Writ Petition No.4086 of 2014

28th August, 2014

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. M.M. VASHI, Mr. SHARDUL SINGH, Mr. RAHUL SINHA, Ms. RAKSHA JAIN
Respondent Counsel: Mr. VIJAY KILLEDAR, Mrs. M.S. BANE

Cases Cited:
Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2012(1) ALL MR 497 (F.B.)=2012(2)Bom.C.R. 505 [Para 4,13,14,20,21,26]
Sudhir R. Bhatankar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1999(4) ALL MR 443 =2000 (1) Mh L.J. 519 [Para 16,26]

JUDGMENT

B. P. COLABAWALLA, J. :- Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent of parties Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally.

2. By this Petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has sought a declaration that the order of suspension dated 19th September, 2013 passed by Respondent No. 2 has come to an end and/or ceases to operate with effect from 19th March, 2014 in view of proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as "the MMC Act"). As a consequence thereto, the Petitioner has also sought quashing of the communication dated 21st March, 2014 addressed by Respondent No. 2 to the Petitioner rejecting his request to resume work.

3. According to the Petitioner, proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act stipulates that any officer or servant whether appointed by the Corporation (in the present case Respondent No.1) or any other competent authority, may be suspended by the Commissioner (in the present case Respondent No.2) pending an order of the Corporation, and such suspension with the reasons therefor, shall forthwith be reported to the Corporation. The said provision further mandates that such suspension shall come to an end, if not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of 6 months from the date of such suspension. The submission of the Petitioner is that his suspension order dated 19th September, 2013 ceased to operate with effect from 19th March, 2014 as the same was not confirmed by the 1st Respondent Corporation within a period of 6 months as mandated by proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act. Despite this, he was not allowed to resume work, and it is for this reason that the Petitioner has approached this Court in its writ jurisdiction.

4. We find that the issue raised in this writ Petition is squarely covered by a Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2012 (2) Bom. C.R. 505 : 2012(1) ALL MR 497. We shall refer to this judgement in detail after adverting to the facts in the present case.

5. In the year 2001, the Petitioner was appointed as a City Engineer of Respondent No. 1 under Section 45 of the Act. Since then, the Petitioner was working in the same position, until his suspension. On 4th July 2013, Respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Commissioner of the Respondent No. 1. It is the case of the Petitioner that after Respondent No. 2 took charge as Commissioner, he indulged in a personal vendetta against the Petitioner by adopting various methods, including passing the impugned suspension order. We are not adverting to these facts in detail as they are not germane to decide the issue raised in the present Writ Petition. Suffice it to state that it is the case of the Petitioner that he has been victimised at the hands of Respondent No.2.

6. Shortly after Respondent No.2 was appointed as Commissioner, he issued 2 show cause notices dated 13th August, 2013 and 26th August, 2013 to the Petitioner as well as his wife. The SCN issued to the Petitioner called upon him to explain why he should not be disqualified from holding the post of City Engineer. By a separate SCN the wife of the Petitioner was called upon to explain and/or show cause why the building permission and completion certificate granted in her favour should not be cancelled. The said show cause notices were challenged in this Court by filing two separate Writ Petitions. Writ Petition No.8134 of 2013 filed by the Petitioner herein was not pressed in view of the statement made on behalf of the Respondent Corporation that no action would be taken for a period of 15 days, on the communication dated 26th August, 2013 without following due procedure established by law and after passing a reasoned order.

7. After disposal of the said Writ Petition, on 16th September, 2013 the Petitioner filed a detailed reply to the show cause notice issued to him. It is the case of the Petitioner that Respondent No. 2 failed to aptly consider the representations of the Petitioner and instead in haste, passed the impugned order of suspension dated 19th September 2013 by invoking the provisions of section 56 of the MMC Act on the ground that initiation of a domestic/disciplinary inquiry was under contemplation against the Petitioner.

