Civil Revision Application No.12 of 2013

31st July, 2013.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. AJEET D. KASLIWAL
Respondent Counsel: Mr. A.P. BHANDARI

Cases Cited:
Bhanu Kumar Jain Vs. Archana Kumar, 2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)=2005(1) SCC 787 [Para 5,12,13]
Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr., 2010 ALL SCR 816 [Para 5,15]
Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012(3) ALL MR 450 (S.C.) [Para 5]
P.K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2276 [Para 5]
Brijitha Vs. Kuttiyamma, 2012 DGLS(AHC) 7999 [Para 5,12,13]
Nagar Palika Nigam Gwalior Vs. Motilal Munnalal, AIR 1977 M.P. 182 [Para 5,8,13]
Mahesh Yadav & anr Vs. Rajeshwar Singh & Ors., 2009(2) ALL MR 422 (S.C.)=2009(2) SCC 205 [Para 7,13]
Ramesh Madhavrao Shelke Vs. Bhaskar s/o. Seetaram Pradhan, 2011(2) ALL MR 258=2010(O) BCI 274 [Para 9]
Shri M.L. Sethi Vs. Shri R.P. Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379 [Para 9]
Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar Hyderabad and Anr. Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 76 [Para 9]
Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 [Para 10]
State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 AIR SCW 5692 [Para 10]
Collector, Ananatnag Vs. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 [Para 10]
State of Karnataka Vs. Moinuddin Kunhi, 2009 ALL SCR 1840=AIR 2009 SC 2577 [Para 10]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Rule, returnable forthwith. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, taken up final hearing.

It is the case of the applicant that one deceased Sambhaji Khanduji Nagare and present revision applicant Nos.2 and 3 had filed R.C.S. No.346 of 1995 for recovery of possession in the Court of C.J.S.D., at Aurangabad against the present respondents No.1 and 2. It is the case of the applicants that in the said suit the present respondent No.1 was served with a summons and he reported appearance through his Advocate Kazi Ziauddin Khan and later on failed to file written statement and participate in the proceedings. The respondent No.2 reported appearance through his advocate and filed his written statement. However, thereafter remained absent. The said suit came to be decreed vide judgment and decree dated 31st March, 2001.

2. The respondent No.1 filed appeal against the said judgment and decree before the lower appellate Court along with an application for condonation of delay, which came to be registered as MARJI No.86/2011. The applicants herein, in response to the notice, reported their appearance and filed reply to the said delay condonation application and prayed for its rejection.

3. The said application for condonation of delay initially was rejected and the same order was challenged before the High Court in Second Appeal No.41/2011, which came to be allowed vide order dated 26th September, 2012 and the lower appellate Court was directed to dispose of the MARJI No.86/2011 within a stipulated period.

4. The respondent No.1 adduced his evidence by filing affidavit in the form of examination-in-chief at Exh.40 and the applicants have cross-examined the respondent No.1. After hearing the parties, the application for condonation of delay came to be allowed. Hence, this civil revision application.

