effective in letter and spirit. When the Statute creating rights and obligations constituted the forum to enforce them, such special forums ordinarily are considered right over and above the general law. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes the intention of the Legislature clear. Civil court does have plenary jurisdiction to try all civil suits, unless barred expressly or by necessary implication. The maxim "Ubi jus ibi remedium" i.e. wherever there is right there is remedy denotes plenary jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide about its own jurisdiction on the basis of the averments in the plaint. Ouster of the jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. But, at the same time, jurisdiction cannot be conferred where there is none. Neither parties can confer jurisdiction by consent because if the court decides without jurisdiction, the decree would be nullity ab initio. When the special Statute has provided the adequate or sufficient alternative efficacious remedy, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded expressly or by necessary implication. Section 34 of the SURFAESI Act mentions expressly that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Civil Suit in relation to the matter required to be determined by the Debt recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. The Civil Court cannot grant injunction against an action under the SURFAESI Act or its Rules. Section 35 mentions the non-obstante clause which has overriding effect. The crux of the question is as to which of the rights or obligations are sought to be enforced. If remedy is available to get the right or obligation adjudicated under the special Act, the suit would not be entertained by the Civil Court as it would not lie in the Civil Court. Plenary jurisdiction of the Civil Court under general law could be resorted to when the statutory Authorities/Forum/Tribunal have acted without jurisdiction or when fundamental principles of the judicial procedure was not complied with.

10. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Firm of Illury Subbayya Chetty and Sons ..vs.. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported at AIR 1964 SC 322, placing reliance upon the judgments in the cases of the Privy Council Secretary of State ..vs.. Mask and Co., reported at AIR 1940 Privy Council 105 and Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ..vs.. The Governor General in Council, reported AIR 1947 PC 78, held as under :

"...................there is a general presumption that there must be a remedy in the ordinary civil court to a citizen claiming that an amount had been recovered from him illegally and that such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indication to the contrary. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain civil cause will not be assumed unless the relevant Statute contains an express provision to that effect or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature.............."

11. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swarup and Ors. v. Shikar Chand and Another., reported at AIR 1966 SC 893, held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with civil causes can be excluded by the Legislature by Special Act which may deal with special subject-matters, but the statutory provision must expressly provide for such exclusion or must necessarily and impliedly lead to that inference. However, the said bar would not be relevant if the plea raised before the Civil Court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity.

12. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai and Anr. ..vs.. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., reported at AIR 1969 SC 78, held that exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by express provision may not be a complete bar to entertain a suit if party satisfies the Civil Court that the Statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. More so, the Statutory Tribunal must be competent to provide all the remedies normally associated with the actions' in Civil Courts, which are either prescribed by the said Statute or not. More so, the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled. In the case of Dhulabhai and Anr. (cited supra), Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court on an analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court expressing diverse views, laid down as many as seven principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court, out of which at least two principles being germane to the controversy involved in this petition are excerpted below :

"(a) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunal the civil court's Jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted In conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(b) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court."

13. In the case of Sardara Singh (dead) by LRs and another ..vs.. Sardara Singh (dead) and others reported at (1990) 4 SCC 90, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Civil Court's jurisdiction is available wherever action is taken without jurisdiction under any Statute.

14. In the case of D.R.Chawla and others ..vs.. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported at (1993) 3 SCC 162, the Supreme Court has held that where statutory enactments only create rights or liabilities without providing forums for remedies, any person having a grievance that he had been wronged or his right is being affected, can approach the ordinary Civil Court, but in case a Special Forum is provided for enforcement of such right or for protection or enforcement of a liability without any authority in law, the ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be upheld on the finding that the rights and liabilities in question have been created by the Act without touching the existing Common Law rights and the remedy provided therein is adequate and complete. But where adequate redressal machinery is not provided under the Statutory Forum, the Civil Court can still examine the correctness of the order passed under the Statute.

15. In the case of Pavitter Singh and others ..vs.. Niranjan Lal Malhotra reported at JT 2001(8) SC 641, the Apex Court has held that Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court in certain cases. The Court has held that, in such an eventuality, the Civil Court cannot entertain and try a suit as its jurisdiction has expressly been barred and the only remedy in such cases, if any person is aggrieved by the order passed under the Act in respect of those evicted, is to resort to writ jurisdiction of the Writ Court.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the provisions of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the cases of Shri Chand ..vs.. Government of U.P. and Ors. reported in AIR 1986 SC 242, and Anwar ..vs.. First Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr and Ors., reported in AIR 1986 SC 1785, has observed that, in most of the matters pertaining to the Motor Vehicles Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred as the matter can be adjudicated upon by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal only.

17. In the case of Sankaranarayanan Potti (dead) by LRs ..vs.. K. Sreedevi and Ors., reported at (1998) 3 SCC 751, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :

"It is obvious that in all types of civil disputes, civil courts have inherent jurisdiction as per Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out from such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other Tribunal or authority."

18. Similar view has been reiterated in the case of Shri Panch Nagar Parakh, Mandsaur ..vs.. Purushottam Das, reported in AIR 1999 SC 3071.

