Criminal Application No.731 of 2015,Criminal Application No.527 of 2016

1st August, 2019.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. FIRDOS MIRZA, Mr. A.J. THAKKAR
Respondent Counsel: Mr. S.Y. DEOPUJARI, Govt. Pleader with M.K. PATHAN, Mr. A.S. KINKHEDE

Cases Cited:
Santosh Mangilal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, Cri.Appln, No.301/2013, dt.26.07.2013 (Nagpur) [Para 2,4,5,8,15]
Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi Vs. State of M.P., 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)=(2004) 7 SCC 490 [Para 2,5,8,17,22]
Rakesh s/o. Mahendrakumar Jain Vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 3144 [Para 5,15]
Dhanraj s/o. Anandrao Mohod & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2016 ALL MR (Cri) 2208 [Para 5,15]
Shri Vijay Machindra Markad & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 1488 [Para 5,15]
Bhagwan s/o Namdeo Dawkhar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 2878 [Para 5]
Niraj Suresh Joshi Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others, Cri.Appln, No.19/2018 [Para 5,16]
Pradip s/o Gulabchand Raisoni (Jain) Vs. The State of Maharashtra and another, Cri. Appln. No.239/2018 [Para 5]
Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of U.P., 2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4444 (S.C.)=2014 ALL SCR 1893 : (2014) 2 SCC 1 [Para 7,11,14]
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 1=1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [Para 7,10,20]
State of Bihar Vs. Gulab Chand Prasad, 1981 ALLMR ONLINE 370 (S.C.) : AIR 1982 SC 58 [Para 9,19,22]
Joginder Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2014 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 119=(1994) 4 SCC 260 [Para 14]
State of U.P. Vs. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 [Para 21]

JUDGMENT

Manish Pitale, J. :- The present reference has arisen by order dated 16/03/2019, passed by Division Bench of this Court and the question for consideration is found in paragraph11 of the said order. The said question is being re-framed for the sake of convenience, as follows :-

"Whether mere nonmention of a particular provision of an "Order" or "Order" issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, by itself is sufficient to quash and set aside a first information report (FIR) registered for offence punishable under section 7 read with section 3 of the said Act, so as to stop further investigating into the matter?"

2. While referring the said question, the Division Bench of this Court has taken into consideration an earlier order of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh Mangilal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra and another (Judgment and order dated 26/07/2013 in Criminal Application (APL) No.301 of 2013), wherein by relying upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v State of M.P., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 490 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)], the Division Bench quashed an FIR, registered for offence under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to "Act of 1955"), on the ground that neither in the FIR nor in the affidavitinreply was there a reference to an "Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955. The Division Bench, while referring the said question, took into consideration the contents of the FIR and found that although detailed allegations were made against the applicant (accused), there was no specific mention of an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955. In this context, the said question arose as to whether mere nonmention of an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 in the FIR would lead to quashing of the same.

3. The few facts relevant in the present case are that on 24/08/2015 a written report was submitted by the Inspection Officer and Naib Tahsildar against the applicant, alleging that there was hoarding of essential commodities with a view to sell them in the black market. Although detailed written report leading to registration of the FIR gives details of the material that was allegedly found to be stored by the applicant for illegally selling it in the open market, no reference was made to any Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, which was contravened by the applicant. Yet offences under sections 3 and 7 of the Act of 1955 were registered against the applicant.

4. The applicant filed the present application under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR on the ground that there was absence of any reference to a specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, which had been contravened by the applicant and following the dictum laid down in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Santosh Mangilal Gupta v State of Maharashtra and another (supra) followed in a number of subsequent Division Bench judgments, the FIR deserved to be quashed.