5. The learned Counsel for the applicants submits that the delay of 9 years 11 months and 2 days has been condoned by the appellate Court there being any sufficient cause shown by the respondent No.1. The lower appellate Court was not justified in recording the findings that the suit summons was not served on the respondent No.1 when admittedly the proceedings are not under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the lower appellate Court is not justified in ignoring the fact that the lower appellate Court has observed in the judgment about the service of summons and engagement of the Advocate by the respondent No. 1. The learned Counsel for the applicants invited my attention to paras 4 and 5 from the judgment of the trial Court coupled with order passed by the trial Court about the service of summons. It is submitted that if the paras 4 and 5 from the judgment of the trial Court are read conjointly with the order passed by the C.J.J.D. on 23rd April, 1997, it clearly reveal that the Court has observed that the defendant No.2, though served with suit summons, failed to file his written statement in spite of several chances. Hence, the suit to proceed without his written statement against him. The learned Counsel invited my attention to the order passed by the C.J.J.D. on 23rd April, 1997 and also on 28th March, 2008 from the original record, which is made available for perusal. The learned Counsel further submits that the appropriate course which was open to the respondents was only to file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. It is submitted that if such application is considered and if the Court finds that there was no proper service of summons, in that case, the decree passed by the Court can be reversed. However, the course adopted by the District Court to appreciate the contention of the respondents that they were never served with summons and, therefore, they were not aware about the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, should not have been gone into by the District Court in view of the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. It is submitted that the District Court, by entering into the said ground has practically reversed the decree passed by the trial Court. The learned Counsel for the applicants, in support of his contention that whenever there is a plea raised by the party that there is no service of summons, in that case, the only course available to such party is under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code, pressed into service the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Bhanu Kumar Jain vs Archana Kumar [2005(1) SCC 787] : [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)]. He invited my attention to paragraphs 33 and 34 from the judgment and submitted that in view of clear pronunciation of the Supreme Court in case of Bhanu Kumar Jain, [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)] (supra), only remedy which was available to the respondents was under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code and further, if any order is passed on such application, then the remedy under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code is available. However, first appeal is not maintainable for adjudication of the application on the ground that there was no service of summons and therefore, respondents were not aware about the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. It is submitted that the first appeal can be entertained only on merits and not on the ground that summons is not served upon the party. He submits that the Supreme Court in para 34 of the judgment in case of Bhanu Kumar Jain, [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)] (supra), has observed that explanation appended to Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code shall receive strict construction. The learned Counsel for the applicants further invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. [2010 ALL SCR 816] and submits that the Supreme Court in the facts of that case has taken a view that if there is delay and if such delay is condoned ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in that case, such order is required to be interfered with. It is submitted that the party who sleeps over his rights for more than 9 years, on application of such party, delay should not have been condoned by the District Court. The learned Counsel further invited my attention to the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [2012(3) ALL MR 450 (S.C.)] and submits that unless sufficient cause is disclosed, the prayer for condonation of delay should not be entertained. If the explanation offered is found to be concocted and if applicant is found to be throughly negligent in presenting its cause, delay cannot be condoned. He further invited my attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court in case of P.K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala and another [AIR 1998 SC 2276] and in particular, para 6 thereof and submitted that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by Statute and Courts have no power to extend period of limitation on equitable grounds. He further invited my attention to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in case of Brijitha vs Kuttiyamma [2012 DGLS(AHC) 7999] and submitted that in an appeal u/S.96(2) of the Code against an ex parte judgment and decree appellate court cannot consider the question whether appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from not appearing in the trial on the day of trial. The learned Counsel further invited my attention to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Nagar Palika Nigam Gwalior v. Motilal Munnalal [AIR 1977 MADHYA PRADESH 182] and submitted that when there is an ex parte decree, it was for the appellate Court u/s 96(2) of the Code to question propriety of ex parte order and the only course open was to file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code.

6. It is submitted that the applicants have already filed Darkhast for execution of decree way back in the year, 2002. It is submitted that when the Court below has observed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order that there was service of summons and in pursuance to such service of summons in fact, the respondents appeared through their advocate, the District Court should not have disbelieved the court below on the said aspect. It is submitted that if the impugned judgment and order is carefully read, it is only to give one more opportunity to the respondents, the District Court has condoned the inordinate delay of 9 years 11 months and two days in filing the appeal. It is submitted that the respondents cannot plead ignorance when summons was served upon them and not only that but, they caused their appearance through Advocate. It is submitted that it was for the original appellants to file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code if they realized that the trial Court has passed an ex parte decree and suit summons was not served upon them. Therefore, relying upon the averments in the application, grounds taken therein, submissions advanced across the Bar, the learned Counsel for the applicants would submit that this civil revision application deserves to be allowed.

