Writ Petition No.1060 of 2015

4th January, 2019.

Petitioner Counsel: Shri P.N. SHENDE
Respondent Counsel: Shri B.B. RAIPURE, Shri S.V. SOHONI, Shri A.M. KADUKAR

Cases Cited:
St. Ulai High School and another Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh and another, 2007(2) ALL MR 1 (F.B.)=2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 [Para 18,20]
Kapil Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Dist. Nanded & Anr. Vs. Vasant Jagdeorao Sirsath & Ors., 2009(6) ALL MR 892 [Para 18]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Heard Shri P.N. Shende, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri B.B. Raipure, the learned counsel for respondent 1, Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned Counsel for respondent 2, and Shri A.M. Kadukar, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent 3.

2. The petitioner is assailing the judgment dated 13.02.2015 rendered by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Chandrapur in Appeal STC 04/2014, by and under which the challenge to the termination from service is rejected.

3. Few facts, which are either admitted or are broadly unconvertible may now be noted.

It is not in dispute that the petitioner rendered service with respondents 1 and 2 from 1997 to 01.04.2003. It is further not in dispute that the proposal for obtaining the approval to the appointment of the petitioner was not forwarded by the management to the Education Officer.

4. The petitioner was terminated w.e.f. 01.04.2003, which termination was assailed in Appeal STC 71/2003. The School Tribunal, by judgment dated 08.02.2012, allowed the appeal and directed respondents 1 and 2 to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity and full back-wages.

5. Respondents 1 and 2 assailed the judgment of the School Tribunal in Writ Petition 2212/2012.

6. By order dated 12.02.2015, this Court disposed of Writ Petition 2212/2012 recording that the dispute is amicably settled in terms of the joint compromise praecipe.

7. It would be necessary to note the terms and conditions of settlement incorporated in the joint compromise praecipe, which read thus:

2. The Petitioners shall reinstate the Respondent no. 1, in service, on 15-02-2013, as an Asst. Teacher and thus shall continue the services of the Respondent no.1, as an Asst. Teacher, while continuity in service and Other Consequential Benefits, i.e. Notional Increments, etc. The Respondent no.1, shall get all benefits of Continuity in Service, but shall not get the benefit of promotion, if any, from the date of his termination, to till the date of his joining, i.e. during his termination period. The Respondent no.1, shall be reinstated and treated as an Asst. Teacher, on 15-02-2013. Thereafter looking to the vacancies arises in future and entitlement of the respondent 1, he shall get promotion, in future.

3. The Petitioner no.1 and 2, immediately shall send a proposal to the Education Department, for grant of its approval to the reinstatement and continuation of the Respondent no. 1, as an Asst. Teacher, within 15 days, from the date of his initial appointment, without fail and shall further send the Pay Bills, for his termination period to the Education Officer.

4. The Respondent no.1, shall not claim anything in future, in respect of his arrears of backwages, for the termination period, from the Petitioner No.1-Management or its school, as awarded by the School Tribunal. It is made clear that the Petitioners shall not be made responsible for the payment of arrears of Salary or Backwages or any other monetary dues of the Respondent no.1. The petitioners shall not take any malafide or vengenceful action against the Respondent no.1, in future, except in accordance with law.

8. It is not in dispute that the Education Officer rejected the proposal forwarded by the management for approval to the appointment on the ground that there are four sanctioned posts of Assistant Teacher which are already occupied.

9. Respondents 1 and 2 terminated the services of the petitioner by order dated 20.04.2014 on the sole ground of rejection of approval.

10. The petitioner challenged the termination order before the School Tribunal in Appeal STC 04/2014 which is dismissed by the judgment impugned.

11. It would be necessary to note one intervening development. The petitioner preferred Writ Petition 4198/2013 challenging the rejection of approval and seeking direction to the management to pay the salary. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not press the challenge to the rejection of approval and Writ Petition 4198/2013 was disposed of by order dated 31.03.2014 recording the willingness of the management to pay the salary.

