Chamber Summons (L) No.22 of 2016,Execution Application No.4 of 2016

1st March, 2017.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr FIRDOSH POONIWALA, with Mr YATIN R SHAH & ADITI BHAT i/b YATIN R SHAH
Respondent Counsel: Mr RAHUL CHITNIS, with Mr CHIRAG SHAH, i/b JJ SHAH

Cases Cited:
PSL Ramanathan Chettiar & Ors. Vs. ORMPRM Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1968 SC 1047 [Para 17]
State of Goa & Anr Vs. Domingos ML Merglhao, 2014(4) ALL MR 221=2013(6) Bom.C.R. 803 [Para 19]
Dr. Ramesh Mulgaonkar Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (N) & Anr., Misc. Civil Application No.593/2006 in First Appeal No.240/2003 (Panaji) [Para 19]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This Chamber Summons is an application by the 1st Respondent seeking dismissal of the Claimants' Execution Application No. 4 of 2016. That Execution Application arises from an award dated 16th January 2006.

A. INTRODUCTION

2. The issue is narrow. The Claimants ("Bhadani") obtained an arbitral award in damages against the Respondents in a claim for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property. The award carried interest beyond 30 days. In proceedings before the Supreme Court, the 1st Respondent ("Kamlini") agreed on behalf of the Respondents to furnish a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary & Senior Master in the amount of the arbitral award. She did so. The Respondents challenge to the award failed. Bhadani did not invoke the bank guarantee. It had separately challenged the award, but it filed its challenge in the wrong court, one without jurisdiction. It obtained an order returning the challenge petition, and presented it to the proper court, with an accompanying application to condone the intervening delay. That application was refused. Several years went by till that order attained finality in the Supreme Court, thus ending Bhadani's challenge. Now Bhadani claims interest on the award amount for the entire intervening period, including for the time it was in the wrong court and pursuing its application for delay condonation. Mr Pooniwala for Bhadani argues that the bank guarantee does not constitute payment into court within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"), and that, in any case, interest did not stop for want of the necessary notice under Order 21 Rule 1(2) read with Order 21 Rules 1(4) and 1(5) of the CPC. Mr Chitnis for the Respondents/Applicants says Mr Pooniwala's submission is incorrect on both counts: the provision of a bank guarantee is equivalent to payment into court of the entire decretal sum; and, as regards notice, there is no question that Bhadani had notice. He also points out that it was not until after Kamlini demanded invocation (against herself ) following the Supreme Court's dismissal of Bhadani's final Special Leave Petition that Bhadani first invoked the bank guarantee. In his submission, nothing in the CPC lends itself to the foisting of such manifest injustice in the garb of execution. I think he is completely correct on all counts. I have held for the Respondents/Claimants. My reasons follow.

B. FACTS

3. The dispute between Bhadani on the one hand and the Respondents related to a plot of land of about 1708.6 sq. mtrs. The plot had additional FSI available to it. The Respondents filed Special Civil Suit No. 367 of 2002 and Regular Civil Suit No. 468 of 2003 in the District Court at Thane in regard to these disputes. The Principal District Judge passed an interlocutory order. Both sides came up to the High Court against that order. This Court suggested the parties refer their disputes to arbitration. They agreed, and their disputes were referred to a three-member Arbitral Tribunal of Mr Justice AA Halbe (Retd), Mr Justice H Suresh (Retd), both former judges of this Court, and Mr Justice SD Pandit (Retd), former judge of the Delhi High Court.

4. The Respondents were ordered to maintain status quo in relation to the construction or development on the plot in question. Kamlini filed filed Civil Appeal No. 1024 of 2006 before the Supreme Court against this order. That SLP remained pending even as parties went to arbitration.