7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Mahesh Yadav & anr v/s Rajeshwar Singh & ors [2009(2) SCC 205] : [2009(2) ALL MR 422 (S.C.)], the Supreme Court on interpretation of proviso appended to Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code held that when an ex parte decree has been passed, the defendant may have more than one remedies. He may file a suit contending that the decree was obtained fraudulently. He may file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte decree. He may prefer an appeal from ex parte judgment and decree. In a given case, he may also file a review application. The Counsel for the respondent No.1 further submits that in view of the provisions of Section 96 of the Code, an appeal is maintainable against the ex parte decree. Therefore, he submits that if more than one remedies are available to the aggrieved party in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Mahesh Yadav, [2009(2) ALL MR 422 (S.C.)] (supra), he can avail any of the remedies which are available to him in law. Therefore, he submits that the contention of the Counsel for the applicant that the respondents were entitled to file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code and filing an appeal for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of non service of summons was not permissible, deserves no consideration. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 invited my attention to the Roznama maintained before the trial Court till disposal of the suit. He submits that careful perusal of the Roznama from the original record would clearly show that there is entry in the said Roznama about issuance of summons to the defendants. However, in the entire Roznama, there is no entry when the summons was served upon the defendants. He further submits that there is no record showing that process fee has been deposited.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 invited my attention to the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court and submits that the appellate Court called upon the parties to lead evidence in order to appreciate their contentions and thereafter, the impugned judgment and order has been passed by the District Court. It is submitted that in order to ascertain whether the suit summons was served upon the original defendants or not, the District Court allowed the parties to lead evidence. It is submitted that the evidence was led before the appellate Court. The respondent No.1 did place on record the Election Card at Exh.43 and Ration Card at Exh.44 in order to show that the respondent No.1 was not residing on the address mentioned in the suit summons. It is submitted that the respondent No.1, at least from the year, 1995, is residing in different area and not on the address on which suit summons was issued by the trial Court. It is submitted that in absence of proof of service of summons, available in the original record, the District Court has adopted the appropriate course to ask the parties to lead evidence and accordingly, the respondents have proved that the summons was not served upon them. The District Court, upon appreciation of the evidence placed on record, accepted the case of the respondents that there was no service of summons on them and also the contentions of the respondents that they never engaged Advocate K. Ziauddin Khan. It is submitted that the judgment and order passed by the District Court is within its jurisdiction. In revisional jurisdiction, this Court cannot interfere in the impugned judgment and order unless there is jurisdictional error or findings recorded by the District Court are perverse. It is submitted that in the facts of the present case, findings recorded by the District Court are upon appreciation of the evidence and said findings are in consonance with the material brought on record. It is submitted that the defendants did not lead any evidence and it was assertion of the respondents that they never engaged Advocate Ziauddin Khan and therefore, it was for the applicants to bring on record that such an advocate was engaged by the respondents. It is submitted that though the execution proceedings were filed in the year, 2002, the applicants in whose favour the decree was passed by the trial Court, did not take effective steps to get the said decree executed till 2010. It is submitted that from the year, 2002, twenty applications have been filed by the applicants only with a prayer to re-issue summons to the defendants. Except filing such applications, no effective steps have been taken. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 that the decree holder waited till the record maintained by the lower Court is destroyed as per the Civil Manual and thereafter, they have taken effective steps to get the decree executed. It is submitted that when the notice / summons was served upon the respondents in the year, 2011, they came to know about the decree passed by the trial Court. Immediately, they applied for the certified copy which they received in the month of February, 2011 and thereafter, steps were taken to file appeal before the District Court. The learned Counsel invited my attention to para 26 from the impugned judgment and submitted that the District Court has rightly held about the conduct of the applicants. It is submitted that the decree in favour of the applicants had been obtained by playing fraud by the plaintiffs / revision applicants herein and fraud vitiates everything and, therefore, the appellate Court has rightly accepted the explanation offered by the respondents and condoned the delay. It is submitted that in second appeal which was filed by the respondents before this Court, this Court passed a detail order thereby setting aside the order passed in MARJI No.86/2011 to be decided on merits observing that the dispute relates to immovable property. Therefore, it is the contention of the Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the District Court has only condoned the delay and appeal is pending for adjudication on merits. It is submitted that the prayer for condonation of delay has been accepted by imposing costs of Rs.16,000/-. It is submitted that the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Nagar Palika Nigam Gwalior (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the applicant, is misplaced in the facts of the present case. The said judgment is prior to amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is further submitted that the facts of the cases which are relied upon by the Counsel for the applicants are totally different than the facts involved in the present case. The Counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the District Court submits that the District Court has considered the documentary evidence, the fact that the respondent No.1 was not residing at Satara, and the fact that the report of the Bailiff regarding service to show that the suit summons was served upon the respondent No.1 is not on record and also the fact that respondent No.1 had not appointed / engaged the advocate in the proceedings, copy of the Vakalatnama is also not on record, the summons of execution proceedings was not served till the year, 2010, the Advocate who was not appointed, appeared there being any report of bailiff on record and the fact that for a period of nine years, notice was not served on the respondent No.1. It is submitted that the Court has considered rights of the parties and imposed costs of Rs.16,000/- on the respondent No.1 for condoning the delay and accordingly, the amount of costs has been deposited. The defendant No.1 in the suit has preferred cross objections in the appeal on 7.2.2013.