12. It is further not in dispute that after the petitioner was terminated as Assistant Teacher for the first time on 1.4.2003 three posts of Assistant Teachers were filled in and the three Assistant Teachers who are appointed are working with the respondents 1 and 2 till date. It is further indubitable that while rejecting the approval to the appointment of the petitioner the Education Officer considered the staffing pattern and the number of Assistant Teachers working, as on the date of the rejection of the approval. The Education Officer did not consider the position obtaining as on the date of the first termination of service i.e. 01.04.2003.

13. The seminal question which falls for consideration is whether in the factual matrix the services of the petitioner could have been terminated on the sole ground of rejection of approval by the Education Officer.

14. Shri P.N. Shende, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the appointment is not rendered invalid or illegal for want of approval which is essentially a lis between the management and the Education Officer impacting the entitlement or otherwise to grant. Shri P.N. Shende, the learned counsel would then submit that the petitioner having succeeded before the School Tribunal and having secured the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service and full backwages could not have intended to enter into a compromise which made the implementation of the judgment of the School Tribunal dependent on approval. The alternate submission is, arguendo, even if such an inference can be drawn from the terms of the compromise praecipe, the management ought to have terminated the junior most Assistant Teacher before forwarding the proposal seeking approval to the appointment of the petitioner. Shri P.N. Shende, the learned counsel would submit that the management ought not to be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong and deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the litigation. This submission is made in the context of the admitted position that although the petitioner continuously worked from 1997 to 01.04.2003 the management did not forward the proposal for approval to the Education Officer and the proposal forwarded pursuant to the compromise praecipe recorded by this Court was forwarded without terminating the junior most Assistant Teacher.

15. Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 would submit that the petitioner too was well aware that there is no sanctioned post since all the four posts of Assistant Teachers are occupied. Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 would submit that the very edifice of the compromise was that both the employee and the management, consciously and with eyes wide open, made the implementation of the judgment of the School Tribunal subject to the approval and in view of the rejection of the approval the management was justified in terminating the services of the petitioner. Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 would then submit that in view of the present strength of students the management is entitled to sanction of one additional post of Assistant Teacher and a proposal seeking such sanction is pending since long with the respondent 3 - Education Officer. Shri A.M. Kadukar, the learned Assistant Government Pleader while not controverting the said assertion, submits that the authority to consider the proposal is respondent 4.

Shri B.B. Raipure, the learned counsel for respondent 1 adopts the submissions of Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2.

16. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, a stand is taken that the compromise contemplated that the reinstatement of the petitioner will be from 15.02.2013 (emphasis supplied). This assertion is contrary to the recitals in the joint compromise praecipe which are that the petitioner herein shall be reinstated in service on 15.02.2013 and shall be entitled to all the benefits of continuity in service except that the petitioner shall not be entitled to the benefit of the promotion, to which he may have become entitled to during the period from the date of the termination till the date of joining. In fairness to the learned counsel Shri S.V. Sohoni, he did not advance any submission on the lines of the stand taken in the affidavit-in-reply that the reinstatement of the petitioner was w.e.f. 15.02.2013 which stand is taken to counter the contention in the petition that the management could have and ought to have terminated the junior most Assistant Teacher and then sought approval to the appointment of the petitioner.

17. Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 submits that since the petitioner did not press the challenge to the rejection of approval and was content with receipt of salary, the termination on the ground of rejection of approval cannot be assailed, may now be considered if only for rejection. The grant of approval is a matter entirely between the management and the Education Officer. In the factual matrix, the Education Officer was not called upon to decide whether the petitioner was appointed in sanctioned post when he was first terminated in the year 2003. Concededly, when the management forwarded the proposal pursuant to the compromise all the four sanctioned posts of Assistant Teachers were occupied and therefore, the rejection of approval by the Education Officer of the proposal does not suffer from any infirmity. The question which arises in this petition would be, even if it is assumed that on the basis of facts presented the Education Officer was right in rejecting the approval, could such rejection have been the sole reason for terminating the services of the petitioner.

18. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Full Bench in St. Ulai High School and another v. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh and another reported in 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 : [2007(2) ALL MR 1 (F.B.)]. Issue 5 which was formulated by the Full Bench for consideration reads thus:

(5) Is it mandatory for every private recognised school to obtain the approval of the Education Department of the State to the appointment of every employee including a teacher employed at such school?

