Writ Petition No.3109 of 1998

9th July, 2018.

Petitioner Counsel: Shri D.L. DHARMADHIKARI
Respondent Counsel: Shri R.A. HAQ, and Shri S.O. AHMED, Shri V.P. MALDHURE

Cases Cited:
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, 2014 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 129=1994 AIR SC 853 : (1994) 1 SCC 1 [Para 13]
Phuljharidevi Vs. Mithailal, AIR 1971 Allahabad 494 [Para 13]
Kanhaylal Vs. Indrachandji, AIR 1947 Nagpur 84 [Para 13]
Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & ors., 2003(4) ALL MR 761 (S.C.)=(2003) 6 SCC 675 [Para 14]
Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & anr, (2003) 3 SCC 524 [Para 15]
Pravin Jethalal Kamdar Vs. State of Maharashtra & ors, 1995 ALLMR ONLINE 1054 : 1996 (1) Mh. L. J. 630 [Para 28]
State of Maharashtra Vs. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, AIR 2000 SC 1099 [Para 28]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- This petition challenges the legality and correctness of two judgments rendered by the Judge, Cooperative Court, Nagpur in Case No. 636 of 1980 on 12.8.1996 and the Member, Maharashtra State Cooperative Appellate Court, Mumbai, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Appeal No. 88 of 1996 on 12.12.1997.

2. By the judgment rendered on 12.8.1996, the learned Judge of the Cooperative Court dismissed the dispute raised under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (for short, the "Societies Act") and directed respondent no. 1 to refund the amount of Rs. 33,871/- with interest @ 18% per annum from 15.2.1980 till satisfaction of the decree. The judgment and order of the Cooperative Court came to be confirmed by the Cooperative Appellate Court by its judgment and order dated 12.12.1997

3. In nut-shell, the case of the petitioner-disputant was as under:

(i) The disputant being a member and share-holder of respondent no. 1 Society, which was formed primarily for the purpose of floating and operating housing schemes for its members, applied for allotment of one flat in one of the apartment schemes initiated by it in Dhantoli, Nagpur. By a resolution passed on 7.11.1979, the general body of the society took a decision to allot one flat to the petitioner and accordingly assigned to her Flat No. 8 on the 1st floor in one of such housing schemes situated at Dhantoli, Nagpur. The petitioner contended that she completed all the formalities and deposited by making payments from time to time a total amount of Rs. 39,871/- towards her obligation to pay the price for the flat.

(ii) It appears that respondent no. 1 Society wanted to help its members raise housing loan from the Maharashtra Cooperative Housing Finance Corporation Limited, Mumbai ("Finance Corporation" for short) and with that object in view, the Society called upon its members to submit various documents to the Society as it submitted proposals on behalf of its members to the Finance Corporation. The dispute of the Society with the petitioner started at this juncture. The petitioner was called upon to submit certain documents to justify her unearned income and as a proof of it she was also called upon to submit to the Society a copy of income-tax assessment order or deposit Rs. 6000/- in lieu thereof. The petitioner gave her explanation that her income was below the taxable limit and, therefore, question of her submitting income-tax return and obtaining income-tax assessment order never arose. She also furnished an affidavit stating the fact that she earned income of Rs. 9900/- from her sewing and embroidery work and Rs. 2100/- by way of household savings. She also entered into correspondence on these lines with the Society. The dispute, however, could not be resolved.

(iii) The petitioner contended that she received a letter from the Finance Corporation dated 6.10.1980 informing her as to how her case was not considered for advancing loan to enable her to purchase a flat in the housing society of respondent no. 1. The Finance by its letter dated 6.10.1980, as submitted by the petitioner, informed her that it was intimated by respondent no. 1 society by its letter dated 10.9.1980 to it that the petitioner was no longer a member of the Society. The petitioner asserted that it was by this letter of the Corporation dated 6.10.1980 that she learnt for the first time that her membership had been cancelled by respondent no. 1 Society and, therefore, she sent a registered notice to the Society dated 24.10.1980 taking exception to her removal from membership and also objecting to the legality and correctness of the resolution passed by the Society in that regard, on the ground that no notice was given to her and her say was not called. The society did not respond and, therefore, the petitioner filed a dispute under Section 91 of the Societies Act against respondent no. 1 Society. Later on, the petitioner also joined respondent no. 2 as party-respondent when she learnt that flat no. 8 or the disputed flat had been allotted and sold by respondent no. 1 Society to her.

