Appeal (Civil) 5706 of 2001Appeal (Civil) 5707 of 2001

27th August 2001

Petitioner Counsel:
Respondent Counsel:

Cases Cited :

Paras 6, 14: D.C. Bhatia & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 56 (1994) DLT 324
Para 13: Mohinder Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Anr. (1985) 4 SCC 221
Para 18: Parripati Chandrasekharrao & Sons Vs. Alapati Jalaiah (1995) 3 SCC 709
Para 21: Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 536
Para 31: Isha Valimohamad and another Vs. Haji Gulam Mohamad & Haji Dada Trust (1974) 2 SCC 484)
Paras 33, 41: M.S.Shivananda Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others (1980) 1 SCC 149
Para 33: Public Works Vs. Ho Po Sang Lord Morris speaking for the Privy Council
Para 35: Bansidhar and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1989) 2 SCC 557)
Para 37: Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City-1 Vs. Godavari Sagar Mills Ltd. 1967 (1) SCR
Paras 39, 40: State of Punjab Vs. Mohar Singh

JUDGEMENT

MISRA, J.:- Leave granted.
2. It is unfortunate, an eviction petition which was filed on the 13th September 1985 still the parties are battling to find which court would have the jurisdiction. Whether the court of Rent Controller under Delhi Rent Control Act or ordinary Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue? As discipline and culture in every walk of life is essential for smooth functioning in all its activities, similarly judicial culture and discipline has to be followed in order to achieve the desired result viz. to give litigant justice in the shortest period of time. Every legislation legislates for the benefit of its subject but many a times, raising issues for every thing and stretching it too long percolates the very objective for which it is made. With the increasing complexities of laws coupled with faulty legislation, using inappropriate language, a stress is created which the courts through its judicial interpretations have been attempting to simplify it.
In spite of this the hope for an early adjudication has been eluding like a mirage. With the advancement of legal studies there is sharpening of the acumen of advocacy. Every word of a statute, if interpreted when equipped with such dynamism, could be intellectually misused, hence interpreters including counsel, has to keep balance not to let this misuse surface. As knife in the hand of a murderer and doctor has different roles to play, so the interpreters have to select to play the role of a doctor to confer benefit to the subject. The words in a statute are dynamic, not static, hence has to be interpreted to subserve to the objectives of an Act. Such Judicial discipline in interpreting has to be followed for yielding legislative intent. Similarly judicial culture has to be cultivated even by counsels appearing for a cause, who has to see that the judicial system does not rust or get stains for a delayed justice.
3. To win a battle for a client is the legitimate expectation of all but in doing so deliberations should not be such which lengthens the litigation, even if it confers temporary gain to ones client in a lis.
Every member of the judicial fraternity has to play its role with the main object to find the truth and render justice to the litigant. This judicial culture has not to be lost sight. The present case is one of such cases, which causes concern in this regard.
4. The aforesaid appeals raise an interesting but somewhat complex question for adjudication with reference to the jurisdiction of the court. The question for consideration is, what is the effect of the amendment which incorporated Section 3(c) in the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act in the pending eviction proceedings. Section 3(c) of the Rent Act was brought through amendment which became effective from 1.12.1988 which reads as under:
3. Act not to apply to certain premises Nothing in this Act shall apply;
(c) to any premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees;
In effect it makes Rent Act inapplicable to the tenancies whose monthly rent exceeds Rs.3500/-. It is not in dispute, in the present case, the rate of monthly rent is Rs.8625/- per month and proceeding for the eviction was pending under the Rent Act when the said amendment came into force. In order to appreciate the controversy effectively we are hereunder giving certain essential matrix of facts.
5. The aforesaid two appeals arise out of judgment and order dated 29th November, 1999 passed by the High Court. The first being from an order in second appeal from order No.5/1999 and the second being from an order in Civil Revision No. 10/1998.
6. The High Court allowed landlords second appeal from order but dismissed the revision of the tenant. Hence both these appeals are filed by the tenant. The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant on the ground of sub-letting as enumerated in Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, in the court of Rent Controller Delhi on the 13.9.1985. When this petition was pending, as aforesaid, Section 3(c) was brought in, through amendment w.e.f. 1.12.1988 by which it excluded the jurisdiction of Rent Controller with respect to those tenancies fetching monthly rent exceeding Rs.3500/-. In effect it took away such tenancies from the purview of the aforesaid Act. Thereafter the landlord sent a notice on 11.9.1991 terminating the tenancy of the appellant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On 18.11.1991 landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession in the Delhi High Court in its original side which is registered as suit No. 390/1995. When this fact was brought to the notice of the Additional Rent Controller that the landlord has already filed a suit appellant prayed that this eviction petition be dismissed or in the alternative its proceedings be stayed. However, the Rent Controller rejected such a request by his order dated 23.11.1992 relying on the ratio of D.C. Bhatia & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr. 56 (1994) DLT 324. Thereafter in the suit the appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint as parallel proceedings cannot be continued both before the Rent Controller and the Civil Court. The Trial Court on 18.10.1997 rejected appellants aforesaid application. Aggrieved by that the appellant filed revision before the High Court.