The consideration of the issue is found in paragraphs 10 to 10.7 which read thus:

10. The requirement of approval:

10.1 A Division Bench of this Court held in Anna Manikrao Pethe v. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal (supra) that where the appointment of a teacher has not been approved by the Education Officer, the appeal filed by the teacher against an order of termination must fail on that ground alone, this being required to be decided as a preliminary issue. Subsequently, the same view was reiterated in Shailaja Ashokrao Walse v. State of Maharashtra (supra). The Division Bench held therein that the approval of the Education Officer to an appointment made by the management is an implied statutory function under the MEPS Rules. Based on these two decisions, the submission urged on behalf of the employee, is that since an appeal at the behest of an employee whose services had not been approved is not maintainable, the remedy of a suit in a Civil Court cannot be regarded as having been ousted. The issue which falls for consideration is whether the judgments of the two Division Benches in Pethe and Walse (supra) reflect the correct position in law.

10.2 In considering the legal position, it would be necessary to note that the terms and conditions of service of employees of private schools are governed by Subsection(1) of Section 4. Under the aforesaid provision, the State Government is empowered to frame rules inter alia to provide for the minimum qualifications for recruitment including the procedure for recruitment. Section 5 casts an obligation on the management to fill in, in the manner prescribed, every permanent vacancy in a private school by the appointment of a person duly qualified to fill in such a vacancy. Before doing so, the management is required to verify from the competent officer in the Education Department whether a suitable person is available on the list of surplus persons. The Rules framed by the State Government enunciate the qualifications required for appointing the Head and members of the teaching staff. Rule 3 provides for the qualifications for and the appointment of a Head. Rule 5 governs the post of Assistant Head and Supervisor. Schedule B read with Rule 6 lays down the qualifications for Assistant Teachers.

10.3 Where the rules contemplate approval in a certain situation, the delegate of the Legislature has expressly provided for such approval. For instance, Rule 3(2) contemplates that if no person with the requisite teaching experience is available on the staff of the school for appointment as a Head of a Secondary School or a Junior College of Education or if qualified persons though available relinquish their claim for appointment to the post of a Head, the management, if it proposes to appoint a person who does not possess teaching experience has to apply to the Deputy Director for relaxing the requirement. The proviso to Rule 6 enables the Education Officer to allow managements to appoint untrained Science Graduate Teachers for teaching Mathematics and Science subjects or untrained Arts or Commerce graduates for teaching other subjects in Secondary Schools in exceptional circumstances such as a non-availability of trained graduates. Such appointments have to be on a year to year basis, subject to the understanding that the teacher will have to obtain a training qualification and that his or her services shall be liable for termination as soon as trained teachers become available. Rule 9(4)(a) contemplates that the upper age limit for appointment of a teacher in a primary school can be relaxed with the previous permission of the Deputy Director in the case of women, ex-servicemen and persons having previous experience. Rule 17(6) contemplates the prior approval of the Education Officer or, as the case may be, the Deputy Director, in the case of a reemployment of a teacher on superannuation. Rule 26(2)(ii) prescribes the condition of prior approval in each case of retrenchment including such cases where the principle of seniority is sought to be departed from. Sub-rule(1) of Rule 33 introduces a requirement of prior approval for placing an employee on suspension. Under Sub-rule(4) of Rule 35, the consequence of suspension without obtaining prior approval is laid down. Rule 37(2)(f) contemplates that while a disciplinary enquiry has to be ordinarily completed within a period of 120 days, the period can be extended in special circumstances by the Enquiry Committee with the prior approval of the Deputy Director. These provisions of the Rules establish that when the rule making authority considers it appropriate to introduce a requirement of approval or as the case may be, prior approval, a specific provision has been made in that regard.