(iv) Respondent no. 1 Society by filing its Written Statement strongly opposed the dispute so raised by the petitioner. According to it, this was a case of resignation from the membership and voluntary withdrawal of allotment of the disputed flat to the petitioner done by her on the authority impliedly given by her to her husband and, therefore, there was no question of sending her notice of convening of the special general body meeting the society. According to respondent no. 1, husband of the petitioner, Chhotelal Verma, was the contractor who was initially allotted the work of construction of the scheme of apartments by respondent no. 1 and as some disputes were there and the matter was likely to be reported to the Income-tax Authorities, the husband of petitioner with a desire to let the matter be at rest there only, offered that his wife would resign from the membership and make a request for withdrawal of allotment of the disputed flat to her so that all differences between the Society on the one hand and his wife as well as he himself, on the other, would be closed and accordingly having been duly authorized by her i.e. the petitioner, Chhotelal Verma by letter dated 2.5.1980 written on behalf of his wife, resigned from the membership of respondent no. 1 Society and also made a request for withdrawal of the allotment of the disputed flat to his wife voluntarily. The Society also contended that all these events were communicated to the petitioner by the Society in detail by its letter dated 17.6.1980, about two days after the managing committee of the Society discussed the resignation letter dated 2.5.1980 from all angles and also considered various defaults committed by the petitioner and the reluctance shown by her to personally attend even once the office of respondent no.1 society. This meeting, it is not in dispute, was held on 15.6.1980 and in this meeting, as submitted by respondent Society, it was proposed that the resignation letter of the petitioner be accepted. It appears that there was no response given by petitioner to the letter of the Society dated 17.6.1980. The respondent No.1 Society also took the plea of benami transaction in it's defence made alternately.

(v) Respondent no. 1 Society convened a special general body meeting on 7.9.1980 and passed a resolution accepting the resignation cum withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980 which was accordingly informed to the petitioner. The Society submitted that as this was a case of resigning from the membership and requesting withdrawal of allotment of disputed flat by the petitioner herself, the question of sending any notice of the special general body meeting to the petitioner never arose. The society also submitted that it refunded the amount of Rs. 16,000/- to the petitioner which was disputed by the petitioner.

(vi) On merits, the Cooperative Court found no substance in the case of the petitioner and accordingly, dismissed the dispute with a direction to the Society to refund amount of Rs. 39,871/- to the petitioner by its judgment dated 12.8.1996 which came to be confirmed by the Cooperative Appellate Court on 12.12.1997.

4. Shri D. L. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the Society does not dispute the petitioner's membership and allotment of the disputed flat to her, the Society could not have dismembered her and withdrawn the allotment of disputed flat to her without a proper request letter submitted under the signature of the petitioner. He submits that the resignation letter dated 2.5.1980 does not bear the signature of the petitioner and apparently, bears the signature of her husband which signature has been disputed by the husband of the petitioner. He submits that even if it is accepted, just for the sake of argument that this letter was submitted under the signature of the husband of petitioner, it could not have been acted upon by the Society unless it duly verified that the letter had been issued under the express or implied authority of the petitioner and this could have been done only by sending notice to the petitioner and giving an opportunity to her to endorse or disown the facts contained in the resignation letter, which was not done by the Society and, therefore, the resolution dated 7.9.1980 allegedly passed by the Society is vitiated. He submits that these facts have not been appreciated by the courts below and, therefore, perverse findings have been recorded by both the courts below.

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is well settled law that under the Indian Jurisprudence, husband and wife are not one entity, but constitute two distinct entities and, therefore, the act of one spouse cannot bind the other unless it is done under the express or implied authority of the other.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the original resignation letter was not produced on record and this letter (exhibit OP-1/15) has been proved by respondent no. 1 by adducing secondary evidence, which was not permissible under the law. He further submits that the resolution in the alleged meeting of the special general body or the minutes were not signed by anybody and, therefore, this resolution which is at exhibit OP-1/2 could not be admitted in evidence, but it was admitted illegally. He also submits that there was one letter issued by the petitioner disputing the signature of her husband which was of the date of 18.7.1980 and this letter was not kept before the special general body meeting held on 7.9.1980.

