CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 18 OF 2019

17th January 2020

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. P. V. Navlani
Respondent Counsel: Mr. B. M. Lonare Mr. U. M. Aurangabadkar Mr. P. P. Mahalle
Act Name: Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section :
Section 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 323 Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 498(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860

Cases Cited :
Paras 8, 10: Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 5 SCC 384
Para 11: Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014
Para 13: Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2000 AIR SCW 3157

JUDGEMENT

MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent.

2. By the present petition, the petitioners are seeking to quash and set aside FIR No.13/2019, registered with respondent No.3 i.e. Women Cell, IMT, Manesar, Gurgaon (Gurugram), Haryana, for offence punishable under the provisions of Section 498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861. The petition came to be filed on 08.01.2019, inter alia, seeking to restrain the respondent No.3-State of Haryana and respondent No.4-Commissioner of Police, Gurgaon (Gurugram), Haryana, from proceeding with the investigation of complaints bearing No.16551/ CP/2018 dated 10.12.2018 and bearing No.16491/CP/2018 dated 08.12.2018 filed by respondent No.5 (wife) of the petitioner No.1 with Police Station Gurgaon, Haryana. The petitioner No.2 is the father-in-law of respondent No.5. The petitioner No.3 is the motherin-law of respondent No.5. The petitioner Nos.4 & 6 are the sisterin-law and brother-in-law of respondent No.5, whereas the petitioner No.5 is the maternal uncle of petitioner No.1.

3. The petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 got married as per Hindu rites and rituals on 16/11/2016 at Amravati. Both, petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 are highly educated and were working with good companies. In the year 2013, the petitioner No.1 went to USA for work. The respondent No.5 continued with her job upto 11/01/2017 and thereafter stayed for two months with the parents of the petitioner No.1 at Amravati. Thereafter, in the month of April, she stayed with her maternal aunt and after getting VISA proceeded to USA to stay with the petitioner No.1 on 25.04.2017. The petitioner No.4 who is the sister of petitioner No.1 resides at Pune. She is a divorcee and resides with her brother and has also taken up a job in Pune. The petitioner No.6 is the younger brother of the petition No.1 and is admittedly suffering from thalassemia major, due to which, he is required to undergo blood transfusion, after every 8 to 10 days.

4. Mr. P.V. Navlani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that for the first one and half year, after marriage the relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 were cordial. Thereafter, friction arose between the two. Petitioner No.1 visited India (Amravati) on 29.08.2018 since the petitioner No.3 i.e. his mother had fractured her rib and was unwell due to rising friction between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5. He submitted that, at the then time, respondent No.5 had also desired to visit India but instead stayed back in USA with her relatives. He submitted that, in the meanwhile, petitioner No.1 also got his job transferred to India and started working from Amravati and therefore, requested respondent No.5 to return back to India. He submitted that respondent No.5 did not cooperate and instead wanted the petitioner No.1 to return to USA, as she wanted to deliver their first child in USA, in order to procure automatic citizenship. He submitted that petitioner No.1 tried very hard to persuade respondent No.5 to return back to India, but she did not listen. He submitted that on 19.10.2018, the brother of respondent No.5 informed petitioner No.1 about the abortion carried out by respondent No.5 in India. He submitted that the petitioner No.1 was not aware that respondent No.5 had returned back to India, at the then time as also about the abortion which was carried out by respondent No.5 in her 22nd week of pregnancy. He submitted that the petitioner No.1, was therefore, very agitated and threatened the brother of respondent No. 5, that he would initiate criminal action against his family, in respect of the above.