8. This suspension order was challenged by the Petitioner in this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 8814 of 2013. After recording the submissions on behalf of the Respondent Corporation as well as the Petitioner, the said Writ Petition was allowed to be withdrawn by an order dated 3rd October, 2013. The submission recorded on behalf of the Respondent Corporation was that the order of suspension dated 19th September, 2013 had been passed in exercise of the powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act and the said order had been reported to the Municipal Secretary with a direction to bring it to the notice of the Respondent Corporation. The submission recorded on behalf of the Petitioner was that if the said order of suspension was not confirmed by the Corporation then the same would cease to operate.

9. Thereafter, on 30th October, 2013 a FIR came to be lodged against the Petitioner, wherein Respondent No. 2 as the complainant, alleged commission of offences under sections 166, 201, 202, 204, 217, 298, 379, 381, 408, 409, 420, 34 and 120 (b) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The crux of the allegations in the said FIR was that 5 files concerning the Land and Estate Department were stolen by the Petitioner. In these proceedings, the Petitioner was finally granted anticipatory bail by this Court by an order dated 14th March, 2014. It is the case of the Petitioner that this was another instance of the personal vendetta embarked upon by Respondent No. 2 against the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner this is fortified by the fact that in the said proceedings the police authorities filed affidavits essentially stating that there was no co-operation by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

10. Be that as it may, in the meanwhile, the period of 6 months from the date of the suspension order viz. 19th September, 2013 came to an end on 19th March, 2014. During the said period, the 1st Respondent Corporation (its General Body) did not confirm or ratify the order of suspension passed by Respondent No. 2. In view thereof, the Petitioner vide his letters dated 19th March, 2014 and 20th March, 2014 called upon Respondent No. 2 to allow him to resume work.

11. Instead of allowing the Petitioner to resume work, Respondent No. 2 issued the impugned communication dated 21st of March 2014 rejecting the request of the Petitioner on the grounds that: (i) as per rule 1(s) of "Proceedings of the Corporation, Standing Committee, Transport Committee, Etc." if the general body does not give sanction or approval, then the same is deemed to have been granted; and (ii) in view of the FIR filed against the Petitioner, as per the Government Resolution dated 14th October, 2011 the issue of suspension will have to be considered and decided by a Committee, under the supervision of the Chief Secretary, State of Maharashtra, after a year of the order of suspension.

12. It is in the backdrop of the above facts that the present Writ Petition is filed:- (i) seeking a declaration that the order of suspension dated 19th September, 2013 has ceased to operate with effect from 19th March, 2014; and (ii) for quashing the communication dated 21st March, 2014 issued by Respondent No. 2 rejecting the Petitioner's request to resume work.

13. Mr Vashi, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, submitted that admittedly in the present case, the appointing authority of the Petitioner was the 1st Respondent and not Respondent No. 2. The power to suspend the Petitioner was therefore with Respondent No. 1 alone, was the submission. He however submitted that as per proviso (b) to section 56 (1) read with the Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra), to meet any urgent situation or exigencies, a power had been conferred on the Commissioner (in the present case Respondent No. 2) to suspend the Petitioner, pending confirmation by the 1st Respondent. He submitted that it is an admitted fact that in the present case Respondent No. 2 had exercised his powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) and suspended the Petitioner on 19th September, 2013. This is in fact recorded in the order of this Court dated 3rd October, 2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 8814 of 2013 and which forms part of the paper book at page 101 (Ex G). Admittedly, the said suspension order has not been confirmed within a period of 6 months from the date thereof and therefore ceased to operate with effect from 19th March 2014, is the submission of Mr Vashi. In view thereof, he submitted that the impugned communication dated 21st March, 2014 rejecting the Petitioner's request to resume work was illegal and liable to be set aside. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the judgement of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra).

14. The further submission of Mr Vashi was that the reliance placed by Respondent No. 2 on rule 1(s) of the "Proceedings of the Corporation, Standing Committee, Transport Committee, Etc." was wholly misplaced. On an ex-facie reading of the said rule, the same was wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case, was the submission. As far as the Government Resolution dated 14th October, 2011 was concerned, Mr Vashi submitted that it too was wholly inapplicable and in any event, the same could not override the clear mandate of section 56 which had been interpreted by the Full Bench in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra) and which was binding on this Court. For all the aforesaid reasons, Mr Vashi submitted that rule be made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the Petition.