7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the byelaws of the Society required that the proceedings of the minutes of the Society be recorded in the minute book and signed by the chairman. But, the Society in the present case, did not bring it's record before the Cooperative Court to show its compliance with the byelaws of the Society. So, he submits that acceptance of the resignation by the special general body meeting is of doubtful nature. Shri Dharmadhikari further submits that when the resignation allegedly submitted by the husband of the petitioner itself was without authority, there was no question of the petitioner challenging such resignation allegedly submitted by her husband.

8. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner has been disagreed to by learned counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 2. They point out from the admissions given by the petitioner's first witness DW 1 Hansraj Verma, the son of the petitioner, who deposed before the Court as a power of attorney holder of the petitioner, that there was authority given by the petitioner herself to her husband to act on her behalf in this case and that it were her husband who had been always presenting himself before the Society for doing various acts on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the inference drawn by the courts below that it was under the implied authority given by the petitioner that the resignation letter dated 2.5.1980 came to be submitted by husband of the petitioner and, therefore, it was duly accepted by the special general body meeting held on 7.9.1980 cannot be found to be perverse.

9. Learned Counsel for respondents further submit that as this was a clear case of resignation from membership and withdrawal of allotment of disputed flat done voluntarily by the petitioner through her duly authorized husband, there was no need for the Society to give notice of its special general body meeting to the petitioner and yet, respondent no. 1 Society, out of abundant caution, by its letter dated 17.6.1980 duly intimated all the facts in detail to the petitioner to which there was no response from the petitioner and resultantly, the special general body meeting held on 7.9.1980 accepted the resignation/withdrawal letter.

10. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that it is not the case of the petitioner that the letter dated 2.5.1980 does not bear the signature of her husband and that it is her specific case that this letter was submitted by her husband without she giving any authority in that regard to her husband. Such being the case of the petitioner, it is further submitted on behalf of the respondents, that the petitioner ought to have entered the witness box and personally stated before the Court regarding the absence of the authority given by her to her husband as this was the fact which could have been only known, if it was really known, to the petitioner and no one else including her son. But, by choosing to stay away from the witness box, the petitioner has made herself vulnerable to an adverse inference to the effect that she had given authority to her husband to submit letter dated 2.5.1980 and in order that no awkward situation for her was created, she refused to step into the witness box.

11. Learned counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 2 invite my attention to the letter dated 18.7.1980 sent by the petitioner to respondent no. 1 Society, admittedly signed by her, wherein the petitioner has stated that she learnt that her husband had surrendered the disputed flat to the Society and so, she asserted by the said letter that this action was not authorized by her and, therefore, it be not acted upon. Learned counsel for the respondents further submit that DW 1 Hansaraj admitted that his mother learnt about surrender of flat by her husband to the Society about one week prior to the letter dated 18.7.1980 and yet the petitioner courageously made a statement in paragraph 17 of the dispute that for the first time she came to know about her dismembering and cancellation of allotment of flat only when letter dated 6.10.1980 was received by her from the Finance Corporation. A false statement such as this, learned counsel for the respondents submit, would show the falsity of the whole case of the petitioner and going by the settled principle of law, this Court should not help the party which bases its case on a falsehood.

12. Shri Maldhure, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 3 and 4 submits that he would support the impugned judgments and orders and say alternately, that an appropriate order be passed.

13. The arguments canvassed on behalf of both the sides would reveal that the point of implied or express authority given by the petitioner to her husband Chhotelal is the central eye of the dispute between the parties, which has, unlike a real storm, loomed large over both sides for more than three decades. This point now would have to be determined by keeping in view certain settled principles of law viz, a] a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court (see : S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu V/s Jagannath 1994 AIR SC 853 = (1994) 1 SCC 1 : [2014 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 129], [b] under Section 187 of the Indian Contract Act agency could be express or implied and [c] as a general proposition of law, a husband has no implied authority to act on behalf of wife and wife has no implied authority to bind by her acts her husband, except in cases of fulfilling wife's necessities of life or when indicated either by circumstances of the case or by conduct of parties or by implication of law. [see: Phuljharidevi vs Mithailal, AIR 1971 Allahabad 494 and Kanhaylal V/s Indrachandji, AIR 1947 Nagpur 84] If this point is resolved accordingly, all the incidental aspects of the case would stand answered accordingly. In fact, both the courts below have resolved this issue by expressing a concurrent opinion that there was indeed implied authority given by the petitioner to her husband to submit resignation and withdrawal letter on her behalf. So, the effort of this Court would be primarily directed towards satisfying itself as to whether or not the concurrent finding of fact so recorded by both the courts below is manifestly illegal or without jurisdiction or perverse or is likely to cause grave injustice to the petitioner. This is because this Court is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction, but a supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