5. Mr. Firdoz Mira and Mr. A.J. Thakkar, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh Mangilal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), followed in a series of judgments of Division Benches demonstrated that when there was nonmention of Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, contravention of which was alleged, the FIR was required to be quashed. It was submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Santosh Mangilal Gupta v State of Maharashtra and another (supra) had relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v State of M.P. [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)] (supra) and that there could not be any reason to doubt the principle laid down in the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The subsequent Division Bench judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants were in the cases of Rakesh s/o. Mahendrakumar Jain Vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 3144, Dhanraj s/o. Anandrao Mohod & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2016 ALL MR (Cri) 2208, Shri Vijay Machindra Markad & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 1488, Bhagwan s/o Namdeo Dawkhar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in 2017 ALL MR (Cri) 2878, Niraj Suresh Joshi Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others (Criminal Application (APL) No.19 of 2018) and Pradip s/o Gulabchand Raisoni (Jain) Vs. The State of Maharashtra and another (Criminal Application No.239 of 2018).

6. The learned counsel for the applicants further invited attention of this Court to section 3 of the Act of 1955, pointing out that the said provision empowers the Central Government to issue Order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity and trade and commerce therein. It was further submitted that section 7 of the Act of 1955 provides for penalties for contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Act of 1955. It was also pointed out that under section 10A, offences punishable under the Act of 1955 are cognizable notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, it was contended that only if an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 was contravened by any person that a cognizable offence could be said to have been committed and an FIR could be registered only when it was recorded in the FIR as to the specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, which was contravened. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, in absence of details of such an Order and further details regarding contravention of the same, no FIR could be registered. On this basis, it was contended that the moment it was found that there was absence of mention of the specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 that was contravened, the FIR was required to be quashed.

7. The learned counsel further placed reliance on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4444 (S.C.) : 2014 ALL SCR 1893], to contend that there could be instances where mandatory registration of FIR would not be necessary till a preliminary enquiry was conducted, as in the present case, regarding existence of an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 and violation, if any, thereof. It was submitted that since the offences under the aforesaid Act were cognizable under section 10A thereof, it was necessary for the Police to first ascertain existence of an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, contravention of which was alleged and record the same before registering the FIR, particularly because, there was every possibility of the Police misusing its power and unnecessarily harassing citizens when there was no material to show that a cognizable offence had been committed. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Division Bench judgments of this Court, there was no scope for the State to claim that it could always be demonstrated before the Court that an Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 did exist, which had been contravened, justifying registration of the FIR, even though there was no mention of such specific Order in the FIR itself. The learned counsel for the applicants also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 1], particularly the principles culled out therein, to claim that where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if taken on its face value, did not prima facie constitute any offence, such an FIR was required to be quashed.

8. Per contra, Mr. S.Y. Deopujari, learned Government Pleader and Mr. M.K.Pathan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, submitted that there was no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the applicants and that mere nonmention of any particular provision of an Order or the Order itself was not sufficient to quash and set aside an FIR. It was submitted that the FIR was required to contain only necessary information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and even if specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 was not mentioned, as long as the facts pertaining to offence for which penalties were provided under section 7 of the Act of 1955, were contained in the FIR, it was sufficient to sustain such an FIR, particularly when the State could place before the Court existence of a specific Order and the fact of contravention thereof by the accused. It was submitted that the applicants were misinterpreting the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi V. State of M.P. [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)] (supra) by reading only paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof and ignoring paragraph 6. It was emphasized that in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with a final conviction of the accused for offences under the said Act of 1955 and confirmation thereof by the High Court in the absence of reference to any Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955. Yet the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not acquit the accused and merely remanded the matter back to the High Court by giving opportunity to the State to place material on record to show as to which "Order" was violated. It was submitted that in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Santosh Mangilal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), it was found that neither in the entire FIR nor in the reply filed by the State before the Court was there any reference to an Order issued under the aforesaid Act and on that basis, the FIR stood quashed. It was submitted that in subsequent Division Bench judgments, at some places it had been erroneously held that since there was absence of mention of "Order" in the FIR, it was required to be quashed.