15. On the other hand, Mr Killedar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that though it was true that the suspension order was not confirmed by the 1st Respondent as required by proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act, the same did not per se extinguish the order of suspension in view of the provisions of rule 1(s) of "Proceedings of the Corporation, Standing Committee, Transport Committee, Etc." which fell under Chapter II of Schedule-D to the MMC Act. Placing reliance on the said provision, Mr Killedar submitted that the suspension order dated 19th September, 2013 got deemed ratification / confirmation / sanction / approval as stipulated in the said rule and therefore this Writ Petition was wholly misconceived. Mr Killedar further submitted that there were as many as 28 serious allegations against the Petitioner in the suspension order dated 19th September 2013, including failure to reject applications made for building permissions in respect of illegal constructions, by virtue of which the State as well as the public at large had to suffer. He submitted that the Petitioner had also indulged in various acts of misconduct, dereliction of duty and wilful negligence but no action could be taken against the Petitioner since he had caused the record containing the evidence against him to disappear. It is in this light that Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint/FIR against the Petitioner.

16. It is the further submission of Mr Killedar, that the suspension order clearly mentions that it is passed as per the provisions of rule 4 (1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 and therefore the said suspension continued till the culmination and result of the inquiry initiated against the Petitioner, and the provisions of proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act did not come into play. In this regard, Mr Killedar also placed reliance on a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudhir R. Bhatankar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2000 (1) Mh L.J. 519 : 1999(4) ALL MR 443. For all the aforesaid reasons, Mr Killedar submitted that the Writ Petition was devoid of any merit and deserved dismissal.

17. With the help of learned counsel for both sides, we have perused the papers and proceedings in the Writ Petition, the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as well as the relevant provisions of the MMC Act and the rules framed thereunder. Section 56 of the MMC Act deals with imposition of penalties on municipal officers and servants. It reads as under:-

"56. Imposition of penalties on municipal officers and servants.-

(1) A competent authority may subject to the provisions of this Act impose any of the penalties specified in sub-section (2) on a municipal officer or servant if such authority is satisfied that such officer or servant is guilty of a breach of departmental rules or discipline or of carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct or is incompetent:

Provided that-

(a) no municipal officer or servant holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of the Assistant Commissioner shall be dismissed by the Commissioner without the previous approval of the Corporation;

(b) any officer or servant, whether appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority, except the Transport Manager being a Government Officer on deputation, may be suspended by the Commissioner pending an order of the Corporation and when the officer so suspended is the Transport Manager or an officer appointed under section 45, such suspension with reasons therefor, shall, forthwith be reported by the Commissioner to the Corporation, and such suspension shall come to an end if not confirmed by the corporation within a period of six months from the date of such suspension:

Provided that, such suspension of an officer or servant pending inquiry into the allegations against such officer or servant shall not be deemed to be a penalty.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section and section 53, a post shall be deemed to be of a rank equivalent to another post if the minimum and maximum pay in the pay scale of both the posts are same. A post shall be deemed to be of a rank higher than another post, if the minimum pay in the pay scale of former is at least equivalent to the latter, but the maximum is higher than the latter. In respect of the pay structure, a post shall be deemed to be of a rank equivalent to, or higher than another post, if the grade pay in pay structure of the former is equivalent to or higher than the latter, respectively.

(c) the Commissioner may impose any of the penalties as specified in clause (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of sub-section (2) on any officer appointed by the Corporation other than the Transport Manager if he is a Government Officer on deputation;

(d) the Municipal Chief Auditor and the Municipal Secretary may impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of sub-section (2) on any officer or servant immediately subordinate to them subject to a right of appeal to the Standing Committee and the Standing Committee may impose any other penalty on any such officer or servant and may also impose, any penalty on any other officer or servant immediately subordinate to the Municipal Chief Auditor or the Municipal Secretary.

(2) ..........

(3) ..........

(4) ..........

(5) ..........