5. Shri Navlani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that because of the above incident and as a counter blast to the same, the respondent No.5 was forced to lodged a false complaint against the petitioners with the Commissioner of Police at Amravati (respondent No.2) and with the Commissioner of Police at Gurgaon (respondent No.4). The petitioner No.1, was summoned by respondent No.3 on 26.11.2018 for recording his statement. He submitted that petitioner No.1, thereafter sent by email his complaint to respondent Nos.3 & 4 against the respondent No.5 and her family members. On 09.12.2018, the petitioner was summoned by the respondent No.2 (Commissioner of Police at Amravati) for the purpose of enquiry upon the complaint lodged by respondent No.5 for recording his statement. The petitioner No.1 cooperated in the said enquiry. He submitted that, thus, there were two authorities namely respondent No.2 & respondent No.4, who were investigating into the complaint of respondent No. 5 simultaneously, one at Gurgaon and the other at Amravati. Therefore, the petitioner No.1 informed respondent No.3 that he would refrain from attending the enquiry, any further. He submitted that once the enquiry was commenced with by respondent No.2 at Amravati, there was no reason for respondent No.3 to have insisted upon conducting the same enquiry at Gurgaon. He submitted that the petitioners were all along willing to cooperate in the enquiry. He submitted that respondent No.2 (Commissioner of Police at Amravati) had already recorded the statement of the petitioner No.1 on 13.12.2018 and that the petitioner was always willing to cooperate with any further investigation if so required.

6. Mr. P.V. Navlani, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that on 26.01.2019, respondent No.3 registered the offence against the petitioners by FIR No.13/2019 for offence punishable under the provision of Section 498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861. Being aggrieved the petitioners immediately approached the Court, on the above ground. He submitted that the principal ground made out in the petition was that major cause of action had occurred either at Amravati or Jodhpur or in the USA, and therefore, the respondent No.2 (Commissioner of Police at Amravati) had jurisdiction to investigate the case and register. The offence, if made out. He submitted that petitioner No.1’s complaint against respondent No.5 for carrying out abortion without the consent of the petitioner No.1 in the 22nd week of pregnancy, in collusion with and involving her family was lodged with the Rajapeth Police Station, District Amravati. He submitted that on 15.02.2019, the petitioner No.1 was summoned by respondent No.4, at Gurgaon in respect of enquiry arising out of FIR No.13/2019 registered with the respondent No.3 for the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. He submitted that the entire cause of action had arisen either at Amravati, Jodhpur or USA and therefore, the respondent Nos.3 & 4 did not have jurisdiction to investigate the case at Gurgaon. He submitted that filing of two complaints at two different places with respect to the same offence was impermissible in law and was solely done with a view to harass the petitioner No.1 and his family members. He submitted that registration of offence with respondent No.3 was a colourable exercise of power and therefore, deserved to be quashed by this Hon’ble Court. He submitted that the petitioner No.1 was ready and willing to cooperate in any enquiry in all respects. His final submission was that, looking at the vagueness of the allegations made in the FIR by respondent No.5, it was in the interest of justice to quash the FIR which was filed against the petitioners at Gurgaon, more specifically, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case.

7. Mr. B.M. Lonare, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 submitted that the allegation of abortion made by petitioner No.1 against respondent No.5 was found to be false upon making enquiry with the Medical Officer. He submitted that miscarriage had taken place, as such, cognizable offence was not made out against respondent No.5. He submitted that the respondent No.5 had filed the complaint and registered FIR with Manesar Police Station, Gurgaon (Gurugram), Haryana, under the provisions of Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code.