9. It is submitted that there cannot be re-appreciation of the evidence in the revisional jurisdiction and the view taken by the appellate Court is a possible view and therefore, in revisional jurisdiction, the said view needs no interference. He also invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in case of Ramesh Madhavrao Shelke vs Bhaskar s/o Seetaram Pradhan [2010(O) BCI 274] : [2011(2) ALL MR 258] and in particular, para 9 thereof, the judgment in case of Shri M.L. Sethi vs. Shri R.P. Kapur [AIR 1972 SC 2379] and also in case of Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar Hyderabad and another v/s Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. [AIR 1973 SC 76] and relying upon the aforesaid judgments, the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 submits that there is a limited scope in revisional jurisdiction.

10. It is further submitted that the conduct of the applicant and the circumstances on record are taken into consideration by the District Court and in para 26, the District Court has made observations about the conduct of the applicants. It is submitted that valuable rights in immovable property are pending for adjudication before the District Court and therefore, the District Court has rightly condoned the delay. /The Counsel for respondent No.1, in support of his contentions that the prayer for consolidation of delay is required to be entertained liberally so as to advance cause of justice, pressed into service, the judgments of the Supreme Court namely, (1) Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123], (2) State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan [2008 AIR SCW 5692], (3) Collector, Ananatnag vs. Katiji [AIR 1987 SC 1353] and (4) State of Karnataka vs. Moinuddin Kunhi [AIR 2009 SC 2577] : [2009 ALL SCR 1840].

11. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, relying upon the written notes of arguments, the judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court, the documents from original record, the findings of the District Court and the submissions across the Bar submits that the civil revision application is devoid of any merits and the same may be rejected.

12. I have given careful consideration to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. With their able assistance, perused the grounds taken in the revision application, annexures thereto and other documents placed on record and also the original record summoned from the District Court. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants that the respondent No.1 ought to have taken recourse to the provisions of Order 9 rule 13 of the Code since the ground that summons was not served on the respondent No.1 is available only under the said provisions. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants that while considering the prayer for condonation of delay, the ground of non service of summons cannot be taken and accepted by the Court. In order to support this contention, the Counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Bhanu Kumar Jain, [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)] (supra), and the judgment of Kerala High Court in case of Brijitha vs Kuttiyamma (supra).

13. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants that the ground of non service of summons cannot be agitated in application for condonation of delay. The remedy of statutory appeal is provided under Section 96 of the C.P.C. When there is ex parte decree, then the appeal is maintainable u/s 96(2) of C.P.C. The form of appeal and what is to be accompanied to the appeal is provided under Order 41 of C.P.C. Rule 3A of Order 41 of CPC provides for an application for condonation of delay when appeal is presented after expiry of period of limitation specified therefor. Therefore, upon conjoint reading of the provisions and procedure for filing the appeal, and an application for condonation of delay, it is abundantly clear that there is no any condition laid down under Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code that whenever application is filed for condonation of delay, the appellant cannot take a ground of non service of summons in the application for condonation of delay. The judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Nagar Palika Nigam Gwalior (supra) and that of Kerala High Court in case of Brijitha vs Kuttiyamma (supra) are not binding upon this Court. Apart from that, the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is prior to the amendment in Code of Civil Procedure. In case of Bhanu Kumar Jain, [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)] (supra), the Supreme Court in para 26 has observed that there may not be a statutory bar to avail two remedies simultaneously and an appeal as also an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree can be filed; one after the other; on the ground of public policy the right of appeal conferred upon a suitor under a provision of statute cannot be taken away if the same is not in derogation or contrary to any other statutory provisions. The Supreme Court, relying upon paras 26 and 28 of the judgment in case of Bhanu Kumar Jain in paragraph 15 of its judgment in case of Mahesh Yadav and anr., [2009(2) ALL MR 422 (S.C.)] (supra), held that the proviso appended to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure postulates that when an ex parte decree has been passed against some of the defendants and it is necessary to set aside the entire decree, the Court is not powerless to do so. If an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was maintainable at the instance of the appellants, we fail to understand as to why a separate suit was required to be filed. When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant may have more than one remedies. He may file a suit contending that the decree was obtained fraudulently. He may file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte decree. He may prefer an appeal from ex parte judgment and decree. In a given case, he may also file a review application. The Supreme Court, in para 16 of the said judgment, has reproduced para 26 and 28 from the judgment of Bhanu Kumar Jain, [2005(5) ALL MR 257 (S.C.)] (supra). Therefore, the Supreme Court in case of Mahesh Yadav and anr., [2009(2) ALL MR 422 (S.C.)] (supra), in para 15 has clearly laid down that the defendants may have more than one remedies to challenge the ex parte decree including filing an appeal. Therefore, the submissions of the learned Counsel for the applicants that the respondent No.1 should have filed an application under order 9 Rule 13 of the Code and not an appeal under Section 96 of the C.P.C., needs no consideration in view of the fact that the respondent No.1 has choice to file appeal. When the appeal is filed, there is a remedy for filing an application for condonation of delay, if appeal is barred by limitation. If the appellant can take the grounds available to him in order to disclose sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the period of limitation, he can certainly take a ground of non service of suit summons.