7. As aforesaid, in the meanwhile the appellant moved an application before the Additional Rent Controller under Section 9 read with Section 151 CPC praying that the court of Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter under the aforesaid Act in view of the amendment brought in the year 1988. The Rent Controller dismissed this application. The Rent Control Tribunal allowed the appellants appeal and quashed eviction proceedings. Aggrieved by that landlord filed second appeal from order in the High Court which was allowed which is the subject matter of one of the aforesaid appeal before us.
8. So far the appeal arising out of revisional order, the High Court held the protection enjoyed by the tenant on account of statute was no more in operation and in such a case parties would be governed by the ordinary common law, hence respondent-landlord was fully justified in filing a suit for possession before the competing civil court having jurisdiction. In other words High Court held respondent-landlord rightly filed suit before the Civil Court.
9. We may point out here that learned counsel for the appellant, in view of his submissions which he is making in appeal arising out of judgment and order in second appeal from order, which we shall be dealing hereinafter, does not want to press this appeal, viz., Civil Appeal No/2001 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C ) No.4233 of 2000), hence it is dismissed.
10. This takes us to consider only the other appeal. The appellant- tenant submits, it is the Civil Court alone which has the jurisdiction after the aforesaid amendment and not the Rent Controller, while respondent-landlord submits, notwithstanding the aforesaid amendment it is the Rent Controller which would have the jurisdiction. From these submissions, following questions arise:
(1) Whether the landlord and tenant are relegated to seek their rights and remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant under rent control legislation is withdrawn through amendment?
(2) Can a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under proviso (b) to Section 14 of the said Act be claimed by a landlord as a vested right?
(3) In case a protection given to a tenant under the Rent Act is said to be not a vested right and if that protection is withdrawn, can a landlord claim any ground of eviction under the Rent Act to be his vested right?
11. Thus question for our consideration is, whether proceedings which were initiated before the Rent Controller having jurisdiction could continue before it even after the said amendment. Submission for tenant is, since tenant has no vested right on the date when amendment came into force and amendment is not retrospective in operation hence it is only the Civil Court which would have jurisdiction. On the other hand submission on behalf of the landlord is, even if it could be said tenant has no vested right, landlord has vested right under the Rent Act and further in view of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the pending proceedings would continue before the Rent Controller as if the amending provision has not come into play. Further it is submitted, Section 6 spells out, where this Act or any Central Act repeals any enactment then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege accrued or incurred under any such enactment so repealed. Since landlord in addition to his vested right under the Rent Act, by virtue of this Section 6 has in any case right under the repealing provision hence the pending proceeding would continue, as there is nothing in the amending Act showing any different intention. So the case of tenant-appellant is that amendment covers pending cases while respondent landlord case is it does not cover hence it would not apply to the pending cases.
12. First we proceed to examine, whether tenant has any vested right.
13. Submission on behalf of the tenant is, a tenant has no vested right under the Rent Act. If tenants have no vested rights under the Rent Control Act, the pending proceedings would not be saved from the effect of the repealing Act. In Mohinder Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Anr. (1985) 4 SCC 221 this was observed by this Court:
The argument that the tenants have acquired a vested right under the Act prior to its amendment is without any substance. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by the Amending Act of 1978, the provision as it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. The provision, as it originally stood prior to its amendment, might not have been constitutionally valid as the exemption sought to be granted was for an indefinite period. That does not necessarily imply that any vested right in any tenant was thereby created. The right claimed is the right to be governed by the Act prior to its amendment. If the Legislature had thought it fit to repeal the entire Act, could the tenant have claimed any such right? Obviously, they could not have; the question of acquiring any vested rights really does not arise.
14. D.C. Bhatia and Ors. vs. Union of India and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 104, is also a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act where the same Section 3(c) which we are considering was brought in through the same Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988. In this case also submission was, that since the amending Act is not retrospective, it would not affect the rights conferred on the tenants under the repealed provisions of the Rent Control Act. This submission was rejected by this Court. The Court held:
We are u