9. The learned Government Pleader further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Gulab Chand Prasad, reported in AIR 1982 SC 58 : [1981 ALLMR ONLINE 370 (S.C.)], contending that even in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that as long as State could show before the Court that an "Order" indeed existed, the FIR/complaint could not be quashed. The learned Government Pleader also referred to section 11 of the Act of 1955 and reading the same with section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code contended that the question in the present case was required to be answered in the negative, so that investigation into such cases would not be nipped in the bud.

10. Learned counsel Mr. A.S. Kinkhede, appearing to assist the State, supported the submissions made on behalf of the State and added that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down repeatedly that an FIR was not expected to be an encyclopedia and that information given to the Police must disclose commission of a cognizable offence and at such a stage if the information given raised suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence, it would be enough. The learned counsel further pointed out that if the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 1] (supra) were appreciated in the correct perspective, it would be evident that State was required to be given an opportunity by the Court to demonstrate that an "Order" did exist, which stood contravened by the accused and that the FIR could not be quashed merely because of non-mention of such an "Order" in the FIR.

11. Having heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and upon perusal of the material brought on record, as also the judgments referred to by the counsel, it is first necessary to appreciate as to what is the relevance of an FIR, which triggers the investigating machinery to investigate and enquire into a grievance raised by the complainant. As pointed out by the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel appearing to assist the State, it has been repeatedly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia. It has been held that as long as the information brought to the notice of the Police raises a suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence, an FIR can certainly be registered. In this context, section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1955 assumes significance. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. [2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4444 (S.C.) : 2014 ALL SCR 1893] (supra) that it is mandatory to register an FIR under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. Once the information received by the Police discloses that the suspected accused have indulged in activities showing ingredients of offences under the provisions of the said Act, it would be mandatory to register the FIR and to proceed to investigate into the matter. The contention raised on behalf of the applicants that in every case, the Police would first have to conduct an enquiry and give details of specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 and also to give details about contravention of various clauses of such Order in the FIR itself, is not in consonance with the said position of law. As long as the information received by the Police shows ingredients of acts which constitute an offence under the provisions of the Act of 1955, the Police can certainly register an FIR and proceed to investigate into the matter.

12. In this context, section 11 of the Act of 1955 becomes relevant, because it is provided therein that an offence under the said Act shall be taken cognizance of by the Court on a report in writing of the facts constituting such an offence, made by a public servant or any person aggrieved or recognized consumer association whether such a person is a member of that association or not. The said provision indicates that any aggrieved person can approach the Police to point out that an offence under the Act of 1955 has been committed. In such situation, when information is received raising suspicion about commission of such an offence under the Act of 1955, the Police could certainly register an FIR and investigate into the matter and thereafter when called upon by the Court, it could be demonstrated in detail as to which "Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, had been contravened and the Court could then take cognizance of such an offence.

13. It would be inappropriate to expect that an FIR would not be registered unless each and every detail of the Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, was stated in the FIR and it was further stated about the clauses of such Order that stood violated. If such an interpretation is placed, it would militate against the very objects and reasons for the enactment of the aforesaid legislation, which provides for control of production, supply and distribution as also trade and commerce in certain commodities in the interest of the general public. Whenever a complaint regarding offence under the Act of 1955 is lodged, it necessarily entails swift action on the part of the Police machinery so as to protect the interest of general public. To accept the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant would amount not only to slowing down the entire process of investigation, but hampering the same, which cannot be permitted.

14. An anxiety was expressed on behalf of the applicants that since offences under the Act of 1955 as per section 10A thereof are cognizable, the Police misuses its powers and thereby harasses citizens with the threat of arresting them, by registering FIRs in a casual manner. But, it is relevant that section 10A of the Act of 1955 has been amended over a period of time. While initially it was provided under the said section 10A of the Act of 1955 that every offence punishable under the said Act shall be cognizable and bailable, later it was provided that such offences would be cognizable and nonbailable. But, thereafter the words "and non bailable" were dropped and now the provision as it stands today states that every offence punishable under the Act shall be cognizable. The learned counsel assisting the State has correctly pointed out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. [2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4444 (S.C.) : 2014 ALL SCR 1893] (supra) has laid down that while registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of the accused immediately on registration of FIR is not at all mandatory. It is also laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 260 : [2014 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 119], that it would not be necessary to arrest accused persons only because FIR was registered pertaining to cognizable offences. Therefore, the said contention raised on behalf of the applicants is not sustainable.