(6) .........." (emphasis supplied)

18. Section 56 (1) inter alia provides that a competent authority may, subject to the other provisions of the Act, impose any of the penalties specified in section 56 (2) on a municipal officer or servant, if such authority is satisfied that such officer or servant is guilty of a breach of departmental rules, or discipline, or carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct etc. On an ex-facie reading of section 56 (1) it is clear that the penalties set out in section 56 (2) can be imposed by the competent authority only after it is satisfied that the officer and/or servant, as the case may be, is guilty of a breach of the departmental rules, or discipline, or carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct etc. No penalty can be imposed under sub-section (2) without a finding of guilt.

19. However, sometimes emergent situations arise requiring immediate suspension of an officer or servant of the Corporation. Under section 5 (2) of the MMC Act, the Corporation consists of elected councillors and nominated councillors having special knowledge or experience in Municipal Administration. They form the General Body of the Corporation. The meeting of the General Body of the Corporation may not be held frequently. To meet such exigencies, proviso (b) to section 56 (1) empowers the Commissioner, pending an order of the Corporation, to suspend any officer or servant (except the Transport Manager being a Government Officer on deputation). However, the said proviso also inserts a safeguard that such suspension with the reasons for the same, shall forthwith be reported by the Commissioner to the Corporation, and such suspension shall come to an end if not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of 6 months from the date thereof. The said proviso therefore clearly mandates ratification of the suspension order by the Corporation (its General Body) within a period of 6 months from the date of the suspension and if the same is not confirmed by the Corporation within the aforesaid period, the said suspension order stands automatically revoked. The purpose of the said time frame stipulated by the legislature is clear. These powers are exercised in urgent and extraordinary situations and without rendering a finding of guilt. It is for this very reason that the further proviso to proviso (b) to section 56(1) stipulates that such suspension, pending an inquiry into the allegations against the officer or servant, shall not be deemed to be a penalty. This is also because one of the penalties that can be imposed under section 56(2) is an order of suspension under clause (f) thereof, but this suspension i.e. under section 56(2)(f), can be ordered only after rendering a finding of guilt.

20. We are supported in our interpretation by the Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra). In the facts before the Full Bench also, challenge was laid to the orders of suspension passed by the Commissioner of the Corporation. The Full Bench was called upon to decide the interpretation of section 56 (1) along with rule 4 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. The Full Bench in categorical terms held that if the order of suspension passed under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act is not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of 6 months from the date of the suspension, the said order automatically stands revoked. The relevant portion of the said Full Bench judgement in the ALL MR report reads thus:-

"Under Section 5 (2) of the said Act of 1949, a Corporation consists of elected councillors elected at ward elections and nominated councillors. Thus, the reference to the Corporation under the said Act of 1949 is a reference to General Body of the Corporation consisting of elected and nominated councillors. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have been appointed by the Corporation under Sub-Section (2) of Section 45. Even under Section 53 (1), powers of appointing Municipal Officer whose minimum monthly salary inclusive of allowances is or exceeds Rs.4,000/- vests in the Corporation. In other cases, the power of appointment vests in the Commissioner or Municipal Chief Auditor or Municipal Secretary as provided in Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (3) of Section 53. The Petitioner Nos.4 and 5 have been admittedly appointed by the Corporation in exercise of powers under Sub-Section (1) of Section 53. Under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 56 of the said Act of 1949, any officer or servant whether appointed by the Corporation or by any Authority (except Transport Manager being a Government Officer on Deputation) can be suspended by the Commissioner pending an order of the Corporation. Thus, even in case of officers, who are appointed in exercise of powers under Sub-Section (2) or Sub-Section (3) of Section 53 of the said Act of 1949, the Commissioner has powers to suspend an officer or servant pending an order of the Corporation. Clause (b) of Sub- Section (1) of Section 56 mandates that if an officer appointed under Section 45 is to be suspended, the Commissioner must record reasons. The Commissioner is under an obligation to report the suspension to the Corporation and if the suspension is not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of such suspension, the same automatically comes to an end. Thus, if the order of suspension passed under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 56 of the said Act of 1949 is not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of the suspension, the said order automatically stands revoked. The proviso makes it very clear that when the order of suspension is passed under clause (b) pending an enquiry into the allegations against the officer or servant, the same shall not be deemed to be a penalty. Thus, the proviso itself makes it clear that power to suspend under clause (b) can be exercised by the Commissioner pending a disciplinary enquiry. Sub- Section (2) of Section 56 of the said Act of 1949 provides for various categories of penalties, which can be imposed on the officer or servant after holding an enquiry. Under clause (f) of Sub-Section (2), one of the penalties is of suspension. Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 56 read with the proviso makes it very clear that the power of suspension under the said clause can be exercised by the Commissioner pending a disciplinary enquiry and the suspension made under said provision will not be by way of penalty. Only an order of suspension under clause (f) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 56 is by way of penalty." (emphasis supplied)

