Civil Appeal Nos.7486-7487 of 2008

8th November, 2017.

Petitioner Counsel: Mr. AKHILESH KUMAR PANDEY
Respondent Counsel: Ms. NANDINI SEN, Mr. DEBA PRASAD MUKHERJEE

Cases Cited:
Eramma Vs. Verrupanna & Ors., 1966 (2) SCR 626 [Para 1]
Chinthamani Ammal Vs. Nandagopal Gounder and Anr., 2007 ALL SCR 1240=2007(4) SCC 163 [Para 1]
Tulasamma and Others Vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs., 1977(3) SCC 99 [Para 1,3,4]
Mangal Singh & Ors. Vs. Shrimati Rattno & Anr., 1967 (3) SCR 454 [Para 1]
Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 993 [Para 4]
Jagannathan Pillai Vs. Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1493 [Para 5]

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT :- Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of this Court in 1966 (2) SCR 626 Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors.; 2007(4) SCC 163 : [2007 ALL SCR 1240] - Chinthamani Ammal v. Nandagopal Gounder and Anr.; 1977(3) SCC 99, Tulasamma and Others v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and 1967 (3) SCR 454, Mangal Singh & Ors. v. Shrimati Rattno & Anr. to contend that Jaichha Kuwar did not become full owner of property as per section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

2. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the counsel for the parties.

3. However in view of the decision of Tulasamma, the widow, namely, Jaichha Kuwar would have to be conferred right of ownership as she was holding the property for the purpose of maintenance and was also in possession of the same, though, her husband died much before 1937.

4. In Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 993 relying on Tulsamma (supra), this court observed:

3. At the outset it was pointed out by Mr. I.N. Shroff, under Counsel for the appellant, that Naraini Devi's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by the decision of this Court in V. Tulasamma and Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi. [1977]3SCR261 and we find that this is so. In the case last mentioned, the facts were these. The husband of Tulasamma died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-brother V. Sesha Reddi. A decree for maintenance was passed in favour of Tulasamma against V. Sesha Reddi on June 29, 1946. On the 30th July 1949, a compromise between the contending parties was certified by the Court executing that decree. Under the compromise, Tulasamma was allotted certain properties in lieu of maintenance, her right being limited to enjoyment thereof coupled with the specific condition that she would not have any right of alienation whatsoever. Tulasamma took possession of those properties and continued to enjoy them till the early sixties. On 12th of April 1960 she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on the 26th of May 1961 made a sale of some others to another person. V. Sesha Reddi filed a suit on July 31, 1961 for a declaration that the alienations made by Tulasamma were not binding on him and could remain valid only so long as she was alive. The basis of the action was that Tulasamma acquired a restricted estate under the terms of the compromise and that her interest could not be enlarged under Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act in view of Sub-Section (2) of that Section The suit was decreed by the trial court whose decision however was reversed in appeal by the District Judge, with a finding that the allotment of properties to Tulasamma by the terms of the compromise had been made in recognition of a "pre-existing" right a finding which was reversed by the High Court, who restored the decree passed by the trial court. The matter came up to this Court in appeal by special leave and Fazal Ali, J., who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus formulated the two points falling for determination:

(1) Whether the instrument of compromise under which the properties were given to the appellant Tulasamma before the Hindu Succession Act in lieu of maintenance falls within Section 14(1) or is covered by Section 14(2) of that Act.

(2) Whether a Hindu widow has a right to property in lieu of her maintenance, and if such a right is conferred on her subsequently by way of maintenance it would amount to mere recognition of a pre-existing right or a conferment of new title so as to fall squarely within Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.

Fazal Ali, J., was of the opinion that the resolution of the dispute made it necessary that the real legal nature of the incidents of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance be considered. He referred to various works by celebrated authors on Hindu Law and in doing so cited passages from 'Digest of Hindu Law' by Colebrooke, 'Hindu Law' by G.S. Sastri, 'Hindu Law and Usage' by Mayne and 'Principles of Hindu Law' by Mulla and came to the conclusion that the widow's right to maintenance, though not an indefeasible right to property, is undoubtedly a "pre-existing" right. A survey of various judicial pronouncements was then undertaken by Fazal Ali, J., and as a consideration thereof he arrived at the following propositions:

(1) A Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow.