14. The another contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the trial Court while deciding the suit has observed that though summons was duly served upon respondent No.1, he has not filed written statement. The Counsel for applicants also invited my attention to the order passed by the trial Court wherein it is observed that in spite of service of summons, the respondent No.1 did not file written statement that he engaged advocate. In the first place, it to be observed that the District Court did summon the record from the trial Court in order to ascertain itself whether the suit summons was served upon the respondent No.1 or not. The District Court has observed that so far as service of summons is concerned, record is not available. So far as the contention of the applicant that the respondent No.1 did engage an advocate is concerned, there is no evidence available on record to hold that the respondent No.1 did engage an advocate. Since the record was destroyed as per Civil Manual, the District Court called upon the parties to lead evidence. Accordingly, respondent No.1 stepped into witness box and stated that he was not residing in village Satara and he is residing since 1994-95 at Peer Bazar, Osmanpura. The respondent No.1 did file on record the ration card and Voters' Identity Card for perusal of the District Court and same has been exhibited. In order to ascertain whether the said documents are original and exhibited, I have perused the record and I am satisfied that the original Voters' I.D. card and ration card have been exhibited. Therefore, the District Court, after recording evidence of respondent No.1 Taher Khan held that the respondent No.1 is residing at Peer Bazar, Osmanpura, Aurangabad since 1995 and not in village Satara. The address in the suit summons was that of village Satara. The said witness has also deposed before the Court that one advocate by name Advocate K.Ziauddin Khan was never engaged by him. The District Court, from the original record received from the trial Court, found that there is no Vakalatnama or proof of service of summons. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 is right in contending that only there is entry of issuance of suit summons. However, it is not mentioned in the Roznama whether the suit summons was served on the respondent No.1 or not. He is also right in submitting that there is no proof of payment of process fees after issuance of summons to the respondent No.1. From the evidence of said witness, it further appears that there was a measurement of suit land. However, the said measurement was without issuing notice to the respondent No.1. It appears that the suit was for possession and in such a suit, measurement was carried out even without issuing notice to the respondent No.1 and decree has been passed relying upon such measurement. This Court while deciding the second appeal arising out of the same proceedings, has taken note of the fact that the matter relates to the immovable property and suit land is having non agricultural potentiality. Therefore, substantial rights of the parties are involved in the matter. There are other details which are stated by the said witness in his evidence before the Court. It appears that the respondents therein did not lead any evidence and filed purshis stating therein that the respondents i.e. applicants herein do not want to lead any oral evidence. It is also relevant to mention that the execution proceedings came to be initiated by the applicant in the year, 2002, till 2010 except filing application for re-issuing summons to the respondents therein, no effective steps have been taken by the applicants in order to get the decree executed. Therefore, adverse inference has been drawn by the District Court and there are certain observations to that effect in para 26 of the impugned judgment of the District Court. It appears that the summons was issued to the respondent No.1 on 6.6.1995. However, the Voters' I.D. and Ration Card produced by the respondent No.1 show that even prior to issuance of suit summons, the respondent No.1 is resident of Peer Bazar, Osmanpura and not village Satara. Therefore, the District Court went to the root of the matter and called upon the parties to lead evidence and upon appreciation of the evidence, came to the definite conclusion that the address of respondent No.1 given in the suit summons issued by the trial Court is at village Satara. However, the original documents produced on record by the respondent No.1 show that he is resident of Peer Bazar, Osmanpura i.e. different area even prior to issuance of suit summons. Therefore, such finding of fact based upon evidence led by the parties, which goes to the root of the matter and which is not perverse in any manner, cannot be upset in revisional jurisdiction. The respondent No.1 has also alleged some fraud in his application filed for condonation of delay.

