Criminal Revision No.461 of 2013

7th August, 2015.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. DINESH JHA
Respondent Counsel: Mr. RAM NARESH ROY

Cases Cited:
Md. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum & Ors., (1985) 2 SCC 556 [Para 8,10]
Danial Latifi & Anr. Vs. Union of India, 2001(4) ALL MR 829 (S.C.)=(2001) 7 SCC 740 [Para 12]
Shabana Bano Vs. Imran Khan, 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 278 (S.C.)=(2010) 1 SCC 666 [Para 15]
Khatoon Nisa Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2003(3) PLJR (SC) 126 [Para 16]
Shamim Bano Vs. Asraf Khan, 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 2200 (S.C.)=2014(3) PLJR (SC) 139 [Para 17,20]
Kirtikant D. Vadodaria Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1996) 4 SCC 479 [Para 21]
Chaturbhuj Vs. Sita Bai, 2008 ALL MR (Cri) 860 (S.C.)=(2008) 2 SCC 316 [Para 22]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The present Criminal Revision application is directed against the judgment dated 19.03.2013 passed by learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Sitamarhi whereby the petitioner has been directed to make payment of maintenance of Rs.2,000/- per month to opposite party no.2 from the date of filing of maintenance application i.e., 11.03.2010. The arrear of maintenance amount was to be paid in six monthly installments. The regular payment was directed to be made from March, 2013 by 7th day of every succeeding month.

3. The matter was adjourned on 19.8.2014, on the prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner to enable the petitioner to make payment of maintenance amount, as directed by the learned court below.

4. The marriage of the petitioner with opposite party no.2 and birth of five female children out of the wedlock are not in dispute.

5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not in a position to make payment, hence, the petitioner has not complied the undertaking given before this Court which is recorded in order dated 19.8.2014.

6. It appears from the records that the petitioner has admitted in his show cause filed before the learned Court below that he deserted O.P. No. 2 since she could not give birth to a male child and hence, he performed second marriage with Noor Khatoon. The petitioner also claimed that he has divorced Opposite Party no. 2 and had made payment of Rs.5,000/- as 'mahr' and Rs.10,000/- as expenses for Iddat period. Hence, the O.P. No. 2 being a divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

7. The only issue which has to be considered and decided is whether a divorced Muslim woman, after having received the 'mahr' amount can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

8. The centre of controversy whether a divorced Muslim woman is entitled for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Md. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum and Ors. (1985) 2 Supreme Court Cases 556 and it has to be recapitulated that while entertaining an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate had granted monthly maintenance for a particular sum which was enhanced by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

9. Answering the issue raised, after referring to number of texts and principles of Mohammedan Law, the Constitution Bench opined that taking the language of the statute, as one finds it, there is no escape from the conclusion that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and that 'mahr' is not such a quantum which can ipso facto absolve the husband of the liability under the Code and would not bring him under Section 127(3)(b) of the Code. It was held that 'mahr' is closely connected with marriage than with divorce and 'mahr', or a significant portion of it is usually payable at the time when the marriage gets dissolved, whether by death or divorce. The Constitution Bench considered whether the amount of 'mahr' constitutes a reasonable alternative to maintenance and held that if the 'mahr' is not substantial, then the husband cannot absolve himself from the liability under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. and his case can hence not be brought within the ambit of Section 127(3)(b) of the Cr.P.C. But, if it is not so, then the same would be taken into account while considering the eligibility of the Muslim woman for maintenance and in fixation of quantum of maintenance. Accordingly, the divorced woman was held entitled to apply for grant of maintenance against her former husband, under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and such applications were not barred under Section 127(3)(b) Cr.P.C.

10. In pursuance to the ratio laid down in Shah Bano (supra) the Parliament enacted the Muslim Woman (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act ) with an intention to bring into effect, the decision rendered in Shah Bano Case.

11. The Statement of "Objects" and "Reasons" to the Bill, which resulted into the Act, reads as follows:-

"The Supreme Court, in Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum & Others, (AIR 1985 SC 945) has held that although the Muslim Law limits the husband s liability to provide for maintenance of the divorced wife to the period of iddat, it does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that it would be incorrect and unjust to extend the above principle of Muslim Law to cases in which the divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband s liability ceases with the expiration of the period of Iddat, but if she is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, she is entitled to have recourse to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. This decision has led to some controversy as to the obligation of the Muslim husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife. Opportunity has, therefore, been taken to specify the rights which a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to at the time of divorce and to protect her interests. The Bill accordingly provides for the following among other things, namely-

(a) a Muslim divorced woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the period of iddat by her former husband and in case she maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, such reasonable provision and maintenance would be extended to a period of two years from the date of birth of the children. She will also be entitled to mahr or dower and all the properties given to her by her relatives, friends, husband and the husband s relatives. If the above benefits are not given to her at the time of divorce, she is entitled to apply to the Magistrate for an order directing her former husband to provide for such maintenance, the payment of mahr or dower or the delivery of the properties;

(b) where a Muslim divorced woman is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat, the Magistrate is empowered to make an order for the payment of maintenance by her relatives who would be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to Muslim law in the proportions in which they would inherit her property. If any one of such relatives is unable to pay his or her share on the ground of his or her not having the means to pay, the Magistrate would direct the other relatives who have sufficient means to pay the shares of these relatives also. But where, a divorced woman has no relatives or such relatives or any one of them has not enough means to pay the maintenance or the other relatives who have been asked to pay the shares of the defaulting relatives also do not have the means to pay the shares of the defaulting relatives the Magistrate would order the State Wakf Board to pay the maintenance ordered by him or the shares of the relatives who are unable to pay."