8. Mr. P.P. Mahalle, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.5 refuted the submissions and contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and reiterated that respondent No.5 was not treated well and that petitioner Nos.2 to 6 treated the respondent No. 5 like a house-maid. He submitted that on several instance, petitioner No.3 would call upon the petitioner No.1 to treat the respondent No.5 in a cruel and dominant manner. She submitted that this act of the petitioner No.3 was supported by petitioner No.4, which led to constant quarrels between the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5. He submitted that after the respondent No.5 became pregnant and went to USA to reside with petitioner No.1, petitioner No.3 continuously insisted that respondent No.5 return to India. He referred to and relied upon complaint dated 12.11.2018, which narrated details of ill-treatment given to respondent No.5, by the petitioners. He submitted that on 09.08.2018, relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent No. 5 resulted in such a situation that respondent No.5 had to seek medical opinion and visit the hospital in USA, wherein the concerned Dr. opined that there were signs of threatened miscarriage. He referred to the diagnosis of the respondent No.5 dated 09.08.2018 in support of his above charge. He submitted that despite the above and the health of the respondent No.5 not keeping well, on 27.08.2018, the petitioner No.1 without informing respondent No.5 deserted her during the period of her pregnancy and returned back to India without informing her. He submitted that while respondent No.5 was in the USA entirely on her own, petitioner No.1 did not send any money and respondent No.5 was left at the mercy of her near relatives to arrange money for purchasing a ticket to come back to India. He submitted that on her return from the USA, respondent No.5 started residing with her parents who were themselves residing with her brother at Gurgaon in Haryana. He submitted that since 2010, the parents of respondent No.5 had shifted to Gurgaon along with the brother of respondent No.5. Prior to 2010, respondent No.5 was residing with her parents in Jodhpur. He submitted that all efforts taken by her parents and family members to mediate with petitioner No.1 failed thereby leading to stress during her pregnancy. He submitted that medical complications which had arisen due to stress was of such a life threatening extent that, there was threat to the life of respondent No.5 and it was only under such circumstances, the inevitable abortion and/or miscarriage had occurred or taken place. He submitted that all along when respondent No.5 was in hospital, petitioner No.1 nor the other petitioners or their family members visited respondent No.5. He submitted that the original complaint was filed by respondent No.5 with respondent No.4. He submitted that a carbon copy of the said complaint was sent by respondent No.5 to respondent No.2 for information of the fact that the said complaint was filed against petitioner No.1 at Gurgaon. He submitted that since petitioner No.1 was residing in Amravati, respondent No.5 had sent copy of complaint lodged at Gurgaon, Haryana to respondent No.2 at Amravati. He submitted that respondent No.5 wanted to pursue her complaint filed at Gurgaon, Haryana, and it was never the intention of respondent No.5 to either file the complaint at Amravati and/or pursue the same at Amravati. He therefore, submitted that, it was never the intention of respondent No.5 to file a second FIR on the basis of the complaint copy which was forwarded to respondent No.2 at Amravati. He submitted that it was the prerogative of respondent No.5 to pursue her complaint which she had lodged at the place of her choice inasmuch as, the suffering of cruelty and mental trauma which respondent No.5 was carrying was evident when she was residing with her parents at Gurgaon, Haryana. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh decided on 09.04.2019 and reported in (2019) 5 SCC 384 in support of the proposition that respondent No.5 was entitled to lodge, maintain and pursue her complaint which was filed at Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code in view of the facts and circumstances of respondent No.5’s case, which clearly amounted to cruelty, both physical and mental trauma as well. He placed reliance on paragraph Nos. 12 to 16 of the above judgment which read thus:
“12. Section 498A of the Penal Code was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983. In addition to the aforesaid amendment in the Penal Code, the provisions of Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to inquiries by police in case of death by suicides and inquiries by magistrates into cause of such deaths were also amended. Section 198-A was also inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to prosecution of the offences under Section 498-A. Further by an amendment in the first schedule to Cr.PC, the offence under Section 498-A was made cognizable and non-bailable. Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section 113-A in the Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman to be drawn if such suicide had been committed within a period of seven years from the date of marriage of the married woman and she had been subjected to cruelty. Section 113-A is in the following terms:
"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment, undoubtedly, was to combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the husband on the wife which leads to commission of suicides or grave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal with harassment of the wife so as to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property, etc. The above stated object of the amendment cannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in the present case. The judicial endeavour must, therefore, always be to make the provision of the laws introduced and inserted by the Criminal Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 more efficacious and effective in view of the clear purpose behind the introduction of the provisions in question, as already noticed.
14. "Cruelty" which is the crux of the offence under Section 498- A IPC is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean "The intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)". Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of the expression "cruelty" appearing in Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychological effect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatize the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause by the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parental home even though there may not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such place.
15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The definition of the “domestic violence” in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with Explanations (a) & (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code, which define “cruelty”. The provisions contained in Section 498- A of the Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompass both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A at the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section 179 Cr.P.C which would squarely be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question raised.
16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.”