15. Insofar as the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Santosh Mangilal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra) is concerned, on which the learned counsel for the applicants have placed much reliance, it is relevant that in the said case the State failed to demonstrate existence of an "Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 and therefore, the FIR stood quashed. In other words, even in the said case an opportunity was granted to the State to demonstrate existence of such of an "Order" and contravention thereof by the accused. In the subsequent Division Bench judgments of this Court in the case of Rakesh s/o. Mahendrakumar Jain Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Dhanraj s/o. Anandrao Mohod & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. and Shri Vijay Machindra Markad & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. (supra), it was found that the State failed to even show the existence "of an Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, leading to quashing of the FIR.

16. But, later Division Bench judgments of this Court as in the case of Niraj Suresh Joshi Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others (supra), the FIR was quashed only on the basis that there was no reference in the FIR to a particular "Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955.

17. In this context, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v State of M.P. [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)] (supra) referred to and relied upon by the rival parties assumes significance. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows :-

"4. Though there is substance in the plea raised by learned counsel for the State, yet, for bringing an application under Section 7 of the Act, the essential requirement is an order, the violation of which is alleged. Unfortunately, neither before the trial court nor the High Court, any effort was made to place on record the order the violation of which was alleged. In Madhya Pradesh Ration Vikreta Sangh Society v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) 4 SCC 535, it was observed that a scheme like the one at hand is framed under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short "the Constitution"). That being so, it was necessary for the prosecution to place on record the "order" which, according to it, was the foundation for taking action against the accusedappellant.

5. Section 7 refers to contravention of any order made under Section 3. It is essential for bringing in application of Section 7 to show that some order has been made under Section 3 and the order has been contravened. Section 3 deals with powers to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities. Exercise of such powers, can be done by "order". According to Section 2(c) "notified order" means an order notified in the Official Gazette, and Section 2(cc) provides that "order" includes a direction issued thereunder.

6. In the circumstances, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we remit the matter to the High Court to hear the matter afresh. The parties shall be permitted to place materials in support of their respective stands. It would be incumbent upon the State to file materials to show as to which "order" was violated. If the document in question is placed before the High Court, it goes without saying that the issue shall be examined with reference thereto and necessary adjudication shall be done."

18. In the said case Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under section 7 of the said Act. It was found by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that although the accused were concurrently convicted up to the High Court, there was no material on record to show that any specific Order under section 3 of the said act existed and the contravention of the same had led to an offence under section 7 of the Act of 1955. Even in such a situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not directly acquit the accused, but remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration, with an opportunity to the State to file material on record to show as to which "Order" was violated. The learned counsel for the applicants have emphasized only on paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted above, while ignoring paragraph 6 thereof. The said paragraph 6 does show that even if there is absence of reference to a particular Order while registration of FIR, the Court can certainly grant opportunity to the State to place on record such an Order and details of contravention thereof, to demonstrate that the accused were indeed liable to be proceeded under section 7 of the said Act of 1955.

19. The learned Government Pleader has correctly relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Gulab Chand Prasad [1981 ALLMR ONLINE 370 (S.C.)] (supra) wherein similar circumstances arose, as the complaint filed against the accused therein did not mention the Order or the clauses thereof which were violated. The High Court in the said case had quashed the proceedings against the accused, but the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the said order and held that the basis of the High Court order in that case was in fact knocked out, as it was shown by the State that an Order under section 3 of the Act of 1955 did exist, the contravention whereof had been alleged. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows.