12. The constitutional validity of the said Act came for consideration before Five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Danial Latifi and Another Vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 740 : [2001(4) ALL MR 829 (S.C.)]. While upholding the constitutional validity of the Act, the Apex Court concluded as such. Paragraph 36 reads as follows:

"While upholding the validity of the Act, we may sum up our conclusions:

(1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.

(2) Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the iddat period.

(3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.

(4) The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India."

13. The Apex Court endorsed the view taken in Shah Bano case as the rationale behind making provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced Muslim wife is to avoid vagrancy or destitution on the part of a Muslim woman. Paragraph 33 reads as follows:

"In Shah Bano case this Court has clearly explained as to the rationale behind Section 125 CrPC to make provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced Muslim wife and this is clearly to avoid vagrancy or destitution on the part of a Muslim woman. The contention put forth on behalf of the Muslim organizations who are interveners before us is that under the Act, vagrancy or destitution is sought to be avoided but not by punishing the erring husband, if at all, but by providing for maintenance through others. If for any reason the interpretation placed by us on the language of Sections 3(1)(a) and 4 of the Act is not acceptable, we will have to examine the effect of the provisions as they stand, that is, a Muslim woman will not be entitled to maintenance from her husband after the period of iddat once the Talaq is pronounced and, if at all, thereafter maintenance could only be recovered from the various persons mentioned in Section 4 or from the Wakf Board. This Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985(3) SCC 545, and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248, held that the concept of "right to life and personal liberty" guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution would include the "right to live with dignity". Before the Act, a Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband was granted a right to maintenance from her husband under the provisions of Section 125 CrPC until she may remarry and such a right, if deprived, would not be reasonable, just and fair. Thus the provisions of the Act depriving the divorced Muslim women of such a right to maintenance from her husband and providing for her maintenance to be paid by the former husband only for the period of iddat and thereafter to make her run from pillar to post in search of her relatives one after the other and ultimately to knock at the doors of the Wakf Board does not appear to be reasonable and fair substitute of the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. Such deprivation of the divorced Muslim women of their right to maintenance from their former husbands under the beneficial provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are otherwise available to all other women in India cannot be stated to have been effected by a reasonable, right, just and fair law and, if these provisions are less beneficial than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a divorced Muslim woman has obviously been unreasonably discriminated and got out of the protection of the provisions of the general law as indicated under the Code which are available to Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian women or women belonging to any other community. The provisions prima facie, therefore, appear to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution mandating equality and equal protection of law to all persons otherwise similarly circumstanced and also violative of Article 15 of the Constitution which prohibits any discrimination on the ground of religion as the Act would obviously apply to Muslim divorced women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion. It is well settled that on a rule of construction a given statute will become "ultra vires" or "unconstitutional" and, therefore, void, whereas on another construction which is permissible, the statute remains effective and operative the court will prefer the latter on the ground that the legislature does not intend to enact unconstitutional laws. We think, the latter interpretation should be accepted and, therefore, the interpretation placed by us results in upholding the validity of the Act. It is well settled that when by appropriate reading of an enactment the validity of the Act can be upheld, such interpretation is accepted by courts and not the other way round."

14. It was thus held that it would be discriminatory if a Muslim Woman is not allowed to avail the beneficial provision of Section 125 of the Code.

15. The Apex Court in the case of Shabana Bano Vs. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 666 : [2010 ALL MR (Cri) 278 (S.C.)] held that a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the woman does not remarry, as the maintenance amount under Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be restricted for the Iddat period only.

16. The issue with regard to maintaining an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. during pendency of the application under Section 3 of the Act was considered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Khatoon Nisa Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2003(3) PLJR (SC) 126, where it was held that the parties can exercise their option to be governed by the provision of Sections 125 to 128 Cr.P.C., as contained in Section 5 of the Act but even otherwise the Magistrate has the power to grant maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Paragraph 10 reads as follows:

