Civil Revision Application No.84 of 2015

15th March, 2016.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. R.D. BHUIBHAR
Respondent Counsel: Mr. A.J. KADU with Mr. P.A. KADU

Cases Cited:
Social and Cultural Association and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2014(3) ALL MR 557=2014(4) Mh.L.J. 174 [Para 2,12]
Naresh Amritlal Shah and Ors. Vs. Kantilal Chunilal Shah and Ors., 2001(2) ALL MR 379=2001(1) Mh.L.J. 572 [Para 3]
Kedar Shivkumar Kale Vs. Digamber Shridhar Mhapsekar and Ors., 2007(6) ALL MR 65=2007(4) Mh.L.J. 77 [Para 3]
Vinayak Dev, Idagunji and Ors. Vs. Shivaram and Ors., 2005(5) ALL MR 861 (S.C.)=(2005) 6 SCC 641 [Para 6,12]
Amirchand Tulsiram Gupta and Ors. Vs. Vasant Dhanaji Patil and Ors., 1992 Mh.L.J. 275 [Para 7]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Being aggrieved by order dated 01.08.2015 passed by 8th Jt. Civil Judge Junior Division, Amravati below Exh.22 in Regular Civil Suit No.178/2015, by which the learned trial Judge held that it has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and consequently rejected the objection as to the jurisdiction raised by the revision-applicants, the present Civil Revision Application has been filed.

2. In support of this revision application, Mr. Bhuibhar, learned Counsel for the revision applicants vehemently argued that the body of the suit plaint, averments as well as prayers and the reliefs claimed in the suit filed by the non applicants in the matter of removal of the members from the society of the trust are the matters falling under Section 50 (1) (iv) (p) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act (for the sake of brevity 'Act') and consequently in the absence of consent obtained under Section 51 of the said Act and in view of the bar under Section 80 thereof, the suit was clearly not maintainable and was required to be dismissed. Mr. Bhuibhar cited several decisions before me, which were also cited before the learned trial Judge. Mr. Bhuibhar has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of a Single Judge at Aurangabad Bench of this Court in Social and Cultural Association and others .vs. State of Maharashtra and others; 2014(4) Mh.L.J. 174 : [2014(3) ALL MR 557], and submitted that trial Judge has not correctly understood the said decision and has not applied the same in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel for the revision applicants contended that the averments in the plaint as well as as the reliefs claimed were clearly within the perview of the decisions to be taken by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, who is empowered to decide the issues raised in the suit and, therefore, the bar under Section 80 of the Act would forcefully apply. He then submitted that the decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned trial Judge do not have any application and ought to have been distinguished by the learned trial Judge and, therefore, the suit ought to have been dismissed being not maintainable by upholding the objection raised by the revision applicants. He, therefore, prayed that the suit be dismissed.

3. Per contra, Mr. Kadu, learned counsel for the non applicants, supported the impugned order and submitted that the perusal of the plaint and the documents along with the plaint and the events stated therein gave rise to the cause of action for filing the suit. The reading of the same together will show that the questions raised cannot be decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner to attract bar of Section 80 of the Act. The trial Court, according to him, has correctly applied his mind to the entire averments of the plaint and the documents and the events which had occurred of taking predatory actions which were arbitrary. In order to enforce the infringement of their personal rights, plaintiffs had no other go but to file the civil suit. He then submitted that in the subject matter of the suit, no proceedings are pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner nor any such proceedings can even be contemplated and as such the only available remedy for the non applicants-plaintiffs was to invoke the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, he prayed for dismissal of the revision application. In support of his case, learned counsel for the non applicants cited decisions in the case of Naresh Amritlal Shah and others .vs. Kantilal Chunilal Shah and others; 2001(1) Mh.L.J.572 : [2001(2) ALL MR 379], Kedar Shivkumar Kale .vs. Digamber Shridhar Mhapsekar and others; 2007 (4) Mh.L.J. 77 : [2007(6) ALL MR 65].