"3. It is alleged by the prosecution that the respondent is a dealer in soda ash. Upon an inspection of his premises on April 13, 1979 the visiting officer found an unaccounted stock of 13 bags of soda ash, in relation to which, according to the complainant, the respondent could not produce the necessary papers. Subsequently, the respondent submitted some cash memos and also pointed out that he had sold soda ash to various parties. May be, that would be for him to establish. The fact remains that there was unaccounted soda ash as complained of in the possession of the respondent and the complainant alleged that this would be violative of the Order. A complaint was filed alleging the aforementioned fact, though of course not mentioning the Order, provision of which was violated, simultaneously stating that the respondent has committed an offence punishable under S. 7 of the Act. It may be mentioned that further allegations in the complaint were that the respondent has committed offences under Ss. 420 and 471 of I.P.C.

4. It appears that the respondent moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings. It was alleged on his behalf that soda ash is not an essential commodity or an article in respect of which there is any statutory order compelling the dealer in the commodity either to display a list of prices or declare the stock. This submission found favour with the High Court. Surprisingly, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State did not point out the Order now relied upon as having been issued under the Act or any other Order, if there be one under the Defence of India Rules. The High Court was constrained to observe that not only the complaint is frivolous but it was absolutely mala fide because if there was no order imposing any obligation on the dealer of a commodity to display the price list or to declare the stock, there will be no question of a dealer not accounting the stock of any such article and if there was no such order, absence of explanation in respect of such a commodity or otherwise may not according to the High Court, entail any liability in law.

5. We are not disposed to make any observation at this stage on any part of the controversy between the parties because a statutory Order covering soda ash is in existence and in force. Mr. Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant-State, assured us that it is in force. If it is in force, a dealer in any of the commodities mentioned in Schedule I will have to comply with Cls. 3 and 4 of the Order. Whether there is any violation of the statutory provisions enacted in Cls. 3 and 4 of the Order is a matter to be adjudicated. But it would be difficult to subscribe in the face of the Order published in the Gazette the copy of the Gazette having been submitted to us to ignore the existence of the Order. The whole basis of the approach of the learned Judge of the High Court gets knocked out once the Order is shown to be existing and in force. May be the High Court would have acted as we propose to do if the Order was shown to the learned Judge hearing the matter. Undoubtedly, Mr. Goburdhan told us that nearly two years have elapsed since the prosecution was launched. That is a fact. However, it would be unwise to ignore the existence of a subsisting order and to dispose of a proceeding as if no such order is there."

20. The reliance placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [2013 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 1] (supra) by the learned counsel for the applicants is based on only the first illustration given in the said judgment in the context of situations where FIRs could be quashed, but the entire set of illustrations is ignored. A proper reading of the illustrations given in the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment, would show that the State could certainly be given an opportunity to place material on record to show that a cognizable offence had been committed. In fact, in the said judgment a note of caution has been given that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of the rare cases and further that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint.

21. In this context the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v O.P. Sharma reported in (1996) 7 SCC 705, is also relevant because it pertains to the provisions of aforesaid Act and it has been held in the said judgment that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution by exercising inherent power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

22. The learned Government Pleader has correctly pointed out that a proper interpretation of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v State of M.P. [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 3473 (S.C.)] (supra) read with of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Gulab Chand Prasad [1981 ALLMR ONLINE 370 (S.C.)] (supra) would show that mere non mention of a specific Order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 and/or contravention of clauses thereof, ought not to lead to quashing of the FIR. The further contention of the learned Government Pleader is also correct that if the FIR is quashed only for the said reason, it would lead to the investigation itself being nipped in the bud, thereby allowing the accused to go scotfree, despite the existence of an order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955 and contravention thereof by the accused.

23. In view of the above, the question referred for consideration stated in paragraph1 is answered in the negative and it is held that mere non-mention of a particular provision of an "Order" or "Order" issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, by itself is not sufficient to quash and set aside an FIR. It is held that the State would be entitled to demonstrate before a Court that an order issued under section 3 of the Act of 1955, indeed exists and that there is contravention of clauses thereof, leading to offence under section 7 of the Act of 1955. With these observations the reference is disposed of. The applications shall now be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal.

Reference Answered accordingly.