14. In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & ors reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 : [2003(4) ALL MR 761 (S.C.)], the Hon'ble Apex Court has defined the limits of power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has struck a note of caution by observing that such jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and with care, caution and circumspection. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the purpose of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and it is only when a subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or is exercising the jurisdiction in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has been occasioned thereby, the High Court would be under a duty to step in and exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. It has also held that the supervisory jurisdiction or a jurisdiction for issuance of writ of certiorari is not available just to correct mere errors of facts or of law unless the basic requirements are satisfied, such as, the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceeding, as for example, it is the result of ignorance of or utter disregard for the provisions of law and a grave injustice or gross failure of justice is seen as a consequence.

15. In another case, the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & anr reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524, a 3-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down almost similar principles governing the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It held that while exercising such jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal and that it is not its job to correct errors of facts muchless errors of law unless grave injustice has been occasioned thereby. It has also observed that it is not permissible for the High Court, on a petition filed under Article 227, to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior courts have passed the order.

16. Bearing in mind these well settled principles of supervising the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts below that one has to consider the evidence available on record. The exercise that is being undertaken now is not in the nature of re-assessing of the evidence, but only to make it sure that no perversity or patent illegality has been committed by the courts below in recording concurrent finding of fact and same has not resulted in causing of grave injustice to the parties.

17. From the averments of the petitioner, one gets convinced that it is not her case that the resignation letter dated 2.5.1980 does not bear the signature of her husband or that it bears a forged signature of her husband. Rather, her case is that her husband did not possess any authority to submit resignation/withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980. The petitioner also does not pray for any declaration that the letter dated 2.5.1980 is a forged letter having been obtained by fraud by respondent no. 1 Society.

18. The averments made in paragraph 17 of the memo of dispute filed by the petitioner show that according to the petitioner, she learnt for the first time about the cancellation of her membership only when she received the letter dated 6.10.1980 from the Finance Corporation. The evidence of the petitioner, however, contradicts her own case. DW 1 Hansraj, the power of attorney holder of the petitioner, admits that by the letter dated 18.7.1980, the petitioner informed the Society that she never authorized her husband to do any act in respect of the disputed flat. In his cross-examination taken on behalf of respondent no. 1, this witness further admits that his mother learnt about the surrender of the disputed flat of her husband about one week prior to her writing the letter dated 18.7.1980 If such is the own case of the petitioner, heavy burden lay upon the petitioner to explain as to what did she do against her own husband who, according to her, made a false representation to respondent no. 1 Society about his possessing authority from the petitioner to surrender the disputed flat. But, the petitioner did not submit any explanation to this effect. The petitioner, rather harped on the averment that she acquired knowledge about the alleged surrender for the first time when she received the letter dated 6.10.1980 from the Finance Corporation. The petitioner maintained complete silence in this regard in the dispute that she raised against the respondent Society.

19. The petitioner's witness Hansraj (DW 1) further admits that the petitioner and her husband Chhotelal were always joint in residence, thereby indicating that there was always a scope for the petitioner to have asked her husband as to whether he had really submitted the letter of resignation and withdrawal dated 2.5.1980 and if so, in what circumstances. Again, on this material aspect of the case, there is a silence maintained by the petitioner. The petitioner could have joined her husband as party-respondent to the dispute as ultimately, she was disowning the act performed by her husband apparently on her behalf in submitting a letter of resignation and withdrawal dated 2.5.1980 on the ground that it was submitted without her authority. The petitioner, however, did not do so, rather, she chose to draft in her husband as a prop to her otherwise debilitating structure of the case tried to be made out against respondent Society. The husband was examined by the petitioner as a second witness or DW 2 who came out with some new case not pleaded by the petitioner and not even canvassed by her son (DW 1 Hansraj). DW 2 Chhotelal Verma, in his evidence before the Court, denied his signature appearing on resignation-cum-withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980 (Exhibit OP-1/15). But, this witness did not contend and obviously because of absence of pleadings, he could not have contended, that this letter was forged by respondent no. 1 Society or anybody on his behalf. If he had so contended, it would have added a new dimension to the case, not contemplated in any manner by the petitioner. It appears to me that DW 2 Chhotelal was always in league with the petitioner-wife and that is why the petitioner-wife maintained an uncanny silence regarding her enquiry with DW 2 Chhotelal about the circumstances which made him submit letter of resignation-cum-withdrawal dated 2.5.1980 to the Society.