CONSIDERATION:

4. I have perused the entire plaint and the accompanying documents referred to in the plaint. The respondent-plaintiffs have filed suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction in the Court of Civil Judge Junior Division, Amravati vide Regular Civil Suit No.178/2015. Some of the paragraphs are quoted below for understanding the nature of controversy.

"1. .....The subject matter of the suit is decision taken by the alleged newly elected body of the defendant No.1 about removal of life membership of the plaintiffs vide resolution No.7 in the alleged Executive Committee meeting dated 3.3.2015. the act of removal of life membership of the plaintiffs No.1 to 4 on the part of defendants is prima facie illegal and against the provisions of the byelaws of the Trust and in violation of the principles of natural justice.

3. The status of the plaintiffs 1 to 4 as a life member and office bearers of executive committee is not in dispute and their change report has been accepted by the Dy. Charity Commissioner, Amravati Region, Amravati vide Change Report No.135/2007...

13. Surprisingly, the plaintiffs received show cause notices dated 22.1.2015 from defendant No.4 in the capacity of alleged Secretary of the defendant No.1 Trust as to why they should not be dismembered from the life membership of the Trust. The contents of the show cause notices reflects the earlier round of litigations between the parties and relying on some findings of the judgment dated 13.12.2011 of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Amravati, it is alleged that plaintiffs have no legal or moral rights to continue as a life member of the defendant No.1 Trust and plaintiffs were called upon to respond to the show cause notice within 15 days. Plaintiffs 1, 2 and 4 sent reply to show cause through their counsel R. M. Agrawal on 5.2.2015 and plaintiff No.3 replied show cause notice personally. In the reply to show cause notice, the plaintiffs denied the entire allegations. It was specifically pointed out in the reply that plaintiffs are still members of the executive body, the rights/claims of the 49 members yet to be decided and matter is subjudice and in view of observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, those 49 members have every right to claim their status as a member. It was further informed that status of the defendants 2 to 10 as elected members of the executive council is yet to be adjudicated in the proceedings U/s 22 of the b. P. T. Act and it was also informed to defendant No.4 that he has no right to act as a Secretary of the Trust and to issue show cause notice and it was specifically pointed out that on the basis of wrong interpretation of the observations of the judgment passed by the Joint C. C. show cause notice has been issued and resolution passed by the alleged executive body dated 17.11.2014 for calling explanation is illegal and lastly it was informed to withdraw the show cause notice. It was further informed in the reply that executive council has no power to remove the life member as per provisions of the byelaws of the Trust. However, inspite of the reply the plaintiffs received another letter dated 7.3.2015 from defendant No.4 in the capacity of alleged Secretary, wherein it was informed that no satisfactory explanation received from the plaintiffs and matter was discussed in the meeting of the executive council dated 3.3.2015 and vide resolution No.7, the committee has resolved to terminate the membership as life members of plaintiffs.

.....The plaintiffs submit that the resolution No.13 passed by the alleged executive committee in the meeting dated 17.11.2014 to issue show cause notice and called explanation of the plaintiffs and further resolution No.7 passed by the alleged executive council in the alleged meeting dated 3.3.2015 of termination of life membership of the plaintiffs is illegal and void in the eye of law in view of the following submissions.

19. The cause of action for the suit arose on 7.3.2015, when defendant No.4 communicated to the plaintiffs regarding dismember from life membership of the defendant No.1 Trust."

Apart from these pleadings, following are the prayers made in the suit, which are nine in number and read thus:

"1. Declare that act of passing resolution No.14 in the alleged executive council meeting dated 17.11.2014 of issuing show cause notice and calling explanation from the plaintiff's about alleged misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs, as null and void.

2. Declare that act of passing resolution no.7 in the alleged executive council meeting dated 3.3.2015 of removing/terminating life membership of the plaintiffs of the defendant No.1 Trust, as null and void, as it is contrary to the settled legal applicable provisions of law and in breach of provisions of the byelaws of the Trust.