5. Before the Arbitral Tribunal, Bhadani sought specific performance and, alternatively, damages in lieu of specific performance in the amount of Rs.95,18,493/-. By its award dated 16th January 2006, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the claim for specific performance but it awarded an amount of Rs.95,18,493/- as damages in favour of Bhadani against Kamlini and directed payment within 30 days, failing which the amount would carry interest at 18% per annum. The Arbitral Tribunal also awarded further amount of Rs.20,77,996/- as additional damages with a similar provision for interest beyond 30 days.1

6. About three weeks later, on 7th February 2006, the Supreme Court disposed of Kamlini's Civil Appeal No. 1024 of 2006 (the one she had filed against the status quo order). Bhadani submitted that Kamlini should be made to deposit the entire amount awarded, said to be Rs.1.15 crores. This is how the Supreme Court order of 7th February 2006 reads:2

Leave granted.

This appeal has been filed against the impugned order dated 3rd May 2005, whereby setting aside the order passed by the lower appellate court, the High Court directed the Appellant to maintain status quo in respect of the construction on the area in issue. Now the arbitration proceedings have culminated into an award 16th January 2006, whereby specific performance sought for by the Respondents has been declined and damages to the extent of Rs.1.15 Crores awarded in their favour and against the Appellant. In view of these subsequent events, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel for the Respondents that his clients are in the process of challenging the Award but in the meantime, the Appellant should be directed to secure the amount awarded, namely Rs.1.15 Crores. The learned counsel for the Appellant submits that though his client is also contemplating to challenge the Award but his client has no objection to furnish Bank guarantee without prejudice to her rights and contentions. Under these circumstances, we direct that the Appellant to furnish a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary of the Bombay High Court securing payment of Rs.1.15 Crores to the Respondent-claimants within four weeks without prejudice to her rights and contentions. The impugned order is accordingly, set aside and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.

No costs.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11189 of 2005.

In view of the order passed in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 11038 of 2005, this Special Leave Petition is disposed of. (Emphasis added)

7. On 6th March 2006, Kamlini furnished a bank guarantee in the amount of Rs.1.15 Crores in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master.

8. In the meantime, Kamlini challenged the award. On 19th June 2006, this Court dismissed her petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.

9. According to Mr Chitnis, Kamlini's bank guarantee was immediately payable on that date. Mr Pooniwala disagrees. He says the terms of the bank guarantee were such that Bhadani could not invoke that bank guarantee until its own challenge to the award in its favour failed. The relevant portion of the bank guarantee reads:3

"NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESSETH THAT THE SAID BANK DOTH hereby stand surety in pursuance of the said Order dated 7th February 2006 for the sum of Rs.1.15 Crores (Rupees One Crore and Fifteen Lacs only) AND THE SAID BANK DOTH HEREBY GUARANTEE to and covenant with The Prothonotary & Senior Master, High Court, Bombay, the Bank shall forthwith pay by demand draft or pay Order, the sum of Rs.1.15 Crores (Rupees One Crore and Fifteen Lacs only) to The Prothonotary & Senior Master, High Court, Bombay, and or her or his successor / successors in office for an on behalf of the Respondent No.1 Viz. Smt Kamlini D. Ashar herein and the said Bank DOTH HEREBY FURTHER COVENANT AND DELCARE THAT the guarantee herein shall remain in force up to the inclusive of an initial period of one year and thereafter the same shall be renewed from year to year till the Arbitration Petition that may intended to be filed by the parties to the aforesaid Arbitration Proceedings is disposed of, for a further period of six months thereafter and the said BANK DOTH HEREBY AGREE AND UNDERTAKE to this Hon'ble to this Hon'ble Court to issue the guarantee herein initially for one year and thereafter renew the same from year to year till the Arbitration Petition that may intended to be filed by the parties to the aforesaid Arbitration Proceedings is disposed of and for a further period of six months thereafter and the said..." (Emphasis added)

10. Bhadani itself filed a Petition under Section 34 on 10th April 2006 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane. That Court lacked jurisdiction. Bhadani applied Order 7 Rule 10 of the CPC for return of the application for presentation to the proper Court. The Court allowed that application on 26th July 2006. Bhadani then presented its Section 34 Petition No.211 of 2006 before the Principal District Judge, Thane and filed an application to condone the delay. The Principal District Judge dismissed that application on 9th October 2014.4 Against this, Bhadani filed Writ Petition No. 1091 of 2008. RM Savant J dismissed the writ petition on 5th December 2014.5 Bhadani filed Special Leave Petition No. 2074 of 2015, which the Supreme Court dismissed on 2nd February 2015.6