19. In the case of P. A. Ahammed Ibrahim ..vs.. Food Corporation of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 3033, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the applications under the provisions of various Statutes cannot be treated as suits or claims unless such possibility is specifically provided for under those particular statutes.

20. In the case of Bhanu Construction Co.(P.) Ltd. ..vs.. Andhra Bank, Hyderabad reported at AIR 2001 SC 477 : [2001 (2) ALL MR 253 (S.C.)], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and held that, after commencement of the provisions of the said Act ever since it came into force, the suit could not be instituted as conferring the jurisdiction upon the Tribunal under the Act would take away the jurisdiction of Civil Court.

21. In the case of Vannattankandy Ibrayi ..vs.. Kunhabdulla Hajee reported in (2001) 1 SCC 564, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the provisions of the Kerala Building and Lease Control Act, 1965, which barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for recovery of premises on various grounds by the landlord before the Authority prescribed under the Act and that the suit was not maintainable. The Court held that where the building stood washed off because of natural calamity; possession of the remaining land may be recovered before the Civil Court. The Court held that under such circumstances, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction, but had the building been there, its jurisdiction was barred by Section 9 of the Code because it ceased to be a building and remained land and in such a situation, only the Civil Court was competent to entertain and try the suit.

22. In the case of Shri Ram and Anr. ..vs.. First Addl. District Judge and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 1250, the Apex Court has held that, in tenancy matters, generally revenue Court has the jurisdiction, but in case a suit is filed for cancellation of a void document, Section 9 of the Code does not impliedly bar such a suit because the document has been obtained by fraud or impersonation, as in such a case mere declaration of title is required and the document, being void, is merely to be ignored for giving relief for declaration and possession.

23. In the case of Ghulam Qadir ..vs.. Special Tribunal and others. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that - in case the title is to be established, the remedy of Civil Court is available and in such case, Section 9 of the Code would not bar the Civil Suit and would ask the Authority only to avail the remedy under the provisions of J & K State Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949.

24. In the case of M/s. Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. ..vs.. Manorma Sirsi reported in 2004 (1) AWC 764 (SC), the Apex Court has held that, as contract of service (Private) cannot be enforced in Court, the suit for declaration/permanent injunction that termination was bad, would not be entertained.

25. A party is bound either by provisions of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under the terms of the contract which is not against the public policy. In case, parties under their own agreement expressly agree that their dispute shall be tried by only one of several forums available to them, then the party can only file the suit in that Court alone to which they had agreed vide Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. ..vs.. Rama Mishra reported in AIR 2002 SC 2402.

26. In the case of Abdul Waheed Khan ..vs.. v. Bhawani and Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1718, the Apex Court has held that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be strictly construed. In fact, it is the pith and substance of the plaint which is to be seen to determine : whether the suit is maintainable in a Civil Court or before other competent Authority, as the language might be used in such a way that it may oust the jurisdiction of a particular Court. The form of action in relation to void document or instrument regarding agricultural land depends on the real cause of action with reference to the facts averred.

27. In the case of Smt. Bismillah ..vs.. Janeshwar Prasad and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 540, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

"It is true that the question of jurisdiction depends upon the allegations in the plaint and not the merits or the result of the suit. However, In order to determine the premise, the nature of action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole................The real point is not the stray or loose explanations which abound in inartistically drafted plaint but the real substance of the case is gathered by construing the pleadings as a whole."

28. In the case of Azhar Hasan and Ors. ..vs.. District Judge. Saharanpur and Ors. reported in AIR 1998 SC 2960, the Apex Court has held that the rights of tenancy are determinable by the Revenue Authorities; in a case where the sale deed is being questioned on the basis of fraud, the executor of the sale deed must be necessarily impleaded and whether the matter can be decided by the Revenue Court or the Civil Court, would depend upon the pleadings taken in the plaint and the relief sought in the suit.

29. In the case of Ramaswamy (dead) by LRs ..vs.. M. Lobo (dead) by LRs., reported in (2001) 10 SCC 176, the Hon'ble Apex Court rejected the contention that a suit in respect of the agricultural land could be entertained only by the Revenue Court and not by the Writ Court on the ground that the use of the land stood changed as it was having the residential buildings.

30. In the case of Shri Ram and Anr. ..vs.. Ist Additional District Judge and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 1250, while deciding a similar issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that suit by a recorded tenure holder in possession for cancellation of a sale deed being void would be before the Civil Court.

31. A seven Judges' Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamla Mills Limited ..vs.. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1942 has considered the issue under what circumstances a suit of civil nature can be held to be barred by special statute. The Court has held that, for deciding the issue, the Court is to be very conscious about the words used in the statutory provisions on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provision, their object and purpose. The issue becomes more important when the bar is pleaded by necessary implication and it becomes pertinent to inquire as to whether remedy is normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said institute or not.

32. In the case of Dhruv Greenfield Limited ..vs.. Hukam Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 2002 SC 2841, the Supreme Court has held that - for ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the other statute should provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provision.

33. In the case of Sahebgouda (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. ..vs.. Ogeppa and Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 2743, the Apex Court has held that - to prove that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction, a very heavy onus lies on the party seeking ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction as exclusion of jurisdiction is not to be easily inferred.