3. The defendants be permanently restrained from implementing the alleged resolution No.7 dated 3.3.2015 of the so called alleged executive council meeting of termination/removal of life membership of the plaintiffs.

4. Issue mandatory injunction against the defendants directing them to communicate the plaintiffs about continuation of their status as a life member of the Trust with retrospective effect from 3.3.2015.

5. Declare that holding of the A.G.M. scheduled to be held on dtd. 14.06.2015 as per notice dd. 03/06/2015 is illegal and void.

6. the defendants may kindly be directed to provide the copies of the so called alleged proceedings of the executive council meeting dated 17.11.2014 and 3.3.2015 to the plaintiffs.

7. The defendants be further restrained from taking any important policy decision, till their status as elected trustees is adjudicated/accepted by the competent authority under B.P.T. Act.

8. Award costs of the suit to the plaintiffs.

9. Grant any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in favour of the plaintiffs, in the circumstances of the case."

5. The trial Judge recorded the following reasons for holding that it has jurisdiction:

"12. The judgments Gaud Saraswat and Charu Mehta cited above by defendants are discussed in para 29 and para 40 in the judgment Girald Shirley cited by plaintiffs, in which it was held that real test is whether all reliefs claimed would be decided by the Charity Commissioner Office. If this answer is in the negative for even one of the reliefs claimed, the civil courts judgments to that extent, could not be barred and the suit would have to be tried.

13. The present matter regarding illegal removal of life members of the trust. Those members are plaintiffs in this suit. They are enforcing their personal civil rights regarding the termination of life membership. The suit is not for title of trust property against outsider, nor related to right created by trust in third party, nor to recover trust property, nor relating to obtaining consent or claimed forgery or fabrication against defendants. The suit is simplicitor for injunction and does not fall under clauses (a) to (q) of the Section 50 of the Act. Thus suit for challenging the validity of resolution passed by the Trust is maintainable in individual capacity."

6. It is necessary to cull out the legal position from the various judgments as such so also about Section 50 and Section 80 of the Act. It would also be appropriate to make a reference to the Supreme Court judgment in relation to the issue in question. In the case of Vinayak Dev, Idagunji and others .vs. Shivaram and others; (2005) 6 SCC 641 : [2005(5) ALL MR 861 (S.C.)], the Apex Court stated thus in paragraphs 8, 11, 13 and 14.

"8. A perusal of Section 50 of the Act shows that in matters referred to or enumerated in the said Section, a suit is to be instituted after obtaining the consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner as per provisions of Section 51 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the claim of the plaintiffs in the plaint falls within the ambit of administration of a public trust as admittedly there is a public trust with respect to the temple in question. If the matter pertains to administration of public trust then the Charity Commissioner comes into the picture and a Civil suit is not maintainable without compliance of Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. The real question is whether the present suit is a suit pertaining to administration of a public trust. In response to this question, the learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to the preamble to the Act which provides "an Act to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Bombay".

9. & 10. .....

11. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the reliefs claimed in the present suit do not fall in any of the clauses of Section 50 of the Act. There is no allegation of breach of trust; no declaration is sought that any property is a property belonging to a public trust. The right to archakship is an individual and personal right enforceable under ordinary law; nor any direction of the court is sought for administration of the public trust. The plaintiffs have never sought any orders of the court regarding administration of the trust.....

13. We have seen the provision of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act relied upon by the appellantsdefendants. The said section does not cover a suit of the present type. Analogy has been drawn of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure while considering Section 50 of Bombay Public Trusts Act. Both provisions are in the nature of representative suits which pertain to public trusts and protection of public interest in the trusts. In the present case, there is no public interest involved. The only interest is that of the plaintiffs and their families. The right of archakship is claimed on the basis of inheritance. It is a hereditary personal right which they want to establish. The right is purely of a private nature. We are of the view that Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is not attracted at all in the facts of the present case.