11. On 21st February 2015, Kamlini filed a Civil Application No. 1939 of 2015 in Bhadani's disposed of Writ Petition No. 10918 of 2014 seeking that the Prothonotary and Senior Master do encash the bank guarantee for Rs.1.15 Crores and mark the award/decree dated 16th January 2006 as fully satisfied; and that a notice be issued under Order 21 Rule 2 to Bhadani.7 On 5th March 2015, Bhadani wrote to the Prothonotary and Senior Master requesting an invocation of a bank guarantee. The bank guarantee itself was invoked on 6th April 2013 and in the next two days, 7th and 8th April 2015, the bank tendered the amount of Rs.1.15 Crores to the Prothonotary & Senior Master. Bhadani Associates withdrew this amount of Rs.1.15 Crores on 2nd March 2016. Kamlini's Civil Appeal No. 1939 of 2015 was thus disposed of on 11th March 2016 while reserving liberty to Bhadani to take appropriate proceedings for its interest claim.8

12. Bhadani has thereafter put the award into execution claiming an amount of Rs.2,00,95,117/- as interest under the award.

C. SUBMISSION & FINDINGS

13. Mr Chitnis submits that in any view of the matter the moment the bank guarantee was furnished on 6th March 2006, interest would stop running since the provision of a bank guarantee is as good as payment on money into Court. Without prejudice to this argument, he submits that it was always open to Bhadani to invoke the bank guarantee the moment Kamlini's Section 34 Petition failed on 19th June 2006. At best, therefore, Kamlini would be liable for interest at the rate awarded for the period from 7th February 2006 (the date of the Supreme Court order) to 19th June 2006 but no further. Kamlini is willing to pay this interest.

14. Mr Pooniwala on other hand first urges that on the plain reading of Order 21 Rule 1 and its various sub-rules, the provision of a bank guarantee is a mere 'security'. It is not 'payment into Court' or a 'deposit into Court'.

15. Order 21 Rule 1 (1 to 5) reads thus:

1. Modes of paying money under decree.

(1) All money payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely:-

(a) by deposit into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, or sent to that Court by postal money order or through a bank; or

(b) out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing; or

(c) otherwise, as the Court which made the decree, directs.

(2) Where any payment is made under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub-rule (1), the judgment-debtor shall give notice thereof to the decree-holder either through the Court or directly to him by registered post, acknowledgement due.

(3) Where money is paid by postal money order or through a bank under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1), the money order or payment through bank, as the case may be, shall accurately state the following particulars, namely: -

(a) the number of the original suit;

(b) the names of the parties or where there are more than two Plaintiffs or more than two Defendants, as the case may be, the names of the first two Plaintiffs and the first two Defendants;

(c) how the money remitted is to be adjusted, that is to say, whether it is towards the principal, interest or costs;

(d) the number of the execution case of the Court, where such case is pending; and

(e) the name and address of the payer.

(4) On any amount paid under clause (a) or clause (c), sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of service of the notice referred to in sub-rule (2).

(5) On any amount paid under clause (b) of sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of such payment:

Provided that, where the decree-holder refuses to accept the postal money order or payment through a bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money was tendered to him, or where he avoids acceptance of the postal money order or payment through bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money would have been tendered to him in the ordinary course of business of the postal authorities or the bank, as the case may be. (Emphasis added)

16. I understood Mr Pooniwala to place his case thus: that Order 21 Rule(1)(a) requires a deposit, and a deposit can only be of money, and a bank guarantee is mere security, not a deposit; if the bank guarantee is taken to be a deposit, then sub-rule (2) is mandatory, and a notice is required to be given either through Court or directly by registered post acknowledgement due. Further, sub-rule (4) stops the running of interest only from the date of service of the notice referred to in sub-rule (2), i.e., where there is a deposit in to Court. Sub-rule (5) operates in the other scenario contemplated, where there is payment out of Court directly to the decree holder. In that case, no notice is required, and interest stops running from the date of payment. The entirety of this argument therefore turns on this: if notice as stipulated under Order 21 Rule 1(2) is not given in the case of a payment into Court, interest does not stop running. The other argument is that in any event a bank guarantee is merely a security and is not a deposit into Court.