20. There was yet another option available to the petitioner to clear the doubts arising from the above referred facts. These facts were within the personal knowledge of the petitioner and so, she was the best person to throw light on them. The concomitant expectation then was that the petitioner would herself enter the witness box and clear the air of doubt surrounding her case. But, she avoided to do so and coupled with this fact, there was suppression of material facts and making of false statements in the memo of dispute and also absence of explanation to the other facts discussed earlier, the cumulative effect of which was and has been of emergence of adverse inference against the petitioner. It would be and is to the effect that the petitioner's such conduct and silence speak eloquently against her clearly indicating that she had indeed authorized her husband to submit the letter of resignation-cum-withdrawal dated 2.5.1980 and if it were not so, she would have appeared before the Court and explained all these material facts. This conclusion is further fortified by some other facts as well.

21. There was a notice given to her by the Society on 15.4.1980 (exhibit 44) calling upon her to explain her unearned income and submit copy of income-tax assessment order. This letter was replied by her by sending a letter dated 25.4.1980 (exhibit 45) informing that her husband had orally explained to the Society on different occasions the income earned by her, that her husband had personally explained to the Society that the income earned by her from her business of sewing and embroidery work was of Rs. 9900/- and her income arising out of the domestic savings was of Rs. 2100/- which together amounted to the income of Rs. 12000/-, well below the taxable limit, ruling out the necessity of submitting income-tax return by her. This admission of the petitioner would show, it were her husband who was taking up her cause in respect of the disputed flat before the Society on every occasion and it were him who was having personal knowledge of the income and other affairs of the petitioner. This would also show that the husband of the petitioner had implied authority to act on behalf of the petitioner and that is the reason why her husband had appeared before the Society every time the petitioner was called upon to submit some details or some explanation or was required to appear before the Society.

22. It is also the contention of respondent no. 1 Society that after tendering of the resignation/withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980, the Society had written a letter dated 17.6.1980 to the petitioner explaining the submission of the resignation letter and various defaults committed by her, the unsatisfactory explanations given by her husband during his appearances on her behalf before the Society and also complete failure of the petitioner to appear before the Society even once whenever the Society expected her to do so in order to remove the doubts and the difficulties that the Society was facing in concluding the allotment of the disputed flat to the petitioner through some registered document. This letter was shown to DW 1 Hansraj. But, he denied its receipt by his mother. Such denial of receipt of such letter by DW 1 Hansraj is not enough. DW 1 Hansraj ought to have deposed the relevant facts enabling the court to reach a conclusion that there was a strong probability that his mother used to apprise him of each and every development that took place in her dispute with the Society and that it were him and not Chhotelal Verma, the husband of the petitioner, who was all the time representing the petitioner before the Society. No such facts as would make the court to draw the inference as expected have been specifically deposed about by DW 1 Hansraj during his evidence before the Court nor did he tender any document to show that he was having the sole and exclusive authority to do everything on behalf of his mother viz-a-viz the Society. Therefore, simple denial of receipt of letter dated 17.6.1980 by his mother is no denial in the eye of law and as such the contents of this letter, the relevant ones are already pointed out, would have to be and would be read in evidence. This conclusion also receives support from the admissions given by the petitioner in her reply dated 25.4.1980 to the Society.

23. All these circumstances and the admissions discussed so far disclose that it were her husband who was authorized by the petitioner to represent her before the Society. The petitioner had an opportunity to enter the witness box and dispel the doubts surrounding her action of giving authority to her husband and that would have been the best evidence. But, she never entered the witness box. It was obvious that there was indeed an authority given by her to her husband to submit letter of resignation and withdrawal of allotment of the disputed flat to her by the Society.