9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, perused the pleadings and copy of complaint dated 12.11.2018 and FIR bearing No.13/2019 dated 26.01.2019. At the outset, we find that the cause of action in respect of incidents which have been narrated in the complaint and the FIR have arisen either in the USA or at Gurgaon, Haryana, save and except the fact that the marriage of petitioner No.1 was solemnised with respondent No.5 at Amravati. The various acts of cruelty which have been claimed to have been committed by petitioner while he was living with respondent No.5 in the USA are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Briefly before heading to the USA, respondent No.5 had resided along with petitioner Nos. 2 to 6 at Amravati, before joining the petitioner No.1 in the USA. During this period, we find that the allegations and charges which have been levelled by respondent No.5 against petitioner Nos.2, 4 to 6 cannot be proved as they do not find any mention or reference either in the complaint or in the FIR. Further, petitioner No.4 who is sister of petitioner No.1and sister-in-law of respondent No.5 was admittedly residing at Pune and not at Amravati. There is no specific charge, claim or any allegation whatsoever against petitioner No.6, who is the younger brother of the petitioner No.1 and is a cronic patient of thalassemia major, requiring constant medical attention and blood transfusion every 8 to 10 days.

10. We find that the mental torture and trauma which has been expressed and narrated by the respondent No.5 in her detailed complaint dated 12.11.2018, filed with the Police Station at Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana, has primarily leveled charges against petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3 i.e. mother of the petitioner No.1 and mother-in-law of respondent No.5 in particular. After perusing the copy of complaint in detailed, we find that the incident of abortion or miscarriage, which had unfortunately taken place in the 22nd week of pregnancy would undoubtedly leave a scar in the life of respondent No.5 considering that respondent No.5 was left abandoned and deserted in the USA by petitioner No.1, during her pregnancy. Further the act of returning back to India without informing respondent No.5, who was pregnant needs to be deprecated, if found to be true after investigation. We also find that petitioner No.1 has repeatedly stated that he had to return back to India for shouldering the responsibility of his family and it was not possible for the petitioner No.1 to continue living in the USA and therefore, he returned back to India and started living with his family at Amravati. We find that petitioner No.1 returned back to Amravati and started working from Amravati. However, we are not in agreement with the proposition expressed by the petitioners that the probe and investigation of the complaint filed by the respondent No.5 ought to be taken over by the respondent No.2 i.e. Commissioner of Police at Amravati. On applying the ratio of the case in Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh cited (supra), there is no doubt in expressing a finding that the fact that respondent No.5 has chosen to file and pursue the complaint at Manesar Police Station, Gurgaon, Haryana, is inconsonance with the provisions of law. We cannot compell the respondent No.5 to pursue her case with respondent No.2, as per the convenience of the petitioners.

11. Shri Navlani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners sought to draw our attention to the amended provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and more specifically Clause-1(A), which was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently, renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. While referring to the judgment in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India in Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014 (arising out of SLP © No.19549 of 2013) and decided on 7.8.2014. The amended clause(2) now reads thus :
“226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs – 2. The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

12. He submitted that on a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it was clear that this Court can issue a writ against the authority located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action had wholly or partially arisen within this Courts territorial jurisdiction. He submitted that in the present case, some cause of action had arisen in Amravati, inasmuch as the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.5 had got married in Amravati and respondent No.5 had resided with the family members of petitioner No.1 i.e. petitioner No.2 to 6 at Amravati for a brief period, after marriage. He submitted that some of the allegations leveled by respondent No.5 were during the said period and therefore, it was well within the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the plea of the petitioners in quashing and setting aside the FIR bearing No.13/2019 registered with respondent No.3 at Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana, against the petitioners in the interest of justice. He submitted that the petitioners were ready and willing to face the enquiry and investigation in respect of any complaint and/or FIR that would be lodged or even transferred to respondent No.2 at Amravati. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the filing of FIR by respondent No.5 at Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana, where she has been residing along with her parents, after her return from USA and during which period the act of cruelty has been charged against the petitioners cannot be said to be not available to the respondent No.5. We find that the a substantial part of the cause of action had arisen in Gurgaon, Haryana and respondent No.5 is therefore, within her right to lodge and pursue her complaint with respondent No.3 in Haryana.