17. In support of these submissions, Mr Pooniwala placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in PSL Ramanathan Chettiar & Ors v ORMPRM Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 1047. According to him the bank guarantee was not unconditional. It required the disposal or dismissal of challenges by both sides (Bhadani and Kamlini) and till then Bhadani was not entitled to have the bank guarantee invoked or to withdraw the amount paid out under it.

18. I do not think this is at all correct. The terms of the bank guarantee do not suggest this. The proposition is also self-defeating. As the forgoing narrative shows, Bhadani misfiled its Section 34 application in a court without jurisdiction. It then took it back and filed it anew in a court that did have jurisdiction. It lay dormant for several years and then finally met its dismissal nearly a decade after its filing. For this entire period, Bhadani wants to make Kamlini responsible for the interest. Let us test this. What if Bhadani never filed a petition under Section 34? On Mr Pooniwala's construct, this would necessarily mean that the bank guarantee could never be invoked at all and Kamlini would be liable for an indefinite amount of interest. What if Bhadani filed its Section 34 Petition after an inordinate length of time of, say, 20 years, and only then obtained an order of dismissal? Again, Mr Pooniwala's formulation suggests that Kamlini would be responsible for Bhadani's inactions or delay. It is difficult to accept either the logic or the equity in such a argument.

19. Mr Pooniwala also then also reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Goa & Anr v Domingos ML Merglhao 2014(4) ALL MR 221 : 2013 (6) Bom CR 803. I am unable to see how this assists Mr Pooniwala. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 4 referred to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court at its seat in Goa in Dr Ramesh Mulgaonkar v Special Land Acquisition Officer (N) & Anr. Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 593 of 2006 in First Appeal No. 240 of 2003. That decision of a Division Bench in turn relied on the Supreme Court judgment Ramanthan Chettiar. The relevant portion of Domingos Merglhao reads thus:

4. Upon hearing the learned counsel, the first point for consideration is whether a deposit in this Court to obtain a stay of the award impugned would result in a deposit for payment in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This aspect is res integra in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 5th February 2007 passed in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 593 of 2006 in First Appeal No. 240 of 2003. The learned Division Bench whilst considering a similar aspect has observed at para 13 thus:

13. The Applicant was certainly free to apply to the Court to receive the enhanced compensation along with interest but under no circumstances the Applicant would have been allowed to withdraw the same without further conditions being imposed upon him by way of security or otherwise. In other words, the Applicant was not free to receive the amount deposited by the Applicant of enhanced compensation along with interest, in terms of Order 41, Rule 5, CPC. In our view, interest on enhanced compensation would have ceased to run only in case the Respondents had deposited the amount with a view of paying the same to the Applicant in Reference Court. In other words, the expression Court in Section 28 of the Act or for that matter in judgment of Prem Nath Kapur and another V. National Fertilizer Corpn. Of India Ltd. and others (supra) could only be the Court as defined in Section 3(d) of the Act i.e. Reference Court. In case the Applicant was ultimately not entitled to the same on account of the Respondents succeeding in the appeal filed by them then the Respondents would certainly have been entitled for restitution. In our view, the liability to pay interest on enhanced compensation would cease only in case the Respondents had deposited the amount of the award-decree in satisfaction of the decree and with a view to enable the decree-holder to withdraw the same. In the case at hand, the Respondents deposited the amount of the award-decree as a condition for staying the execution of the decree. There can be no dispute that the Applicant would have been at liberty to apply for withdrawal of the same but the same would not have been released in his favour unless he gave necessary security. By the instant deposit and its subsequent investment all that the decree-holder has been able to obtain is 5.5% interest on the enhanced amount of compensation depriving the Applicant of the balance of 9.5% since the law mandates that interest is payable on enhanced compensation at the rate of 15% after the expiry of the period of one year. In this context, reliance could be placed on a three Judge decision of the Apex Court in the case of PSLR Chettiar and Others v. ORMPRM Ramanathan Chettiar (AIR 1968 SC 1047) wherein the Apex Court has stated that the fact of a judgment-debtor's depositing a sum in Court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree-holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree-holder. He can if he likes take the money out in terms of the Order, but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment-debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security, say, of immovable property, if the Court allows him to do so and on his losing the appeal putting the decretal amount in Court in terms of Order 21, Rule 1, CPC in satisfaction of the decree. The Apex Court has stated that the real effect of deposit of money in Court as was done in that case was to put the money beyond the reach of the parties pending the disposal of the appeal. The decree-holder could only take it out on furnishing security which means that the payment was not in satisfaction of the decree and the security could be proceeded against by the judgment-debtor in case of his success in the appeal. Pending the determination of the same, it was beyond the reach of the judgment-debtor. It was also contended before the Apex Court that at any rate the decree-holder cannot claim any amount by way of interest after the deposit of the money in Court and the said contention was rejected because the deposit in that case was not unconditional and the decree-holder was not free to withdraw it whenever he liked even before the disposal of the appeal. In case he wanted to do so, he had to give security in terms of the Order. The deposit was not in terms of Order 21, Rule 1 CPC and as such, there was no question of the stoppage of interest after the deposit. (Emphasis added)