15. The learned Counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. (supra) and submits that the respondent No. 1 has not approached the District Court with clean hands and, there is inordinate delay of nine years and eleven months in filing the appeal. Therefore, this Court may allow the revision application. It is true that in the given case, the delay of few days in absence of sufficient cause cannot be condoned. However, if sufficient cause is disclosed in the application for condonation of delay, in that case, the Court can always exercise discretion and condone delay. In the facts of the present case, I do not think that the respondent has not approached the Court with clean hands. The respondent No.1 has disclosed all the relevant facts before the appellate Court and also before this Court. The District Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, found that the address of respondent No.1 mentioned in the suit summons at village Satara is not correct and the applicant has proved that he is residing since 1994-95 at Peer Bazar, Osmanpura, Aurangabad. The said ground goes to the root of the matter and, therefore, the District Court has rightly appreciated the contention of the respondent No1. and the evidence brought on record and, then condoned the delay. Ultimately, the right of appeal is a statutory right and the matter relates to immovable property which has non-agricultural potentiality.

The District Court has also accepted the contention of the respondent No.1 that he had not engaged advocate. The District Court to satisfy itself, summoned the record from the trial Court and found that there is nothing in the said record which would show / demonstrate that the respondent No.1 did engage the advocate to represent him. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, none of the judgments, cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants in order to show that there is inordinate delay and the same should not have been condoned, has application. In the peculiar facts of this case, the District Court has allowed the parties to lead evidence and upon appreciation of such evidence, reached to the conclusion that the address in the suit summons was incorrect and also the suit summons was not served upon the respondent No.1. The District Court has also made some comments about the conduct of the applicants for not taking steps for long eight years to get the decree executed, except filing applications for issuance of summons.

So far as the another contention of the applicants as to how the respondent No.1 came to know about filing of such suit is concerned, the respondent No.1 in his evidence has stated that when his neighbourer told him that a Bailiff from the Court was inquiring about him, he came to be know about the said proceedings and, thereafter, the Bailiff came to serve summons of the execution proceedings. Though the learned Counsel for the applicants submits that such summons of execution proceedings is served upon the respondent No.1 in the month of January, 2011, he did not take steps till March/April, 2011, it appears that the respondent No.1 has explained that after he got knowledge, he applied for certified copies and those were received by him somewhere in the month of February, 2011. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 has placed reliance upon the various authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court wherein the view is taken that prayer for condonation of delay may be liberally considered. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, in revisional jurisdiction, no case is made out to cause interference in the impugned judgment and order of the District Court. It is not necessary to reiterate / reproduce the findings recorded by the District Court while allowing the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondent No.1 along with the appeal. Suffice it to say that those findings are in consonance with the evidence brought on record. The another important aspect in the matter is that already another respondent has filed cross objections in the appeal. Therefore, the appeal is bound to be proceeded on merits and, therefore, at the most what would happen is that the appeal filed by the respondent No.1 will be entertained on merits since delay is condoned. While allowing the application for condonation of delay, the District Court has imposed costs of Rs.16,000/- upon the respondent No.1, which has been deposited by him before the District Court.

16. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, no case is made out to interfere in the impugned judgment and order passed by the District Court. Hence, Civil Revision Application sans merits and the same stands rejected. Rule stands discharged with no order as to costs.

Ordered accordingly.