10.4 Rule 8(2) prescribes that after appointments to teaching and nonteaching posts are made, the names and particulars of qualifications and experience of persons so appointed shall be forwarded within a fortnight from the date of each such appointment to the Education Officer and in the case of a Junior College of Education, to the Deputy Director. Rule 8(2) is, therefore, a clear indicator of the fact that what is contemplated under the rule is the forwarding to the Education Officer of the names of the appointees together with their qualifications and experience. Neither the Act, nor the Rules impose a condition of the grant of approval to an appointment by the Education Officer. The power of appointment is regulated by the Act and the Rules and a denial of approval by the Education Officer cannot invalidate an appointment.

10.5 In several judgments of Learned Single Judges of this Court, the view that has been taken is that the necessity for the management to take the approval of the Education Officer is an incident of the management seeking grantinaid but approval is not a condition precedent to the validity of the appointment. In Mahatma Phule Krida Prasarak Mandal v. Suresh T. Waghmode (Writ Petition 3993 of 1999, decided on 11th August 1999), Mr. Justice D. K. Deshmukh, held thus:

"The matter concerning grant of approval is between the management and the Education Officer and is relevant only for the release of grant by the State Government to the management. Therefore, the School Tribunal has to decide about the nature of appointment of Respondent No. 1 on the basis of the appointment order, advertisement etc. and not on the basis of the approval granted by the Education Officer."

The same view was reiterated in a judgment of Mr. Justice V.C. Daga in Ramchandar Ramadhar Yadav v. Hyderabad (Sind) National Collegiate Board, Writ Petition 467 of 1994 decided on 23rd December 2005 (since reported in 2006(2) Mh.L.J. 530) where the Learned Judge held thus:

"So far as the impugned order of the Tribunal considering the approval granted by the Education Officer to Respondent No. 1 is concerned, the order of the Education Officer granting or refusing to grant approval is not relevant to decide the status of the Petitioner because the question of grant of approval is between the Education Officer and the management and the same is relevant only for the purposes of grant in aid by the State Government."

In Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar v. Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti, AIR 2001 SC 2836 the case before the Supreme Court arose out of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 and the Grantin-Aid-Code. The High Court had held that since the management had not obtained the approval of the Inspecting Officer to the appointment of the Appellant as Assistant Teacher, the Appellant had ceased to be a teacher in the Institution. The question which fell for determination before the Supreme Court was whether there was any requirement of law for the management to obtain approval in regard to the appointment of a teacher in the institution. Under Section 3 of the Karnataka Act, the State Government was empowered to make rules in respect of matters relating to Code of Conduct and conditions of service of employees. Rule 6 of the Rules framed by the State Government dealt with the method of recruitment. The Supreme Court held that the Act and the statutory Rules constitute a comprehensive Code governing appointment and the method of appointment of teachers and the provisions made thereunder could not be supplemented in the form of administrative instructions:

"The appointment and conditions of service of teachers in private Government aided institutions are governed by the provisions of the Act and the statutory rules. The said provisions are self-contained Code relating to the appointments of teachers in private aided institutions. The field relating to method of appointment of regular teacher in a Government aided institution is fully covered by the provisions of the Act and the rules and we do not find any provisions in the Act empowering the Government to supplement the rules by executive instructions."

10.6 The Grant-in-aid Code was held to be a body of administrative instructions issued with the object that the grant allocated by the Government would be distributed and utilised subject to the observance of the conditions stipulated therein. The Supreme Court held that if there was a breach of the conditions governing the grantinaid, it was open to Government to take action against the management but this would not invalidate the appointment of a teacher when the method of appointment was covered by the Act and the Rules:

"The administrative instructions pertaining to grant-in-aid for secondary schools have been issued with the object of extending and improving institutions and for that purpose a sum of money is annually allocated by the Government for distribution as grant-in-aid to schools subject to observance to the conditions specified therein. The conditions embodied in Rule 16 of the Grant-in-Aid, Code provide for the conditions under which financial assistance would be made available to the Management of the institution by the Government. If there is a breach of the conditions of the grant-in-aid, it is open to the government either to suspend or cancel the financial grant to the institution. But such breach of conditions of the grant-in-Aid Code would not make the appointment of a teacher in the institutions invalid when the method of appointment of teachers in the institution is fully covered by the Act and the statutory rules. It is, however, true that for breach of administrative instructions which have no statutory force, a public servant guilty of such a breach can be subjected to disciplinary action, but the same cannot be pressed into service for action which has the effect of modifying the statutory rules. We are, therefore, of the view that breach of non-statutory Rule 16 would not render the appointments of appellant invalid."