13. Shri Navlani, thereafter, referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2000 AIR SCW 3157 and drew our attention to paragraph No. 7 of the said judgment. He submitted that it was wholly within the jurisdictional power of this Court to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action had wholly arisen or had arisen in part, no matter where the seat of the authority concerned was located and as such, once again reiterated his submissions. Paragraph Nos.7 and 13 of the above judgment are relevant and reads thus.
“7. The object of the amendment by inserting clause (2) in the Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (AIR 1953 SC 210) (supra) and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which “the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts……….
13. We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. Nor are we to be understood that any person can create a fake cause of action or even concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial limits of another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place of residence of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in the particular writ petition. The High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case.”

14. We find that it has been categorically observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the place of residence of persons moving a High Court is not the criteria to determine the controversy and cause of action in the particular Writ Petition and that the High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It further depends upon the facts in each case. It is needless to mention here that a large number of events had taken place in the USA. Similarly, while respondent No.5 was residing with the petitioner at Amravati for a brief period, after her marriage and before proceeding to the USA, some part of the cause of action had arisen at Amravati and admittedly after her return from the USA, she resided with her parents at Gurgaon, during which period another very important cause of action had arisen. This cause of action had arisen at Gurgaon was in respect of the abortion or miscarriage which had to be done in the 22nd week of pregnancy of respondent No.5 which would leave an indelible mark in the life of the respondent No.5. Such an instance has been related by the respondent No.5 to the cause of mental trauma and cruelty which respondent No.5 had faced in the USA, immediately before returning to India and residing with her parents at Gurgaon. Therefore, we find that respondent No.5 was within her right to pursue her complaint with respondent No.2 at Gurgaon, Haryana.

15. However, on a close analysis of the complaint dated 15.11.2018 and the FIR dated 26.01.2019. We find that insofar as the roles of the petitioner No.2 and petitioner Nos.3 to 6 are concerned, they cannot be indicted. This is so because the narration of events of mental torture and charges which has been leveled by respondent No.5 in the complaint and the FIR do not point a direct finger to the role of these petitioners i.e. petitioner No.2 i.e. father- in-law and petitioner Nos.4 to 6 i.e. the two younger brothers of petitioner No.1 and sister of the petitioner No.1. Further, there is no direct or indirect allegation of any cruel act by these petitioners which can amount to cruetly. On a close reading of the complaint and FIR it can be best said that, it was petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3 i.e. the husband and mother-in-law of the respondent No.5, who were in direct confrontation with respondent No.5 and whatever the respondent No.5 has stated in her complaint and FIR is directly indicting these two petitioners i.e. the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3. We, therefore, would like to quash and set aside the FIR bearing No.13/2019 registered with respondent No.3 at Manesar, Gurgoan, Haryana, for the offences punishable under Section 498(A), 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as the petitioner No.2 and petitioner Nos.4 to 6 are concerned. This is because the complaint and the FIR do not show any instance of involvement of these petitioners either directly or indirectly concerning the respondent No. 5 in any act of causing simple hurt by the petitioners to the respondent No.5, as also any demand of dowry or money or causing any form of cruelty whether physical or mental to the respondent No.5.

16. In view of the above, FIR bearing No.13/2019 registered with respondent No.3 i.e. Women Cell, IMT Manesar, Gurgaon (Gurugram), Haryana, for the offences punishable under Section 498(A), 323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as petitioner No.2 and petitioner Nos. 4 to 6 are concerned is quashed and set aside.

17. Insofar as the above FIR registered against the petitioner Nos.1 and 3 is concerned, we direct that the same be carried to its logical end in accordance with law by respondent Nos.3 & 4.