34. In the case of Dwarka Prasad Agrawal ..vs.. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal and Ors. reported in 2003 (3) SCCD 1210 : AIR 2003 SC 2696, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered a case as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stood barred by the Companies Act. In that case, the owner of the Printing Press leased out the premises to a company, of which he himself had been one of the members. Another member of the Company wanted to disposses the lessor of the Printing Press. In such circumstances, eviction suit filed by the lessor against the said other member of the Company was held to be maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in spite of the fact that the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the Companies Act, 1956 barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Court held that, in such an eventuality, the statutory provisions ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court requires very strict interpretation.

35. In the case of Chhedi Lal Gupta and Ors. ..vs.. Mohammad Sattar reported in AIR 1963 SC 448 - a suit under Section 73 of the Trade Marks Act had been filed in the Civil Court and the objection had been filed regarding jurisdiction, which was dismissed by the Civil Court. However, in Writ Petition, the High Court issued the writ of prohibition to the learned Civil Court not to proceed with the trial of the suit and issued further direction to return the plaint under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enable the plaintiff to file the same in a Court/Authority of having the jurisdiction in the matter.

36. In the case of Auto Engineering Works ..vs.. Bansal Trading Company and Ors. reported in (2001) 10 SCC 630, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the Civil Court comes to the conclusion after having heard on the issue of jurisdiction that it does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the Court must return the plaint to present the same before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

37. In the case of S. Govinda Menon ..vs.. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is no prohibition for the Writ Court to issue the writ of prohibition to the inferior Court if it assumes a jurisdiction which it does not possess or this is to prevent it from exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction, the purpose of issuing such a writ is to keep the inferior Court/Tribunal within their bounds of limited jurisdiction. Writ may also be issued in case of departure from the principles of natural justice.

38. In the case of M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta and Anr. ..vs.. Collector of Customs, Calcutta reported in AIR 1962 SC 1893, the notice issued by the statutory Authority had been challenged being without jurisdiction. In the instant case, it does not involve the similar feature; hence, none of the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has any application in the instant case.

39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thirurnala Tirupati Devasthanams and Anr. ..vs.. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu and Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3209 has considered the issue at length and also had taken into consideration the earlier judgments, particularly, in the cases of G.Veerappa Pillai ..vs.. Raman and Raman Ltd., reported in AIR 1952 SC 192; T.C. Basappa ..vs.. T. Nagappa, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440; Hari Vishnu Kamath ..vs.. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, reported in AIR 1955 SC 233; Nanduri Yogananda Lakshminarasimhachari ..vs.. Sri Agastheswaraswamvaru, reported in AIR 1960 SC 622; Ujjam Bai ..vs.. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1962 SC 1621; Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh ..vs.. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1965 SC 1153 and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar ..vs.. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1, and has summarized the law as under :

" On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice; (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act. in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern the exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial discipline of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original Jurisdiction distinct from appellate Jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used "as a cloak of an appeal in disguise". Lax use of such a power would impair the dignity and integrity of the subordinate court and could also lead to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the subordinate court. It was not even argued that there was total lack of jurisdiction in the Civil Court. It could not be dented that the Civil Court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the maintainability of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred by Section 14 of the said Act or on the principles of res judicata/estoppel. Thus unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High Court should not have prevented the Court of competent Jurisdiction from deciding these questions. In other words, the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide these question in the case of Firm Seth Radha Kishan ..vs.. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, reported at AIR 1963 SC 1547, the Honourable Apex Court held that in a case where Jurisdiction of Civil Court has expressly been barred, a suit should not be entertained even If it is impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Code, but a suit in the Civil Court will always lie to question the order of a Tribunal created by a Statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final if the said Tribunal abused its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of Its provisions. (emphasis mine)"

40. The principle that emerges from the in-depth discussion is that, if remedy is made available statutorily, it must be exhausted first before the Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction can be approached upon afore-emphasized grounds. Conclusion is that when the remedy is specifically made available and specific remedy of injunction is carved out of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the special statute, such statutory remedy has to be exhausted first by the parties in accordance with special statutory provisions and then only the aggrieved party may approach the Civil Court if there was violation of fundamental judicial procedure or if process of law was abused by the statutory forum/Tribunal or that it acted in violation of the provisions of the Statute. This being the position, if, in view of averment in the plaint, the plaintiffs have statutory remedy, the plaintiffs must first approach the statutory forum for an order of injunctive reliefs available under the Statute against the respondents including the Bank concerned. Scheme and Object/purport of the SARFAESI Act leads us to the above conclusion. Hence, no interference is required in the impugned judgments and orders in the facts and circumstances of the case. The substantial question is answered accordingly. The second Appeal is dismissed with costs.

41. Now the learned Counsel for the appellants prays for staying operation of this Judgment and Order. Although I am not inclined for staying operation of the Judgment and Order, since it is stated that there was interim relief pending the appeal, operation of this Judgment and Order shall remain stayed till expiry of four weeks from today.

Appeal dismissed.