10.7 A management of an institution seeking grant-in-aid is responsible to ensure compliance with the requirement imposed by the State for the disbursal of aid. The rejection of a proposal by the management for disbursal of grantinaid constitutes a lis between the management and the Government. In the event that the management fails to comply with the conditions prescribed by Government for the disbursal of aid which has been sanctioned, Government would be entitled to take such measures as are open in law. Government is entitled to ensure that financial aid which it sanctions is used for the purposes for which it is meant.

Government is entitled to guard against misuse or diversion and take disciplinary and other measures against errant managements. However, neither the Act, nor the Rules mandate the approval of the Education Department as a condition precedent to a valid order of appointment. The question of approval relates to the disbursal of financial aid. The denial of approval cannot, therefore, invalidate an order of appointment.

The Full Bench has articulated that approval to appointment is not envisaged or mandated either by the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 ('Act' for short) and Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 ('Rules' for short) and denial thereof cannot, therefore, invalidate an order of appointment.

The Full Bench then considered the question whether a condition of approval can be imposed by the management in the order of approval and if so, whether a termination of service can be sustained on the ground that there has been a nonfulfillment of contractual condition contained in the order of appointment. The answer given by the Full Bench is that it would not be open to the management to impose a condition that the validity of the appointment would be subject to the grant of approval. The view of the Full Bench is predicated on the premise that the conditions of appointment which are statutorily prescribed do not envisage any condition providing for prior or post facto approval as a condition for continued employment.

Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 would however, rely on the decision of a learned Single Judge in Kapil Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Dist. Nanded & Anr. v. Vasant Jagdeorao Sirsath & Ors. reported in 2009(6) ALL MR 892. The decision is rendered in the context of the factual position that an approved Assistant Teacher was terminated from service, the terminated teacher assailed the termination in appeal which was allowed by the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal found that the Assistant Teacher was terminated with clear intention to absorb respondent 3 in the appeal, who was the daughter of the President of the institution, and was appointed in post which was not sanctioned. It is in this contest that the learned Single Judge observes thus:

21. I find considerable substance in the arguments advanced by the Counsel for the Education Officer respondent no.2 that merely to accommodate respondent no.3, who is daughter of the President of the petitioner institution, whole story was concocted by the petitioners in notice dated 30th March,1998 by taking recourse to the provisions of Rule 16 of the M.E.P.S. Rules, 1981 to dislodge the respondent no.1. I also find considerable substance in the arguments for the reason that the counsel for the Education Officer respondent no.2 has tendered the documents while arguing the matter which clearly show that the President of the said institution as well as the Head Master have clearly communicated to the Education Officer that now the respondent no.1 is not working and in his place respondent no.3 should be accommodated.

It clearly appears that merely to accommodate respondent no.3 who is daughter of the President of the Institution, the petitioners have tried to dislodge the respondent no.1 and the malafide intentions on the part of the petitioners were writ large. Therefore, it will have to be held that the appointment of the respondent no.3 was clearly in excess of the sanctioned posts. Though, initially approval was granted by the Education Officer to her services, the said approval had been subsequently withdrawn by the Education Officer. It is not in dispute that at the time of appointment of the respondent no.1 the said appointment was on sanctioned post. Therefore, necessary result would be that while reinstating the respondent no.1, the respondent no.3 is required to be removed from the service.

The decision cited does not take the case of the respondents 1 and 2 herein any further.

19. In fairness to Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 it must be recorded that certain decisions were cited to buttress the submission that the petitioner participated in the selection process conducted post termination dated 01.04.2003 and is therefore, precluded from challenging the termination.