"Subsequent to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short "the Act") as it was considered that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 125, Cr.P.c. can be invoked only when the condition precedent mentioned in Section 5 of the Act is complied with, in the case in hand, the Magistrate came to a finding that there has been no divorce in the eye of law and as such, the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. This finding of the Magistrate has been upheld by the High Court. The validity of the provisions of the Act was for consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case of Danial Latifi and Anr. Vs. Union of India, JT 2001(8) SC 218: (2001) 7 SCC 740. In the said case by reading down the provisions of the Act, the validity of the Act has been upheld and it has been observed that under the Act itself when parties agree, the provisions of Section 125, Cr.P.C. could be invoked as contained in Section 5 of the Act and even otherwise the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of the divorced woman, and the parameters and considerations are the same as those in Section 125, Cr.P.C. It is undoubtedly true that in the case in hand, Section 5 of the Act has not been invoked. Necessarily, therefore, the Magistrate has exercised his jurisdiction under Section 125, Cr.P.C. But, since the Magistrate retains the power of granting maintenance in view of the Constitution Bench decision in Danial Latifi s case (supra) under the Act and since the parameters for exercise of that power are the same as those contained in Section 125, Cr.P.C., we see no ground to interfere with the orders of the Magistrate granting maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman. In fact, Mr. Qamaruddin, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, never objected to pay maintenance as ordered by the Magistrate. But he seriously disputes the findings of the Magistrate on the status of the parties and contends that the Magistrate was wholly in error in coming to the conclusion that there has been no divorce between the parties in the eye of law."

17. The issue involved in the present proceeding was under consideration in the case of Shamim Bano Vs. Asraf Khan, 2014(3) PLJR (SC) 139 : [2014 ALL MR (Cri) 2200 (S.C.)] where the wife filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. at earlier point of time as the divorce took place subsequently and thereafter filed an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of 'mahr', return of articles and payment of maintenance for the Iddat period, wherein the High Court held that when the wife had already taken recourse to Section 3 of the Act after divorce took place and obtained relief which has been upheld by the High Court, the application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. can only be maintainable till she was divorced whereas it was held by the Apex Court that the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is maintainable. Paragraph 15 reads as follows:

"Coming to the case at hand, it is found that the High Court has held that as the appellant had already taken recourse to Section 3 of the Act after divorce took place and obtained relief which has been upheld by the High Court, the application for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code would only be maintainable till she was divorced. It may be noted here that during the pendency of her application under Section 125 of the Code the divorce took place. The wife preferred an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of mahr and return of articles. The learned Magistrate, as is seen, directed for return of the articles, payment of quantum of mahr and also thought it appropriate to grant maintenance for the Iddat period. Thus, in effect, no maintenance had been granted to the wife beyond the Iddat period by the learned Magistrate as the petition was different. We are disposed to think so as the said application, which has been brought on record, was not filed for grant of maintenance. That apart, the authoritative interpretation in Danial Latifi (supra) was not available. In any case, it would be travesty of justice if the appellant would be made remediless. Her application under Section 125 of the Code was continuing. The husband contested the same on merits without raising the plea of absence of consent. Even if an application under Section 3 of the Act for grant of maintenance was filed, the parameters of Section 125 of the Code would have been made applicable. Quite apart from that, the application for grant of maintenance was filed prior to the date of divorce and hearing of the application continued."

18. It has further been held by the Apex Court that seeking option under Section 5 of the Act would not make any difference and the order of the High Court was set aside. Paragraph 17 reads as follows:

"Under these circumstances, regard being had to the dictum in Khatoon Nisa's case, seeking of option would not make any difference. The High Court is not correct in opining that when the appellant-wife filed application under Section 3 of the Act, she exercised her option. As the Magistrate still retains the power of granting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code to a divorced Muslim woman and the proceeding was continuing without any objection and the ultimate result would be the same, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to hold that the proceeding after the divorce took place was not maintainable."

19. The other aspect which was considered by the Apex Court was that on divorce, the woman suffers from emotional fractures, fragmentation of sentiments, loss of economic and social security, hence, such beneficial provisions under Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be denied to a divorced Muslim Woman. Paragraph 16 reads as follows:

"Another aspect which has to be kept uppermost in mind is that when the marriage breaks up, a woman suffers from emotional fractures, fragmentation of sentiments, loss of economic and social security and, in certain cases, inadequate requisites for survival. A marriage is fundamentally a unique bond between two parties. When it perishes like a mushroom, the dignity of the female fame gets corroded. It is the law s duty to recompense, and the primary obligation is that of the husband. Needless to emphasise, the entitlement and the necessitous provisions have to be made in accordance with the parameters of law."

20. The issue whether divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance was also considered in the case of Shamim Bano Vs. Asraf Khan, 2014 (3) PLJR (SC) 139 : [2014 ALL MR (Cri) 2200 (S.C.)], where it has been held that a Muslim woman after filing application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights and Divorce) Act, 1986 can still maintain the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

21. So far as the ambit and scope of the provision contained in Section 125 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the same has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, reported in (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 479. The relevant portion reads as follows:

"While dealing with the ambit and scope of the provision contained in Section 125 of the Code, it has to be borne in mind that the dominant and primary object is to give social justice to the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions in Section 125 are intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation."

22. Considering the object of social justice under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the Apex Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Vs. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 Supreme Court Cases 316 : [2008 ALL MR (Cri) 860 (S.C.)], held:

"Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and Ors."

23. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit in the application.

This application is, accordingly, dismissed.

Application dismissed.