24. All these facts and circumstances clearly establish that the resignation-cum-withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980 was under an implied authority given by the petitioner to her husband to act on her behalf and accordingly, it was submitted by her husband to the Society. As this was a case of voluntary resignation and withdrawal of the allotment of disputed flat, there was no need for the Society to issue any notice to the petitioner of the proposed special general body meeting scheduled to be held on 7.9.1980. Still, by way of abundant precaution, the Society did inform the petitioner of the resignation letter submitted by her husband on her behalf by its letter dated 17.6.1980, I must say that denial of this letter never made by the petitioner by personally deposing before the court which was so necessary for her to do so, the reasons being that she was having personal knowledge about the receipt or otherwise of the said letter, and her power of attorney holder DW 1 Hansraj had failed to bring on record essential circumstances which would enable the court to draw a conclusion in a reasonable manner or as a strong possibility that he was representing the petitioner and not Chotelal Verma, all throughout before the Society and, therefore, any receipt of letter dated 17.6.1980 by the petitioner could not have escaped his attention. It would then follow that the concurrent finding of fact regarding resignation and withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980 having been given under an implied authority of the petitioner in favour of her husband cannot be seen as perverse or so illogical as not to arise at all from the facts established on record. This would also show that the resolution passed by the Society in its general body meeting held on 7.9.1980 could not be seen as vitiated in the absence of the petitioner.

25. It is also the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the minutes of the special general body meeting were not signed by the person who was under a duty to sign them. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the original resignation letter was never produced and the so-called resolution dated 7.9.1980 of the special general body meeting was not a certified copy of the original and, therefore, could not have been relied upon by the courts below. I do not see any substance in these objections. Firstly, the secondary evidence of the resignation letter was permitted to be adduced by the trial Court by passing a specific order in that regard which order was never challenged by the petitioner and, therefore, the order has attained a finality. Secondly, the objections regarding not signing of the minutes of the special general body meeting and placing on record a copy of the resolution which was not a certified copy, I must say that these were the objections which ought to have been taken at the admission of the documents in evidence. But they were never taken. Even otherwise, all these objections have become insignificant when we consider the important facts of the petitioner having tendered a letter of resignation and also withdrawal of the allotment of flat to her voluntarily. If the petitioner intended to surrender the flat and the request of the petitioner was granted by the Society, I do not understand as to what grievance the petitioner can have about the manner in which her request was granted by the respondent Society. After all, it is not her case that she wanted to or had withdrawn subsequently her resignation letter.

26. Now, the petitioner is taking an objection in not following the provisions of Section 25 of the Societies Act and Rules 21 and 28 of the MCS Rules, 1961. However, these provisions of law deal with the different kind of situation. Section 25 is about ceasation of membership and it states that a person shall cease to be a member of the society on his resignation from the membership thereof being accepted. It also lays down the other eventualities on the happening of which ceasation of membership occurs. Rule 21 of the Rules is about withdrawal of membership and Rule 28 prescribes the conditions on the fulfillment of which the Society may expel a member from the Society. None of these provisions of law says anything about the manner in which resignation letter should be dealt with by the Society. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner made in this regard is, therefore, rejected.

27. There is one more angle involved in this dispute and in my considered view, it would govern the discretion of the court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This aspect is of causing of grave injustice to the petitioner. However, if one takes a look at the impugned orders, we would find that they aptly balance the equities between the parties. Respondent no. 1 Society has been directed to repay the amount of Rs. 33,871/- with interest @ 18% per annum with effect from 15.2.1980 to the petitioner. Respondent no. 1 Society has also been directed to pay to the petitioner an amount of Rs. 355/- towards the cost of the dispute. Both these directions ensure that scale of justice does not even slightly tilt towards any of the parties in the present case. There is thus an assurance that no grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner.

28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the cases of Pravin Jethalal Kamdar v. State of Maharashtra & ors reported in 1996 (1) Mh. L. J. 630 : [1995 ALLMR ONLINE 1054] and State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar reported in AIR 2000 SC 1099 in support of his contentions.

29. These two judgments arise from one and the same case and the principle they lay down is that she sale deed involved in that case being void ab initio and the suit in truth and substance being a suit for possession of the property, there was no need to set aside the sale deed and such sale deed could be ignored without any declaration sought as to its nullity. Learned counsel for the petitioner would wish this Court to apply the principle that a document which is void ab initio be ignored and equitable relief be accordingly granted to the party seeking it, to the facts of the present case. With due respect, I would say, this would not be possible. The reason being that the resignation-cum-withdrawal letter dated 2.5.1980 has been found, on facts established, to have been submitted on the implied authority given by the petitioner to her husband and, therefore, there is no occasion for this court to hold that this letter is void ab initio warranting its ignorance.

30. In the circumstances, I see no merit in this writ petition and it deserves to be dismissed with costs. Writ Petition stands dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged accordingly.

Petition dismissed.