Perusal of the judgment in Appeal STC 71/2003 would reveal that such a contention was not urged before the School Tribunal. The legality or correctness of the judgment of the School Tribunal in appeal STC 71 of 2003 is not in issue in this petition. Moreover, the contention that the petitioner participated in the selection process would have been relevant had the petitioner challenged the selection. The petitioner challenged the termination and the fact that he did participate in the recruitment process undertaken by the management post his termination would not preclude the petitioner from continuing with the challenge to the termination.

20. I am not persuaded to accept the submission of Shri S.V. Sohoni, the learned counsel for respondent 2 that the petitioner and the management intended to make the implementation of the judgment of the School Tribunal conditionally upon grant of approval. Holistic reading of the compromise praecipe would indicate that the only intent was that the management ought not to be saddled with the liability to pay back wages. Be it noted, that it is the contention of the management that both the management and the petitioner were aware that all the four sanctioned posts of assistant teachers were occupied. If both the management and the petitioner were aware that all the four sanctioned posts were occupied there could not have been any intention of making the implementation or the benefit of the judgment of the School Tribunal conditionally upon grant of approval. The Full Bench has enunciated that a condition contractually imposed that the validity of the appointment shall be subject to approval, is not enforcible since such condition of either prior or post facto approval, is not envisaged statutorily. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the compromise praecipe did contain the condition as understood by the management, the condition is not enforcible in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench in St. Ulai High School & another..vs.. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh, 2007(1)Mh. L.J. 597 : [2007(2) ALL MR 1 (F.B.)].

21. Irrefutably, the only reason for termination is that the respondent 3 - Education Officer did not accord approval to the reinstatement of the petitioner. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated with continuity in service and full back wages by the School Tribunal. For reasons spelt out supra, the management could not have terminated the services of the petitioner after reinstating the petitioner pursuant to the judgment of the School Tribunal on the ground that the approval to reinstatement, is rejected by the Education Officer. The other reason given by the School Tribunal which dismissed the appeal challenging the second termination, which is that the petitioner did not press the challenge to the rejection of the approval, is manifestly erroneous. It is true that the petitioner preferred Writ Petition 4198 of 2013 challenging the rejection of approval and seeking direction to the management to pay the salary and that the petitioner was satisfied with the assurance of the management to pay the unpaid salary and did not press the challenge to the rejection of approval. The fact that the petitioner did not press the challenge to the rejection of the approval is of no relevance for reasons more than one. Firstly, the rejection of the approval does not suffer from any infirmity since the proposal forwarded by the management called upon the Education Officer to consider the position as on the date of the proposal and not the position prevailing when the petitioner was first terminated in the year 2003. The four sanctioned posts were occupied and the Education Officer therefore had no option but to reject the approval to the appointment of the petitioner. The management, having persuaded the petitioner to enter into a compromise, was expected to seek approval to the appointment of the petitioner on the basis of the factual position obtaining when the petitioner was terminated on 1.4.2003. The management did not do so nor did the management terminate the services of the junior most assistant teacher and ventured to seek approval knowing fully well that since all the four posts of sanctioned assistant teachers are occupied, the proposal as forwarded, was bound to be rejected. The conduct of the management was not fair and the irresistible inference is that the management attempted to take the process of law for a ride.

22. The termination of the petitioner by order dated 20.4.2014 and the judgment of the School tribunal in appeal STC 4/2014 dated 13.2.2015 are unsustainable and quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service as directed by the School Tribunal by judgment dated 8.2.2012 in appeal STC 71 of 2003 and shall be entitled to salary from 15.2.2013 onwards, which shall be the primary responsibility of the management.

23. The proposal for sanctioning additional post of assistant teacher which is pending before the Respondent 3 - Education Officer shall be forwarded to the Respondent 4 within one months and shall be decided either way by respondent 4 within three months thereafter.

24. It is clarified that as recorded in the compromise praecipe the petitioner shall be treated as in continuous service since 1997 and notwithstanding the rejection of approval or the fate of the proposal which is submitted for sanctioning additional post, the management shall be responsible for paying regular salary to the petitioner. The arrears of salary, for the period 15.2.2013 till date, if any, shall be paid within 8 weeks failing which the amount of arrears shall attract interest @ 12% per annum.

25. The petition is allowed in the aforestated terms.

Petition allowed.