14. We have seen the object of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Appropriately the Act seeks to regulate and make better provision for administration of public religious and charitable trusts. Such trusts cater to things of public interest, i.e .things which concern large sections of public. Unless such trusts are properly administered public interest will suffer. Therefore, matters affecting administration of such trusts are covered under Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. This situation is somewhat similar to suits under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These suits are suits in representative capacity and pertain to matters of public interest. In contrast the suit which has given rise to the present appeal is a suit to establish an individual right. The plaintiffs claim that they are hereditary archaks of the temple since time immemorial and are entitled to exercise this right which cannot be taken away from them. No public interest is involved. Public is not concerned whether A acts as an archak or B acts. Such a suit, therefore, cannot be covered by Section 50 of the Act. Law is settled on this aspect as per various judgments of this Court."

It is thus clear from the above ratio of the decision, the individual right of a person or a member of a trust who claims infringement of his personal right or individual right and makes a grievance in relation thereto he would be entitled to maintain a suit in the Civil Court.

7. In fact, it is the trite law that the jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a rule must be presumed to be intact unless taken away by the statutory law explicitly or impliedly. After making survey of several decisions, in the case of Amirchand Tulsiram Gupta and others.vs.Vasant Dhanaji Patil and others; 1992 Mh. L. J. 275, the Division Bench of this Court has had to say thus,

"7. It is necessary in this connection to refer to the decision in, Shree Gollaleshwar Dev and others. v. Gangawwa Kom Shantayya Math & others. The Supreme Court held that section 50 created and regulated a right to institute a suit by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons interested in the trust, in the form of supplementary statutory provisions without defeasance of the right of the manager or a trustee or a shebait of an idol to bring a suit in the name of idol to recover the property of the trust in the usual way. In other words the Supreme Court accepted the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court that the right of a trustee to bring a suit in the usual way, that is in exercise of rights under the Common Law is not affected by provisions of section 50 of the Public Trusts Act. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court was followed by a Single Judge of this Court in the decision reported in 1986 Mah.L.J. 773, Vidarbha Kshatriya Mali Shikshan Sanstha v. Mahatma Fuley Shikshan Samiti Amaravai, holding that trustees who want to enforce their civil rights are not covered by definition of the expression "person having interest" and are entitled to file suits without obtaining prior permission. The same view was taken by another Single Judge in the decision reported in 1988(2) Bombay Cases Reporter 429, Leelavati w/o Vasantrao Pingle v. Dattraya D. Kavishar & others. The same view was taken by another Single Judge in an unreported decision dated September 13, 1990 delivered in Original Side Suit No. 958 of 1975 and the decision of the Single Judge was confirmed in Appeal No. 1315 of 1990 by the Division Bench by judgment dated March 14, 1991. The Division Bench specifically disapproved the view taken by the trial Court in the present case holding that the decision reported in 69 Bom.L.R. 472 Rajgopal Raghunathdas Somani v. Ramchandra Hajarimal Jhavar, still holds field and section 50 does not prohibit a suit being filed by trustees to recover possession from a trespasser without obtaining prior permission. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench and the learned Single Judges, and we entirely disagree with the finding of the trial Judge that the suit was not maintainable in absence of permission. The learned trial Judge was clearly in error in holding that after amendment of section 50 and section 2(10)(e) it is incumbent upon the trustees to obtain prior approval of the Charity Commissioner to institute suit against a trespasser for recovery of possession. As the finding of the trial Judge on this count is set aside, consequently the finding that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit could be filed only in the City Civil Court after obtaining prior approval cannot stand."

Perusal of paragraph 7 above shows reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Gollaleshwar Dev and others holding that Section 50 created and regulated a right to institute a suit in the form of supplementary statutory provisions and not in supersession of personal/individual rights unconnected with the trust property or the administration of the trust and the public interest, if any, involved.

8. It would be appropriate at this stage, having discussed with the help of some decisions as above, to quote Section 50 (iv) (p) of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, which reads thus:

"50. Suit by or against or relating to public trusts or trustees or others:

In any case -

(i) .....

(ii) .....

(iii) .....