20. Indeed, this makes it clear that Ramanathan Chettiar is being mis-applied to this case. That dealt with a situation of the decree holder having to furnish security to withdraw an amount deposited, and the question of whether the deposit was per se satisfaction of the decree. The question before me today is not about whether interest should or should not run since the date of the bank guarantee, but for how long. In this case, there was an award or decree against Kamlini in the amount of Rs.1.15 crores. By giving a bank guarantee she effectively paid that money into court. To keep that bank guarantee alive she had to keep the same amount of money available as security to her bank. Whether, therefore, she deposited the money or kept the bank guarantee alive made very little difference and was possibly only a matter of a more efficient banking transaction. The security spoken of in the two decisions is not of a judgment-debtor furnishing security; those decisions speak of the judgment-debtor depositing money into court and of the decree-holder being required to furnish security for its withdrawal. Decretal amounts are often secured by, for instance, immovable property or some other species the property sufficient to cover the decretal claim. I do not see the difference between depositing the amount of Rs.1.15 Crores in cash, providing a bank guarantee or, for that matter, depositing a cheque and continuously revalidating it every few months as required. All would amount to the same thing. When invoked or banked, each was instantly encashable. A bank guarantee is not 'security'. The word 'security' indicates collateral, some property against which action may be taken towards realization, whether by mortgage, hypothecation, lien or one of the many modes known to law for this purpose. A bank guarantee is an assurance of instantaneous payment on demand.

21. This leaves the question of whether a notice under Order 21 rule 1(2) is mandatory to stop the interest running. I am unable to accept Mr Pooniwala's argument on this either. It amounts to saying that although Bhadani knew of the Supreme Court order requiring furnishing of a bank guarantee and although Bhadani could not have been unaware of Kamlini furnishing that bank guarantee, the formality of a notice not having been complied with, Bhadani is entitled to continued interest. This is not the purpose or ambit of sub-rule (2) at all. I believe sub-rule (2) contemplates two situations. It is limited to the circumstances contemplated by Order 21 Rule 1(1)(a) or (c), i.e., the deposit into Court by Judgment Debtor of an amount or transmission to that court by postal money order or through a bank of the amount, or payment as the Court that passed the decree otherwise directs. We are not concerned with sub clause (c). The purpose of sub clause (a) read with sub-rule (2) is to ensure that when a judgment debtor makes payment into Court, the decree-holder knows of this so that he can make the application for withdrawal against furnishing security, i.e., an application of the kind contemplated in Domingos Merglhao and Dr Ramesh Mulgaonkar. But surely if the judgment-creditor or decree-holder knows of the deposit being made, and therefore of his right to withdraw it against security, no question would arise of any such notice being required, or of interest running for decades together because the decree-holder, despite knowledge, chose not to draw out the deposit. The clue perhaps lies in sub-rule (5), which contemplates the other scenario of direct payment out of court to the decree-holder. There, interest stops as soon as the money is paid, because, clearly, the decree holder has knowledge of having got his money. The purpose of sub-rule (2) is not some doctrinaire formality of procedure, but is to let the decree-holder know, which he may otherwise not, that the judgment debtor has put money into court.