(2) Though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e., it is a jus ad rem, not jus in rent, and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court.

(3) The right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance.

(4) The right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 and is therefore, a pre-existing right.

(5) The right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature.

(6) Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make arrangements for her maintenance.

Fazal Ali, J then embarked on a consideration of the scope and meaning of Section 14 of the Act in the light of various pronouncements made by this Court as also of the decisions rendered by various High Courts in relation to the points in dispute. During the course of the discussion he made the following pertinent observations:

It is true that a widow's claim for maintenance does not ripen into a full-fledged right to property, but nevertheless it is undoubtedly right which in certain cases can amount to a right to property where it is charged. It cannot be said that where a property is given to a widow in lieu of maintenance, it is given to her for the first time and not in lieu of a pre-existing right. The claim to maintenance, as also the right to claim property in order to maintain herself, is an inherent right conferred by the Hindu Law and, therefore, any property given to her in lieu of maintenance is merely in recognition of the claim or right which the widow possessed from before. It cannot be said that such a right has been conferred on her for the first time by virtue of the document concerned and before the existence of the document the widow had no vestige of a claim or right at all. Once it is established that the instrument merely recognized the pre-existing right, the widow would acquire absolute interest. Secondly, the Explanation to Section 14(1) merely mentions the various modes by which a widow can acquire a property and the property given in lieu of maintenance is one of the modes mentioned in the Explanation. Sub-section (2) is merely a proviso to Section 14(1) and it cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to destroy the very concept of the right conferred on a Hindu woman under Section 14(1) Sub-section (2) is limited only to those cases where by virtue of a certain grant or disposition a right is conferred on the widow for the first time and the said right is restricted by certain conditions. In other words, even if by a grant or disposition a property is conferred on a Hindu male under certain conditions, the same are binding on the male. The effect of Sub-section (2) is merely to equate male and female in respect of grant conferring a restricted estate.

Finally, Fazal Ali, J. made a reference to Naraini Devi's case (supra) to which he himself was a party (apart from Sarkaria, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court) and in relation thereto made the following observations:

This case is no doubt directly in point and this Court by holding that where under an award an interest is created in favour of a widow that she should be entitled to rent out the property for her life-time, it was held by this Court that this amounted to a restricted estate under Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act. Unfortunately the various aspects, namely, the nature and extent of the Hindu women's right to maintenance, the limited scope of Sub-section (2) which is a proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 and the effect of the Explanation, etc., to which we have adverted in this judgment, were neither brought to our notice nor were argued before us in that case. Secondly, the ground on which this Court distinguished the earlier decision of this Court in Badri Parshad v. Smt. Kanso Devi MANU/SC/0293/1969 : [1970]2SCR95 was that in the aforesaid decision the Hindu widow had a share or interest in the house of her husband under the Hindu Law as it was applicable then, and, therefore, such a share amounted to a pre-existing right. The attention of this Court however, was not drawn to the language of the Explanation to Section 14(1) where a property given to a widow at a partition or in lieu of maintenance had been placed in the same category, and therefore, the reason given by this Court does not appear to be sound. For the reasons that we have already given, after taking an overall view of the situation, we are satisfied that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Naraini Devi's case (supra) was not correctly decided and is therefore overruled.

Summarising the conclusions of law which Fazal Ali, J., reached after an exhaustive consideration of the texts and authorities mentioned by him, he enumerated them thus:

(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of-a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing right.

(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long-needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 supplies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new titles in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or-share to which the female is entitled, the Sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

(5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance", etc., in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes Sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of Sub-section (2).

(6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.

Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.

(7) That the words "restricted estate" used in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.

Applying these principles Fazal Ali, J., held:

(i) that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by the Court;

(ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the properties and there was a clear restriction prohibiting her from alienating the properties;

(iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into force; and

(iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties.

In this view of the matter Fazal Ali, J., allowed the appeal of Tulasamma's legal representatives.