(iv) for any declaration or injunction in favour of or against a public trust or trustee or trustees or beneficiary thereof,

the charity Commissioner after making such enquiry as he thinks necessary or two or more persons having an interest in case the suit is under subclauses (i) to (iii), or one or more such persons in case the suit is under sub clause (iv) having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner as provided in Section 51 may institute a suit whether contentious or not in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or part of the subjec-tmatter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree of any of the following reliefs:

(a) to (o) .....

(p) declaring or denying any right in favour of or against a public trust or trustee or trustees or beneficiary thereof and issuing injunctions in appropriate cases; or"

It is clear from the reading of clause (iv) above, that it must be read in conjunction with clause (p). I, therefore, bring clause (iv) and clause (p) in juxtaposition:

"(iv) for any declaration or injunction in favour of or against a public trust or trustee or trustees or beneficiary thereof,

(p) declaring or denying any right in favour of or against a public trust or trustee or trustees or beneficiary thereof and issuing injunctions in appropriate cases; or"

From the reading of the above provision, it is clear that Section 50 of the Act contemplates the suit in which any declaration in favour or against a public trust or trustee or beneficiary is sought and also for issuing injunction.

9. Perusal of the pleadings above shows that the non applicant-plaintiffs are seeking declaration, neither in favour or against the public trust or trustees nor are asking for any injunction for or against. What they are asking is that their individual or private right to continue to remain as life members by predatory actions of dismemberment of defendant no.1-Trust in arbitrary and malafide manner by levelling charges against them be declared illegal, null and void. Consequently they are seeking injunction that they be allowed to continue to enjoy their status accordingly. Thus, the plaintiffs are seeking redressal of their grievances for their alleged removal from life-membership of the trust for alleged misconduct. It is noteworthy that 'Court' under Section 2 (4) means only 'District Court' for the purposes of the Act. The Legislature does not appear to have desired that all and sundry disputes about personal rights or legal injury should compulsorily be placed with the jurisdiction of the District Court. The disputes affecting the trust properties and their management or administration only are intended to be compulsorily sent to the District court that too only after screening or consent from the Charity Commissioner. The obvious intention appears to be to have adjudication fo such matters affecting the trust from the Judge of higher cadre rather than the Judge having ordinary original civil jurisdiction. In other words, the Legislature is more concerned with the welfare, management, administration of the trust and its properties rather than the personal rights or feuds between the persons.

10. Examining the scheme of the Act in this context, it is seen that removal of life members from the trust cannot form the subject matter of 'change' contemplated in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17 i.e. Schedule-I prescribed by Rule 5. Schedule-I contains in all 21 Columns. Insofar as the present subject matter is concerned, only Column nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 are relevant, which I quote hereinunder:

11. From reading of the above and the plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiffs did not claim that any change in the name of trustees or managers had occurred. The dismemberment of the plaintiffs from life membership, therefore, could not be a 'change' within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. Section 22 reads thus:

"22.(I) Where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under section 17, the trustee shall, within 90 days from the date of the occurrence of such change, or where any change is desired in such entries in the interest of the administration of such public trust, report such change or proposed change to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner in charge of the Public Trusts Registration Office where the register is kept. Such report shall be made in the prescribed form.

(1A) Where the change to be reported under sub-section (1) relates to any immovable property, the trustee shall, along with the report, furnish a memorandum in the prescribed form containing the particulars (including the name and description of, the public trust) relating to any change in the immovable property of such public trust, for forwarding it to the Sub-Registrar referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 18.

Such memorandum shall be signed and verified in the prescribed manner by the trustee or his agent specially authorised by him in this behalf.

(2) For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register kept under section 17 or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded in the register, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner may 2 hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner.