22. Under the unamended Arbitration Act 1996, the mere filing of a Section 34 petition operated as stay. The result was that Kamlini's petition under Section 34 stayed the enforcement of the award against her. The bank guarantee was therefore not encashable for that period. I reckon that period to be from 6th March 2006 when the bank guarantee was furnished to 19th June 2016 when Kamlini's Petition was dismissed. The moment that Petition stood dismissed, the bank guarantee could have been immediately invoked by Bhadani. Had it attempted to do so, and since it had its own challenge wending its way through Court, Bhadani might have been called on to provide security. Even this was not necessary - Bhadani's challenge was obviously on the basis that it was entitled to a higher amount, not that it was not entitled to the amount awarded to it. The amount of the bank guarantee was the minimum to which Bhadani was always entitled.

23. I cannot accept Mr Pooniwala's submissions. The present Chamber Summons is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). The Execution Application No. 4 of 2016 is dismissed.

24. However Kamlini is liable to pay an amount of Rs.9,83,591/- as interest. This is on the basis of Mr Chitnis's computation at the rate of 18% from the date of the award, 16th January 2006 to 19th June 2006 when Kamlini's Section 34 Petition was dismissed. That statement of a computation is taken on record and marked "X" for identification.

25. This award of interest will, however, be adjusted against costs payable to the Applicant, Kamlini Ashar, and which I quantify in the exact amount of Rs.9,83,591/-. I award costs for several distinct reasons. The first is that it was Kamlini who volunteered through her Advocate before the Supreme Court to provide a bank guarantee, and which she did. She kept it alive for entire period of time. She had no reason to suspect that she would then have to face such an inflated claim for interest - almost twice the amount of the award itself. She then had to face an execution application in which her residential flat was sought to be put to sale. Indeed as recently as on 2nd February 2017, there was a notice of sale of that flat issued in the Free Press Journal and Janambhoomi by the Court Commissioner. What I find inexplicable - and even inexcusable - in all this is why the entity entitled to immediate payment and to receive actual money, Bhadani, did not immediately on 19th June 2006 when Kamlini's Petition under Section 34 was dismissed demand that invocation. As we have seen, there was no bar on it doing so. Had it done so and had she opposed invocation, I might have understood and considered awarding interest against her. On the contrary, the record indicates that it was not until after Kamlini moved a Civil Application herself (in Bhadani's dismissed writ petition) asking for an order for encashment of her own bank guarantee against herself and in favour of Bhadani that Bhadani for the first time on 5th March 2015 wrote to the Prothonotary and Senior Master seeking an invocation of a bank guarantee furnished nine years earlier on 6th March 2006. Bhadani knew of the offer of a bank guarantee. It knew of the furnishing of the bank guarantee. It knew of the dismissal of Kamlini's challenge petition. It mis-filed its own petition, and then pursued a delay condonation for several years, ultimately with no success. I see no reason in these circumstances why Kamlini should be foisted with a claim for interest that is almost twice the decretal amount. Where a decree holder is himself guilty of delay, despite specific knowledge of a deposit or providing a bank guarantee, and where he allows to pass an opportunity for withdrawal of the amount deposited or guaranteed, he cannot insist on the formality of a notice in procedural law to gain a substantive monetary advantage in this manner. Our procedural rules are not meant to aid claims mounted like this. Hence the order awarding costs in the exact amount of the limited interest liability.

26. All properties of the Applicants are released from attachment and freed from execution.

27. All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this order.

Ordered accordingly.