Bhagwati, J. wrote a separate judgment in Tulasamma's case and A. C. Gupta, J., agreed with him. He also allowed the appeal substantially for the same reasons as had weighed with Fazal Ali, J., and in doing so observed:

Now, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides that nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to Sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi MANU/SC/0293/1969 : [1970]2SCR95 . It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of Sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in Sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob Sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by Sub-section (1). The language of Sub-section (2) is apparently wide enough to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate Sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in Sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of Sub-section (1). The Explanation to Sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that Sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property.... The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting Sub-section (2).

Bhagwati, J. laid down the nature of the right which a Hindu widow has to be maintained out of the joint family estate in the following terms:

It is settled law that a widow is entitled to maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate, irrespective whether that estate may be in the hands of his male issue or it may be in the hands of his coparceners. The joint family estate in which her deceased husband had a share is liable for her maintenance and she has a right to be maintained out of the joint family properties and though, as pointed out by this Court in Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram MANU/SC/0295/1969 : [1969]3SCR789 . her claim for maintenance is not a charge upon any joint family property until she has got her maintenance determined and made a specific charge either by agreement or a decree or order of a Court, her right is "not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of her claim or even with notice of the claim unless the transfer was made with the intention of defeating her right". The widow can for the purpose of her maintenance follow the joint family property "into the hands of any one who takes it as a volunteer or with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance". The courts have even gone to the length of taking the view that where a widow is in possession of any specific property for the purpose of her maintenance, a purchaser buying with notice of her claim is not entitled to possession of that property without first securing proper maintenance for her, vide Rachawa and Ors. v. Shivayanappa I.L.R. 18 Bom 679. cited with approval in Ranibai's case (supra). It is, therefore, clear that under the Sastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property and this right would ripen into a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged in the joint family property and even if no specific charge is created, this right would be enforceable against joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rent, since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rent, i.e., a right against the family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her preexisting right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such preexisting right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title. There is also another consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if the instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she would have a limited interest, she would have no more than a limited interest in the property under the Hindu Law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a limited interest in the property would be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case (supra), "merely recording the true legal position" and that would not attract the applicability of Sub-section (2) but would be governed by Sub-section (1) of Section 14.

All the three Judges were thus unanimous in accepting the appeal on the ground that Tulasamma's right to maintenance was a pre-existing right, that it was in recognition of such a right that she obtained property under the compromise and that the compromise therefore did not fall within the ambit of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act but would attract the provisions of Sub-section (1) thereof coupled with the Explanation thereto. With respect we find ourselves in complete agreement with the conclusions arrived at by Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ., as also the reasons which weighed with them in coming to those conclusions.

5. In Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1493, this Court observed:

3. The typical facts in the backdrop of which the problem has to be viewed are:-

(1) A Hindu female acquired a property, say by reason of the death of her husband, before the commencement of the Act (i.e. before June 17, 1956).

(2) What she acquired was a widow's estate as understood in shastric or traditional Hindu Law.

(3) She lost the possession of the property on account of a transaction whereby she transferred the property in favour of an alienee by a registered document of 'sale' or 'gift'.

(4) The property in question was retransferred to her by the said alienee 'after' the enforcement of the Act by a registered document thus restoring to the widow the interest (such as it was) which she had parted with earlier by reversing the original transaction.

It is in this factual background that the question will have to be examined as to whether upon the reconveyance of the very property which she had alienated after enforcement of the Act, she would become a full owner in respect of such a property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act). Be it realized that the law has been settled by this Court that the limited estate or limited ownership of a Hindu female would enlarge into an absolute estate or full ownership of the property in question in the following fact-situation:

1. Where she acquired the limited estate in the property before or after the commencement of the Act provided she was in possession of the property at the time of the coming into force of the Act on June 17, 1956.

2. Even if the property in question was possessed by her in lieu of her right to maintenance as against the estate of her deceased husband or the joint family property, she would be entitled to become a full or absolute owner having regard to the fact that the origin of her right was traceable to the right against her husband's estate.