(3) If the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be, after receiving a report under sub-section (1) and holding an inquiry, if, necessary, under sub-section (2), or merely after holding an inquiry under the said sub-section (2), is satisfied that a change has occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under section 17 in regard to a particular public trust, or that the trust should be removed from the register by reason of the change, resulting in both the office of the administration of the trust and the whole of the trust property ceasing to be situated in the State, he shall record a finding with the reasons therefor to that effect and if he is not so satisfied he shall record a finding with reasons therefor accordingly. Any such finding shall be appealable to the Charity Commissioner. The Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner shall amend or delete the entries in the said register in accordance with the finding which requires an amendment or deletion of entries and if appeals 'for applications were made against such finding, in accordance with the final decision of the competent authority provided by this Act. The amendments in the entries so made subject to any further amendment on occurrence of a change or any cancellation of entries, shall be final and conclusive.

(4) Whenever an entry is amended or the trust is removed, from the register under sub-section (3), the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be, shall forward the memorandum furnished to him under sub-section (1A), after certifying the amended entry or the removal of the trust from the register, to the sub-Register referred to in sub-section (7) or section 18, for the purpose of filing in Book No. 1 under section 18 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, in its application to the State of Maharashtra."

The Assistant Charity Commissioner is thus required to decide or deal with any question as to 'change' under Section 22 of the Act. It is thus clear from the above that the question; whether the plaintiffs were legally dismembered from the life membership or not and whether the act of their dismemberment was illegal, null and void, mala fide or contrary to law are the questions which cannot become change in order to attract Section 22 enquiry proceedings and, therefore, the grievance made by the plaintiffs consequently was their individual or private grievance unconnected with the administration of the trust and its properties. Section 80 of the Act reads thus:

"80. Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act and in respect of which the decision or order of such authority has been made final and conclusive."

Thus the bar to invoke jurisdiction of civil court provided in this provision will not be attracted as the Assistant Charity Commissioner is not required to decide or deal with any question other than the 'change' within the meaning of Section 22 read with Section 17 and Rule 5, Schedule-I.

12. The decision in the case of Social and Cultural Association and others [2014(3) ALL MR 557] (supra) and in particular paragraph 13 thereof does not consider the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinayak Dev, Idagunji and others [2005(5) ALL MR 861 (S.C.)] (supra) nor the fact that Section 22 does not contemplate an adjudication for the purpose of finding out correctness of the decision about dismemberment of life members and that Section 22 contemplates only change in relation to the entries in Section 17 and consequently the relevant entries in Schedule-I only namely; change in the name of trustees or managers and it does not contemplate removal of any member or life members for misconduct or for any other reason to become a change so that the authority to decide or deal with the same would be available with the Charity Commissioner. The decision in the case of Social and Cultural Association and others [2014(3) ALL MR 557] (supra) is, therefore, of no assistance to the revision applicants.

13. There is one more reason for saying so. Filing of a change report for adjudicating whether removal of life members from the trust is not at all contemplated under the scheme of the Act. There would be, therefore, no occasion to decide or deal with that question. One may contend that if or as and when the change is reported in future, the question whether these life members were legally removed or not could be decided as ancillary. The answer obviously would be that the law does not wait for future cause of action and hence plaintiff having cause of action cannot be told to wait ad infinitum.

Last but not least. The State Government has by now made the charity organisation full-proof by providing infrastructure, the Judicial Officers to man the posts of Deputy Charity Commissioner, Joint Charity Commissioner, Charity Commissioner etc. in the entire State. It is somewhat anomalous to allow adjudication of some types of disputes by Civil Court, District Court, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, particularly when the Judicial Officers of the rank of District Judge presides over as Joint Charity Commissioner. It has given rise to conundrum. Under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, all types of disputes are to be decided by Cooperative Court, appeal/revision by Cooperative Appellate Court. In fact, no disputes are now required to be decided by Civil Court but for a few. I think, on similar line, the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act is required to be revisited on these aspects. And I recommend so to the State Government.

14. In that view of the matter, the revision must fail and I make the following order.

ORDER

(i) Civil Revision Application No. 84/2015 is dismissed.

(ii) A copy of this judgment be forwarded to Principal Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai for information and necessary action.

(iii) No order as to costs.

Application dismissed.