21. In the facts of the present case, the suspension order of the Petitioner is dated 19th September, 2013. We find that the said suspension order was passed by Respondent No. 2 invoking his powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act. In fact, a statement to that effect was also recorded by this Court in its order dated 3rd October, 2013 passed in the Writ Petition No. 8814 of 2013. Admittedly, the said suspension order has not been confirmed/ratified by the Corporation (its General Body) within a period of 6 months from the date thereof. In view of the clear and unambiguous language of proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act as well as the ratio of the Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra) it will have to be held that the suspension order of the Petitioner dated 19th September, 2013 automatically stood revoked/came to an end on 19th March, 2014.

22. Having held so, we shall now deal with the argument of Mr Killedar that despite the clear language of proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act and the ratio of the Full Bench judgement of this Court, the suspension order dated 19th September, 2013 did not per se stand revoked/come to an end in view of the provisions of rule 1(s) of "Proceedings of the Corporation, Standing Committee, Transport Committee, Etc." which finds place under Chapter II of Schedule-D to the MMC Act. Placing reliance on the said provision, Mr Killedar submitted that the suspension order dated 19th September, 2013 got deemed ratification/confirmation/sanction/approval as stipulated in the said rule and therefore the suspension order continued to operate even after the period of six months, notwithstanding the fact it was not formally ratified/confirmed by the 1st Respondent Corporation. We find that the reliance placed on the aforesaid provision is wholly misconceived. Rule 1 (s) reads as under:-

"(s) where, any proposal of the Commissioner requires sanction or approval of the Corporation, the Corporation shall consider and dispose of any such proposal within 90 days reckoned from the date of the meeting of the Corporation held immediately after the proposal is received by the Municipal Secretary, whether the item pertaining to such proposal is taken on the agenda of such meeting or not, failing which sanction or approval to such proposal shall be deemed to have been given by the Corporation, and a report to that effect shall be made by the Commissioner to the Government and he shall take further action as per the directives of the Government:

Provided that, any such deemed sanction or approval shall be restricted to the extent the proposal conforms to the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force." (emphasis supplied)

23. On an ex-facie reading of the said provision it is clear that it relates to cases where "any proposal" of the Commissioner requires "sanction or approval" of the Corporation. It further stipulates if the "sanction or approval" is not accorded within 90 days, then a deemed "sanction or approval" is given and a report to that effect is required to be made by the Commissioner to the State Government. We fail to see how this provision can apply to a suspension ordered by the Commissioner, pending an inquiry, and invoking his powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act. When the Commissioner invokes his powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) he does not "propose to suspend" the delinquent officer, but goes ahead and passes a suspension order, if the facts and circumstances of the case so require. It is of great significance that this suspension order requires "confirmation" of the Corporation for it to continue beyond a period of 6 months as stipulated in proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act. The word "confirmation" appearing in proviso (b) to section 56 (1) cannot be equated with words "sanction or approval" in rule 1(s) reproduced above. Sanction or approval contemplated under section 1(s) is required for an act that it is proposed to be taken, whereas confirmation as contemplated under proviso (b) to section 56(1) is required in relation to an act that has already been done or taken. We therefore find, that rule 1(s) has no application to the facts of the present case and the reliance placed thereon by Mr Killedar is wholly misplaced. This argument therefore stands rejected.