5. On an analysis of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, it is evident that the Legislature has abolished the concept of limited ownership in respect of a Hindu female and has enacted that any property possessed by her would thereafter be held by her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would come into operation if the property at the point of time when she has an occasion to claim or assert a title thereto. Or, in other words, at the point of time when her right to the said property is called into question. The legal effect of Section 14(1) would be that after the coming into operation of the Act there would be no property in respect of which it could be contended by anyone that a Hindu female is only a limited owner and not a full owner. (We are for the moment not concerned with the fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 14 which provides that Section 14(1) will not prevent creating a restricted estate in favour of a Hindu female either by gift or will or any instrument or decree of a Civil Court or award provided the very document creating title unto her confers a restricted estate on her). There is nothing in Section 14 which supports the proposition that a Hindu female should be in actual physical possession or in constructive possession of any property on the date of the coming into operation of the Act. The expression 'possessed' has been used in the sense of having a right to the property or control over the property. The expression 'any property possessed by a Hindu female whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act' on an analysis yields to the following interpretation:

(1) Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired before the commencement of the Act will be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

(2) Any property possessed by a Hindu female acquired after the commencement of the Act will be held as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Since the Act in terms applies even to properties possessed by a Hindu female which are acquired 'after' the commencement of the Act, it is futile to contend that the Hindu female shall be in 'possession' of the property 'before' the commencement of the Act. If the property itself is acquired 'after' the commencement of the Act, there could be no question of the property being either in physical or constructive possession of the Hindu female 'before' the coming into operation of the Act. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that possession, physical or constructive or in a legal sense, on the date of the coming into operation of the Act is not the sine-qua-non for the acquisition of full ownership in property. In fact, the intention of the Legislature was to do away with the concept of limited ownership in respect of the property owned by a Hindu female altogether. Section 4 of the Act (it needs to be emphasized) provides that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act. The legislative intent is therefore, abundantly loud and clear. To erase the injustice and remove the legal shackles by abolishing the concept of limited estate, or the women's or widow's estate once and for all. To obviate hair-splitting, the Legislature has made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property possessed by a Hindu female, it will be of absolute ownership and not of limited ownership notwithstanding the position obtaining under the traditional Hindu law. Once it is shown that at the point of time when the question regarding title to property held by a Hindu female arises, she was 'possessed' of the property on that date, in the eye of law, the property held by her would be held by her as 'full owner' and not as 'limited owner'. In other words, all that has to be shown by her is that she had acquired the property and that she was 'possessed' of the property at the point of time when her title was called into question. When she bought the property from the alienee to whom she had sold the property prior to the enforcement of the Act, she 'acquired' the property within the meaning of the explanation to Section 14(1) of the Act. The right that the original alienee had to hold the property as owner (subject to his right being questioned by the reversioner on the death of the female Hindu from whom he had purchased the property) was restored to her when she got back the right that she had parted with. Whatever she had lost 'earlier', was 'now' regained by her by virtue of the transaction. The status-quo-ante was restored in respect of her interest in the said property. In the eye of law, therefore, the transaction by which the vendee of the Hindu female acquired an interest in the said property was 'reversed' and the Hindu female was restored to the position prevailing before the transaction took place. In other words, in the eye of law the transaction stood obliterated or effaced. What was 'done' by virtue of the document executed in favour of the transferee was 'undone'. Such would be the consequence of a retransfer by the alienee in favour of a Hindu female from whom he had acquired an interest in the property in question. Thus on the date on which her right to the property was called into question, she was 'possessed' of the property which she had inherited from her husband she having by then re-acquired and regained what she had lost. And by virtue of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act the limitation which previously inhered in respect of the property disappeared upon the coming into operation of the Act. It is no longer open to anyone now to contend that she had only a 'limited' ownership in the said property and not a 'full' ownership, the concept of limited ownership having been abolished altogether, with effect from the coming into operation of the Act."

6. There is a finding recorded by the High Court that the property was recorded in the name of Jaichha Kuwar, who was in possession as on the date when Hindu Succession Act came into force. Thus she was in possession and enjoyment of the property, and there is nothing on record to show that she was dispossessed at any point of time. She has acquired full ownership right over the property in question. Other decisions cited by appellant are quite distinguishable.

7. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

8. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Appeals dismissed.