24. We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr Killedar that the suspension order of the Petitioner was passed under rule 4 (1) and more particularly rule 4 (1) (c) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. For ready reference, rule 4 (1) is reproduced hereunder:-

"4. Suspension.--- (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor by general or special order may place a Government servant under Suspension- (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him contemplated or is pending, or (b) where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State, or (c) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation inquiry or trial: Provided that, where the order of Suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report lower than the appointing authority, the circumstances in which the order was made. (emphasis supplied)

25. For more than one reason, the said argument will have to be rejected. Firstly, on behalf of the Respondents, it was specifically recorded in the order dated 3rd October, 2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 8814 of 2013 that the impugned suspension order dated 19th September, 2013 was passed in exercise of the powers under proviso (b) to section 56 (1) of the MMC Act and that the order had been reported to the Corporation by sending a copy thereof to the Municipal Secretary with the direction to bring the said order to the notice of the 1st Respondent Corporation. It is therefore too late in the day to now contend that the impugned suspension order was passed under rule 4 (1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Secondly, we find that on the facts of the present case even the reliance placed on rule 4 (1) (c) is wholly inapplicable. In the present case, there was no case pending against the Petitioner in respect of any criminal offence under investigation, inquiry or trial when the impugned suspension order came to be passed on 19th September, 2013. The FIR/complaint lodged by Respondent No. 2 against the Petitioner alleging commission of offences under various sections of the IPC, 1860 was only on 30th October, 2013. Therefore, the impugned suspension order could never have been passed under rule 4 (1) (c). Thirdly, in the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the appointing authority of the Petitioner is the Corporation. Under rule 4 (1) either the appointing authority could suspend the Petitioner (in the present case the 1st Respondent Corporation) or, the Petitioner could be suspended by any authority to which the appointing authority was subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority that was empowered in that behalf by the Governor by general or special order. In the facts of the present case, nothing has been brought to our notice that Respondent No. 2 is any of the authorities as contemplated under rule 4 (1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. In this view of the matter, this argument of Mr Killedar will also have to be rejected.

26. The reliance placed by Mr Killedar on the judgement of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudhir R. Bhatankar (supra) does not detain us any further as the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra), has held that it does not lay down the correct law regarding the scope and ambit of the powers of suspension conferred by proviso (b) to section 56(1) of the MMC Act. The Full Bench held as under:-

"27. In view of the above discussion, the decision of this Court in the case of Sudhir R. Bhatankar, [1999(4) ALL MR 443] (supra) can not be treated as laying down correct law regarding the scope and ambit of the powers of suspension conferred by clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 56 of the said Act of 1949 read with the proviso thereto."

27. Apart from the arguments recorded herein and dealt with by us in this judgement, no other arguments were canvassed on behalf of the Respondents. It is for this reason that we are not dealing with the contention raised by the Respondents in the affidavit in reply tendered to this Court today, that as per the Government Resolution dated 14th October 2011, if serious allegations are levelled against the suspended officer, the proceedings have to be produced before the Committee constituted by the State within one year from the date of the order of suspension. Though we find that the aforesaid contention is raised in the affidavit in reply, no argument in that behalf was canvassed by Mr Killedar. Hence, we are not dealing with the aforesaid contention and/or the import of the said Government Resolution dated 14th October, 2011 and its impact on the impugned suspension order.

28. The learned counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 submitted that the departmental proceedings have already been initiated against the Petitioner. Considering the seriousness of the charges levelled against the Petitioner, the learned counsel submitted that the enquiry shall be completed at the earliest. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations made and/or the charges framed if any, against the Petitioner in the departmental enquiry, we direct that the Petitioner shall extend co-operation in the enquiry initiated against him by the Corporation.

29. Before parting, we must clarify that we haven't gone into the merits of the allegations levelled by both sides and leave these issues open to be agitated by the parties herein, in the appropriate forum and at the appropriate time.

30. In view of our discussion and findings in this judgement, Rule is made absolute and the Petition is granted in terms of prayer clauses (a) & (b). There shall be no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.